

BOETHIUS ON
SIGNIFICATION AND MIND

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF STUDIES
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

W.J. VERDENIUS AND J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

VOLUME LII

JOHN MAGEE

BOETHIUS ON
SIGNIFICATION AND MIND



BOETHIUS ON SIGNIFICATION AND MIND

BY

JOHN MAGEE



E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • KØBENHAVN • KÖLN
1989

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Magee, John (John C.)

Boethius on signification and mind / by John Magee.

p. cm. -- (Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687 ; v. 52)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 9004090967

1. Boethius, d. 524. Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias. 2. Aristotle. De interpretatione. 3. Logic.

4. Signification (Logic) 5. Boethius, d. 524--Contributions in logic. I. Title. II. Series.

B439.B643M34 1989

160--dc20

89-37962

CIP

ISSN 0079-1687

ISBN 90 04 09096 7

© Copyright 1989 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

For Shonali

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	IX
Sigla	X
Abbreviations and Editions	XI
Introduction	1
I. Aristotle: <i>Peri Hermeneias</i> I, 16a3–9	7
II. Boethius' Translation	49
III. Orandi Ordo	64
IV. Cogitabilis Oratio	93
Afterword	142
Bibliography	150
Index Locorum	155
Index Nominum et Rerum	162

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professors at the University of Toronto and Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies for their encouragement and support when I undertook to study Boethius' writings: Leonard Boyle, Édouard Jeuneau, John Warden, John Corbett, Edward Synan, Paul Gooch, and Brian Stock, the sponsor of my dissertation. The late Professor Osmund Lewry generously provided assistance on numerous occasions. Professor James Shiel made comments on a draft of the first chapter; Professor Paul Kristeller discussed with me some passages of Plotinus; and Professor James Russell interpreted Armenian and Syriac texts for me. Permission to study MSS. of Aristotle and Ammonius in the following libraries is gratefully acknowledged: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Bibliothèque Nationale. As reader for the series, Professor L.M. De Rijk made helpful suggestions and corrections. I would like to thank Professor Gisela Striker, who generously gave of her time to read an entire draft, and made very valuable philosophical criticisms. Finally, a special debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Leonardo Tarán, for his attentive reading of the entire book, and for his kind assistance on many occasions.

SIGLA

- AL* = *Aristoteles Latinus*
ASTH = *Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science III: Studies in the History of Linguistics*
CAG = *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*
CCL = *Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina*
CLCAG = *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*
CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*
DK = H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., Berlin, 1951 – 52
DL = Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum*, ed. H.S. Long, 2 vols., Oxford, 1964
GG = *Grammatici Graeci*
LSJ = Liddle, Scott, Jones, et al., *A Greek-English Lexicon*
MGH = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*
OLD = *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P.G.W. Glare
PG = *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca*
PL = *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina*
SVF = H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1903 – 24

ABBREVIATIONS AND EDITIONS

Alexander of Aphrodisias

—*De An., Mant.* = *Praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora. De Anima Liber cum Mantissa*, ed. I. Bruns. Berlin, 1887. *CAG* Suppl. 2.1. (The authorship of these works has been questioned.)

Ammonius

—*In An. Pr.* = *In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium*, ed. M. Wallies. Berlin, 1899. *CAG* 4.6.

—*In Cat.* = *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius*, ed. A. Busse. Berlin, 1895. *CAG* 4.4.

—*In de Int.* = *In Aristotelis de Interpretatione Commentarius*, ed. A. Busse. Berlin, 1897. *CAG* 4.5. Trans. Moerbeke: *Ammonius: Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. G. Verbeke. Louvain-Paris, 1961. *CLCAG* 2.

Aristotle (All works, including those not listed below, are cited according to page, column and line numbers of the Prussian Academy edition.)

—*Cat., PeriH.* = *Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford, 1949.

—*De An.* = *De Anima*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1956; rev. with comm. 1961.

—*Fragmenta*, ed. V. Rose. 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1886. *Fragmenta Selecta*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1955.

—*GA* = *De Generatione Animalium*, ed. H.J.D. Lulofs. Oxford, 1965.

—*GC* = *On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away (De Generatione et Corruptione)*, ed. and comm., H.H. Joachim. Oxford, 1922.

—*Meta.* = *Metaphysics*, ed. and comm., W.D. Ross. 2 vols. Oxford, 1924; rpt. with corr. 1953. Ed. W. Jaeger. Oxford, 1957.

—*NE* = *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. I. Bywater. Oxford, 1894.

—*Parva Naturalia*, ed. and comm., W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1955.

—*Phys.* = *Physics*, ed. and comm., W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1936; rev. text 1950.

—*Poet.* = *De Arte Poetica*, ed. R. Kassel. Oxford, 1965.

—*PrAn., PAn.* = *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, ed. and comm., W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1949; rpt. with corr. 1957.

—*Rht.* = *Ars Rhetorica*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1959.

—*Sph. El.* = *Sophistici Elenchi*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford, 1958.

Augustine, St

—*Conf.* = *Confessiones*, ed. M. Skutella. Leipzig, 1934; rpt. with corr. Stuttgart, 1969.

—*Civ. Dei* = *De Civitate Dei Libri XXII*, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1927/8.

—*De Dialectica*, ed. J. Pinborg; trans. and comm., B.D. Jackson. Dordrecht-Boston, 1975. Synthese Historical Library 16.

—*Div. Quaest.* = *De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus*, ed. A. Mutzenbecher. 2 vols. Turnholt, 1975. *CCL* 44.

—*Doct. Xr.* = *De Doctrina Christiana. PL* 34 (= *CSEL* 80; *CCL* 32).

—*De Mus.* = *De Musica. PL* 32.

—*Trin.* = *De Trinitate Libri XV*, ed. W.J. Mountain. 2 vols. Turnholt, 1968. *CCL* 50.

—*Gen ad Litt.* = *De Genesi ad Litteram. PL* 34 (= *CSEL* 28.1).

—*Lib. Arb.* = *De Libero Arbitrio Libri Tres*, ed. W.M. Green. Turnholt, 1970. *CCL* 29, *pars* 2.2.

—*Mag.* = *De Magistro Liber Unus*, ed. K.-D. Daur. Turnholt, 1970. *CCL* 29, *pars* 2.2.

Boethius

—*CPh.* = *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Philosophiae Consolatio*, ed. L. Bieler. Turnholt, 1957;

rpt. 1984. CCL 94.1. I have sometimes consulted as well the editions of: Wm. Weinberger, Vienna-Leipzig, 1934 (= CSEL 67); K. Büchner, 3rd ed., Heidelberg, 1977; A. Fortescue, London, 1925; rpt. Hildesheim-NY, 1976.

—*Div.* = *Liber de Divisione*. PL 64. Cf. also: L. Pozzi, text, trans. and comm., *Boezio: Trattato sulla Divisione*. Padua, 1969; P.M. de Loe, ed., *B. Alberti Magni Commentarii in Librum Boethii de Divisione*. Bonn, 1913.

—*Hyp. Syll.* = *De Hypotheticis Syllogismis*, ed., trans. ad comm., L. Obertello. Brescia, 1969.

—*In Cat.* = *In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quattuor*. PL 64. (The text in Migne is very unreliable, but there is no critical edition of this work yet.)

—*In Isag.* = *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii in Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, ed. S. Brandt. Vienna-Leipzig, 1906; rpt. NY-London, 1966. CSEL 48.

—*In Perih.* = *Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ*, ed. C. Meiser. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1877/80; rpt. NY-London, 1987.

—*Inst. Ar.* = *De Institutione Arithmetica Libri Duo*, ed. G. Friedlein. Leipzig, 1867; rpt. Frankfurt, 1966.

—*In Top. Cic.* = *In Topica Ciceronis Commentariorum Libri Sex*. PL 64.

—*Intr. Syll. Cat.* = *Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos*. PL 64.

—*Syll. Cat.* = *De Categoricis Syllogismis Libri Duo*. PL 64.

—*Top. Diff.* = *De Differentiis Topicis Libri Quattuor*. PL 64.

The following works are cited according to chapter (where applicable), page and line numbers of the revised Loeb edition of H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand and S.J. Tester: *Boethius: The Theological Tracts; The Consolation of Philosophy*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.-London, 1973:

—*Eut.* = *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*.

—*Fid. Cath.* = *De Fide Catholica*.

—*Hebd.* = *De Hebdomadibus: Quomodo Substantiae In Eo Quod Sint Bonae Sint Cum Non Sint Substantialia Bona*.

—*Pat.* = *Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de Divinitate Substantialiter Praedicentur*.

—*Trin.* = *De Trinitate: Liber Quomodo Trinitas Unus Deus Ac Non Tres Dii*.

Boethius' translations of Aristotle are cited according to volume, page and line numbers of the appropriate volumes of *Aristoteles Latinus* (= AL).

[Boethius]

—*Post. An. Int.* = *Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis Interpretatio*. PL 64.

Calcidius

—*In Tim.* = *Timaeus a Calcidio Translatus Commentarioque Instructus*, ed. J.H. Waszink. London-Leiden, 1962. *Plato Latinus* 4.

Cicero

—*Acad.* = *Academicorum Reliquiae cum Lucullo*, ed. O. Plasberg. Leipzig, 1922.

—*Att.* = *Epistulae ad Atticum: Cicero's Letters to Atticus*, ed., trans. and comm., D.R.S. Bailey. 7 vols. with index. Cambridge, 1965–70.

—*Div., Fat.* = *De Divinatione, De Fato*, ed. R. Giomini. Leipzig, 1975.

—*Fin.* = *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Libri V*, ed. T. Schiche. Leipzig, 1915.

—*Inv.* = *Rhetorici Libri Duo Qui Vocantur de Inventione*, ed. E. Stroebel. Leipzig, 1915.

—*Lgg.* = *De Legibus*, ed. C.F.W. Mueller. Leipzig, 1898.

—*ND* = *De Natura Deorum*, ed. W. Ax. 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1933.

—*Off.* = *De Officiis*, edd. O. Plasberg and W. Ax. Leipzig, 1949.

—*Rpb.* = *De Re Publica*, ed. K. Ziegler. Leipzig, 1959.

—*Top.* = *Topica*, ed. A.S. Wilkins. Oxford, 1903.

—*Tusc.* = *Tusculanae Disputationes*, ed. M. Pohlenz. Leipzig, 1918.

Dexippus

—*In Cat.* = *In Aristotelis Categorias Dubitationes et Solutiones*, ed. A. Busse. Berlin, 1888. *CAG* 4.2.

Dionysius Thrax

—*Ars Grammatica*, ed. G. Uhlig. Leipzig, 1883. *GG* 1.1.

Festus

—*Sexti Pompei Festi de Verborum Significatu Quae Supersunt cum Pauli Epitome*, ed. W.M. Lindsay. Leipzig, 1913.

Firmicus Maternus

—*De Errore Profanarum Religionum*, ed., trans. and comm., G. Heuten. Brussels, 1938.

Isadore of Seville

—*Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri XX*, ed. W.M. Lindsay. 2 vols. Oxford, 1911.

John of Salisbury

—*Ioannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Carnotensis Metalogicon Libri IV*, ed. C.C.I. Webb. Oxford, 1929.

Macrobius

—*Sat.*, *In Somn. Sc.* = *Saturnalia; Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1970.

Olympiodorus

—*Proleg. et in Cat.* = *Prolegomena et in Categorias Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse. Berlin, 1902. *CAG* 12.1.

Philoponus

—*In de An.* = *In Aristotelis de Anima Libros Commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin, 1897. *CAG* 15. (The third book of this commentary is commonly believed to be by Stephanus.) Trans. Moerbeke: *Jean Philopon: Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. G. Verbeke. Louvain-Paris, 1966. *CLCAG* 3.

Plato

—*Platonis Opera*, ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols. Oxford, 1900–07.

Plotinus

—*Enn.* = *Plotini Opera*, edd. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer. Editio Maior. 3 vols. Paris-Brussels-Leiden, 1951–73.

Porphry

—*Isag.*, *In Cat.* = *Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium: Expositio per Interrogationem et Responsionem*, ed. A. Busse. Berlin, 1887. *CAG* 4.1.

—*Opuscula Selecta*, ed. A. Nauck. Leipzig, 1886; rpt. Hildesheim-NY, 1977.

Proclus Diadochus

—*Elements* = *ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ: The Elements of Theology*, ed., trans. and comm., E.R. Dodds. 2nd ed. Oxford, 1963.

—*In Rpb.* = *In Platonis Rem Publicam Commentarii*, ed. Wm. Kroll. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1899/1901; rpt. Amsterdam, 1965.

—*In Tim.* = *In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1903–06; rpt. Amsterdam, 1965.

Quintilian

—*Institutionis Oratoriae Libri XII*, ed. M.W. Winterbottom. 2 vols. Oxford, 1970.

Seneca

—*Ep.* = *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*, ed. L.D. Reynolds. 2 vols. Oxford, 1965.

Sextus Empiricus

—*AM, PH* = *Adversus Mathematicos, Pyrrhoneioi Hypotyposeis*, ed. H. Mutschmann, rev. J. Mau, indices K. Janáček. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1912–62.

Simplicius

—*In Cat.* = *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. C. Kalbfleisch. Berlin, 1907. *CAG* 8.

—*In de An.* = *In Libros Aristotelis de Anima Commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin 1882. *CAG* 11. (The authorship of this work has been questioned.)

Sophonias

—*In de An.* = *In Libros Aristotelis de Anima Paraphrasis*, ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin, 1883. *CAG* 23.1.

Stephanus

—*In de Int.* = *In Librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione Commentarius*, ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin, 1885. *CAG* 18.3.

Themistius

—*In de An.* = *In Libros Aristotelis de Anima Paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze. Berlin, 1899. *CAG* 5.3.

Thomas Aquinas, St

—*In Peri H.* = *In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio*, ed. R.M. Spiazzi. Rome, 1955.

INTRODUCTION

The following is a study of Boethius' thought on signification which attempts to situate that thought historically and to evaluate it philosophically. Its justification is found in the present lack of any systematic examination of the subject,¹ and in the intrinsic importance of that subject for the history of later ancient and especially of medieval thought. It is frequently the case that medievalists will have read Boethius' philosophical works with an eye only to subsequent developments; those classicists who bother with him at all will probably have done so out of an interest (one which shows signs of increasing) in investigating the very last stages in the history of ancient learning. That Boethius has sometimes run afoul of misunderstandings originating on both sides of the academic fence can, I believe, be explained in part by the fact that his work as both commentator *and* translator sets him somewhat apart in the history of ancient commentary on Aristotle. As a commentator, he has tended to be ignored by those classical scholars who are accustomed to the massive and weighty Greek commentaries from the likes of Alexander (late 2nd-early 3rd c. AD) and Simplicius (6th c. AD). As a translator, he has sometimes obscured, for the medievalists not working in the Greek tradition of commentary (as indeed for the many medieval writers who depended upon his translations), the prehistory of certain ideas expressed during the course of his commentaries on the texts of what in the Middle Ages came to be known as the *logica vetus*.

In a work with aims as limited as those adopted here it has not been possible to reexamine in definitive fashion the many questions that concern Boethius' precise sources, not to mention his influence upon the Middle Ages. Rather, one can propose to investigate in the light of a specific topic Boethius' methods and his thought as witnessed first in his translation, and then in his commentary, that is, to follow him through the different stages of his work. This has been the guiding principle behind the chapters which follow. That signification was a subject of deep concern to medieval thinkers is a claim that will hardly require defending; a close analysis of Boethius' contribution to the problem will, I hope, shed some light *per accidens* upon later developments. It may also clarify some of the issues which concern Boethius' relationship to what had been done previously.

The present work is divided into four chapters, taking as its starting

¹ There are two valuable studies by L.M. De Rijk, as well as a short article by K. Berka. Beyond this, however, very little has come to my attention.

point the lines of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* around which Boethius' theory of signification turns. The first chapter of the study plunges *in medias res*, and for that the reader's patience is requested. The Greek text is both difficult and compressed, and necessarily brings into consideration questions of the history of transmission and commentary, as well as numerous aspects of Aristotle's thought both in this and in other works. But since Boethius translated either all or part of the *Peri Hermeneias* before commenting upon it, and then revised the translation for the second commentary; and since in his translation, as in all translations, there is an element of "commentary" upon the meaning of the original, it has been thought necessary to come to a clear understanding of what Aristotle wrote before proceeding to the translation and commentaries. After careful examination of the Greek passage and of the questions it poses, there follows in the second chapter an analysis of Boethius' Latin translation of the same, and of the interpretation implicitly contained therein. The third and fourth chapters treat of Boethius' commentaries on the passage, as seen from two points of view: (a) from the way in which Boethius thinks Aristotle to have disposed or ordered the four things (*res, intellectus, vox, litterae*) laid down in the context of the doctrine of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–9; (b) from the point of view of the theory of cognition Boethius develops in support of the above. The question Boethius ultimately poses for our consideration is: How are the operations of the passive mind converted into words and statements that can be spoken aloud? If his commentaries allow no certain answer to this question, important ground will nevertheless have been gained in studying carefully the way in which Boethius introduces the problem, and then in suggesting the solution which seems most consistent with what is said in his commentaries.

A few words concerning Boethius' sources and his knowledge of Greek philosophy are advisable here. It now seems to be generally accepted, although some will perhaps disagree, that when Theodoric is reported by Cassiodorus as writing to Boethius:

Atheniensium scholas longe positus [positas: *Obbarius*] introisti,²

he does not mean that Boethius actually studied at Athens, but that he has mastered the teachings of the Athenian school *despite* his distance from that city. As concerns Courcelle's thesis that Boethius as a young man studied in Alexandria, the putative parallels extracted from the *Peri Hermeneias* commentary of Ammonius (dates below, n. 6) present conflicting or at any rate inconclusive evidence, because (a) they are not all true

² Var. I.45.3 = *MGH Auct. Ant.* I.12.40,6; *CCL* 96.49,17f.

parallels (e.g., Andronicus' *athetesis*), while (b) those few that are (e.g., the doctrine of the "two necessities") could just as well have been culled from a commentary which is no longer extant, most probably from Porphyry (ca. 232–305 AD), and (c) many sections of Boethius' commentaries are obviously constructed along lines of argument quite different from those witnessed in Ammonius (e.g., divisions of *kephalaia* and *tmemata*). Although the rather limited scope of the present study has not permitted extensive investigation of the question of Boethius' sources, it seems to me that James Shiel has repeatedly drawn attention to a point deserving the most serious consideration, namely, that Boethius' access to information concerning the earliest commentators on the *Peri Hermeneias* was not only very limited, but probably second-hand. Given the relative obscurity surrounding the history of the codex before the fourth century and the absence of extant sixth-century codices with scholia such as those Shiel postulates, and given the possibility that even the Biblical marginalia whose invention is associated with Procopius of Gaza (ca. 460-ca. 530) were the forebears of medieval rather than the descendants of classical scholia, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that Boethius probably owned a copy of Porphyry's commentary rather than *only* a single Greek codex of Aristotle which was heavily annotated with material from Porphyry and subsequent commentators. This assumption is very difficult either to prove or to disprove, but Boethius gives no evidence of being incapable of selecting and organizing material such as would have been available at least in Porphyry's commentary.³ If I do not proceed according to the assumption that the scholia theory has been securely established yet for the whole of the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries, I must nevertheless acknowledge at the outset the importance not only of many of Shiel's findings, but of his approach to the problem in general.⁴ Shiel has made it clear that answers to the question of Boethius' sources will come only after detailed and

³ Nor does Shiel imply that he was incapable in this respect; he argues that Boethius' material was restricted to the scholia (in a single codex, probably of Athenian provenance) which were copied along with the treatises of the Organon. Although it is possible that such scholia came into being shortly after the invention of the codex and were in use even in the fourth or fifth centuries, the extant examples (e.g. Vat. Urbina Gr. 35, 9th c.) are of a much later period.

⁴ Since my discussion is limited to such a small portion of the treatise on which Boethius comments, I have attempted not to over-generalize about his sources. This is to say that the determination of the question of sources requires systematic philosophical and philological analysis of every stage of translation and commentary for each of the treatises on which Boethius wrote, followed by detailed comparison with the evidence presented in the extant commentaries of other authors. This is an immense undertaking. Shiel, who has written on Boethius for some thirty years, has contributed much by putting some far too facile assumptions in question on the basis of close examination of the Boethian texts themselves.

systematic examination of the manner in which the translations and commentaries were composed. With the publication of the relevant volumes of *Aristoteles Latinus* many of the necessary tasks may now be approached. That Porphyry does in fact stand behind Boethius' comments is confirmed by two points in my discussion, where differences of opinion between Herminius (2nd c. AD) and Alexander are put to rest according to Porphyry's pronouncements. That Porphyry's commentary was directly available to Boethius has, however, been challenged by Shiel, and not without some controversy. For to deprive Boethius of the rich *bibliotheca*, the *certissima sedes* (*CPh.* I.4,3) which tradition, long enamored of the inspiring image of a scholar surrounded by a hostile world filled with more learned books than learned men, has ascribed to Boethius, has proved difficult for some to accept. But had Shiel's theory not been raised for consideration, modern scholarship might well have continued unquestioningly to attribute to Boethius an almost unlimited knowledge of many ancient literary and philosophical works which in fact he probably did not read first-hand. In the case of the double commentary *In Peri Hermeneian* it is indeed difficult to ascertain precisely Boethius' source(s): that he owned copies of Andronicus (1st c. BC), Aspasius (ca. 100 – 150 AD), Herminius or Alexander is extremely unlikely; the references to Syrianus (d. before 438)⁵ will obviously not have come from Porphyry; the silence surrounding Proclus (AD 410/2 – 485) would be expected even if there were any possibility of knowing for certain that Boethius had access to published versions of his lecture on the treatise. But if Boethius studied first-hand the teachings of even Syrianus and Proclus on Aristotle's treatise, we may well ask why his doxographies, despite their prolixity (Boethius can stretch out a long explanation on the basis of only a few words reported concerning an ancient authority), often convey the impression of being based upon information which is highly compressed. Conciseness is not one of Boethius' virtues—some points will be laboriously explained many times over in his commentaries; if more complete or more numerous accounts of the opinions of, say, Herminius, Aspasius and Alexander had been accessible to him, one can only think that Boethius would have made that fact abundantly clear, and that his already very long second commentary would only have been longer still. And yet if we assume that Boethius relied primarily upon Porphyry, it ought nevertheless to be quite clear that he supplemented him with some source which periodically made reference to Syrianus. It is difficult to speculate about the nature of this

⁵ *In Perih.* II.18,26; II.87,30; II.172,13; II.321,21; II.324,15. This must hold also in the case of Boethius' references to Iamblichus (d. ca. 330 AD; e.g. *In Cat.* 162a, via Theophrastus [AD 317–88]).

source since no clear evidence for it survives, but it is here that the scholia theory proves most attractive. Furthermore, in the case of *Peri Hermeneias*, chapter 14, for which Porphyry evidently wrote no commentary at all and in commenting upon which Boethius did not follow Syrianus, it may be that scholia did indeed provide the basic source material.

As to the question of possible Stoic influences, the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries seem to indicate once again that Porphyry's transmission of material was of considerable importance. What Boethius says concerning mind and the production of meaningful, articulated spoken sounds is difficult to trace to a specific Stoic source, but it is very probable that Cicero and Seneca provided many Latin expressions and concepts that were ultimately of Stoic provenance.

In considering, in the final chapter and Afterword, the Neoplatonic influences upon Boethius' thought, matters prove even more difficult to assess, not only because of the rather incohesive nature of the evidence on Boethius' side, but because of the difficulty involved in distinguishing consistently the different strains of thought that run among the Neoplatonists themselves. The *Philosophiae Consolatio* is clearly the work of a mind steeped in Neoplatonism, if not in an easily identifiable school of Neoplatonists. It is also a work which gives the impression of having been shaped by much more diverse reading than informs the logical commentaries. In this respect, Klingner's arguments in favor of Boethius' knowledge of some Platonic dialogues and of Proclus' *In Timaeum* seem to me still to warrant serious attention, although the last word on the subject is yet to be pronounced, and recently Stephen Gersh has given preference, perhaps rightly, to seeing a more Porphyrian orientation in Boethius' metaphysics.

Those instances in which earlier authors (especially Ammonius) have been cited or referred to in the critical notes are not all intended to imply, of course, that Boethius there relies upon them as his sources, nor that we can assume he has read them. They are meant primarily to serve, as also with the citations of later authors such as Simplicius, Philoponus (ca. 490 – 570), Stephanus (below, n. 6), etc., as points of comparison—in certain cases, the only surviving ones—which may help to illustrate the general direction of Boethius' thought. Ammonius invites frequent comparison (and here Courcelle was too easily misled) primarily because his is the only fully extant commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias* which could possibly have been written before those of Boethius, while Stephanus' version is apparently derivative of Ammonius, although perhaps with some influence from Galen as well.⁶

⁶ L. Tarán, ed., *Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione* (Codex Parisinus

Graecus 2064), (Meisenheim am Glan, 1978): Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie 95, p. ix, n. 12. On Ammonius, see L.G. Westerink, ed., trans., intro., *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1962), pp. x-xiii: Ammonius was born sometime before 445 and died between 517–26; Boethius' dates are ca. 480–524/25. It is impossible to say whether Ammonius composed his commentary before Boethius composed his two commentaries, i.e., before ca. 513–16. On Stephanus, see R. Vancourt, *Les derniers commentateurs alexandrins d'Aristote: l'école d'Olympiodore, Étienne d'Alexandrie* (Lille, 1941), p. 26ff. Vancourt places Stephanus in Alexandria before 618/9, where he probably composed his commentary. It is possible that he was a student of Olympiodorus (b. 495–505, d. after 565), or that he was influenced by him indirectly through David or Elias. There seems no reason to doubt that he was the author of the commentary attributed to Philoponus on the third book of Aristotle's *De Anima*, which follows "Plutarch" on the vexed question of the "agent intellect." There are, however, some similarities between Stephanus' exposition of the problem and the Latin translation of Philoponus' genuine commentary (ed. G. Verbeke, Louvain-Paris, 1966: *CLCAG* 3). Vancourt appears certain that Stephanus means Plutarch of Chaeroneia (1st c. AD) rather than Plutarch of Athens (d. 431/2 AD), although he cites no evidence whatsoever in support of this view.

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE: *PERI HERMENEIAS* I, 16a3–9

ΠΕΡΙ ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ I, 16a3–9

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθη-
μάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ.
16a5 καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ
αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταῦτα πᾶσι πα-
θήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα
ἤδη ταῦτά. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυ-
χῆς, —ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας—

³ μὲν οὖν *ABCRdnΔΣΓα*^{lw} : μὲν *om.* ζ^l : μὲν δὴ *transfert Hoffmann apud π*^l

⁵ οὐδὲ² *ABdn*^l*ΔΓα*^(c) : οὕτως οὐδὲ *CRnΛα*^{(c)β}^{lc} : καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲ Σ

⁶ ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων *Ra*^w (τ. σημ. α^{(l)χ(c)π}), πρ. α^{(p)βpςp} *lectionem novit* (?) *Olympiodorus teste Georgio* : ταῦτα σημεῖα τῶν πρώτων (Δ) : ταῦτα πρώτων σημεῖα *Λβ*^{lc} : τούτων σημεῖα πρώτων (Δ) Γ : ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτον *R²dnα*^{(c)ζ}^l : ταῦτα τὰ σημεῖα πρώτον α^(l) : ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως *ABR*²(πρ. *superscr.*), *n²α*^{(l)χ(c)} (πρ. α^{(p)ςc}) : σημεῖα ταῦτα πρώτως *Ca*^{(l)(c)} : ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτον *vel* πρώτως *lectionem novit* (?) *Olympiodorus teste Georgio* : σημεῖα ταῦτα πρώτον *vel* πρώτως Σ(σημ. τ. π^l, πρ. *vel* πρ. π^{lcπ})

ταῦτά *ABCRdn²ΔΣΛπ*^{lα}*lcπβ*^{lcπς}^l : ταῦτα *nΓ Herminius teste Boethio*

⁷ ταῦτα *A*¹(*ut vid.*), *BCRdnΔΣΛΓα*^{lcβ}^{(l)ε}*π*^{lς}^l : ταῦτά *A*(*ut vid.*), β^(l) *Alex. Aphrod. teste Boethio*

⁸ ταῦτά *AB*^l*CRdn*(Δ)*ΛΣΓπ*^{lρα}*lcπβ*^{lcπς}^l : ταῦτα *B*(Δ) *Herminius testibus Ammonio et Boethio*

⁸⁻⁹ περὶ . . . πραγματείας *post ἀληθές* (13) *poni vult Maior*

⁹ πραγματείας *ABCRn*^l*ΔΛ*, ?*Γα*^{(l)β}^{lc} : πραγματείας τοῦτο *da*^(l), ?*Γ* : πραγματείας ταῦτα Σ : τοῦτο πραγματείας α^(l) : ταῦτα πραγματείας *n, n²α*^(l)

SIGLA

A = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 35, ff. 54v–55r (saec. IX sub finem vel X ineuntis)

B = Venetus Marcianus Gr. Z. 201 (coll. 780), f. 26v (954)

C = Parisinus Coislinianus Gr. 330, f. 43r (saec. XI)

R = Vaticanus Barberianus Gr. 87, ff. 35v–36r (saec. IX vel X)

d = Laurentianus Pl. 72.5, f. 50rv (saec. X dim. sec.)

n = Ambrosianus Gr. 490 (olim L 93 sup.), f. 60v (saec. IX vel X)

Δ = translatio Armenia, olim Davidi adscripta (saec. V)

Σ = translatio Syra anonyma (? saec. VII, e Graeco exemplari saec. VI antiquiore)

Λ = translatio Latina Boethii (ca. 510)

Γ = translatio Syra Georgii (d. 724)

- π = commentarius Probi (? saec. V)
 α = commentarius Ammonii (saec. V dim. sec. vel VI)
 α^w = translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka (1268)
 β = commentarii Boethii (ca. 513–16)
 ς = commentarius Stephani (? ante 618/19)

A, B, etc. = lectio originalis in *A, B, etc.*
A¹, B¹, etc. = correctio scribae in *A, B, etc.*
A², B², etc. = correctio manus recentioris in *A, B, etc.*

π^{lp} , α^{lp} , etc. = lemma, citatio, paraphrasis in π , α , etc.

- ? = fortasse
 ... = usque ad
 () = codices vel loci non omnes

It is necessary for us to begin with the first chapter of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias*, lines (16a)3–9. As the common starting point for virtually all medieval theories of semantics, this passage proved extremely influential also in the history of logic of that period, when it was widely believed to contain Aristotle's theory of signification or meaning. The Greek text, apparatus and sigla have been printed immediately above.¹ Minio-Paluello's *apparatus criticus* in four instances (lines 6–8) provides information which is pertinent to the present discussion. Three of these present relatively little difficulty, and may be clarified directly. They concern the readings ταῦτα/ταῦτά, 16a6–8, from which we gain valuable information concerning the earliest commentators. It will be best to discuss these before proceeding.²

¹ I have studied by autopsy MSS. A B C R d and n (studied but not collated = E G K e g i q). These six primary witnesses are conveniently described by Montanari (I.54–61). Not all of Minio-Paluello's readings are correct, and since his apparatus is negative it is impossible to infer from it what is in, among others, A and C. Montanari's apparatus is positive, and provides information also for the MSS. of Ammonius. Since I have not made a critical edition of the treatise, I have studied only MSS. A F and G of Ammonius in one or two places, relying otherwise on Montanari and Busse as far as possible. For the Syriac and Armenian I have had to rely upon Hoffmann, Furlani, Conybeare, Minio-Paluello and Montanari, with assistance from Prof. James Russell of Columbia University. I differ from Montanari in, among others, the following places: At 5 the scribe of n apparently expunges οὕτως. At 6 Stephanus' lemma reads τὰ αὐτὰ πᾶσι, etc. I report information for 7 because I think Boethius' information concerning Alexander to be genuine. At 6 evidently Δ cod. Tic. and Γ have Armenian and Syriac forms equivalent to τοῦτων σημεῖα, although Conybeare and Furlani seem to think that these may be corruptions in the translations rather than in their exemplars. At 8 Δ has the Armenian equivalent of ταῦτά only in Jerus. 1291 and the codex Ticinus (cf. Conybeare). At 9 the scribe of n expunges ταῦτα, which is overwritten by the corrector.

² In what follows, I have not concentrated on the MSS. readings for these lines

Papyrus evidence indicates that before Aristophanes of Byzantium punctuation symbols were used for Greek written in continuous script, although it is clear that punctuation was the exception rather than the rule; but that Aristophanes invented a system of accentuation seems to be generally accepted. Accents are not found in early Ptolemaic papyri, and there is no evidence of their use before Aristophanes. Indeed, accentuation seems to have become a normal practice only in the early Middle Ages. Pfeiffer maintains that lectional marks were the concern more of scribes and correctors than of scholars;³ but in the cases we are about to discuss it is clear (a) that the written accents were of concern at least to the commentators Herminius and Alexander, and (b) that since the unaccented text of what Aristotle originally wrote was ambiguous, it was therefore open to interpretation. Since the ambiguity affected the sense of the passage, it became a matter for *philosophical* criticism. Now Boethius reports that for 16a6–8 Herminius and Alexander proposed ταῦτα (παθήματα/πράγματα) and ταῦτᾶ (ὁμοιώματα) in place of ταῦτά and ταῦτα, respectively.⁴ Alexander read ταῦτᾶ ὁμοιώματα at 16a7, arguing that Aristotle's primary intention is to differentiate γράμματα and φωναί (which are significant by convention, and therefore not "the same for all"), from ὁμοιώματα and πράγματα (which are natural, and therefore "the same for all").⁵ In drawing out the antithesis, so Alexander appears

primarily because the testimony of scribes in such cases is of far less value and interest than that of the commentators. Apart from orthography (ταῦτά, τὰ αὐτά), the primary witnesses are remarkably consistent. Minio-Paluello reports ταῦτα as a variant in B (16a8) without drawing attention to the fact that it was corrected to ταῦτά by the scribe. The ταῦτα Montanari reports for n (app. cr. ad loc. 16a6) is indeed correct, and was missed by Minio-Paluello. The smooth breathing and grave accent (ταῦτᾶ) are corrections. The only observation I add is that in A the ταῦτα of 16a7 seems to preserve a grave accent over the final alpha (ταῦτᾶ), which may indicate that the scribe originally wrote ταῦτά but then corrected his mistake.

³ See, R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship I: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 178–80.

⁴ *In Perih.* I.40,25: est alia quoque scriptura hoc modo sese habens: "quorum autem hae [codices; haec: Meiser emend.] primorum notae, hae omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam hae" [Herminius]; II.37,30: sed hic duplex lectio est. Alexander enim hoc modo legi putat oportere: "quorum autem hae [codices; haec: Meiser emend.] primorum notae, eadem omnibus passiones animae et quorum eadem similitudines, res etiam eadem;" II.39,25: Herminius vero huic est expositioni contrarius. dicit enim non esse verum eosdem apud omnes homines esse intellectus, quorum voces significativae sint. quid enim, inquit, in aequivocatione dicitur, ubi unus idemque vocis modus plura significat? sed magis hanc lectionem veram putat, ut ita sit: "quorum autem hae [? hae] primorum notae, hae omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam hae:" ut demonstratio videatur quorum voces significativae sint vel quorum passiones animae similitudines.

⁵ *In Perih.* II.38,3: volens enim Aristoteles ea quae positione significant ab his quae

to have held, ὁμοιώματα, following the expression, ταῦτα . . . παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (16a6–7) and taken in coordination with πράγματα . . . ταῦτά (16a7–8), accurately represents Aristotle's meaning only if read ὁξύτόνως ("the same," ταῦτά). Boethius reports Alexander's position, but in the following section of his own commentary (cf. below) uses instead the Latin phrase, *hae* (not *eaedem*) *similitudines*, for the Greek of 16a7.⁶ According to Waitz, Alexander outran the meaning of Aristotle's words; for Aristotle is not demonstrating that "the same" likenesses are of "the same" things, but only that the πράγματα which cause impressions in the soul have their foundation in nature, and are therefore "the same for all."⁷

Boethius says that Herminius, on the other hand, understood ταῦτα (*hae*) in place of ταῦτά (*eaedem*) at 16a6/8, and argued that the mental impressions (= *intellectus*) which spoken sounds are said to signify are not in fact "the same for all." That is, some words are equivocal, and prompt more than one concept or thought in the minds of those who hear them. According to Herminius' interpretation, the passage is therefore to be understood with this restriction: Aristotle means only that those things which are signified by spoken sounds are mental impressions (and not necessarily "the same" mental impressions), and that those things whose likenesses are conceived in thought are actual things (and not necessarily "the same" things).⁸ Like Boethius, Ammonius attests Herminius' reading of ταῦτα in place of ταῦτά at 16a8, but "replaces" the circumflex with the accute accent. Aristotle, he explains, is distinguishing that which is natural and "the same for all" (νοήματα, πράγματα) from that which is artificial and not "the same for all" (γράμματα, φωναί), and that requires ταῦτά. Unlike Boethius, however, Ammonius does not record Alexander's opinion, although his own view is in accord with the argument that

aliquid designant naturaliter segregare hoc interposuit: ea quae positione significant varia esse, ea vero quae naturaliter apud omnes eadem.

⁶ *In Perih.* II.39,9: nec vero in hoc constitit, ut de solis vocibus atque intellectibus loqueretur, sed quoniam voces atque litteras non esse naturaliter constitutas per id significavit, quod eas non apud omnes easdem esse proposuit, rursus intellectus quos animae passiones vocat per hoc esse naturales ostendit, quod apud omnes idem sint, a quibus id est intellectibus ad res transitum fecit. ait enim, "quorum *hae* similitudines, res etiam *eaedem*," etc.

⁷ T. Waitz, ed. and comm., *Aristotelis Organon Graece*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1844), I.325–26 (16a6): "Lectionem vulgarem et codices tuentur omnes et vet. intp. lat.: quare neque obtemperandum erit Alexandro pro ταῦτα vs. 7 scribenti ταῦτά, neque Hermino ταῦτά vs. 6 mutant in ταῦτα . . . Namque si Herminum sequimur, tollitur membrorum oppositio, quam particula μέντοι indicat, si Alexandrum, universe proferuntur (καὶ ὃν ταῦτά ὁμοιώματα) quae hoc loco non nisi de iis quibus animus afficiatur (περὶ τῶν παθημάτων τῆς ψυχῆς) et dicta esse debent et re vera dicta sunt.

⁸ Migne's text (412c11) is corrupt: res etiam *eaedem* (above, n. 4). Meiser's *res etiam hae* (I.40,28; II.39,33) is obviously what Boethius, in paraphrasing Herminius, wrote.

Boethius attributes to Alexander. We may be certain (were proof still required) that here Boethius is not following Ammonius, since Ammonius never raises the issue of equivocity, nor does he propose ταῦτα (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, a6–7) with explicit reference to Herminus.⁹ Waitz too comments on Herminus' reading.¹⁰ The balanced structure of the passage, he argues, as signalled by the adversative μέντοι (16a6) is destroyed if ταῦτα is adopted.¹¹ Mental impressions are likenesses of things; if the things are "the same," so must the mental impressions be. But since actual objects do not (formally) change from one society to the next, neither will the mental impressions of those objects change. The balance of the passage lies in the "sameness" attributed to mental impressions and actual things, as opposed to the "not-sameness" of written marks and spoken sounds. That, once again, was Alexander's explication, which Boethius prefers to that of Herminus. Boethius' source for this information is Porphyry.¹²

In his critical apparatus Minio-Paluello reports: (a) Boethius' testimony concerning Herminus (ταῦτα, 16a6; Minio-Paluello does not point out, however, that this reading was originally in n); (b) Boethius' testimony concerning Alexander (ταῦτά, 16a7; ? originally in A); and (c) Ammonius' testimony concerning Herminus (ταῦτα, 16a8; also originally in B, but there is no reference to the fact that it has been corrected in the first hand to ταῦτά; note as well that Minio-Paluello fails to mention Boethius, *In Perih.* I.40,28; II.39,33: *res etiam hae*).¹³ Ammonius' view of the matter

⁹ Ammonius, *In de Int.* 24,12–21. I believe, however, that Montanari (below, n. 15) is correct in assuming that Ammonius' reference to Herminus (24,18) must apply to 16a6 as well as to 16a8, for Ammonius makes the same division (24,19–21) as in Alexander, Boethius, etc.: spoken sounds and written marks are *not* the same for all; thoughts and things *are* the same for all.

¹⁰ Above, n. 7.

¹¹ Cf. J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1954), p. 405. This balancing adversative "seldom goes so far as to eliminate, or seriously invalidate, the opposed idea." But Aristotle here has given the particle progressive force, for the previous idea (that written marks and spoken sounds are not the same for all) is not at all invalidated; a new point, or a development of the previous one (that mental impressions and actual things are the same for all) is introduced in contrast with what has gone before.

¹² *In Perih.* II.40,9: sed Porphyrius de utrisque acute subtiliterque iudicat et Alexandri magis sententiam probat, hoc quod dicat non debere dissimulari de multiplici aequivocationis significatione. nam et qui dicit ad unam quamlibet rem commodat animum, scilicet quam intellegens voce declarat, et unum rursus intellectum quemlibet is qui audit exspectat. quod si, cum uterque ex uno nomine res diversas intellegunt, ille qui nomen aequivocum dixit designet clarius, quid illo nomine significare voluerit, accipit mox qui audit et ad unum intellectum utrique conveniunt . . . neque enim fieri potest, ut qui voces positione significantes a natura eo distinxerit quod easdem apud omnes esse non diceret, eas res quas esse naturaliter proponebat non eo tales esse monstraret, quod apud omnes easdem esse contenderet. quocirca Alexander vel propria sententia vel Porphyrii auctoritate probandus est.

¹³ See above, n. 2.

has already been discussed. For his part, Boethius attributes the refutation of Herminus to Porphyry, who argued as follows. Aristotle distinguishes conventionally from naturally significant spoken sounds on the basis of the fact that the former are not “the same for all,” whereas the latter *are* “the same for all.” This being so, it would make no sense whatsoever for him not to maintain as well that extramental realities have as cause (*eo . . . quod*, II.40,25) of their being *naturaliter* the fact that they are “the same for all.”¹⁴ The readings Minio-Paluello has adopted for these lines of the treatise are beyond question, although the supporting evidence in his apparatus is not.

Before leaving this section of the text, it is necessary to review Montanari’s rather ingenious explanation of the events behind these reports.¹⁵ He points out that the corruptions in n and B (for lines 6 and 8, respectively) probably resulted from the close proximity of these four homographs (ταῦτα, ταῦτά, ταῦτα, ταῦτά), and from scribal misinterpretations of the accentuation; he further argues that Boethius’ testimony is not reliable. Montanari points out that Herminus knew the genuine readings at 16a6/8, since he evidently rejected them only on *doctrinal* grounds without making any reference to the MSS. His proposals therefore cannot be accepted as actual evidence for the earliest MSS. readings. Now in the Boethian MSS. *hae similitudines* (16a7) is uniformly presented for the continuous translation and for the first edition of the commentary; *eaedem* appears in the second edition in a citation (II.38,2, in which Boethius reports Alexander’s reading) and in the lemma, II.25,12; *hae* occurs in only two citations in the second edition of the commentary, but is undoubtedly correct.¹⁶ *Eaedem*, Montanari concludes, is a corruption in the archetype (= *In Perih.* II.25,12, app. cr. ad loc.) which has been misconstrued in reference to Alexander. That is, Alexander did indeed propose ταῦτά (*eaedem*) as a correction of Herminus’ false emendations at 16a6/8, but he did *not* read it at 16a7. Hence Alexander gave ταῦτά in order to put the text back into accord with what the MSS. of the time read at 16a6/8, and what Boethius says about Alexander is spurious.

Despite the ingenuity of this argument, a cautionary note is required.

¹⁴ Above, n. 12. A curious argument, almost putting the cart before the horse, for it would seem more to the point for Boethius to argue that “sameness” is the effect rather than the cause of the thing’s being “by nature.” Cf. the same ambiguity in Stephanus, *In de Int.* 1,23: εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν φύσει, ἔδει παρὰ πᾶσιν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἢ γὰρ φύσις πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ δημιουργεῖ. Ὅτι δὲ τὰ νοήματα καὶ τὰ πράγματα παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φύσει δῆλον.

¹⁵ E. Montanari, *La Sezione Linguistica del Peri Hermeneias di Aristotele*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1984/88): Studi et Testi 5/8, I.82–83 (6.3.2); I.132–35.

¹⁶ *AL* II.1.5,9; *In Perih.* I.36,28; I.39,14; I.40,8; II.25,12 (here the translations in S = Vindobonensis 80 and T = Monacensis 18479, according to Meiser ad loc., have *hae* [*haeae*], while the rest have *eaedem*); II.38,2; II.39,17; II.39,32. Cf. *AL* II.1.xxxvii.

The section from *In Perih.* II.37,30 (*sed hic duplex lectio est. Alexander enim hoc modo legi putat oportere*) to II.39,25 (*Herminus vero huic est expositioni contrarius*) reads straight through as a résumé of Alexander's interpretation which has been interlaced with some of Boethius' own observations. Moreover, what immediately follows (II.38,3) is noteworthy:

volens enim Aristoteles ea quae positione significant ab his quae aliquid designant naturaliter segregare hoc interposuit: ea quae positione significant varia esse, ea vero quae naturaliter apud omnes eadem.

The explicative conjunction indicates that Boethius is supplying the substance of what he understands to be Alexander's view of the matter (cf. II.39,26: *dicit enim*), which in this instance must mean the change in reading mentioned in the preceeding lines. A steady elaboration follows, which is intended to show that *passiones animae* (*intellectus, similitudines*) are *eadem apud omnes* and *naturaliter*, while *voces* and *litterae* are not. In the context of this argument *eadem similitudines* makes perfectly good sense, since it is consistent with Aristotle's ταῦτά πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (a6–7). But for the moment Boethius has turned his attention from the question of the correct reading at 16a7, to the Nature-Convention difference which indeed provided the basis for Alexander's *eadem*. Boethius' second citation comes at *In Perih.* II.39,16–17, where we find the genuine reading (*hae*). Here it is Boethius speaking, although what he says is in general accord with Alexander's opinion: *res* also, from which *animae passionēs* derive, are “the same for all” and “by nature.” Next, however, Boethius stresses the seemingly otiose observation that *animae passionēs* are the same thing as *similitudines* (II.39,21):

ita quoque etiam ipsae res quarum similitudines sunt animae passionēs eadem apud omnes sunt. quocirca quoque naturales sunt, sicut sunt etiam rerum similitudines, quae sunt animae passionēs.

Yet the point is not irrelevant, for Boethius is winding his way back around to the beginning of his rather lengthy excursus, which was Alexander's proposed reading for 16a7: *eadem similitudines* (as opposed to the *passiones animae* of a6–7). Immediately after this follows the objection of Herminus, which, of course, is aimed not at the question of reading *eadem* at 16a6 as opposed to 16a7, but at the more general question of whether the *passiones animae* (*intellectus, similitudines*—it makes little difference at this point, cf. II.35,19f.) should be called “the same” *at all*. The inconsistency in citations (*eadem/hae*) can therefore be attributed to Boethius' carelessness in slipping from Alexander, to his own clarification of what Alexander maintained as the grounds for the change in reading, then back again, before introducing Herminus. Otherwise it is necessary to assume that (a) Boethius has seen Alexander's variant *eadem* (unaccompanied by any

further information), that (b) he has mistaken its position in Aristotle's text (16a7) and made up out of whole cloth an interpretation to fit, without (c) realizing that he himself subsequently reverts to *haec*. But this is unwarranted; it will be better to suppose with Minio-Paluello that Boethius in fact has indirect access to the genuine opinion of Alexander. Certainty is impossible in this matter, but it seems safest to conclude that Boethius is following some source which displays the opinions of both Herminus and Alexander, shows the latter to be the more coherent, and then settles the issue on Porphyrian grounds.¹⁷ It is, we shall see, a pattern that occurs elsewhere in his commentary. As a final observation, it may be pointed out that this particular passage offers us a glimpse into Boethius' methods and the limitations of his source materials. Boethius evidently had access, probably by way of Porphyry himself, to a very brief notice which stated Alexander's reading for 16a7 and then added a few words concerning the substance of his view (e.g., "Here Alexander reads 'the same;' for likenesses, as mental impressions and things, are the same for all, whereas spoken sounds and written marks are not"); he grasped the point of the argument and devoted considerable space to his own explanation of the same, but in so doing he inadvertently reverted to the correct version of the text, which in no way impugned the argument as a whole.

The fourth point in the apparatus which is pertinent to the present discussion concerns the variants for *πρώτων* (16a6: *πρώτως*, *πρῶτον*), which will be considered presently.

In the time of Ammonius and Boethius it was already traditional to treat these lines of the treatise as though an interpolation.¹⁸ This originated in the *πρόθεσις* and *τάξις* assigned by the commentators to the treatise as a whole.¹⁹ Both ancient and medieval commentators found an

¹⁷ Above, n. 12.

¹⁸ Boethius, *In Perih.* II.25,15: cum igitur prius posuisset nomen et verbum et quaecumque secutus est postea se definire promississet, haec interim praetermittens de passionibus animae deque earum notis, quae sunt scilicet voces, pauca praemittit. Cf. Ammonius, *In de Int.* 17,20–28 (below, n. 24). Similarly, the commentary of Probus, trans., J.G.E. Hoffmann, *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristoteleis* (Leipzig, 1873), p. 94: "Aristoteles vult definire nomen et verbum et ea quae [deinceps] dicta sunt. Et quidem antequam definit, dicit . . ."

¹⁹ E.g. Ammonius, *In de Int.* 1,21–2,10; 4,5–24; Boethius, *In Perih.* II.7,18 (*intentio* = Boethius' translation of *σκόπος*). Boethius has (*In Isag.* I.12,19–14,7) a lengthy discussion of the *ordo* of the works of the *Organon* (cf. below, n. 27), of which the salient point is that the *Isagoge* must be studied first, as an introduction to the *Categories* and thus to the *Organon* as a whole. Aristotle's logic, Boethius explains, is based upon the syllogism, the doctrine of which is to be studied first in the *Prior Analytics* and then in the *Posterior Analytics* and *Topics* (cf. F. Solmsen, "Boethius and the History of the 'Organon'," *American Journal of Philology* 65 [1944], 69–74, rpt. in M. Fuhrmann and J. Gruber, edd. *Boethius*

order implicit in the subject matter of the different treatises of the Organon. The *Categories* was to be the first work studied, since it treats of the significance of uncombined words of the “first imposition,” words that indicate the ten classes of being.²⁰ The *Peri Hermeneias* would come second, because it treats of words combined in assertoric statements. The *Analytics* were to come third, since they discuss combinations of statements in syllogisms. It was held that reality could be studied by physics, by mathematics and by metaphysics (θεολογία);²¹ the operations of the mind would fall under psychology, and those of language under grammar.²² Since the Stoics, the status of logic had been in dispute—is it a tool, or a part, of philosophy?—,²³ but in the case of the *Peri Hermeneias* we find Ammonius

[Darmstadt, 1984]: Wege der Forschung 483, pp. 127–33). But as syllogisms are made up of propositions, and propositions of words that are significative of things, Aristotle composed the *Peri Hermeneias* and *Categories* respectively.

²⁰ By “first imposition” the commentators mean the study and (or) application of words in so far as they are significative of things. By “second imposition” they mean the study of words in so far as they can be explained according to the laws of grammar and syntax. Thus to refer to the first imposition of the word *sedile* would be to refer to its significate, seat; to refer to the second imposition would be to explain, e.g., that it is of the third declension, that, being a liquid i-stem, its ablative singular form is irregular, etc.

²¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* 1026a13–19, on which, see J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), p. 296, with n. 44, and W.D. Ross, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1924), I.355. For the commentators, see: Boethius, *Trin.* II.8,5: nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, *naturalis*, in motu inabstracta ἀνυπεξαίρετος (considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta), *mathematica*, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), *theologica*, sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu caret); *In Isag.* I.8,13ff. (below, pp. 130–31, n. 149); Calcidius (4th c. AD), *In Tim.* 264 (p. 270): dividitur porro haec trifariam, in theologiam et item naturae sciscitationem praestandaeque etiam rationis scientiam. neque enim quisquam deum quaereret aut ad pietatem aspiraret, quod est theologiae proprium, nec vero id ipsum quod nunc agimus agendum putaret nisi prius caelo sideribusque visis et amore nutrito sciendi rerum causas, eorum etiam, quae ortum habent temporarium, exordia; haec quippe demum ad naturalem pertinent quaestionem. quid quod dierum et noctium vice considerata menses et anni et horarum curricula dinumerata sunt numerique ortus et genitura dimensionis intro data? quod ad tertiam partem philosophiae pertinere perspicuum est (cf. Albinus, *Ep.* III); Proclus. *In Tim.* I.8,13: ἔτι δέ, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ Πυθαγόρειον ἀρέσκον τριχῇ τὰ πράγματα διήρηται, εἰς τε τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων μέσα, ἃ δὴ καλεῖν εἰώθασι μαθηματικά, πάντα δὲ ἐν πᾶσιν ἔστι θεωρεῖν οἰκειῶς—καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀρχηγικῶς προϋφίστηκε τὰ τε μέσα καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἀμφοτέρω ἐστίν, εἰκονικῶς μὲν τὰ πρῶτα, παραδειγματικῶς δὲ τὰ τρίτα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐστὶν ἰνδάλματα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν, etc.

²² E.g., below, n. 105; *In Perih.* II.6,7–7,5; II.14,30–15,6; II.32,17–29; I.32,14–21; *Intr. Syll. Cat.* 762c; 766a–b; *Syll. Cat.* 796d–97a, etc. Boethius repeatedly stresses that the grammarian and logician study language from two distinct points of view, and that it is the former alone who studies words *propter se*.

²³ Boethius, *In Isag.* II.142,16: hanc litem vero tali ratione discernimus. nihil quippe dicimus impedire, ut eadem logica partis vice simul instrumentique fungatur officio.

commenting that the subject matter is spoken or written *words* which are significative of *things*, but through the mediation of *thoughts*, διὰ μέσων τῶν νοημάτων.²⁴ In this sense, logic is not wholly devoid of philosophical content. Elsewhere Ammonius observes that the syllogisms which are concerned with things reveal logic operating as a part of philosophy; those used to investigate the “bare” rules of thought, without consideration for things, pertain to logic as a tool of philosophy.²⁵ The word-thought-thing scheme is apparently traceable to Alexander, Herminius, Boethius, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Syrianus, principally in connection with the *Categories*.²⁶ Similarly Boethius:

nam cum ea quae sunt in voce res intellectusque significant, principaliter quidem intellectus, res vero quas ipsa intelligentia comprehendit secundaria significatione per intellectuum medietatem, intellectus ipsi non sine quibusdam passionibus sunt, quae in animam ex subiectis veniunt rebus.²⁷

quoniam enim ipsa suum retinet finem isque finis a sola philosophia consideratur, pars philosophiae esse ponenda est, quoniam vero finis ille logicae quem sola speculatur philosophia, ad alias eius partes suam operam pollicetur, instrumentum esse philosophiae non negamus; est autem finis logicae inventio iudiciumque rationum; Plotinus, I.3.6. Cf. L. Tarán, review of Moraux, *Gnomon* 53 (1981), 740–41.

²⁴ *In de Int.* 17,20: Ἦν μὲν ἀκόλουθον κατὰ τὰ ἐπηγγελμένα τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς ἐξῆς ἀποδοῦναι τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος, ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ οὐ πᾶσα λέξις ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα (ἡ γὰρ ἀσημος οἶον βλίτυρι καὶ σκινδαψὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων) καὶ διαφέρουσι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῶν ἀσημῶν φωνῶν κατὰ τὸ σημαντικά τινων εἶναι, πρότερον ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διδάσκει διὰ τούτων, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ προηγουμένως καὶ προσεχῶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν σημαίνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι τὰ νοήματα, διὰ δὲ τούτων μέσων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον δεῖ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐπινοεῖν μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὑποτιθέμενοι λεκτὸν ἡξίουον ὀνομάζειν; 24,5: λέγει γὰρ ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεία πρώτως, ταῦτα λέγων τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα, ὧν οὖν πρώτως ταῦτα σημεία ἐστὶ (λέγει δὲ τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνεται γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα, οὐ μέντοι προσεχῶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσων τῶν νοημάτων, τὰ μέντοι νοήματα οὐκέτι δι’ ἄλλων μέσων σημαίνεται, ἀλλὰ πρώτως καὶ πρωσεχῶς; 24,30: ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς σημαίνουσης τὰ πράγματα διὰ μέσων τῶν νοημάτων. Cf. Probus, p. 94 (trans. Hoffmann): per medietatem harum; Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, II.46ff.

²⁵ *In An. Pr.* 10,36: κατὰ γὰρ Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον οὔτε μέρος ἐστίν, ὥς οἱ Στωικοὶ φασιν καὶ τινὲς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, οὔτε μόνως ὄργανον, ὥς οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου φασίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος ἐστὶν καὶ ὄργανον φιλοσοφίας· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων λάβῃς τοὺς λόγους, οἶον αὐτοὺς τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς, μέρος ἐστίν, ἐὰν δὲ φιλοῦς τοὺς κανόνas ἀνευ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὄργανον. ὥστε καλῶς οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου τὰ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει ἀφορῶντες ὄργανον αὐτὴν φασιν· φιλοῦς γὰρ κανόνas παραδίδωσιν, οὐ πράγματα λαμβάνων ὑποκείμενα ἀλλὰ τοῖς στοιχείοις τοὺς κανόνas ἐφαρμόζων. For a general introduction, see T.-S. Lee, *Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Späantike* (Göttingen, 1984): Hypomnemata 79, pp. 24–54. Behind this view lay the belief that the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle could be harmonized.

²⁶ Simplicius, *In Cat.* 13,11–21; Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9,17–10,14; Olympiodorus, *Proleg. et in Cat.* 18,29–20,12.

²⁷ *In Perih.* II.33,27. Cf. *In Cat.* 161b: nam cum res infinitae infinitis quoque vocibus significarentur, et (ut dictum est) sub scientiam venire non possent, hac definitione, qua decem praedicamentorum divisio facta est, cunctarum rerum et vocum significantium

If to the commentators *Peri Hermeneias* I, lines 3–9 seemed in some way intrusive, their place in the treatise was justified on the ground that Aristotle had first to discuss the relations of written marks, spoken sounds, mental impressions (in Boethius and Ammonius, *intellectus*, νοήματα) and actual things before proceeding to the treatment of true or false propositions, and this precisely because those propositions arise only in the mind, not in things.²⁸ The legacies of Ammonius and Boethius appear still to influence those interpretations which find sketched in *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–9 a theory of meaning, for the most traditional view of this passage takes from the ancient commentators the idea that Aristotle makes spoken sounds significative primarily of things that arise in the soul, and secondarily of things outside of the soul. This was the view frequently expounded

acquirimus disciplinam. hinc est quod ad logic(a)m tendentibus primus hic liber legendus occurrit, idcirco quod cum omnis logica syllogismorum ratione sit constituta syllogismi vero propositionibus jungantur, propositiones vero sermonibus constent, prima est utilitas quid quisque sermo significet, propriae scientiae diffinitione cognoscere. haec quoque nobis de decem praedicamentis inspectio, et in physica Aristotelis doctrina . . . perutilis est; 161c: nec illud fere dubium est, ad quam partem philosophiae huius libri ducatur intentio, idcirco quoniam qui de significativis vocibus tractat, de rebus quoque est aliquatenus tractaturus. res etenim et rerum significatio juncta est, sed principalior erit illa disputatio quae de sermonibus est: secundo vero loco illa quae de rerum ratione formatur. quare quoniam omnis ars logica de oratione est, et in hoc opere de vocibus principaliter tractatur (quanquam enim sit huius libri relatio ad ceteras quoque philosophiae partes) principaliter tamen refertur ad logicam, de cuius quodammodo simplicibus elementis, id est, de sermonibus in eo principaliter disputavi; 159c: in hoc igitur opere haec intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et de vocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt. nam quodcunque de substantia vel facere vel pati dicitur, non ita tractatur, quasi unum eorum casibus inflecti possit, aliud vero temporibus permutari, sed quasi aut hominem, aut equum, aut individuum aliquod, aut speciem generusve significet; 252b: quae vero hic desunt in libris qui Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά inscribuntur apposuit; *In Perih.* II.8,20: praedicamentorum vero in hoc ratio constituta est, in quo hae duae partes interpretationis res intellectibus subiectas designent. nam quoniam decem res omnino in omni natura reperiuntur, decem quoque intellectus erunt, quos intellectus quoniam verba nominaque significant, decem omnino erunt praedicamenta; II.12,19: mihi quoque videtur hoc subtiliter perpendentibus liquere hunc librum ad analyticos esse praeparatum. nam sicut hic de simplici propositione disputat, ita quoque in analyticis de simplicibus tantum considerat syllogismis, ut ipsa syllogismorum propositionumque simplicitas non ad aliud nisi ad continens opus Aristotelis pertinere videatur; *Intr. Syll. Cat.* 762c: quoniam igitur nobis hoc opus est in categoricos syllogismos, syllogismorum vero compago propositionibus textitur, propositionum vero partes sunt nomen et verbum, pars autem ab eo cuius pars est, prior est; de nomine et verbo, quae prima sunt, disputatio prima ponatur, dehinc de propositione ad ultimum de syllogismorum connexione tractabitur; *Syll. Cat.* 794d: sed quoniam syllogismorum structura nobis est hoc opere explicanda, syllogismis autem prior est propositio, de propositionibus hoc libello tractatus habebitur. et quoniam propositionis partes sunt nomen et verbum, pars autem ab eo cuius pars est prior est, de nomine et verbo, quae prima sunt, disputatio prima ponatur. On the first and second impositions, see below, n. 105; above, nn. 20; 22.

²⁸ Cf. below, pp. 118, n. 112; 122, n. 127.

in the medieval schools, where, for centuries, Boethius' were the only available translations and commentaries for the treatise. Kretzmann maintains²⁹ that this medieval interpretation of the passage, the descendant principally of Boethius' translation (even after Moerbeke had translated the treatise Thomas Aquinas followed the Boethian translation and the sense it imparted),³⁰ misrepresented Aristotle on the subject of spoken sounds, mental impressions and actual things.

However, the medieval commentators were not to blame if in fact their only translation of the treatise did not disclose all of the possibilities in the Greek text. What those possibilities are should become evident after examination of some translations and commentaries made after the Middle Ages, that is, made when Greek was once again generally available and studied. Those who have come after the Middle Ages, no less than Boethius himself, have had to bear the burden of translation; and many modern translations are in effect commentaries upon Aristotle's Greek, just as are the less precise passages of Boethius' Latin version. It is not possible here to solve all of the problems that might be raised in connection with this passage; we need only to point out the most important difficulties as background against Boethius' Latin—our next subject of discussion—in order to gain a clear view of its sense, and of its relation to the Greek original. A complete analysis of Aristotle's text and of the relevant literature will be found in the two-volume study of E. Montanari (esp. I.124–44; II.31–63), for which a third volume is planned.

A well-known translation of Aristotle's Greek is that of Edghill, in the Oxford Aristotle:

Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which

²⁹ N. Kretzmann, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention," in, *Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972*, ed. J. Corcoran (Dordrecht-Boston, 1974), p. 5; "Semantics, History of," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards (NY-London, 1967), vol. VII, p. 367. Both of these references are quoted below, p. 47f.

³⁰ This is a point made by Kretzmann, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound," p. 19, n. 6. The *explicit* to Moerbeke's translation of Ammonius in codex Vaticanus latinus 2067 (see *AL* II.2.lviii, n. 2) indicates that the translation was completed in September of 1268. Of course, if St Thomas wrote his commentary upon the *Peri Hermeneias* prior to this date, then his use of Boethius' translation of the treatise rather than Moerbeke's is easily explained. Oesterle incorrectly assumes that the lemmata in Spiazzi's edition of Thomas' commentary are from Moerbeke's translation: *Aristotle: On Interpretation, Commentary by St Thomas and Cajetan (Peri Hermeneias)*, trans. J.T. Oesterle (Milwaukee, 1962), p. 23, n. 10. This has been noticed also by Kretzmann (loc. cit.).

these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images.³¹

Two observations are in order. (a) The translation suppresses the change from σύμβολα (16a4) to σημεῖα (16a6), by giving in their place only “symbols” and “symbolize.” (b) It implies that, since there is only the symbol relation to bind spoken words, mental impressions (or, “experiences”) and things, spoken words must “directly symbolize” (σημεῖα πρῶτων, 16a6) mental impressions, and thus indirectly symbolize things outside of the mind. That is, the symbols function in two stages, which, for present purposes, may be designated, “sense” and “reference.”³² The retention of the symbol-sign difference in Ackrill’s translation, the most frequently cited English version of recent years, does not remove this idea:

Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all³³

Owens substitutes “signs” for “symbols,” but appears otherwise to have in mind precisely the sense conveyed by the Oxford, as well as by Ackrill’s, translation. “The definition,” he writes, “is the conceptual expression of the Entity of the thing. Names are the signs of concepts, and so mediately the signs of things.”³⁴ Larkin draws out more explicitly the sense embodied in the translation:

The brevity of Aristotle’s explanation here indicates that he is introducing the point that language refers to things through thought.

. . . Aristotle refers words to things through thought; thus he has a triadic theory of signification: the word is a symbol of a thought which is a likeness of the thing signified.³⁵

This “triadic” theory of signification, she goes on to argue, follows from Aristotle’s having dropped the Platonic Ideas; that is, the actual things which ultimately are signified by spoken sounds are separate from the corresponding concepts or abstractions in the soul. Only if Aristotle thought of concepts as separate entities could spoken sounds be said to be symbols

³¹ E.M. Edghill, trans., *Categoriae and De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1926), ad loc.

³² Sometimes: connotation, intension: denotation, extension. In general, see Wm.P. Alston’s introductory essay, “Meaning,” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. V, p. 243f.

³³ J.L. Ackrill, trans. with notes, *Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretation* (Oxford, 1963), p. 43.

³⁴ *Doctrine of Being*, p. 120.

³⁵ M.T. Larkin, *Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle* (The Hague-Paris, 1971): *Janua Linguarum* 87, pp. 22; 34.

directly of reality. But the soul is the place of the forms only potentially,³⁶ and so Aristotle maintains that spoken sounds directly symbolize mental impressions, and indirectly symbolize actual things. Or, as St Thomas, whose exposition Larkin follows, put it, the signification of spoken sounds to mental conceptions is immediate:

sed quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius . . . et ideo exponens ordinem significationum non incipit a litteris, sed a vocibus: quarum *primo* significationem exponens, dicit: *sunt ergo ea, quae sunt in voce, notae id est, signa earum passionum quae sunt in anima.*

. . . quas [sc. *passiones animae*] nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate . . . non enim potest esse quod significant immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen *homo* naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam *ideam* hominem separatam.³⁷

Aristotle does not uphold Man as existing *realiter* in abstract, but as abstract only in concept. Essence (*essentia, quod quid est*) is grasped by simple conceptions of the intellect, and it is the function of spoken language to signify the *ratio* or *definitio* that derives from those conceptions.

Larkin goes on to explicate Aristotle's use of *σημεῖα* at 16a6 in light of the Nature-Convention antithesis:

Giving language its foundation in thought or intelligence, Aristotle speaks of words as the symbols of mental experiences which are the signs of things. Men all have the same speech sounds and mental experiences, but the words symbolizing these mental experiences may differ from one locality to another. If words are symbols and not signs, then they are significant by the conventions of men and not naturally; nothing is by nature a name, for letters and syllables have no natural likeness to the objects named.³⁸

Unlike signs, symbols are artificial means of inference—presumably, in the same sense as chirographs may be said to be “symbols” of legal agreements, but smoke a “sign” of fire. In each instance, the presence of the latter can be inferred from that of the former. Because spoken languages derive from convention, not nature, they are systems of symbols, not of signs. The inarticulate sounds made by beasts, on the other hands, are “signs” of the things beasts feel. A similar interpretation of “symbols” is found in Waitz: “τὰ σύμβολα, ut quae sint arbitraria, non omnibus

³⁶ *De An.* 429a27–29. Larkin does not make this point, but it seems implicit in those she does make.

³⁷ *In Peri H.* Lects. II.13.3; II.15.5.

³⁸ *Language*, p. 96.

eadem sunt, τὰ παθήματα vero, quorum sunt indicia prima, et res ipsae, quas repraesentant et quarum sunt imagines, eadem sunt.”³⁹

Two difficulties arise. (a) Where in this text does Larkin find the idea that, “mental experiences . . . are the signs of things?” Aristotle apparently refers to them as likenesses, but are they signs? The reference of ταῦτα (σημεῖα) must be either φωναί or γράμματα or both, but it most certainly is not παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (16a6–7). That is, Aristotle calls written marks and spoken sounds “signs,” but he does not—at least here—call mental impressions “signs.” (b) What in the Greek suggests the notion of direct and indirect symbolization? Waitz found it in the adverb πρώτως (16a6), for which he reported only one alternative, the neuter singular πρῶτον of two *codices Laurentiani*.⁴⁰ Bekker has πρώτως,⁴¹ which is the reading given previously by Lucio, Niphus and Pacius,⁴² and in more recent times by Steinthal, Cooke, Tricot, Colli and, no doubt, many others as well.⁴³

How is πρώτως to be understood? Aristotle in several places indicates what he means by πρῶτος (= the superlative of πρότερος, πρό). In the *Categories* he makes five distinctions; in the *Physics*, three; in the *Metaphysics*, four, with nine subdivisions.⁴⁴ It is not difficult to uncover the

³⁹ *Organon*, I.325 (16a6).

⁴⁰ *Organon*, I.123 (d; G = Laur. 72.17, 14th c.). Waitz reports correctly for both of these MSS. Πρῶτον is also in K (Vat. Gr. 241, 13th c.).

⁴¹ I. Bekker, ed. *Aristotelis Opera* (Berlin, 1831), 2nd ed., O. Gigon (Berlin, 1960), I.16a6, following A, B and C.

⁴² Pacius gives πρώτως: J. Pacius, ed., *Aristotelis Peripateticorum Principis Organum* (Basel, 1566; rpt. Hildesheim, 1967), p. 87 (trans.: quarum haec primum sunt signa). See also, M.L. Lucio, *Aristotelis Organum Graece et Latine Commentario Analytico et Paraphrastico* (Basel, 1619), p. 102; A. Niphus, ed. and comm., *Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ, Hoc Est, de Interpretatione Liber* (Venice, 1555), p. 2: “Quare textus debet stare ‘Quorum tamen haec primo,’ non autem ‘primum.’ Nam graecus codex habet πρώτως, et non πρώτων. Ubi enim πρώτων legeretur, ut fortasse Boetius noster habebat, in latinum primorum esset convertendum.” Niphus’ translation is confusing, for *primo* and *primum* generally distinguish temporal and sequential priority respectively, while it is surely the latter which translates πρώτως in this instance, cf. *ibid.*: “Dici potest pro Alexandro quod nomen in voce primo primitate (ut ita dicam) subordinationis passiones primo significabit. Primitate autem apprehensionis, res primo.”

⁴³ H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1890/91; rpt. Hildesheim, 1961), I.181 (zunächst); H.P. Cooke and H. Tredennick, trans., *Aristotle: The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), p. 114; G. Colli, trans. and comm., *Aristotele: Organon* (Turin, 1955), III.757; J. Tricot, trans. and comm., *Aristote: Organon* (Paris, 1959), I.78, n. 1.

⁴⁴ Respectively: 14a26ff. (time, non-reciprocity as to implication of existence, order, that which is by nature better, cause); 260b16–19 (in connection with movement: ontological independence, temporal and logical priority); 1018b9ff. ([1] that which is nearer to some beginning in [a] time [b] place [c] movement [d] power or [e] order; [2] that which is prior in knowledge, as either [a] universal, in respect of definition, or [b] particular, in

most common meaning of the adverbial form *πρώτως*, as the three following examples from the *De Anima* will demonstrate.⁴⁵ At 405a7 Aristotle raises for consideration the view that fire, since it is the finest and most nearly incorporeal of the elements, is that which constitutes soul. Fire has, and communicates to other things, movement *πρώτως*. Themistius takes the adverb to denote spatial proximity. Rodier, on the other hand, insists that Aristotle means logical priority: the movement of other things is derived, but that of fire is *per se*.⁴⁶ Philoponus comments that that which is by nature best suited to impart movement is *ἐν τοῖς πρωτοῖς* or *ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς*,⁴⁷ while Hicks says that the adverb “emphasizes the primary notion of soul . . . its first and foremost characteristic is that it is the movement.”⁴⁸ Here Aristotle seems to have in mind the *κατὰ φύσιν* sense of *πρῶτος* that is discussed in the *Metaphysics*. At 413b2, he attributes the existence of living things *πρώτως* to sensation. Philoponus indicates that this is meant to distinguish sentient and nutritive life: sponges, which have touch, possess sensation *πρώτως*, that is, they possess the *minimal condition* for life.⁴⁹ This clearly suggests logical priority, the *sine qua non*. Then, at 414a13 Aristotle speaks of the soul as the instrument of perception and of thought *πρώτως*. Both Simplicius and Philoponus understand this to imply the difference between form (= soul, *πρώτως*) and matter (= body, *δευτέρως*).⁵⁰ Noteworthy in this instance is the complementary *δευτέρως*

respect of sensation; [3] attributes of prior subjects which are themselves prior; [4] that which is prior *κατὰ οὐσίαν* or *κατὰ φύσιν*, as [a] substrate (vs. attribute) or [b] part or matter (potential priority). All others forms are predicated in connection with [4], and in this respect “prior” appears to be an *ad unum* equivocal).

⁴⁵ The adverb appears first in Aristotle (LSJ s.v. *πρότερος*, B.IV).

⁴⁶ G. Rodier, ed. and comm., *Aristote: Traité de l'âme*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1900), II.64.

⁴⁷ Philoponus, *In de An.* 83,13–15.

⁴⁸ R.D. Hicks, ed., trans. and comm., *Aristotle: De Anima* (Cambridge, 1907), p. 212 (403b29).

⁴⁹ *In de An.* 235,27–36. Cf. F.A. Trendelenburg, ed. and comm., *Aristotelis de Anima Libri Tres*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1877), p. 280 (413a31). Hicks gives, “primarily,” “fundamentally.”

⁵⁰ Simplicius, *In de An.* 104,32–33 (It has been argued that this commentary is by Priscianus Lydus. This is discussed by H.J. Blumenthal, “The Psychology of (?) Simplicius’ Commentary on the *De Anima*,” in, *Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius*, edd. H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd [Liverpool, 1982], p. 73. I refer to it as Simplicius’ work because that is how it appears in the CAG.); Philoponus, *In de An.* 245,28–29; cf. Alexander, *De An.* 31,10–25; *Mant.* 102,29–03,3 (The authorship of these works has been doubted also. See P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise exégète de la noétique d'Aristote* [Liege-Paris, 1942], pp. 19–28; 133–42. I refer to them under the name of Alexander for the same reason as above.); Hicks, *De Anima*, p. 329 (414a13): “the adverb is often joined with *κυρίως*, and *ἀπλῶς* and *καθ' αὐτὸ* are equivalent expressions. Each thing is said to be what it really is . . . in virtue primarily of its form and only secondarily in virtue of its matter. The force of *πρώτως* is to bring out the fundamental position of the soul in life. We live and perceive by the body, but we cannot be said to do so *πρώτως*.”

which the commentators find implicit in *πρώτως*: something occurring “in the first place” or “primarily” implies something else occurring “in the second place.”

Such is the sense of *πρώτως* that has traditionally been assigned to the passage with which we are now concerned. For example, Tricot (cf. Bonitz, s.v.) draws attention to the connection between *πρώτως*, *κυρίως* and *ἀπλῶς*, and translates, “*immédiatement, primitivement, au sens fondamental et premier*,”⁵¹ Waitz said it signifies circumstances in which an efficient cause acts upon an object without any intermediary (“*unmittelbar, ursprünglich, primitiv*,” cf. *εὐθέως*).⁵² Ammonius adds *προηγουμένως* καὶ *προσεχῶς*.⁵³ The adverb here appears best translated into English as, “immediately.” The commentators are not very precise in stating the meaning of the word, but Stephanus observes that words are *σημεῖα* of concepts *πρώτως*, and *σημεῖα* of extramental realities *δευτέρως*;⁵⁴ Boethius in his commentaries uses *principaliter* and *secundo loco*. With this the sense becomes somewhat more clear: actual things are signified through the *mediation* of intellect, and so words signify thoughts in the first place and extramental things in the second.⁵⁵ Another possibility, however, is that *πρώτως* approximates our expression, “primarily,” that is, that it denotes non-reciprocity as to the implication of existence, for it is possible for a word to have sense without having reference (e.g., “goatstag,” “chimaera,” etc.), but no word that has reference will lack sense.⁵⁶

All of these observations presume that the adverb *πρώτως* is in fact the correct reading. Did Aristotle write it? Kretzmann has suggested that Minio-Paluello selected the omega of *πρώτως* and the nu of *πρῶτον* according to the rationale that both must have been present in the original. But the manuscript evidence, he claims, is “overwhelmingly in favor of the adverbial form.”⁵⁷ This overstates the case, for (a) although the MSS. evidence that is presented in Minio-Paluello’s apparatus seems *prima facie* to favor the adverb, even a glimpse at what lies beneath the surface will show the argument in favor of the genitive plural to be a stronger one, and (b) since in this case the different variants cannot be explained only on the basis of scribal errors (cf. *ταῦτα/ταῦτά*, above), all attempts

⁵¹ Above, n. 43. See also idem, *Organon*, I.7, n. 2; Aristotle, *Meta.* 1028a30–31.

⁵² Waitz, *Organon*, I.325 (16a6): “*πρώτως ex usu Aristotelis fieri dicitur id quod ex ipsis et solis naturae legibus alicuius rei efficitur, ut alia re, quae media interponatur inter causam efficientem et id quod efficitur, non indigeat.*” For some instances of *εὐθέως*, *De An.* 421b31; 422b34.

⁵³ *In de Int.* 17,25; 24,8–9.

⁵⁴ *In de Int.* 5,21–22.

⁵⁵ Cf. also Dexippus (4th c.), *In Cat.* 9,24–10,32.

⁵⁶ See below, pp. 52f.; 124, n. 134.

⁵⁷ “Aristotle on Spoken Sound,” p. 18, n. 4.

to account for them on mechanical grounds must be approached with extreme caution. It is both necessary and valuable to assess first the external evidence in favor of the different readings independently of internal considerations, for in this way the history of the corruption can be determined. After this, however, it will be necessary to weigh all of the internal evidence, since it is on the basis of Aristotle's meaning that the decision in favor of a reading must ultimately be made. If the oldest reported reading (πρώτων) does not give a cogent sense, indeed does not give the sense that is most consistent with the philosophical aims of Aristotle's argument, then it must be rejected: *recentiores, non deteriores*. It is a mistake, however, to overlook the fact that Minio-Paluello's apparatus is a negative one, and thus to neglect the oldest attested reading without first having asked whether or not it is an *appropriate* reading. For if πρώτων is both the best and the oldest reading, then we must conclude that it is what Aristotle wrote. Now it can be shown (a) that πρώτων is in fact the oldest reading, and (b) that it is also the best reading, not only because it (i) makes sense in context, but because it (ii) removes some of the difficulty that results from reading πρώτως, and (iii) provides an explanation for the position of lines 8–9, which, due to their apparent incongruity with lines 3–7, have sometimes been thought misplaced in the text. Some of what will be said here has been expounded by Montanari, but the matter is sufficiently important for the correct understanding of the passage as to make separate discussion necessary.⁵⁸

From Minio-Paluello's apparatus we learn that πρώτως occurs in two important and early MSS. First, it is mentioned as being in n (= Ambrosianus L 93 sup., *nunc* 490, 9th/10th c.).⁵⁹ As Montanari shows, however, Minio-Paluello failed to see that πρώτως is only a correction, in the *second* hand, of πρώτον. Study by autopsy reveals further complexity. At some point the last three characters of the word were erased, along with an interlinear variant which is now completely lost (a later hand adds in its place πρωτ with a ligature that is not very clear). The accent and last three characters of πρώτως have been heavily written in darker ink by the second hand. Behind the acute accent, in the original hand, is a circumflex, which indicates an original reading of πρώτον (thus Montanari). There is one remaining consideration. Directly above what is now the second omega of πρώτως are visible three unerased expunction marks, almost certainly in the first hand.⁶⁰ The possibility should not be ruled

⁵⁸ *Sezione Linguistica*, I.126–32.

⁵⁹ According to Minio-Paluello (praef. xv; pp. 48–49), in the original hand, but Montanari (I.127, 1.5.2.3) rightly argues for the corrector.

⁶⁰ Expunction marks in the same hand appear also above οὕτως (16a5), ταῦτα (16a9), and above αὐτά (sc. τὰ αὐτά/ταῦτά, 16a8).

out that *πρώτων* was once in the MS. That is, given that the scribe originally wrote *πρώτον*, it is possible that he subsequently *added* an acute accent (which was later overwritten in the second hand, as for *πρώτως*) and expunged the omicron, writing *ω* (= *πρώτων*) above the line (now erased). The fact that the expunction marks appear above the omega only, suggests that he originally wrote nu as the final consonant. Be that as it may, we must at least accept that *πρώτως* is not what the scribe wrote, but a later correction. Second, Minio-Paluello correctly indicates that *πρώτως* is found in B (= Marcianus 201, AD 954, Waitz's *codex optimus*). Busse's edition of Ammonius shows *πρώτως* as being in the lemma of Ammonius' recension, 17,17 (FGM):

ταῦτα σημεία πρώτως,

in a citation, 24,5 (FGM):

ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεία πρώτως,

and in two paraphrases, 24,6/10 (FGM):

ὧν οὖν πρώτως ταῦτα σημεία ἐστι . . . ὧν τοίνυν πρώτως σημεία ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ . . . ταῦτα νοήματά ἐστι, etc.

Hayduck's edition of Stephanus shows the adverb as being in a citation or perhaps semi-quotation. In any event, *πρώτως* is what Stephanus probably reads, since in such cases the lemmata (cf. below) are generally of less authority than what the commentator himself says, 5,21 (P):

πρώτως εἶπεν σημεία εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῶν νοημάτων, etc.

Πρῶτον (an adverbial accusative) is found in the original hand of n, as well as in d (= Laurentianus 72.5) and G (= Laurentianus 72.17). In Ammonius, it appears in the lemma, 17,17 (A):

ταῦτα [τὰ] σημεία πρῶτον,

and in a citation, 24,5 (A):

ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεία πρῶτον.

In Stephanus, it appears in the lemma, 5,20 (P):

ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεία πρῶτον.

The anonymous Syriac translation has an adverb, but from which of the two Greek words it derives is uncertain.⁶¹ Minio-Paluello collated (see

⁶¹ The anonymous Syriac translation dates from the (?) 7th c., Georgius' translation from the 8th c. The anonymous version has an adverb (*qdm̐y*): Hoffmann, *De Hermeneuticis*

his preface, p. xiv), among others, A (= Urbinas 35, late 9th/early 10th c.), B, C (= Coislinianus 330, 11th c.) and n. What he reports for n at 16a6 is incomplete (cf. above), while he does not include A and C in his apparatus at all.⁶² Both of these MSS. have *πρώτως*.⁶³ Ammonius says that he inspected the text of the treatise before commenting upon it,⁶⁴ and Busse consistently adopts *πρώτως* for the lemma, citations and paraphrases. This, coupled with the evidence presented in Minio-Paluello's apparatus, has led Kretzmann and others to suppose that *πρώτως* must be Aristotle's *ipsissimum verbum*. Yet quite apart from the lack of evidence indicating that Minio-Paluello has *emended* the passage, we are obliged to question Kretzmann's paleographical supposition on its own terms. First it must be pointed out that there is no evidence, as the hypothesis requires, that the change was from *πρώτως* to *πρῶτον*; second, if we were seeking a mechanical explanation for the change, it would be more economical in any case to suppose that the genitive plural produced the variants, since it is able to account for each with only one change respectively (v/ς; ω/o). But arguments such as these are extremely weak, and so must be put aside. It is more likely, as we shall see, that the genitive plural was replaced by the adverb and accusative singular in accordance with the presumed sense of the passage. In any case, it should be emphasized that Minio-Paluello did not emend the text. His reading is based upon the indirect but secure evidence of the oldest translations of the treatise. All of the Boethian manuscripts render the genitive plural,⁶⁵ which cannot be accounted for by either *πρώτως* (= *principaliter*) or *πρῶτον* (= *primum*). Indeed Carl Meiser, who followed Waitz's edition of the Greek text and therefore had good reason to suppose that the adverb is correct, showed that Boethius cannot have had the *πρώτως* that is in many of the extant MSS.⁶⁶ Frederick Conybeare, comparing Waitz's Greek

apud Syros Aristoteleis, p. 23. Cf. Probus (p. 70 Hoffmann; trans. *ibid.*, p. 96: "Ipsae autem voces significant et actiones et cogitationes; sed primo significant cogitationes et deinde actiones. Propterea dixit: 'πρώτως'.").

⁶² Minio-Paluello intended (pp. xxi-xxii) to discuss these MSS. in subsequent publications.

⁶³ *Πρώτως* is also in E (Vat. Gr. 247, 13th/14th c.), e (Laur. 72.3, 12th c.; both *πρῶτον* and *πρώτων* appear to be indicated above the line), g (Laur. 71.35, late 13th c., with a sublinear variant that is unclear), i (Laur. 72.15, 14th c.) and q (Ambros. 525 = M 71 sup., 14th/15th c.). These are of relatively little importance.

⁶⁴ *In de Int.* 8,24–28; v. also Busse's preface, pp. vi-vii.

⁶⁵ See below, p. 52f.

⁶⁶ C. Meiser, "Des Boetius Übersetzung der Aristotelischen Schrift ΠΕΡΙ 'ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ," *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*, 117 (1878), 251 (below, p. 53, n. 12). Meiser demonstrated that Boethius' attention to accuracy can leave no doubt but that, where his Latin translation differs from what is in the extant MSS., his Greek exemplar will have done the same.

text with the ancient (5th c.) Armenian version, subsequently showed in agreement with Meiser that the slavishly literal Armenian translator had only the genitive plural form before him.⁶⁷ (We shall come to Georgius' version presently.) This evidence alone, as it antedates all of the extant MSS. of the treatise, shows πρώτων to be the oldest known reading. Similar constructions in the *Metaphysics* and *De Anima* exhibit almost the same pattern of corruption, and suggest that what Aristotle originally wrote had since come under the censorship of editors who found either the syntax or the thought difficult.⁶⁸

But the translations are not the only external evidence to secure the antiquity of πρώτων. For not only is it found in the original hand of R (= Vaticanus Barberianus Graecus 87, 9th/10th c.),⁶⁹ but the evidence in Ammonius and Stephanus is not as simple as it appears at first sight. For in Ammonius' commentary, codex A shows the genitive plural in two paraphrases (24,6/10, cf. above); A is a conservative witness which in these instances preserves the *lectio difficilior*. And in another of Ammonius' paraphrases (24,8–9) Busse selects the adverb against the neuter plural of all four of his MSS.:

τὰ μέντοι νοήματα οὐκέτι δι' ἄλλων μέσων σημαίνεται, ἀλλὰ πρώτως καὶ
 πρωσεχῶς (*sic*, but προσεχῶς, 24,8) ...

πρώτα AFM: καὶ πρώτα G.

⁶⁷ F.C. Conybeare, ed., *A Collation With the Ancient Armenian Versions of the Greek Text of Aristotle's Categories, De Interpretatione, De Mundo, De Virtutibus et Vitiis and of Porphyry's Introduction* (Oxford, 1892): *Anecdota Oxoniensia* 6, p. v: "The version of the Categories and De Interpretatione ... is written in a Grecising style; indeed it is little more than the Greek written with Armenian words;" p. xxiii: "Karl Meiser, the editor of the accurate text of Boethius' commentary, calls attention in Fleckeisen's *Jahrbücher* (vol. 117), to many characteristics of the Boethian text, which are attested also by the Armenian. There can be therefore no doubt but that the Armenian Version represents a Greek text of Aristotle at least as old as the fifth century." Prof. Russell confirms for me the genitive plural (with a definite article: *αιαῖνων*) which Conybeare (pp. 82; 97) translates from the Armenian back into Greek.

⁶⁸ *Meta.* 1029a15 (ὅ ... πρώτῳ/πρώτως); 1035b25 (ὅ πρώτῳ/πρώτος); *De An.* 423b30 (ἐν ᾧ ... πρώτῳ/πρώτως). Cf. Alexander, *Mant.* 102,29–03,2, in which ὅ πρώτῳ is contrasted with δευτέρως; and Porphyry, *VPl.* 20.80: ὧν ... μόνων/μόνον.

⁶⁹ Study by autopsy substantiates Montanari's claim (*Sezione Linguistica*, I.126–27 [1.5.2.1–2]; cf. in general, I.130–31 [1.5.6]) concerning this MS. R is one of the three oldest MSS., and like n (cf. above), it has been corrected in this place. Πρώτων is undoubtedly what the scribe wrote, for the acute accent is placed squarely above the first omega, while the second omega is very clear, and the nu untouched. A faint and clumsy correction makes the second omega into an omicron, and then rather awkwardly adds a circumflex above the tau (= πρώτων). A later correction overwrites the acute accent of πρώτων, but adds ως above the line. This is missed by W. Belardi, *Il Linguaggio nella Filosofia di Aristotele* (Rome, 1975), p. 107: "che in realtà nessun codice del testo greco conferma."

Ammonius is referring to thoughts as “first” thoughts (a point to which we shall return). This may be compared with Stephanus, 5,26:

οἷον τὰ νοήματα ἐπειδὴ δεύτερα μὲν εἰσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, πρῶτα δὲ τῶν φωνῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων.

Πρῶτα is the reading in P, which Hayduck retains but would emend to πρότερα. Now, codex A of Ammonius seems to argue exclusively for an original reading of πρώτων, for those instances (17,17; 24,5) in which it gives πρῶτον (cf. Moerbeke’s lemma, *primum*),⁷⁰ so far from attesting to this form as a variant for πρώτως, are probably the result of a shortening of the final omega in the genitive plural which it preserves at 24,6/10. Furthermore, Moerbeke’s translation of the same lines (24,5ff. Busse) clearly renders πρῶτων:

dicit enim “quorum tamen haec signa primorum (πρῶτον A),” “haec” dicens illa quae in voce, hoc est nomina et verba, quorum primorum (πρώτων A) haec signa sunt (dicit autem conceptionum; significantur autem per ipsas et res, non tamen immediate, sed per medias conceptiones, conceptiones tamen non adhuc per alia media significantur, sed prime [πρῶτα AFGM] et immediate), quorum igitur primorum (πρώτων A) signa sunt quae in voce, etc.⁷¹

Finally, it is necessary to note that the Syrian Georgius (d. 724) preserves a fragment of a commentary (? Olympiodorus) which explicitly refers to the fact that in this line the text was divided between the adverb and genitive plural, but which then attempts to show that an adverbial interpretation is in fact required (evidently as already traditional among the commentators) for the *genitive plural*!⁷² Furlani showed that Georgius had the genitive plural in the Greek text upon which he based his translation, but the adverb in the lemma of the commentary he translated.

The history of this corruption may be reconstructed with good probability. The Ammonian recension and commentary (A πρώτων/πρῶτον) with Moerbeke’s translation, the Boethian and Armenian translations, and Georgius’ translation with the (?) Olympiodoran fragment all point to the genitive plural as being the oldest known reading. Since vocalic

⁷⁰ AL II.2.41,7. I have verified Busse’s readings here for A (Parisinus Gr. 1942, f. 152v, 12–15 = 24,5–10 Busse). The only questionable reading is in line 12 (= 24,5 Busse: πρῶτον), the ligature of which is somewhat unclear (the accent seems to be acute). The shortcomings of Busse’s edition have been discussed by Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, I.66ff.

⁷¹ Ammonius. *Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. G. Verbeke (Louvain-Paris, 1961): *CLCAG* 2, p. 45,51.

⁷² See Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, I.128 (1.5.3); I.131–32 (1.5.7), and G. Furlani, “Aristoteles, de interpretatione, 16a, 6–7, nach einem syrisch erhaltenen Kommentar,” *Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete*, 1 (1922), 37.

quantities were unstable in later Antiquity, and since the tradition of commentary (at least by Ammonius' time) demanded an adverb, the second omega of the genitive plural began to be replaced by an omicron, thus rendering a reading which was close to the adverb. Therefore these variants most probably came into being in connection with what was presumed by the commentators to be the meaning of the text rather than with the mistakes made by the scribes who copied it. It speaks well of Boethius' reliability as a translator that he retains *primorum* in his translation despite repeatedly using *principaliter* in his commentaries.

That the genitive plural is the best reading will have to be determined on internal grounds; so far, the evidence has shown only that it is a very old reading. Now, literally construed, πρώτων must indicate that the antecedent of the relative pronoun (ὧν) is "first" or "primary," but not necessarily in reference to σημεῖα. ὧν is an objective genitive (cf. below, n. 108) and its antecedent (sc. πρώτα) has been incorporated into the relative clause, thus being attracted to the case of the pronoun itself.⁷³ Παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (a6–7) is appositive. So Aristotle means that mental impressions are "first things," and of them written marks and spoken sounds are the signs. That is how Crossett translates: "The primary [affections] which take place in the soul, however, of which these symbols are signs," etc.⁷⁴ According to the most literal reading of the text, the notions of direct and indirect symbolization are lost altogether. It will be necessary to return to this point presently.

Why "thoughts" and "concepts" enter into St Thomas', Larkin's and Owens' accounts of the passage is perhaps not immediately obvious, for the only cognitive contents or faculties mentioned in these six lines are the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 16a3/7)⁷⁵ which appear afterward to be called ὁμοιώματα. Νόημα does not occur before 16a10. It seems that every conceivable reference and interpretation has been wrung from the handful of words at 16a8–9 in this connection. Larkin does not indicate what is the relationship between a mental impression and a thought or concept, but St Thomas, by whose exposition she is influenced, explicitly identifies *passiones animae* with *intellectus conceptiones*.⁷⁶ Compare Pacius: "παθήματα vocat sensa animi (quae mox appellabit νοήματα) quoniam intellegere est

⁷³ As also sometimes in Latin, e.g. Horace, *Epod.* II.37: quis non *malarum*, quas amor curas habet, / haec inter obliviscitur?

⁷⁴ In, H.G. Apostle, trans. and comm., *Aristotle's Categories and On Propositions (De Interpretatione)* (Grinnell, 1980), p. 136. They are primary, Crossett explains (p. 137, n. 4), because they are common and fundamental to all human experience. It is unclear why Crossett supplies "symbols" for ταῦτα, a6.

⁷⁵ I do not differentiate between the two expressions.

⁷⁶ In *Peri H.*, Lect. II.15.5.

pati.”⁷⁷ Di Cesare has argued that, in using παθήματα Aristotle assumes the theory of active intellect (*De Anima* III.5), that is, that πρώτων does indeed indicate the “first” stages (sensation, imagination) of cognition, but not only the first stages, for even in beasts there is ψόφος, but that is not yet φωνή. A theory of φωνή demands an “agent” intellect which can make assertoric judgements, and that is the central subject of Aristotle’s treatise.⁷⁸ McKeon spoke of there being a discourse in the soul which is symbolized by spoken language;⁷⁹ Saint-Hilaire, of a *parole intérieure de l’âme*,⁸⁰ while Lucio distinguished between *interna* and *externa signa*.⁸¹ O.F. Owen thought Aristotle’s concern to be “language in its construction, being enunciative of the gnostic powers of the soul,” or, “language

⁷⁷ *Aristotelis Organum*, p. 87.

⁷⁸ D. di Cesare, *La Semantica nella Filosofia Greca* (Rome, 1980): Biblioteca di Cultura 186, pp. 173, n. 38–174: “E d’altra parte sarebbe assolutamente incomprensibile l’introduzione dei *pathémata* nel processo di costruzione del linguaggio, se esse non fossero intesi come ‘moti della coscienza creatisi sotto l’azione di alcunché,’ [quotation from Pagliaro] processi psichici attivi formati anche dalle immagini e dai concetti;” *ibid.*, p. 177. R. Brandt (*Die Aristotelische Urteilslehre; Untersuchungen zur ‘Hermeneutik’* [Diss. Marburg, 1965], pp. 13–14) would distinguish two senses of pathemata: those that are *in* the soul (a3–4) and those that are *of* the soul (a6–7) or “first” (a6). The former are *in* intellect, not of sense-perception. The *ἔστι μὲν* at a3 is not, he argues, *solitarium*, but is to be coupled with *ἔστι δέ* at a9, where Aristotle enters into the discussion of simple and combined thoughts. Brandt adduces further support for his distinction from the repetition at 16a11 of the *ἐν τῇ φωνῇ* of a3–4, which, he argues, can be contrasted with *σημεῖα* (a6), with a subjective genitive, *τῆς φωνῆς*, understood (*σημεῖα τῆς φωνῆς*). But, quite apart from the fact that Aristotle does not mention “signs of spoken sound,” it is unclear how this expression would have to be interpreted if applied. How are “the things in spoken sound” which are “symbols” of “the impressions in the soul” (or: “thoughts in the soul”) to be distinguished from the “signs” (sc. of spoken sounds) of “the first impressions of the soul”? Does Brandt mean that beasts, when they howl, signify sense-perceptions rather than phantasms? Furthermore, Brandt, if I understand correctly, would locate the meaning of “first” (a6) in sense-perception, although it is more likely a reference (see below) to *De An.* 432a12, which does *not* take into account sense-perception (cf. 432a9–10), but seeks to distinguish the simplest thoughts from phantasms (and hence, from perceptions one stage lower).

⁷⁹ R. McKeon, “Aristotle’s Conception of Language and the Arts of Language,” *Classical Philology*, 41 (1946), 194: “Aristotle was convinced . . . that meaning was no less an integral part of language than the sounds which bear the meaning and that language depends no less on the rational power of man by which meanings are constructed than on the physiological organs by which sounds are formed. Language is therefore studied in psychology, for not only is the use of discourse one of the marks which differentiate the rational from the sensitive powers of soul, but a ‘discourse of the mind’ may be differentiated from the ‘outer discourse’ expressed in words.”

⁸⁰ J.B. Saint-Hilaire, trans. and comm., *Logique de Aristote*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1939–44), I. xxxii.

⁸¹ *Aristotelis Organum*, pp. 102–03. *Interna Signa* = “*animi sensa seu notiones*, quibus ipsae rerum similitudines intellectui nostro repraesentantur; [logica] internos illos duntaxat animi, de rebus cognoscendis, conceptus, per externa rerum symbola cum ratione dirigere docet;” *Externa Signa* = “*sunt internarum tantum animi passionum, seu conceptionum de rebus, symbola.*”

as the interpretation of thought.”⁸² Arens, on the other hand, expresses doubt about the psychological scope of the passage, translating παθήματα first as “impression,” “imagination,” “concept,” “(to) form in the mind,” and “think.” He also speaks of the pathemata, however, as little more than the “purely passive process” involved in the formation of images on the “photographic plate” of the soul.⁸³ The reference at 16a8–9 to the *De Anima* is not in all cases helpful in discovering Aristotle’s meaning; some scholars question whether it is Aristotle’s at all, while others disagree over precisely which section of the *De Anima* we are being directed to.⁸⁴

In this connection it is possible to see that πρώτων is the *best* reading for 16a6. Ammonius, no doubt Boethius as well, holds that at *Peri Hermeneias*

⁸² O.F. Owen, trans., *The Organon or Logical Treatises of Aristotle, with the Introduction of Porphyry*, 2 vols. (London, 1908), I.47, n. 3, almost certainly following Ammonius, *In de Int.* 5, 17–19.

⁸³ H. Arens, *Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Its Tradition: Texts from 500 to 1750* (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1984): *ASTH* 29, p. 31: “Now the concrete thing . . . can only leave its individual picture in the soul or on the photographic plate, and only something like it can be imagined or evoked before ‘the mind’s eye,’ for instance, a tree in the form of an oak or pine or poplar, whereas the word signifies a notion, the genus tree, not a species nor an individual appearance. So Aristotle’s famous theory omits the specific human process of abstraction and analogy, the precondition of language. That is the cause of its inconsistency: the notion tree, the significate of the words δόρυ, arbor, tree, Baum, cannot be an image of the real trees. The gap will be filled by the commentators.”

⁸⁴ Ackrill, who suggests that it may be an editor’s remark, refers to *De An.* III.3–8: *Categories and De Interpretatione*, p. 113; Gohlke, on the other hand, is certain it was Aristotle’s own comment: P. Gohlke, trans., *Kategorien und Hermeneutik* (Paderborn, 1951), p. 119, n. 1; Pacius (*Aristotelis Organum*, p. 87) referred to III.5; Waitz (*Organon*, I.326) to *De An.* III.6; Kretzmann (“Spoken Sound,” p. 9) suggests *De An.* III.8; Arens (*Theory of Language*, pp. 32–33) mentions numerous passages from books 2 and 3. It has been suggested, following Littig and Maier, that the line should be transposed to 16a13: Brandt, *Aristotelische Urteilslehre*, p. 12, n. 3; P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, 2 vols. (Berlin-NY, 1973/84): Peripatoi 5–6, I.119, n. 9; cf. Belardi, *Linguaggio*, pp. 271–72. Difficulties concerning the reference to *De Anima* began in Antiquity, for, according to Boethius (*In Perih.* II.11–13), Andronicus of Rhodes athetized the treatise on the ground that *De An.* 432a10–14 has no discussion of *passiones animae* in the sense of *affectiones* (cf. 403a5–10). His correction of Andronicus follows Alexander: the *passiones animae* are not to be understood as *affectiones* but as *intellectus*. Ammonius (*In de Int.* 5, 24–6, 22), on the other hand, provides a different account of Andronicus’ view. Andronicus, he explains, saw that Aristotle in the *Peri Hermeneias* refers to τὰ νοήματα as παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, but could not find any passage in the *De Anima* where Aristotle does the same. Andronicus therefore conjectured that two works were concealed by the reference, one of which had to be spurious. But that was not the *De Anima*. Ammonius himself maintains that in the *De Anima*, Aristotle identifies imagination with the passive intellect, and that that explains his use, in the *Peri Hermeneias*, of “impressions in the soul,” instead of “thoughts.” Courcelle therefore incorrectly argues for Boethius’ dependence upon Ammonius in this regard (cf. below, p. 54, n. 14). Montanari thinks that the reports of Boethius and Ammonius are not incompatible, and that each accounts for part of a double argument advanced by Andronicus (*Sezione Linguistica*, I.139 [1.7.2.6]). Even if this be the case, Courcelle’s conclusions are unsound.

16a8–9 Aristotle is referring to *De Anima* III.8, 432a12–14,⁸⁵ but neither he nor Boethius explains what possible significance that passage of the *De Anima* might hold for *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6. Difficulties in discerning the precise reference of the lines have led some modern commentators to conjecture that 16a8–9 is no more than a gloss which should be transposed to 16a13, i.e., after Aristotle has mentioned the difference between combined and uncombined thoughts. Reading the genitive plural at 16a6, however, will resolve many difficulties if we interpret παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς against the background of the πρῶτα νοήματα.⁸⁶ Thus understood, πρῶτων eases considerably the otherwise rather abrupt transition from παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς to νόημα (16a10). And when we recall that νόημα is first used in connection with the observation that some thoughts or concepts are either true or false (i.e. in combination) but others are not, the reading makes especially good sense. The πρῶτα νοήματα, simple, uncombined notions, lie somewhere between mental impressions and the assertoric judgements which, when read back into 16a3–8, have bedevilled so many commentators, but particularly those who accept πρῶτως.⁸⁷ For it is the adverb at 16a6 that has made commentators puzzle over the connection between 16a3–8 and 16a9ff.: Why does Aristotle suddenly drop the “triadic” theory of meaning that appears to be outlined in the opening lines? Kretzmann and Pépin will approach the difficulty by giving πρῶτως an interpretation which removes the triadic theory altogether, but without addressing the question of whether or not the older reading πρῶτων is what Aristotle wrote. If, however, πρῶτων turns out to be appropriate in the context of the opening lines of the treatise, then there will be no point in seeking a new interpretation for πρῶτως.

⁸⁵ Ammonius, *In de Int.* 25,31–26,2; Boethius, *In Perih.* II.28,1–25 (below, p. 96f.). Boethius does not state that lines 8–9 refer specifically to *De Anima* 432a10–14, but his quotation and translation of the latter (II.28,3–13) indicate that he thinks it to be the passage which is explanatory of the lemma, 16a3–9 (II.25,6–14; cf. I.41,11–15). Cf. Hicks, *De Anima*, pp. 547–48, on the reading at 432a13, also discussed below, p. 108ff..

⁸⁶ Cf. Furlani, “Aristoteles, de interpretatione, 16a, 6–7,” p. 37, line 16.

⁸⁷ Although adopting the adverb, Jean Pépin offers some valuable remarks: “SYMBOΛΑ, ΣΗΜΕΙΑ, ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑΤΑ. A Propos de De interpretatione I, 16a3–8 et Politique VIII 5, 1340 a6–39,” in *Aristoteles und Seine Schule*, ed. J. Wiesner (Berlin-NY, 1985): Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung I, p. 32 with n. 27. He cites *De An.* 429b24–25, 429a13–18, and 403a8–9 in order to show that the distinction made between imagination and thought (432a10–14) also underscores their affinity with one another (cf. 433a10) and with perception. Pépin is right to argue that the use of νόημα is indicative of the general bearing of the opening lines, but he may overstate the case (p. 40) in claiming that mental impressions can include fully formed thoughts, judgements, etc. The fact that Aristotle refers to mental impressions as likenesses of things implies that they are “true” rather than “false,” and that suits well the πρῶτα νοήματα. Not all assertoric judgements, on the other hand, are true.

It is noteworthy that, in commenting upon the *Categories*, Simplicius expands the phrase διὰ μέσων τῶν νοημάτων by adding the words ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων.⁸⁸ A similar addition is found in Ammonius on the *Categories*.⁸⁹ The additional words are no doubt to be explained in light of the commentators' efforts to account for the subject matter of the *Categories* (i.e. uncombined words which are significative of the classes of being), which is different from that of the *Peri Hermeneias*; but the use of nearly the same phrase is indeed striking: when Aristotle lays down (as the commentators believe he does) the theory of words signifying "through the mediation of thoughts," he means the *first* thoughts. The point becomes most clear when it is observed that Themistius supplies the words ἀπλᾶ καὶ πρώτα in clarification of the ταῦτα (as he reads) of *De Anima* 432a13, which is, of course, one of the lines in the very text to which Ammonius explicitly refers *Peri Hermeneias* 16a8–9, and which Boethius quotes in his explication of 16a3–9.⁹⁰ So although the ancient commentators find a connection between the two passages, they do not bring what is said about "first" thoughts at *De Anima* 432a10–14 to bear upon the question of the correct reading at *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6, since they give preference to πρώτως according to the belief that Aristotle is arguing that words signify things "through the mediation of thoughts." There is, it seems, no need to move 16a8–9 to 16a13. Rather, there is philosophical justification in accepting part, if not all, of what the commentators indicate. *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–9 does indeed take into account the "simple and first" thoughts of the *De Anima*. So long as we are not committed to the presuppositions (a) that Aristotle is proposing a doctrine that locates thoughts midway between words and things, and (b) that he must have written πρώτως at 16a6 in support of that doctrine, the matter is clear. At *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6 he has in mind the "simple and first" thoughts which are discussed, as he tells us,⁹¹ in *De Anima* III.8, but it is unnecessary for him now to enter into the "other subject" of how they differ from phantasms and perception, etc. Instead, he will proceed to the discussion of the

⁸⁸ See above, n. 24 (Ammonius); Simplicius, *In Cat.* 13,20–21.

⁸⁹ *In Cat.* 12,1.

⁹⁰ Themistius, *In de An.* 116,17.

⁹¹ This argument does not depend upon the view that Aristotle wrote lines 8–9, although I see no reason to doubt that he did. Cf. Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, I.142ff.; II.63. Montanari is certain, however, that the *Peri Hermeneias* is a later treatise than the *De Anima*, and that lines 8–9 were not added by Aristotle himself. This is a problem into which we cannot enter here. It is necessary only to see that, if 16a6 does take into account the "first" thoughts of 432a12, then it makes good sense for Aristotle to point out at 16a8–9 that, "these things have been discussed in the treatise on the soul," i.e., that what is said about the "first" thoughts in the *De Anima* is indeed relevant to both 16a3–8 and 16a9ff., but that it belongs to another enquiry.

difference between simple and complex thoughts—i.e., to the idea that some thoughts are necessarily either true or false while others are not—since that is pertinent to the subject matter of the *Peri Hermeneias*. Lines 8–9 constitute, then, a transitional statement⁹² which both establishes a legitimate connection between 16a3–8 and *De Anima* 432a10–14 (the isolated concepts or impressions in the soul which are neither true nor false), and leads into 16a9ff. (having established that spoken sounds are significative of these “first” thoughts, Aristotle now raises the question of what is true or false, without pursuing the issue of how assertoric statements signify things either within or outside of the mind). That, however, can be evident only so long as the genitive plural *πρώτων* is retained at 16a6.

An English translation with the virtue of being more precise than that in the Oxford Aristotle is that of Apostle:

Spoken expressions are symbols of mental impressions, and written expressions [are symbols] of spoken expressions. And just as not all men have the same writing, so not all men make the same vocal sounds, but the things of which [all] these are primarily signs are the same mental impressions for all men, and the things of which these [mental impressions] are likenesses are ultimately the same.⁹³

The intrusive “all” (= ταῦτα, 16a6) suggests that spoken sounds and written marks bear the same relation to mental impressions, i.e., that they are “primarily signs” of them. That, we shall see, is a plausible interpretation of ταῦτα. The translation is strict at σημεία, but vague at πρώτων (? πρώτως). Are spoken sounds and written marks (a) primarily *signs* (as opposed to symbols) of mental impressions, or (b) signs *primarily* of mental impressions (and thus signs secondarily of actual things)? The new possibility signalled by the stricter translation is subtle, but not to be overlooked. Notice, for example, the manner in which it is obfuscated by Cooke’s version (emphasis added):

Words spoken are *symbols or signs* of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are *primarily signs*,⁹⁴

⁹² Thus 16a9 immediately resumes with ἔστι δέ, balancing the ἔστι μὲν (οὖν) of 16a3. Furthermore, the ὥσπερ of 16a9 (“just as there is sometimes in the soul a thought which is neither true nor false . . .”) suggests a connection with something already mentioned (sc. the “first” thoughts or impressions). Cf. ὥσπερ, 16a5. See also Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica* I.143 (1.7.4.4).

⁹³ *Categories and On Propositions*, p. 30. Cf. Owen, *Organon*, I.46–47: “Those things . . . which are in the voice, are *symbols* of the passions of the soul, and when written, are *symbols* . . . yet those passions of the soul, of which these are *primarily the signs* . . .”

⁹⁴ *The Categories; On Interpretation*, p. 115. It is difficult to know precisely what to make

and how that of Tricot, although preserving the lexical difference between symbols and signs, clearly favors (b) (emphasis added):

Les sons émis par la voix sont les *symboles* des états de l'âme, et les mots écrits les *symboles* des mots émis par la voix. Et de même que l'écriture n'est pas la même chez tous les hommes, les mots parlés ne sont pas plus les mêmes, bien que les états de l'âme dont ces expressions sont les *signes immédiats*⁹⁵

Now if (a) is correct, it will be necessary to find some philological basis for distinguishing a sign from a symbol; (b) on the other hand, leads back to the sense of the Oxford translation, for it implies that a word's sense takes precedence over its reference. The new possibility is disclosed simply by retaining the symbol-sign difference. Apostle does not indicate which alternative is intended, but in his glossary he gives an entry only for "sign," which he associates with the category of Relation. Signs are relatives whose correlatives are *significata*, and, "Signification is a relation. That which signifies is a sign or expression . . . and in the soul it is an impression, while that which is signified is an object Synonym: 'mean'."⁹⁶ Here Apostle, like Larkin, has missed the mark, for Aristotle does not speak of impressions in the soul as signs, but only as likenesses. Moreover, to call them "signs" adds at least this complication: if spoken sounds, written marks *and* mental impressions are "signs," then they all share a similar or identical relation to extramental *significata*; yet the Nature-Convention antithesis which is so clearly a part of Aristotle's doctrine demands that written marks and spoken sounds be different from mental impressions and actual things by being at opposite poles of the sign (or symbol) relation. So (a) whether written marks and spoken sounds are signs *or* symbols of mental impressions, it ought in any event to be clear that they are not "the same for all;" whereas (b) the (signified *or* symbolized) mental impressions, like actual things, *are* the same for all. It is possible to doubt whether, or in which sense, written marks and spoken

of Gohlke's translation, *Kategorien und Hermeneutik*, p. 86: "Die Sprache ist Zeichen und Gleichnis für die seelischen Vorgänge, die Schrift wieder für die Sprache Die seelischen Vorgänge jedoch, die sie *eigentlich* bedeuten sollen" Further inaccuracy is introduced by the use of *Sprache* and *Schrift* (cf. below, n. 128; Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, II.34 [1.2.3]).

⁹⁵ *Organon*, I.77–78. Cf. Saint-Hilaire, *Logique*, I.148: "Les mots dans la parole ne sont que l'image des modifications de l'âme; et l'écriture n'est que l'image des mots que la parole exprime. De même que l'écriture n'est pas identique pour tous les hommes, de même les langues ne sont pas non plus semblables. Mais les modifications de l'âme, dont les mots sont les signes immédiats"

⁹⁶ Apostle, *Categories and On Propositions*, p. 149. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 98: "The difference between a symbol and a sign is not discussed here. One may read Kretzmann's 'Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention'," etc.

sounds are signs as opposed to symbols, but Aristotle provides no basis for the view that a mental impression is a sign.⁹⁷

“All too brief and far from satisfactory,” is Ackrill’s assessment of Aristotle’s account of the relation between spoken sounds, written marks, mental impressions and actual things, and this for two reasons.⁹⁸ (a) Aristotle does not make clear what he means by τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, later called ὁμοιώματα and νόημα. Their relation to sense-perceptions and mental images is obscure; and to speak of them as likenesses is insufficient even as a description of simple thoughts, but especially so if Aristotle means thoughts that are or can be expressed in sentences, for of what is the thought that “the cat will soon wake,” if true, a likeness? If false, how can it be a likeness at all?⁹⁹ (b) Aristotle leaves unexplained what it means for a spoken sound to be a “symbol” of something in the mind. “There are,” he concludes, “grave weaknesses in Aristotle’s theory of meaning;” but, he adds, the difficulties are mitigated by the fact that the idea of spoken sounds symbolizing mental impressions, which in turn are likenesses of things, is not central to the *Peri Hermeneias*, and what Aristotle says is largely independent of psychological speculation, or of the “special theory about words, thoughts and things.” That is, Aristotle subordinates the “the theory of meaning” to an argument in support of the view that *language is conventional*. Kretzmann takes his approach one step further: Aristotle, in this passage, is arguing *only* that language is significant by convention, and is not at all delineating a theory of meaning.¹⁰⁰

Now since it is the traditional reading of this passage at which Kretzmann’s analysis is aimed, and since that reading is supposed to depend upon the historical influence of Boethius’ mistranslation of Aristotle’s Greek, it will be necessary for us to investigate Kretzmann’s evaluation of this difficult text, and to examine some of its presuppositions *in extenso*.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 98–99. Aristotle gives only a tentative explanation of mental impressions, referring to them as non-verbal images in the soul which are not restricted only to sensible objects.

⁹⁸ *Categories and De Interpretatione*, pp. 113–14.

⁹⁹ As Ackrill advances no supporting argument for this assertion, I trust that the objection has already been met (above, p. 32f.). It will in any case be clear from *De An.* 430b4–6 that the formation of such judgements as that Cleon is, was, or will be white is due to νοῦς, which evidently is not what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of ὁμοιώματα (= πρῶτα νοήματα) in the present passage. Aristotle himself (*De An.* 429a15–18) describes τὸ νοεῖν as involving an element of likeness. Certainly the “first” thoughts can be likenesses of natural objects, but they are not judgements. He does not begin to discuss the idea of true and false notions until 16a9, at which point the reference to likenesses ceases.

¹⁰⁰ Kretzmann follows Ackrill’s translation (above), the only one that, in this view, “shows an understanding of the text.”

Only then will it be possible to have a balanced view, as the present goal demands, of the Latin translation itself. Kretzmann begins by identifying the semantical elements and relations posited by Aristotle (placing them in order of natural priority):

Actual Things	Likenesses
Mental Impressions	Signs
Spoken Sounds	Symbols
Written Marks.	

Eight semantical claims are found in the passage:

- (1) Written marks are symbols of spoken sounds
- (2) Spoken sounds are symbols of mental impressions
- (3) Spoken sounds are (in the first place) signs of mental impressions
- (4) Mental impressions are likenesses of actual things
- (5) Written marks are not the same for all
- (6) Spoken sounds are not the same for all
- (7) Mental impressions are the same for all
- (8) Actual things are the same for all.¹⁰¹

And it is pointed out that no relation, indirect or direct, is explicitly established between spoken sounds and actual things.¹⁰² That relation is, at best, implicit in *πρώτως* (16a6), the reading Kretzmann adopts. Explication of claims (1) and (2) provides grounds for some preliminary comments concerning the meaning of *σύμβολα*. Kretzmann claims that in this passage “symbols” means neither names that are likenesses of other things, nor names that are representations of things (at least not in the sense that the owl is said to be a symbol of Minerva), nor names that are symptomatic indices of things (as smoke is of fire).¹⁰³ Claim (1) therefore requires no assumption about the semantical function of written marks; it requires only that written marks be “rule-governed embodiments” of something in the vocal medium. Similarly, for claim (2): spoken sounds are “rule-governed embodiments” of things that take place in another medium, the soul. And as written marks are “encoding” symbols of spoken sounds, so spoken sounds are “encoding” symbols of mental impressions (but “decoding” symbols of written marks). Claim (3) prompts

¹⁰¹ “Aristotle on Spoken Sound,” pp. 4; 10.

¹⁰² “There is nothing explicit in these four claims relating spoken sounds or written marks to actual things, nor is there any apparent implicit claim about such a relationship. When we are told that spoken sounds are symbols and signs of mental impressions and that mental impressions are likenesses of actual things, we are given no license to infer anything at all about a relationship between spoken sounds and actual things” (p. 4).

¹⁰³ For this and what follows, “Aristotle on Spoken Sound,” pp. 5–8.

two questions: (a) Are signs the same as symbols? (b) Does “in the first place” mean the priority of sign relation over symbol relation, or that of sense over (an implicit theory of) reference? Kretzmann argues for a negative reply to (a), and so adopts the “working hypothesis” that signs are natural, and symbols non-natural, means of inference: “Elsewhere in Aristotle and in other authors before him and after him, the words ‘σημεῖον’ and ‘σύμβολον’ differ in being associated broadly with natural and with artificial indications, respectively This natural/artificial division is the philological basis of my hypothesis.” Later occurrences of σημεῖον do not, he holds, threaten the “stricter interpretation” being developed for lines 16a3–9.

Some reservations may be stated at once. Kretzmann’s conception of the difference between these two words lays the argument open to question, for although Kretzmann makes reference to Bonitz’s index, he does not explain what the evidence therein indicates, except to note that Bonitz thought the two words to be synonymous. Moreover, virtually no evidence outside of Aristotle is presented (Ammonius is but referred to in a note). Waitz believed that the two words could be thus differentiated.¹⁰⁴ Among the evidence of or near Aristotle’s own time, there is Plato’s association of σύμβολον with νόμισμα (state-sanctioned coinage), which Aristotle himself explains in connection with νόμος (originally from νέμειν). Ammonius, it may be added, compares conventional languages to νομίσματα, while Boethius finds a likeness between words and *nummi*.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, the Aristophanic myth in Plato’s *Symposium* refers to male and

¹⁰⁴ Waitz, *Organon*, I.324f. (16a4): “Ut sibi opponuntur σύμβολα et μῆματα sic etiam σημεῖα et ὁμοιώματα, eo tamen discrimine, ut illa sint κατὰ συνθήκην (pendent enim ab iis de quibus homines inter se convenerunt), haec vero in rebus ipsis posita sint (das σύμβολον ist ein subjectives σημεῖον, das ὁμοίωμα ein objectives μῆμα).” Also, Tricot, *Organon*, I.77, n. 3: “La symbole est un signe conventionnel;” Crossett, in Apostle, *Categories and On Propositions*, p. 137: “symbols are a kind of sign. Men speaking the same language hear the noises as symbols; men hearing others converse in a foreign language . . . can only take what are symbols to the speakers as signs that they are speaking a language. If the foreigners begin to teach him their language, the noises become symbols as soon as he understands what they are signs of (16a26–28).” But cf. Steinthal’s objection (*Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, I.182 n.) to Waitz’s view: the two words, he holds, are used interchangeably in this passage, and “sign” in any case can mean ‘standard’ or ‘seal;’ also, in the *Cratylus*, no technical distinction can be attached to Plato’s use of some of the same terminology as is found in Aristotle’s passage. Steinthal argues that Plato and Aristotle are in essential agreement, for Aristotle (16a27–29; *Sens. et Sensib.* 437a13–15) rejects the “tool” theory of words, as Plato does in the *Cratylus*. A view of these two words which is similar to that of Waitz is found in Brandt, *Aristotelische Urteilslehre*, pp. 33–34, who incorrectly cites *Sph. El.* 165a7 as though from the *Topics*. On the Pythagorean “symbol,” cf. DK 58 C 6.

¹⁰⁵ Plato, *Rpb.* 371b8; Aristotle, *NE* 1133a30–31; Ammonius, *In de Int.* 22,27: καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ θύρα λέγεται μὲν εἶναι ξύλον καὶ τὸ νόμισμα χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσὸς (οὕτω δὲ λέγονται ὡς ἐκ τούτων ἔχοντα τὴν γένεσιν, φυσικῶν δυντῶν πραγμάτων, αὐτὰ κατὰ τοὺς

female as “symbols,” and gender is clearly a matter of *nature*—the metaphorical underpinning of the myth notwithstanding.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, in discussing the Empedoclean theory of generation, Aristotle refers to the male and female seeds when separated as “symbols.” Here it is impossible that he means something artificial, since the bearing of Empedocles’ remark is the divided φύσις of the embryo.¹⁰⁷ Again, a survey of LSJ produces clear evidence that not all σύμβολα are artificial,¹⁰⁸ nor all

ἐπιτεθέντας τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις χαρακτῆρας καὶ τὰ σχήματα τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ξύλα τοίως ἢ τοίως συντεθῇ, τότε λέγομεν γεγονέναι θύραν ἢ θρόνον, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὅταν ὁ χρυσὸς τοιούσδε δέξηται τύπους, τότε γίνεται νόμισμα, τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τρόπον οὐχ ἀπλῶς φωναὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα, ἀλλὰ τοιῶσδε μορφωθεῖσαι καὶ διαπλασθεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῆς λεκτικῆς φαντασίας καὶ σύμβολα νομισθεῖσαι τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διανοημάτων. ἴδοι δὲ ἂν τις ὁ λέγομεν ἑναργῶς, ὅτι φύσις μὲν αἱ φωναί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα κατὰ συνθήκην, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ γενετῆς κωφῶν; Boethius, *In Perih.* II.32,13: sicut nummus quoque non solum aes impressum quadam figura est, ut nummus vocetur, sed etiam ut alicuius rei sit pretium: eodem quoque modo verba et nomina non solum voces sunt, sed positae ad quandam intellectuum significationem. vox enim quae nihil designat, ut est “garalus,” licet eam grammatici figuram vocis intuentes nomen esse contendunt, tamen eam nomen philosophia non putabit, nisi sit posita ut designare animi aliquam conceptionem eoque modo rerum aliquid possit. etenim nomen alicuius nomen esse necesse erit; sed si vox aliqua nihil designat, nullius nomen est; quare si nullius est, ne nomen quidem esse dicitur. Festus explicitly connects *nummus* with νόμισμα: *Sign. Verb.* p. 177. Νόμος and *nummus* may derive from a common Italic prototype: G. P. Shipp, *NOMOS* “Law” (Sydney, 1978): The Australian Academy of the Humanities 4, p. 16. The “two impositions” is a doctrine discussed by Porphyry (*In Cat.* 57,2–58,20) which is used to distinguish the grammatical from the logical study of language (cf. Boethius, *Intr. Syll. Cat.* 762c). For the grammarian, any sound capable of inflection is a name; for the philosopher, it is necessary that the name have meaning, and that is established by convention. Boethius and Ammonius compare the meaning to the impressions stamped upon bronze in minting currency. The distinction appears elsewhere in Ammonius (*In Cat.* 11,7–12,1), and it appears in Simplicius (*In Cat.* 15,2–16) and Dexippus (*In Cat.* 11,4–17). Cf. Dionysius Thrax, on derivatives, *Ars Grammatica*, p. 25,3–5. Augustine alludes to (*Doct. Chr.* II.25.39 = *PL* 34.55) the conventionality of minted currency, but makes no connection with language, although (II.3.4 = *PL* 34.37) he does refer to all signs as *quasi quaedam verba visibilia*. Horace (*AP* 58–59) speaks of “coining” words (*nota producere nomen* [*?procludere nummum*], n.b. the use of *nota*, Boethius’ translation (later) of Aristotle’s σύμβολον); Suetonius (*Aug.* 75; 94 *fin.*) uses *nota* to express the idea of marks stamped upon metal in the minting of coins. It is interesting to compare the metaphor as it has survived after the Middle Ages, e.g., in Shakespeare, *Cor.* III.i.76 (“So shall my lungs coin words”), and Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* 120, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (NY, 1968), p. 49e (“Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it.”).

¹⁰⁶ *Symp.* 191d4.

¹⁰⁷ DK 31 B 63 = *GA* 722b11; cf. 764b17, with M.R. Wright, *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments* (New Haven, 1981), pp. 117; 218–19.

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Anaxagoras, DK 59 B 19, the rainbow that portends a storm (χειμῶνος . . . σύμβολον); the attestations in Galen and Aretaeus (LSJ, s.v. σύμβολον, III.3). It appears that the use of the word in reference to medical symptoms is somewhat rare. Of approximately ten instances in Galen, at least six (*De Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* III.8) have the meaning, ‘allegory,’ and are not concerned with medical symptoms at all. Note, however, the meteorological connotation in the scholium on Aratus, *Phaen.* 832 (impurity in the air =

σημεῖα natural.¹⁰⁹ Finally, on the basis of extensive philological research W. Mūri argued for an interpretation of σύμβολον which must challenge Kretzmann's hypothesis. Mūri showed that, besides the older uses of the word (those related primarily to the *tessera hospitalis*), σύμβολον acquires connotations which come directly from the verb συμβάλλεσθαι (-ειν) and which are closely associated, even synonymous, with σημεῖον (*symbolon-Zeichen*). A symbol in this sense is a means of inference: it leads to a conclusion, conjecture or understanding of that to which it is related or linked.

χειμῶνος . . . σύμβολον): *Scholia in Aratum Vetera*, ed. J. Martin (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 414, with which may be compared Archilochus (σῆμα χειμῶνος, a cloud signifying a storm), in M.L. West, ed., *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1971), I.41 (105.3). Aeschylus (*Ag.* 144) and Pindar (*Ol.* 12.10) use "symbol" for portents; Aeschylus makes it equivalent to τέκμαρ (*Ag.* 315; cf. Sophocles, *OT* 221 = "clue," clearly not a conventional indication as to the source of the Theban pest; while at *ibid.* 710; 1059, σημεῖα = 'evidence'). Denniston and Page draw attention to the difference between expressions with objective and subjective genitives. Τοῦτων σύμβολα ordinarily means, "that which portends these things," not, "that which these things portend" (as e.g. at *Ag.* 8: λαμπάδος τὸ σύμβολον). See J.D. Denniston and D. Page, edd. and comm., *Aeschylus: Agamemnon* (Oxford, 1957), p. 82, with E. Fraenkel, ed., trans., and comm., *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1950), II.88. It is obvious that Aristotle is using the objective genitive at 16a6. Four of the references in Bonitz's Index (*Meteor.* 360a26; *EE* 1239b31; *GC* 331a24 with Joachim ad. loc.; 332a32) argue against Kretzmann's hypothesis, for they show applications to the term that bear upon natural phenomena.

¹⁰⁹ The attestations in LSJ (s.v. σημεῖον, I.3–8) in which "sign" stands for indications that are not natural in origin raise serious difficulties concerning the hypothesis. Herodotus uses the word for naval signals or ensigns (7.128; 8.92); Xenophon uses it for military standards (*Cyr.* 8.5.13); Plato uses it in connection with the impressions made in wax by signets (*Thl.* 191d7). As at *Symp.* 191d4 (above, n. 106), there is perhaps room for doubt here, for Plato does not address the question of whether or not one must learn to "decipher" the seal-impression, or whether its significance is naturally evident. But the two metaphors are quite clear. In the *Symposium*, Aristophanes is made to use the metaphor of legal symbols to explain what is a fact of nature, erotic attraction. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates is made to use a conventional sign (seal-impression) as an illustration of the (natural) processes of memory. Σύμβολον is appropriate in the first case, because it suggests the rejoining of two separated halves; σημεῖον is appropriate in the second because it conveys the notion of the preservation of an image in a pliable medium. At least six of the references in Bonitz (*Rht.* 1383b30–84a8; 1386b2) cast doubt on the distinction Kretzmann defends. Aristotle thinks of behavior, dress and speech as "signs" of obsequiousness, effeminacy, suffering (to arouse pity), etc. It is difficult to conceive of these as being natural symptoms, since in many instances the behaviour will be contrived. Cf. *Poet.* 1454b19–55a21, where Aristotle discusses different forms of *anagnorismos* ("signs"); in Homer (*Od.* XXI.231; XXIII.73; 110; 206; 225; 273; XXIV.346) the related σῆμα is used in connection with what can only be "conventional" as opposed to natural methods of recognition. At *Poet.* 1462a6 and *Rht.* 1417b2 "sign" and "symbol" are used for virtually identical purposes. And when Porphyry (*In Cat.* 56,2) refers to the special terms invented by Aristotle as "signs," the symbol-sign difference seems to vanish altogether. If it be objected that in this passage Porphyry cites the category of Relation, and that of all correlatives it is true to say that one is necessarily a "sign" (index) of the other (e.g., every wing is indicative of a "winged" and every rudder of a "ruddered"), it need only be pointed out that this is incidental to Porphyry's main observation, sc., that Aristotle sometimes invents "signs" for concepts which have no names already (e.g. "entelechy").

The connection with the significate can be either natural or arbitrary. In our passage, of course, it is the latter; but, Mūri observes, Aristotle frequently uses the more basic synonym, σημεῖον.¹¹⁰ Bellemare has argued against Mūri that σύμβολα, 16a4, may in fact derive from one of the older meanings of the word, but he also argues against the reduction of σύμβολον to a *signe conventionnel*.¹¹¹

Following is Arens' observation, which is almost certainly directed at Kretzmann's hypothesis:

Note concerning 'symbolon' and 'sêmeion.' In 2 Aristotle calls the onoma and rhema "symbols" of the mental impressions, and in 4 "semeia" of them; on the other hand, he also calls the written forms "symbola" of the spoken ones: this clearly proves that he does not make any difference between symbolon and semeion. It would have been unnecessary to point this out if nobody had claimed that there was such a difference.¹¹²

Arens' proof is misconceived, however, in two respects. (a) Aristotle does not call the *name* and *verb* symbols (the commentators will supply that), but he calls *spoken sounds* and *written marks* symbols; name and verb are *subintelligenda*,¹¹³ but only for those who find in the passage a theory of meaning, as Kretzmann does not. For on his view, the introduction of "name" and "verb" must necessarily involve *petitio principii*, since names and

¹¹⁰ W. Mūri, "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ. Wort- und Sachgeschichtliche Studie," *Beilage zum Jahresbericht über das Städtische Gymnasium in Bern* 1–3, 1931, rpt. in idem, *Griechische Studien: Ausgewählte Wort- und Sachgeschichtliche Forschungen zur Antike*, ed. E. Vischer (Basel, 1976); Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 15, p. 19: "Aristoteles setzt in der Darlegung seiner Sprachtheorie symbolon synonym neben das häufigere σημεῖον (de interpr. passim). Daß er aber jenes gerade in solchem Zusammenhange einführt, mag seinem guten Grund haben. Die Nomina sind . . . symbola für die Vorstellungen; diese entsprechen den Dingen, jene Zeichen also mittelbar den Dingen . . . Nicht jeder Lautbestand ist ein Nomen, welches bedeutet; keiner ist es durch sich selbst (φύσει), sondern erst dadurch, daß ihn das Denken als Zeichen für Dinge benützt. Die Bedeutung der Laute wird also festgesetzt. Weil die Wörter κατὰ συνθήκην bedeuten, wählte Aristoteles, über den Begriff des bloßen Zeichens (σημεῖον) hinausgehend, symbolon: Zeichen—und darin klingt mit: auf Grund einer Übereinkunft." Despite the fact that Mūri does not give a *philosophical* analysis of the passage, nor would he agree to Kretzmann's philological premiss, he nevertheless confirms the view that is the object of Kretzmann's criticism. For he shows that taking the two words as synonyms tends to limit the sense of the passage to that which the ancient commentators defend but Kretzmann denies, i.e., by finding a triadic structure according to which thoughts are made to mediate spoken sounds and actual things. Similar reasoning is evident in the analysis of K. Gyekye, "Aristotle on Language and Meaning," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 14 (1974) 72.

¹¹¹ P. Bellemare, "Symbole: fondements anthropobiologiques de la doctrine aristotelienne du langage," *Philosophiques*, 9 (1982), 265–79. Cf. T.H. Irwin, "Aristotle's Concept of Signification," in, *Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L. Owen*, edd. M. Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1982), p. 256, n. 15; Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, II.39–43.

¹¹² *Theory of Language*, p. 27.

¹¹³ Cf. Boethius, *In Perih.* II.30,30: subaudiendum est verba et nomina.

verbs are conventional things, while spoken sounds *qua* spoken sounds are natural.¹¹⁴ Kretzmann will use this to explain the presence of *σημεῖα* in line 6. (b) Kretzmann in any case does not deny that Aristotle calls written marks “symbols,” but in fact observes that, “What is clearer about written marks than about spoken sounds . . . is the conventionality of their relation to what they immediately symbolize,”¹¹⁵ and his argument is based on the hypothesis that conventionality is to be associated with “symbol,” not with “sign.” So *if* the backward reference of the words *ταῦτα σημεῖα* (16a6, claim 3) is spoken sounds but not written marks as well, Kretzmann will have found support for his distinction. That is, the symbol-sign distinction is introduced only in connection with spoken sounds, about which, Kretzmann will argue, Aristotle has two ways of thinking: as natural symptoms, and as conventional symbols, of what takes place in the soul. Dogs bark and human beings laugh, but only human beings speak languages such as Greek or Latin. The “working hypothesis” is put forward as a test of the coherence of Aristotle’s eight claims, but Kretzmann adduces support for it from *Peri Hermeneias* 16a26–29, where Aristotle contrasts the natural and symptomatic sounds made by beasts with the artificial languages of men.¹¹⁶ The appearance of *νόημα* in the same chapter of the treatise confuses the real questions with which Aristotle is concerned. The scope of claim (4) must therefore be restricted. *Τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ* may refer to or include sense-impressions and “mental images generally,” but they are not states of sustained cognition: “Taking 16a3–8 seriously requires us to begin, at least, by interpreting claim (4) in such a way as to give it a chance of being true, and that means considering it as applying only to mental images of actual things.” The restriction allows (4) to stand in conjunction with the seven other claims; it (one must presume) eliminates the problem of “the cat’s soon waking;” and it seems to receive support in Aristotle’s turning away from psychology, directing the reader’s attention instead (16a8–9) to the “other business” of the *De Anima*:

Once the narrow scope of claim (4) has been revealed, it is harder to suppose that this text was intended as a general theory of meaning. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that Chapters 2–6 address themselves to detailed

¹¹⁴ Cf. the scholium, codex Parisinus 1917, f. 17v. (reported in Busse’s introduction to Ammonius, *In de Int.*, xl). Also, Ammonius, *In de Int.* 22,11–17; 16,15–30; Boethius, *In Perih.* II.31,27: verba autem et nomina positione significant neque solum sunt verba et nomina voces, sed voces significativae nec solum significativae, sed etiam quae positione designant aliquid, non natura. This point is explicitly stated, of course, in Aristotle’s definition of the name, *PeriH.* 16a19.

¹¹⁵ “Aristotle on Spoken Sound,” p. 12.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 10; 15–16.

questions regarding meaning and come up with answers that bear no clear resemblance to the account of 16a3–8. But if it is not Aristotle's theory of meaning, as it has almost always been taken to be, what is it?¹¹⁷

Kretzmann's answer: The spare semantical claims of these six lines, the restricted scope of claims (4) and (7), and Aristotle's implicit criticism of the "tool" theory of language,¹¹⁸ all show that Aristotle intends *only* to provide grounds for the idea (16a19; 17a1) that language is significant by convention, and not by nature. Aristotle distinguishes that which is natural and "the same for all" from that which is conventional and "not the same for all" by the use of both "signs" and "symbols," in order to show that there are no spoken sounds which exist naturally as symbols. Spoken sounds are indeed primarily (in the first place) symptomatic indices of what takes place in the soul, but while the sign relation is the necessary condition, it is not the sufficient condition, for a meaningful spoken sound. That is why Aristotle speaks of spoken sounds "becoming" symbols.¹¹⁹ Kretzmann finds, then, three types of relation in Aristotle's passage. First is the relation of spoken sound to mental impression (symptom to cause), which is common to both men and beasts. Second is the relation of conventionally significant spoken sound to mental impression (encoding symbol to symbolized), which is proper to human beings. Third is the relation of name to bearer (reference), which presupposes, but does not necessarily follow upon, the second relation, since many spoken sounds are the symbols of mental impressions for which there are no existent objects outside of the mind (goatstags, chimaeras, etc.).¹²⁰ This third level is not posited in *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–9, nor indeed is it required by what is, since Aristotle is not constructing a general theory of meaning. "Language is not a sign-system *sui generis*," Kretzmann concludes, "it is just the most complex, most flexible, richest combination of modes of signification; and the more artificial modes are, Aristotle reminds us, constructed on the basis of the less artificial."¹²¹

This argument is extensive and provocative indeed, but three dubious points in its construction remain. Two have been discussed already: the

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

¹¹⁸ *PeriH.* 16b33–17a2; Plato, *Critl.* 387a–90a.

¹¹⁹ 16a28: *ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον*. There is no need, with Arens (*Theory of Language*, p. 39), to emend the text. Aristotle's point is clear, and the emendation finds no support in the MSS. Cf. Kretzmann, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound," p. 16: "Of course a *name* does not *become* a symbol, but a spoken sound (or a name considered simply as a spoken sound) may be said to do so." This must be Aristotle's meaning.

¹²⁰ "Aristotle on Spoken Sound," p. 16.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 18.

argument for reading *πρώτως* instead of *πρώτων*, and the philological basis upon which *σύμβολα* is made to connote artificial, and *σημεῖα* to connote natural, sources of inference. The third difficulty has been mentioned in passing. Claim (3), which is the cornerstone of the argument, omits the role of written marks.¹²² The balanced structure of the passage and the adversative *μέντοι* (16a6), however, almost certainly demand that the backward reference of *ταῦτα* (*σημεῖα*, 16a6) be *both* “written marks” and “spoken sounds,” i.e., the *artificial* elements with which Aristotle intends next to contrast mental impressions and actual things (indeed Alexander seems to have made this consideration the basis for his reading of *ταῦτα* at 16a7, cf. above): the Nature-Convention antithesis is in fact the pivotal issue of the passage. The neuter gender favors this interpretation,¹²³ although it is possible that *ταῦτα* means only “the latter of the two things above” (as opposed, say, to either *ἐκεῖνα*, “the former,” or *τάδε*, “the following”), and that its gender comes by attraction to *σημεῖα*.¹²⁴ The point cannot be easily determined on a grammatical basis, but if claim (3) is wrongly conceived in the omission of *γράμματα*,¹²⁵ then Kretzmann’s argument collapses, for although it may be possible to see written marks as artificial “symbols” of spoken sounds, it is altogether impossible to see them as natural “signs” of either spoken sounds or mental impressions. Unlike Kretzmann, Colli gives the pronoun wide

¹²² Thus also Brandt, *Aristotelische Urteilslehre*, p. 35, and interlinear glosses in MSS. A, d and n.

¹²³ I.e., by referring either to what precedes generally (thus suppressing the gender of *φωναί*), or to *τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ* and *τὰ γραφόμενα* specifically. Montanari (*Sezione Linguistica*, II.32–39; 43–45) argues for the latter. He interprets *ταῦτα* in light of the use of (a) *τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ* and *τὰ γραφόμενα*, and then of (b) *αἱ φωναί* and *τὰ γράμματα*, which, he argues, correspond respectively to two of the three sections into which the passage can be divided: (a) *ἔστι μὲν οὖν . . . ἐν τῇ φωνῇ* = spoken and written expressions; (b) *καὶ ὥσπερ . . . αἱ αὐταί* = *elementa significantia*; and (c) *ὧν μέντοι . . . ἤδη ταῦτά* = *significata*. *Ταῦτα*, Montanari holds, refers to the things in (a). That is, the *significata* are discussed only in-relation to spoken and written expressions, since the *elementa* are not semantical entities and therefore cannot be signs of mental impressions. It is an interesting analysis of the structure of the passage, but I am uncertain that the difference between (a) and (b) is so precise.

¹²⁴ Cf. Pépin, “SYMBOLA,” p. 34, n. 39, citing Ammonius, *In de Int.* 24,5–6, for support. Pépin points out that the gender may also derive from the parallel formulation of the expression for spoken sounds (16a3). But Aristotle’s use of the neuter article at 16a3 does not change the fact that both of the expressions for written marks (a4–5) are also neuter, or that, as Pépin himself acknowledges, *φωναί* (a5) is feminine. Ammonius’ comment (above) will be of no help to Kretzmann’s argument, for Ammonius’ next point is to clarify *τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ* by supplying *ὀνόματα* and *ῥήματα* and that, we have already seen, is inconsistent with an interpretation such as the one Kretzmann develops. The ellipsis of the copula at 16a6 creates no ambiguity; *ταῦτα* is predicative rather than attributive (hence the omission of the article).

¹²⁵ “Aristotle on Spoken Sound,” p. 15: “But writing, like speech, is a linguistic medium, as mind is not; and so the primary *linguistic* element is the spoken sound.”

compass, but, like Kretzmann, he retains the symbol-sign difference and reads the adverb at 16a6. His translation shows the difficulty that ταῦτα poses for Kretzmann's interpretation (emphasis added):

Ordunque, i suoni della voce sono *simboli* delle affezioni che hanno luogo nell'anima, e le lettere scritte sono *simboli* dei suoni della voce. Allo stesso modo poi che le lettere non sono le medesime per tutti, così neppure i suoni sono i medesimi; tuttavia, *suoni et lettere risultano segni*, anzitutto, delle affezioni dell'anima¹²⁶

Similarly, Belardi (*Linguaggio*, p. 88) translates: "invece, le affezioni dell'anima, delle quali tali espressioni orali (e le rispettive scritte) sono segni, sono le medesime per tutta l'umanità"

Complementary to Kretzmann's theory is that of Jean Pépin, which arrives at the same conclusion, but by a slightly different course.¹²⁷ Pépin's argument turns on a distinction of two senses of the expression τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ: (a) inarticulate sounds understood in the broadest sense; (b) spoken language.¹²⁸ Pépin believes that the presence of the latter in our passage is implicitly confirmed by *Peri Hermeneias* 23a35 and 24b1–2, where the phrase is coupled with the notions of affirmation and negation. Aristotle's two expressions for written marks (γράμματα, γραφόμενα), it is argued, differentiate between alphabetic sounds and written marks, respectively.¹²⁹ Both presuppose the notion of articulated spoken sounds, and so pertain to the second level of τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. The twofold interpretation of the latter expression is pressed into the service of τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (the phrases are constructed on parallel lines): (a) there are images that arise in the soul as a result of sense-perception, and which, in beasts, are restricted to the level of states of emotion; (b) there are, in human beings, concepts or thoughts, isolated or in combination (Aristotle's "inner locution," *PAn.* 76b25).¹³⁰ Pépin would agree to Kretzmann's

¹²⁶ *Organon*, I.57.

¹²⁷ Reference above, n. 87.

¹²⁸ "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ," p. 30, with nn. 18–20. Cf. also Brandt, *Aristotelische Urteilslehre*, p. 32 and n. 1 (supplying *pathemata*, following *Problemata* 895a10–14); Montanari, *Sezione Linguistica*, II.34 (1.2.3.1); II.54ff. Against Waitz Steinthal argues (*Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, I.181n.; 187) that the things *quae proferuntur per linguam* must in fact be mental impressions, and that Aristotle in this respect puts himself in the difficulty of maintaining that mental impressions are symbols of themselves. He further argues that the expression, τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, "the things in spoken sound," must refer to the meanings in spoken sound (cf. *ibid.* I.184) which are symbolic of those in the soul (citing 23a32–33; 24b1–2), i.e., that the affirmations and denials in spoken sound are symbolic of the judgements in the soul. Waitz surely has the more reasonable interpretation of the phrase and of its immediate context, and in the end Steinthal himself resorts to translating the phrase with *Sprache*. Steinthal recognizes that αἱ φωναί is a problematical expression, and that τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ is very ambiguous.

¹²⁹ "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ," p. 31.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 31–33; cf. Brandt, above, n. 78.

claim (3) as to the meaning of ταῦτα (σημεῖα, 16a6): only spoken sounds are said to be signs.¹³¹ Therefore, “symbols” denotes two types of relation (spoken sounds-mental impressions; written marks-spoken sounds), and “signs” only one (spoken sounds-mental impressions).¹³² By specifying the claim that is made at 16a7 and by adopting πρώτως at 16a6,¹³³ Pépin arrives at the conclusion that the only considerations differentiating lines 3–4 from lines 6–7 are: (a) the σύμβολα-σημεῖα change, and (b) the use of πρώτως in 16a6. Thus the adverb appears to be introduced only in connection with σημεῖα (“primarily signs”), and Aristotle must therefore be distinguishing between symbols and signs.¹³⁴ That is, σημεῖα refers to the primitive level of φωνή or signification, the inarticulate sounds spontaneously produced by beasts.¹³⁵

Despite the increased attention Pépin gives to providing a philological underpinning for the symbol-sign distinction,¹³⁶ two difficulties in his argument remain unsettled: (a) the backward reference of ταῦτα (16a6) has not been established in favor only of αἱ φωναί/τά ἐν τῇ φωνῇ; (b) πρώτως is chosen without consideration for the facts (i) that πρώτων is the oldest reading, and (ii) that it can be shown to be philosophically consistent with the rest of the passage.

The problem, then, is that acceptance of the views of Larkin, St Thomas, Owens, etc. requires an adverbial interpretation of πρώτων and the suppression of the possibility that Aristotle may be making a distinction between symbols and signs; acceptance of Kretzmann’s and Pépin’s analyses, on the other hand, is to ignore the evidence in favor of πρώτων. But once it is acknowledged that there is no adverb at 16a6, all efforts to reevaluate the same in light of a symbol-sign difference must appear strained. To Kretzmann and Pépin is owed the observation that 16a6 is indeed the line over which most interpretations of the passage must divide; but their distinction of “symbol” and “sign” drives the argument right back to the most pressing issues posed by that very line of the text: to what precisely does ταῦτα refer, and on what basis is πρώτων to be ignored? It is upon the determination of these questions that the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine must attend. Πρώτων, it has been suggested, points

¹³¹ Above, n. 125.

¹³² Pépin, “ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ,” p. 34.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 29, n. 16, recognizing that there is no emendation, but denying the authority of the Boethian translation.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 36–38.

¹³⁵ Citing (p. 39) *Pol.* 1253a9–15.

¹³⁶ In which a certain strain is nevertheless felt, as, e.g., in the case of his remarks (p. 28) concerning *Poetics* 1462a6 and *Rhetoric* 1417b2–3. It is difficult to see how the degrees of spontaneity in the gestures of an actor as opposed to those of a legal defendant will explain the lexical difference between σημεῖον and σύμβολον.

to the *πρῶτα νοήματα* of *De Anima* III.8, and should be interpreted in that light. I would like to suggest that in this passage Aristotle in effect makes the following claims: “Spoken sounds are symbols (or signs) of the ‘first’ (simple, uncombined) thoughts or impressions in the soul, and written marks are symbols (or signs) of spoken sounds. Neither written marks nor spoken sounds are the same for all. The impressions in the soul or ‘first’ thoughts, of which spoken sounds *and* written marks are the signs (or symbols), are likenesses of objects in the natural world (and as such are neither true nor false). Both they and the natural objects *are* ‘the same for all.’ The ‘first’ thoughts are discussed elsewhere, and need not be entered into now.” Aristotle continues: “Of course, just as when thoughts are neither true nor false and the corresponding spoken sounds are the same way; so too, when thoughts *are* necessarily one or the other the corresponding spoken sounds are the same way. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation.” With this the introductory remarks come to an end (lines 13–18 introduce the idea that isolated names and verbs, the *significancia*, are similar to the “first” thoughts, being neither true nor false), and the definitions of those terms (name, verb, negation, affirmation, etc.) which are pertinent to the investigation of the true subject matter of the treatise, the categorical proposition, begin (16a19ff.). Some of the points are reiterated in the closing chapter of the treatise.¹³⁷

The present analysis of the difficulties embedded in this compressed text places us now in a position to see two ways in which *translation* has affected the sense of the Greek. Retaining the symbol-sign change and reevaluating the force of the commonly accepted *πρώτως* have brought some commentators from the view that Aristotle is laying down a theory of meaning (sense-reference), to the view that he is showing only that spoken sounds are primarily natural symptoms, and secondarily conventional symbols, of what takes place in the soul. It is in light of the difficulties of translation that we must approach Boethius’ Latin version of the passage, for as Kretzmann rightly notes, it was Boethius who, “translated both

¹³⁷ It is possible to translate 16a6: “the first things of which these are signs—the impressions of the soul—are the same for all,” which suggests that the *second* things of which they are the signs—actual things—are also the same for all. This, however, only confuses once again the symbol-sign change (since at a6 Aristotle does not use *σύμβολα*, while any meaningful relation between spoken sounds and extramental things will be according to what is established by convention, i.e. will entail the use of “symbols”), and thus derogates the arguments of both Kretzmann and Pépin. It also suggests that actual things are to be understood as somehow secondary. Are we to think that they are secondary in so far as they are signified by spoken sounds, or that they are secondary in some more fundamental sense? The second alternative is obviously unacceptable in the present context. The first has been discussed already.

‘σύμβολα’ and ‘σημεῖα’ as ‘*notae*,’ thereby hiding this difference from the view of Western philosophers for seven centuries or more, the centuries during which his translation of *De Interpretatione* was one of the few books which every philosopher discussed.” Again:

Most medieval semantic theories take as their starting point Boethius’ translation of the rudimentary account in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*, Chapter 1. No doubt the traditional misreading of those passages during and after the Middle Ages is largely the result of the fact that in his otherwise faithful rendering Boethius obliterated the Aristotelian distinction between symbols and symptoms, translating both σύμβολα and σημεῖα as *notae*.¹³⁸

According to this view it will have been Boethius’ translation that put into circulation an “Aristotelian” triad of *vox-intellectus-res*, and thereby placed the mind midway between spoken sounds and actual things. This triad, so the argument will go, pointed the way to the *modi significandi*, *modi intellegendi*, and *modi essendi*, of the Modistae.¹³⁹ And so Boethius’ inaccuracy in translation will turn out to be of considerable historical importance: prior to the rediscovery of Greek it was impossible for philosophers to view the passage as an argument solely for the conventional basis of language.

That this triadic formulation: things, thoughts, words, originated with Boethius is not, of course, the case, as Ammonius and other early commentators demonstrate. As for the interpretation of Aristotle’s Greek text itself, enough has now been said. That the Boethian translation did in fact suppress the symbol-sign difference and that it was highly influential upon thinkers of the Middle Ages are matters of historical fact, and must be acknowledged as such. It is possible for us now to consider the translation.

¹³⁸ Respectively, “Aristotle on Spoken Sound,” p. 5; “Semantics, History of,” p. 367a.

¹³⁹ In *Perih.* II.20,16–20; I.37,5–10. See R.W. Hunt, “Studies on Priscian II,” in idem, *Collected Papers on the History of Grammar in the Middle Ages*, ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall (Amsterdam, 1980): *ASTH* 5, p. 71. John of Salisbury (*Metalogicon* III.5 [p. 142 = *PL* 199.904a]) confuses Augustine and Boethius-Aristotle in connection with this triad: *Eo spectat illud Augustini, tractum quidem ab Aristotile, quoniam de fonte isto hauserunt omnes, quia in omni enuntiatione spectanda sunt tria, dictio, dicibile, et res.* For in fact, this triad comes from Augustine, *De Dialectica* V (p. 90,10). Cf. L.M. De Rijk, “On the Chronology of Boethius’ Works on Logic,” *Vivarium* 2 (1964), 140.

CHAPTER TWO

BOETHIUS' TRANSLATION

TRANSLATIO BOETHII

The Latin text of 16a3–9 is reproduced below from Minio-Paluello's edition (*AL* II.1). Line divisions (in apparatus also) are marked according to the Greek text. I have added to the apparatus (bold type) Boethius' reports for Herminus' readings at lines 6 and 8 (from citations in both commentaries; these are not variant readings for the text of the translation itself), and Meiser's emendation, line 6.

Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima
pas|sionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt
16a5 in voce. | Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eadem,
sic nec eadem | voces; quorum autem hae primorum notae,
eadem omnibus pas|siones animae sunt, et quorum hae
similitudines, res | etiam eadem. De his quidem dictum
est in his quae sunt dicta de ani|ma—alterius est enim
negotii—;

4 et om. (c) 5 litterae + sunt *Ch* || eadem¹] eadem (c) || eadem²] eadem *Fu*(c) 6 hae] haec (C) *hanc lectionem Meiser quoque vult poni* (ταῦτα) || eadem] aeel/dem *Re* : eadem *Fu*(c) : heaedem eadem *He* : **hae** *Herminus proponebat* 7 sunt animae *transp.* *Jz* || hae] **eadem** (C) *Alexander proponebat* || similitudines + sunt *Ch* 8 eadem] eadem *Fu*(c) : **hae** *Herminus proponebat* 8–9 de anima dicta *transp.* *Tn* 9 enim om. *HeSzTnGlnk*

SIGLA

- Re* = Carlsruhensis, bibl. Badensis, Reich. CLXXII (saec. IX)
Jz = Parisinus, bibl. nation., lat. 13956 (saec. IX)
Fu = Parisinus, bibl. nation., lat. 7193 (saec. X)
Tn = Monacensis, bibl. publ. Bavar. 18479 (saec. XI)
Ch = Carnutensis, bibl. munic. 497 (saec. XII)
Sz = Vindobonensis, bibl. nation. 80 (saec. X)
He = Parisinus, bibl. nation., lat. 12949 (saec. IX)
Gl = Sangallensis, bibl. monast. 817 (saec. XI)
Nk = Sangallensis, bibl. monast. 818 (saec. XI)

- c = commentarii primi Boethiani lemmata, citationes vel paraphrases
C = commentarii secundi Boethiani lemmata, citationes vel paraphrases
() = commentariorum codices vel loci non omnes

Lorenzo Minio-Paluello was the editor also of the critical text of Boethius' Latin translation of the *Peri Hermeneias*. Lines (16a) 3–9, along with sigla and a slightly revised apparatus, appear on the previous page.¹ The *apparatus criticus* indicates very few variants which affect the meaning of this portion of the treatise. Orthography is one of the primary areas of disagreement between witnesses. Line 7 (Alexander's reading, reported by Boethius at *In Perih.* II.38,2: *eaedem similitudines*; also in the lemma, II.25,12) contains, of course, an exception, but since it has been discussed above it need not be entered into here. Two additions to Minio-Paluello's apparatus are the *hae* at 16a6 and the *hae* at 16a8, which Boethius attributes (*In Perih.* I.40,26–28; II.39,31–33) to Herminus. These have been discussed already as well. Minio-Paluello showed² that there are three discernable stages in the history of this translation of the treatise, behind which may have been a preliminary translation of the complete Greek text. The lemmata of the second commentary comprise a translation of nearly the whole work, but it is uncertain whether they are revisions of the lemmata of the first commentary (which are a third less complete than those of the second), or revisions of a complete preliminary translation. The continuous translation represents the most polished version, and while it often agrees with the lemmata of one commentary (particularly those of the second) against those of the other, the lemmata of the two commentaries only rarely agree with one another against the text of the continuous translation. The continuous translation and the lemmata of the second commentary frequently agree with one another against the lemmata of the first commentary, but the continuous translation occasionally offers improvements upon the lemmata of the second commentary. It is possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the continuous translation is the product of an ancient editor who was able to compare anew Boethius' Latin version with the Greek. In the following discussion this possibility has been ignored only because nothing in the interpretation of 16a3–9 depends upon differences in readings which might belong to an unknown translator rather than to Boethius. Apart from the different readings reported for 16a6–8, for which we have Boethius' own discussion in the commentaries, the three versions are in agreement as concerns these lines. As Meiser followed rather inconsistent editorial procedures in establishing the text of Boethius' translation of the treatise,³ it has been deemed best to disregard his *haec* (for *hae*, 16a6, below, n. 6), as well as his transposition, *voces eaedem* (16a5–6), and his omission of *sunt* (16a7), all evidently

¹ *AL* II.1.5,4.

² *AL* II.1.xxxviff.

³ Minio-Paluello, *AL* II.1.xl.

intended to put the Latin into close accord with the Greek (but note that Meiser does *not* transpose *primorum notae* = σημεία πρώτων, 16a6).

Boethius' rendering is pretty much word-for-word,⁴ and that is consistent with his acknowledged policy of translation:

... in his scriptis in quibus rerum cognitio quaeritur, non luculentae orationis lepos, sed incorrupta veritas exprimenda est. quocirca multum profecisse videor, si philosophiae libris Latina oratione compositis per integerrimae translationis sinceritatem nihil in Graecorum litteris amplius desideretur.⁵

There are, however, two changes. (a) The gender of the pronoun ταῦτα has been made feminine (*hae*, 16a6), thus removing that ambiguity which resulted from the change of gender (φωναί, ταῦτα) in the Greek, since now there is no difficulty in taking both *litterae* and *voces* as the words to which *hae* refers.⁶ (b) *Notae* suppresses the σύμβολα-σημεῖα change in terminol-

⁴ In the preface to his edition of the Greek text (p. xvi) Minio-Paluello speaks of Wm. of Moerbeke's translation as being more accurate than Boethius'. He notes Boethius' tendency to omit μέν, καί, δῆ, οὖν, etc. This assessment is supported by two places in the present passage. Aristotle begins (a3) with ἔστι μὲν οὖν, which Boethius translates, *sunt ergo*. Moerbeke, on the other hand, translates, *sunt quidem igitur*. Does Boethius suppress μὲν or is it not present in his Greek text (cf. Stephanus' lemma)? At a8, all of the earliest MSS. give the same particle collocation, μὲν οὖν (the μὲν or οὖν disappears in some later MSS.: e, g, i). Boethius translates, *quidem*, while Moerbeke uses *quidem igitur* once again. It seems clear that Boethius here translates for sense rather than for exactness, and that he has both the μὲν and the οὖν in his exemplar. Both Boethius and Moerbeke translate ἔστι δὲ (a9), *est autem*. Boethius adds *sic* at a5, but that is undoubtedly a translation of the οὕτως that is also preserved in some of the early MSS. The other differences are: *caedem voces* (a5–6); *primorum notae* (σημεῖα πρώτων, a6); *sunt* (a7); *etiam* (ἤδη, a8 = *iam*, Moerbeke); *his* (τοῖς, a8); *alterius est* (ἄλλης, a9).

⁵ *In Isag.* II.135,8.

⁶ See, however, *In Perih.* II.39,3: *atque hoc est quod ait: "quorum autem hae [codd.; haec: Meiser emend.] primorum notae," id est voces*; I.39,12: *quorum autem hae [codd.; haec: Meiser emend.] primorum notae*; I.39,18: *ergo nunc hoc dicit: quorum hae id est voces*. Meiser emended the *hae* presented almost unanimously by the codices he collated, and wrote *haec* instead (cf. above, p. 44). Cf. *ibid.* I.3,9 (no mention in apparatus); I.36,26; I.40,13; I.40,26; II.25,10. II.37,31; II.38,18; II.40,29; II.43,6. Rewriting the sentence in the following way underscores the apparent rationale for this change: *passiones animae sunt [ea prima] quorum hae[c, sc. litterae et voces, sunt] notae*. Meiser seems to have thought that a better balance is attained if, as in the Greek, the unattracted (sc. *litterae, voces*) neuter *haec* is given, just as in the case of the unattracted *quorum* (= *passiones*, 16a6–7; cf. 16a7–8: *quorum hae similitudines, res etiam caedem*). The facts remain, however, that (a) *hae* has the support of the MSS. (*haec* is found only at (?) II.38,18, II.39,31, and at II.43,6 only in E = MS. Monacensis 14582 [11th c.] before the emendation to *hae* in the second hand), as Minio-Paluello concluded and as Meiser himself acknowledged in his apparatus, and that (b) in the Greek assimilation is not a question, since Aristotle uses expressions for both spoken sounds and written marks which are neuter. Moreover, since in the first commentary Boethius uses *hae* in a paraphrase or semi-quotation (I.39,18, above), we may be certain that this represents his own understanding of the text. It seems advisable, therefore, to follow the majority of the MSS. rather than to impute to Boethius a reading for which there is no solid evidence.

ogy. The latter is especially noteworthy because it is *never* mentioned in the commentaries. Boethius gives the Greekless readers of the Middle Ages who will have to depend upon his translation no reason to suspect that where he writes only *notae* there are in fact two different Greek words. Nor, of course, is any attempt made to defend the suppression of *σημεῖα*. Boethius will not resort, therefore, to the traditional explanation for a problematical point in translation from Greek to Latin, namely, that Latin suffers from a paucity of philosophical vocabulary.⁷ *Signum* is at his disposal, but he chooses not to use it. In this instance he evidently thinks that the lack of accuracy in his translation does not warrant mention, let alone explication. On the other hand, he remains faithful to the Greek by giving the genitive plural (unassimilated: *passiones*) *primorum* at 16a6. That the genitive is in his eyes the *lectio difficilior* is clear from the fact that, apart from the citations and some paraphrases, in his commentary he substitutes adverbial alternatives for it (*principaliter*, *prius*, *primum*).⁸ Boethius' reference to an opinion of Alexander will help to clarify the point under consideration:

sed quoniam ita dixit Aristoteles: "quorum autem hae [*codd.*; haec: *Meiser*] primorum notae, eadem omnibus passiones animae" sunt, quaerit Alexander: si *rerum* nomina sunt, quid causae est ut *primorum intellectuum* notas esse voces diceret Aristoteles? rei enim ponitur nomen, ut cum dicimus "homo" significamus quidem intellectum, rei tamen nomen est id est animalis rationalis mortalis. cur ergo non *primarum* magis *rerum* notae sint voces quibus ponuntur potius quam *intellectuum*?⁹

This, of course, is not a literal citation of the text but a paraphrase which Boethius proposes for discussion within the context of the commentary. The objection that had been raised is that, since Aristotle recognizes that names are the names of things, he ought therefore to speak of them as names *primarily* of things. Boethius tells us that this objection was refuted by Alexander: names are indeed the names of things outside of the mind, but that is not the only reason for our making use of them. For the primary reason for using them is to signify the things we think.¹⁰ Alexander, we

⁷ Cf. e.g. Lucretius I.136–45. Boethius himself, following Tertullian (*Adv. Prx.* II.4) and Augustine (*Trin.* VII.4–6), struggles (*Eut.* III.88,57) with the limitations of the Latin tongue: neque enim verborum inops Graecia est; *ibid.* III.86,25: nos vero per inopiam significantium vocum. This recalls Cicero, *Tusc.* II.15.35: Haec duo Graeculi illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant.

⁸ E.g. *In Perih.* I.40,18–21 (*prius*); II.24,11–12; II.33,28; II.34,23; II.43,19 (*proxime*; *principaliter*); II.44,14 (*primum*). Migne (411c8, = II.37,31, etc.) wrongly gives *primo*. Glareanus' edition (Basel, 1546 and 1570, pp. 216; 297) gives *primo* in the lemma; Rota's edition (Venice, 1546, p. 118) has *primum*. Cf. below, p. 79, n. 46.

⁹ *In Perih.* II.40,28.

¹⁰ *In Perih.* II.41,7: sed fortasse quidem ob hoc dictum est, inquit, quod licet voces

may speculate, had taken into account the fact that many of the things we think have no corresponding objects outside of the mind but can nevertheless be expressed in meaningful statements. This speculation is supported by a remark of Dexippus (who claims to be following Alexander and Porphyry) on the *Categories*: actual things are incidentally the “causes” of things enunciated but are not themselves things enunciated, since they are not *inherent* causes of them, as thoughts are. For there are many meaningful words (e.g., “goatstag,” “centaur”) which have no real referents.¹¹ In the case of the Boethian passage above it is necessary to observe, however, (a) that the form in which the objection is stated assumes that the words, *primarium . . . rerum*, are *adverbial* in force just as in the case of those (*quorum . . . primorum*, or in the paraphrase, *primorum intellectuum*) they are intended to replace, while (b) the original syntax is nevertheless reproduced so as to obviate any possible charge (for Boethius as well as Alexander disagrees with the objection) of deliberate distortion of Aristotle’s text and hence of his meaning. Here we have an instance of Boethius’ conservatism as a scholar. The burden rests upon the commentator to find adverbial force in the genitive, and although Boethius takes the liberty of supplying the adverb in his commentary, he nevertheless does not do so in his translation.¹² The case for using only *notae* must therefore appear all the more evident to him; otherwise we might well have expected another breach of his rule on translation—the use of *principaliter* or of some equivalent expression, instead of *primorum*, at 16a6.

Marius Victorinus (4th c.) may well have translated the *Peri Hermeneias*,

rerum nomina sint, tamen non idcirco utimur vocibus, ut res significemus, sed ut eas quae ex rebus nobis innatae sunt animae passionones. quocirca propter quorum significantiam voces ipsae proferuntur, recte eorum primorum esse dixit notas.

¹¹ *In Cat.* 7,11: πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο εἶποιμ’ ἂν ὥς οὐδὲν κωλύει αἰτία εἶναι τοῦ λέγειν τὰ πράγματα, μὴ μέντοι προσεχῶς, ὅπερ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πυρέττειν φέρε αἰτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἡλίωσις καὶ τοῦ ὀδυνᾶσθαι ἡ τῆς βελόνης νύξις, ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἡ βελὼν ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ὀδύνῃ οὔτε ἡ ἡλίωσις ἐν τῇ πυρέσει. τῶν γὰρ αἰτίων ἃ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐξω χωριστά, ἃ δὲ συμπάρεσιν ὥστε δύναται μὲν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αἰτία εἶναι τοῦ λέγειν, οὐ μὴν αὐτὰ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οἱ παρόντων πραγμάτων λέγομεν καὶ περὶ γεννημένων καὶ περὶ μελλόντων, ἔδει δὲ τοῦ λόγου ὄντος τοῦ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα εἶναι. εἰ δὲ οὐ συνυφέστηκε τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ἂν εἶη ταῦτα τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ λέγειν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα οἷον ἵπποκενταύρους καὶ τραγελάφους, λέγουσι δὲ λόγους καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι καὶ οἱ παράφρονες, ὥστε εἴπερ τὰ λεγόμενα ἦν τὰ πράγματα, κάκεινοι ἂν κατὰ πραγμάτων ἔφερον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ ὑφεστηκὸς ὀνομάζομεν. That Dexippus is in fact following an argument of Alexander (cf. *ibid.*, 6,5–6) seems further supported by the fact that in Boethius Alexander’s response to the above-mentioned (n. 9f.) objection is posed in terms of the things that *cause* spoken sounds, i.e. the thoughts that are signified by them. This will be discussed in the following chapter.

¹² Pace Meiser, “Des Boethius Übersetzung,” p. 251: “C.1, 16a6: da Boetius constant übersetzt *quorum autem haec primorum notae* und auch so erklärt, so hat er nicht πρώτως gelesen, sondern πρώτων,” etc. Meiser was undoubtedly correct as concerns the translation, but it is not true that Boethius constantly uses *primorum* in his commentary.

but since there is no extant translation from his pen, it is impossible for us to know whether the use of one Latin word for both σύμβολα and σημεία is unique to Boethius.¹³ However, a useful point of comparison is Ammonius' commentary, which since Courcelle has been the focus of controversy over the question of whether or not Boethius studied in Alexandria as an adolescent. Boethius' two commentaries bear no certain signs of dependence upon that of Ammonius, and in fact they show many points of divergence from it; but it is very likely that the commentaries of both authors reflect a common tradition of commentary upon the *Peri Hermeneias*,¹⁴ included in which were the teachings of Aspasius, Herminius, Alexander, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus.¹⁵ Ammonius' comments on the opening of the treatise are pertinent to the present discussion.

A likeness, Ammonius explains, is revelatory of the nature of an original and is not dependent upon the conventions of men. A symbol (sign), on the other hand, is something established according to convention:

τούτων οὖν τὰ μὲν νοήματα ὁμοιώματα καλεῖ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰς δὲ φωνὰς οὐκ ἀξιοῖ καλεῖν ὁμοιώματα τῶν νοημάτων, ἀλλὰ σύμβολα καὶ σημεία, καὶ τὰ γράμματα τῶν φωνῶν ὡσαύτως.

Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ὁμοίωμα τοῦ συμβόλου, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένον τοῦ Σωκράτους ὁμοίωμα εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν καὶ τὸ σιμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐξόφθαλμον ἔχει τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐκέτ' ἂν αὐτοῦ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα), τὸ δὲ γε σύμβολον ἥτοι

¹³ The testimony for Victorinus' translation is found in Cassiodorus, *Inst.* II.3.18 (128, 17–20 Mynors). See, however, Minio-Paluello, *AL* II.1.ix, n. 1. The correct reading for the passage in Cassiodorus is uncertain.

¹⁴ The thesis that Boethius studied in Alexandria was originally P. Courcelle's: *Les lettres grecques en occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1948), pp. 264–78, trans. H. E. Wedeck, *Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 280–95 (see above, p. 31, n. 84; all references are to page numbers of the English edition). A concise summary of the arguments fatal to Courcelle's thesis is found in Tarán, *Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, pp. vii–viii, n. 10. As for Courcelle's false emendation ("Ammonius," *In Perih.* II.361,9), see J. Shiel, "Boethius and Eudemus," *Vivarium* 12 (1974), 14–17. On Courcelle's own admission (op. cit., p. 285), Ammonius' name is not likely to have made its way into the commentary. H. Kirkby draws attention to the chronological difficulties in Courcelle's thesis: "The Scholar and His Public," in *Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence*, ed. M. Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 60–61, with n. 81; cf. Minio-Paluello, *AL* I.6.xiv, n. 3. On the more general question of sources, see Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958), 217–44, rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, *Boethius*, pp. 155–83; idem, "The Greek Copy of Porphyrios' Isagoge Used by Boethius," in *Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben*, ed. J. Wiesner (Berlin-NY, 1987): Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung 2, pp. 312–40.

¹⁵ Ammonius evidently heard Proclus lecture on the treatise (*In de Int.* 1,6–11). He and Boethius are the authorities on the matter of the earlier commentators. Albinus evidently wrote a commentary (Boethius, *In Perih.* II.4,5–7). Cf. J. Isaac, *Le Peri Hermeneias en occident de Boèce à St Thomas: Histoire littéraire d'un traité d'Aristote* (Paris, 1953), pp. 12–14.

σημεῖον—ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ αὐτὸ ὁ φιλόσοφος ὀνομάζει—τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑφιστάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας·
 . . . διὰ τοῦτο καλεῖ τὰ μὲν νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμοιώματα, τὰ δέ γε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῶν νοημάτων καὶ τὰ γράμματα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σύμβολα καὶ σημεῖα.¹⁶

Especially noteworthy here is Ammonius' observation that the words σύμβολον and σημεῖον are synonymous, and that they connote conventional forms of representation.¹⁷ A similar point is found in Stephanus: just as a painted likeness of Socrates must accurately represent its original, so must our thoughts or concepts represent their objects—this is not subject to our control; it is possible, however, to signify a natural object by more than one name. That is, symbols (σύμβολα) are established according to convention. In an earlier passage, however, Stephanus uses instead the word “signs” (σημεῖα).¹⁸ For Ammonius, of course, it was not necessary to translate Aristotle, but if Boethius had his commentary to hand when interpreting Aristotle's Greek, the use of only *notae* would not have seemed without precedent. If he worked independently of Ammonius' commentary—as all the evidence seems to suggest—he may still have followed a commonly used source, probably Porphyry's commentary, or a scholium which made the same, or a similar, point.

The Latin tradition is more helpful in our determination of why Boethius uses *notae* instead of *symboli*. *Symbolus* appears to have been used with frequency only in the ante- and post-classical periods, and with no specifically semantical connotations. In his discussion of *notationes*, however, Cicero points out in passing that Aristotle's σύμβολον has *nota* as its Latin counterpart: sunt verba rerum notae. itaque hoc quidem Aristoteles σύμβολον appellat, quod Latine est nota.¹⁹ This is later followed by Quintilian (I.6.28):

¹⁶ *In de Int.* 19,32 and 20,23 respectively.

¹⁷ Cf. Dexippus, *In Cat.* 6,13 (following Porphyry, above, p. 53, n. 11): ἐπεὶ γὰρ σύμβολα καὶ σημεῖα τῶν πραγμάτων τέθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς μὲν πᾶσι γνωρίμοις ἀνάγκη ἦν ἤδη κεῖσθαι ὀνόματα ἃ ταῦτα σημαίνει, ὅσα δ' ἐπιστημονικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, παρὰ τῶν ἐπιστημόνων ἀπῆται τὴν θέσιν.

¹⁸ *In de Int.* 6,6–13; cf. below, p. 70, n. 22, for his use of “signs.” He cannot therefore have made any distinction between the two words.

¹⁹ *Top.* VIII.35. Elsewhere Cicero uses *nota* to denote words spoken or written: *Rpb.* III.2.3: a simili etiam mente vocis, qui videbantur infiniti, soni paucis notis inventis sunt omnes signati et expressi; cf. *ibid.*: ut signa quaedam sic verba rebus inpressit; *Fin.* V.25.74: ut . . . signa commutant, sic illi [sc. *Stoici*] . . . nomina tamquam notas mutaverunt. Here *nota* and *signum* appear to be used as synonyms (cf. Boethius, below, p. 63). That they are synonymous is made clear by *Div.* II.21.47: per notas nos certiores facit Iuppiter . . . signum Iovis conlocabatur; *ibid.* I.56.127: qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt. Sometimes Cicero equates it with *argumentum*, *Acad.* I.8.32: argumentis (quibusdam) et quasi rerum notis. Frequently it is used in connection with *visa* (presentations), which are the products of *nature*: *Acad.* II.11.35: sine

Etymologia, quae verborum originem inquirat, a Cicerone dicta est notatio, quia nomen eius apud Aristotelen invenitur σύμβολον, quod est 'nota'.

Most illuminating is Boethius' commentary on Cicero's passage, in which an explanation of the translation is attempted:

nota vero est quae rem quamque designat. quo fit ut omne nomen nota sit, idcirco quod notam facit rem de qua praedicatur, id Aristoteles σύμβολον nominavit.²⁰

For Boethius and his Roman contemporaries, the word *symbolus* (= *symbolum*)²¹ may have sounded slightly foreign; or, its association with the Apostles' Creed may have rendered it unsuitable for the context of Aristotle's doctrine.²² *Nota*, however, served well. Its derivation from the supine

aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et propria nota; *ibid.* II.18.58: quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur, quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi nota (cf. *ibid.* II.26.84). *Signum*, on the other hand, can signify conventional methods of signification, *Rpb.* I.2.3: neque ea signa audiamus, quae receptui canunt. Study of Merguet's lexicon shows, however, that *signum* is used most frequently in connection with portents, predictions, etc. For *nota* in the sense of spoken or written words as used in the classical period, consult *OLD* (s.v. *nota*, 6). For later attestation, see e.g. Ammianus Marcellinus XVIII.3.2: ancilla ascita notarum perita; Prudentius, *PSi.* IX.23: verba notis brevibus comprehendere cuncta peritus; cf. *ibid.* IX.36: fictis notare verba signis; Ennodius, *Vita S. Epiphani* (PL 63.208c): notarum in scribendo compendia, et figuras varias verborum multitudinem comprehendentes brevi asecutus. Festus identifies two basic senses, *Sign. Verb.*, pp. 182–83: "Nota" alias significat signum; ut in pecoribus, tabulis, libris, litterae singulae, aut binae; alias ignomiam.

²⁰ *In Top. Cic.* 1111b; cf. *ibid.* 1085a: nota etiam rem designat; Victorinus, *Liber de Diffinitione*, PL 64.901b–c. Boethius uses *nota* also at: *Eut.* V.104,62; *CPh.* I.4.17; III.11,40; V.m3,12; m4,8; 29.

²¹ Pliny's is the earliest attestation (below, n. 22) for the neuter form, Müri, "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ," p. 8, n. 4.

²² The Apostles' Creed was an early baptismal confession based upon the "Old Roman" Creed and originating probably in Southern Gaul. It may have been in use by as early as the 4th century. The early reports have it that, before dispersing, the Apostles composed the rule for their teaching. Thus (?) Ambrose, *Explanatio symboli ad initiandos*, PL 17.1155c: symbolum Graece dicitur, Latine autem collatio: et maxime symbolam [*sic*] negotiatores dicere consueverunt, quando conferunt pecuniam suam, et quasi ex singulorum collatione in unum constipata, integra et inviolabilis conservatur, ut nemo fraudem collationi facere conetur, nemo negotiationi: denique inter ipsos negotiatores ista est consuetudo, ut si quis fraudem fecerit, quasi fraudulentus rejiciatur. sancti ergo apostoli in unum convenientes, brevitarium fidei fecerunt; Rufinus of Aquileia, *Commentarius in symbolum apostolorum* II, PL 21.337a: discessuri itaque ab invicem, normam sibi prius futurae praedicationis in commune constituunt, ne forte alii alio abducti, diversum aliquid his qui ad fidem Christi invitabantur, exponerent. omnes igitur in uno positi, et Spiritu Sancto repleti, breve istud futurae sibi . . . praedicationis indicium, in unum conferendo quod sentiebant unusquisque, componunt, atque hanc credentibus dandam esse regulam statuunt. symbolum autem hoc multis et iustissimis ex causis appellari voluerunt. symbolum enim Graece et indicium dici potest et collatio, hoc est quod plures in unum conferunt; Augustine, *Sermo de symbolo*, PL 40.1189: et si quis non ambulaverit per fidem, non perveniet ad speciem. hoc attendentes sancti Apostoli, certam fidei regulam tradiderunt, quam secundum numerum Apostolicum duodecim sententiis comprehensam, symbolum

of *noscere* indicates already the psychological orientation of Boethius' understanding of the word in this context. A *nota* is that which makes something to be known, or (by implication) reveals something that is known (*res nota*). Whether given or received, its primary relation is thought to be to the knowing mind rather than to the objects known.

An answer to the question why Boethius does not use *signa* in his translation is to be found in the doctrine of syllogistic. According to Aristotle's well-known definition a sign is a demonstrative premiss that is either necessary or generally approved.²³ When something exists in conjunction with something else, present, past or future, it may be said to be a sign of that thing's being. Aristotle constructs enthymemes from signs (middle terms) according to the three figures of the syllogism: (1) Milk in the woman is a sign of pregnancy, for all women with milk are pregnant; but the woman has milk; therefore, she is pregnant; (2) Sallowness is a sign of pregnancy, for to be pregnant is to be fallow; but the woman is fallow; therefore, she is pregnant; (3) Pittacus' being good is a sign that the wise are good, for Pittacus is good, and Pittacus is wise; therefore, the wise are good. If true, (1) is irrefutable, because universal. (2) is refutable, because the terms are inappropriately combined. (3) is refutable even if it is true, since it is not universal. The signs correspond to the minor premises; when major premises are added, enthymemes or syllogisms result. Signs that are proper middle terms (first figure) are evidences, for they are universal and heuristic. Aristotle goes on to discuss various affections of the body which can serve as indices or signs of inner states.²⁴ In the first figure, for example, it is in some cases possible to infer something about a person's inner condition on the basis of physical constitution (e.g. the symptoms that accompany feelings of anger: inferring that which is not directly perceived from that which is). Cicero gives a definition of

vocaverunt. Tertullian uses the word to mean 'warrant' (*Adv. M.* V.1, PL 2.469a; cf. *Adv. V.*, PL 2.562a), but it seems that by the 4th c. it has acquired the meanings, 'confession' and 'creed.' Augustine also associates it with legal contracts (*Serm.* 212, PL 38.1058). On the 'Apostles' Creed, see J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 3rd ed. (NY-London, 1972), pp. 368–434. *Symbolus* seems not to occur in Cicero, Catullus, Lucretius, Vergil, Horace, Livy, Ovid or Lucan. Pliny (*NH* 33.4.10) and Plautus (*Bacc.* 263–65; *Pseud.* 55–57), however, use it in the sense of token, tally or signet, which, of course, accords with the original meaning of its Greek counterpart. It is also found in the Vulgate, Prov. 23.21. Firmicus Maternus (*Err. Prof. Relig.* XVIII.1, p. 85) uses it as a synonym for *signum*: libet nunc explanare quibus se signis vel quibus symbolis in ipsis superstitionibus miseranda hominum turba cognoscat; habent enim propria signa, propria responsa. (?) Ambrose's and Rufinus' explanations suggest that the word was rather uncommon, and that the connection with συμβάλλειν was no longer self-evident.

²³ *PrAn.* 70a6–9, with Ross' comments, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 498–502. Cf. Aristotle, *Rht.* 1357a24–b21; *PAn.* 71b16–23.

²⁴ Cf. Ps. Aristotle, *Physiognomonica* 805a5–14, as discussed by Pépin, "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ," p. 27.

signum which shows clear affinity with Aristotle's passage, and the *Recensio Florentina* of Boethius' *Primorum Analyticorum Aristotelis Interpretatio* gives a strict translation of Aristotle's Greek.²⁵

Signum in this syllogistic sense adds little or nothing to Aristotle's explication of the relation of spoken sounds, mental impressions and actual things. Perhaps this explains why Boethius, who wrote extensively on the syllogism, avoids the word in his translation. Furthermore, the syllogistic sign, at least in the first figure, is not concerned ultimately with things established according to convention, but with truth, which is discerned in light of the correspondence, or lack of correspondence, of the syllogistic premises with the facts of nature. Socrates' humanity may be a sign of his mortality, but that which is at issue is obviously a fact of nature. That is the point behind Aristotle's illustration of the flute-player: learning to play the flute does indeed involve a change of inner state, but since it is not a *natural* change (nature does not teach us to play the flute, and thus many people never learn to play the flute at all, while there are many styles of flute playing and many kinds of flute in the world), it cannot be expected to produce any discernible symptom.²⁶ The relation of ground to consequent has some metaphorical connection with material cause.²⁷ With the Stoics, of course, logical and causal relationships become nearly indistinguishable.²⁸ Thus signs are understood by them to be indicative also of things which either have not yet taken place or are not immediately obvious.²⁹

²⁵ Cicero, *Inv.* I.30.48: *signum est quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quiddam significat quod ex ipso profectum videtur, quod aut ante fuerit aut in ipso negotio aut post sit consecutum, et tamen indiget testimoni et gravioris confirmationis*; Boethius, *AL* III.1.37 (= *PL* 64.711a): *signum autem vult esse propositio demonstrativa vel necessaria vel probabilis; nam quo existente est vel quo facto prius vel posterius facta est res, signum est vel esse vel fuisse vel quoniam erit*; cf. *Post. An. Int.* 720a: *per signa syllogismi*. On the authenticity of Boethius' *PrAn.* translation, see J. Shiel, "A Recent Discovery: Boethius' Notes on the *Prior Analytics*," *Vivarium* 20 (1982), 128–39. The *Recensio Carnutensis* differs in only one respect (*AL* III.2.189,23: *posterius futuro*).

²⁶ *PrAn.* 70b9–11.

²⁷ Cf. *Phys.* 195a16–19. See in general L. Tarán, review of Mignucci, *Gnomon* 45 (1973), 753–54.

²⁸ E.g. Cicero, *Fat.* XI.23–XII.28; Seneca, *Ep.* 65.12; *SVF* II.913; Marcus Aurelius, VII.9; IX.9. The universal *logos* forms the basis for what the Stoics maintain concerning determinism, a problem with which Boethius wrestles both in his commentaries and in the *Consolatio*. One may also note the possibility of Stoic influence upon Boethius' use of *ratio* in the sense of *natura* at *In Cat.* 161c14 ([*disputatio*] *de rerum ratione*), and the virtually synonymous use of *causa* and *ratio* at *CPh.* IV.4,37 (*hac igitur aliisque causis ea radice nitentibus*; cf. IV.4,26, *rationes*), and IV.6,1 (*sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas evolvere velatasque caligine explicare rationes*). Cf. *In Perih.* II.26,16–17 (*causam, rationem*).

²⁹ Even apart from the problem of divination, this is a complex area of enquiry. For Hellenistic philosophy I restrict myself to mention of P. H. and E. A. De Lacy, edd., trans. and comm., *Philodemus: On Methods of Inference: A Study in Ancient Empiricism*, 2nd ed. (Naples, 1978), p. 223ff., concerning Sextus' view of arbitrary "admonitive" signs.

Later Plotinus will speak of the world as "teeming with signs"³⁰ and of the wise as those who are able to draw inferences from them. There are also, he argues, customary (ἐν συνηθείᾳ, originally a Stoic idea) methods of inference such as the auguries taken from the flights of birds, the burning of entrails, etc., but these are valid only if pertinent to the necessary concatenation binding together the processes of the All. If the flights of birds are symptomatic of real and discernible causes, then the inferences they generate will stand.³¹ The final development will come in the form of theurgic attempts actually to manipulate the causal nexus of the cosmos to personal advantage.

The other passages of the *Peri Hermeneias* in which the word "sign" appears³² are not concerned with the semantical problems set out in 16a3–9, and neither is Boethius' corresponding commentary. When, for example, Boethius speaks of verbs as not being *per se signa* of subsistence or non-subsistence (*esse, non esse*), he means only that a verb is a sign that something has (or has not, in the case of "indefinite" verbs) taken place in conjunction with that of which it is predicated (—this assumes, of course, that the thing of which the verb is predicated exists: "runs" is not the sign of an actual attribute in, let alone the subsistence of, a chimaera).³³ And when he uses *signum* in the context of discussions of future contingents, it is clear that he has his training in syllogistic in mind, and not anything Aristotle says concerning the relationships of spoken sounds, mental impressions and actual things. One instance occurs in his second commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*:

non autem oportet arbitrari illa esse utrumlibet et contingentium naturae, quaecumque nobis ignota sunt. neque enim si nobis ignotum est a Persis ad Graecos missos legatos, idcirco missos esse incerti eventus est; nec si letale signum in aegrotantis facie medicina deprehendit, ut aliud esse non possit nisi ille moriatur, nobis autem ignotum sit propter artis inperitiam, idcirco illum aegrum esse moriturum utrumlibet et contingentis naturae esse iudicandum est . . .³⁴

³⁰ II.3.7.12; cf. IV.4.39.17–22.

³¹ Cf. R.M. Jones on natural and artificial forms of divination in Plutarch, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Menasha, 1916; rpt. NY-London, 1980), pp. 32; 40.

³² 16b7; b10; b22. 16a16 (= Boethius, *AL* II.1.6,1 = *In Perih.* II.44,5) has it in the sense of 'indication' or 'evidence.' Cf. Boethius, *In Perih.* II.36,7: signum namque est vocus ipsarum significationem litteris contineri, quod, etc.

³³ *In Perih.* I.64,22: cum enim dico "currit," hoc ipsum "currit" significat quidem aliquid, sed si est aut non est nondum significat; "neque enim esse signum est rei aut non esse;" II.76.10: quod autem addidit: "neque enim signum est rei esse vel non esse," tale quiddam est: "esse" quod verbum est, vel "non esse," quod infinitum verbum est, non est "signum rei" id est nihil per se significat. esse enim nisi in aliqua compositione non ponitur. "Runs" has no *per se* signification of running. Cf. Ammonius, *In de Int.* 56, 14–32.

³⁴ *In Perih.* II.193,6.

The second appears in the *Consolatio*:

etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur advertas, statuamus nullam esse praescientiam. num igitur, quantum ad hoc attinet, quae ex arbitrio veniunt ad necessitatem cogantur?—minime.—statuamus iterum esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere; manebit, ut opinor, eadem voluntatis integra atque absoluta libertas. sed praescientia, inquires, tametsi futuris eveniendi necessitas non est, signum tamen est necessario ea esse ventura. hoc igitur modo, etiam si praecognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret; omne etenim signum tantum quid sit ostendit, non vero efficit quod designat. quare demonstrandum prius est nihil non ex necessitate contingere, ut praenotionem signum esse huius necessitatis appareat; alioquin si haec nulla est, ne illa quidem eius rei signum poterit esse quae non est. iam vero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque petitis extrinsecus argumentis sed ex convenientibus necessariisque causis esse ducendam.³⁵

In the first of these two passages Boethius speaks of the medical symptom as a sign that something either will or will not come about. The patient's impending death is a fact of nature which is in no way changed by our knowledge or ignorance of the same. The symptom only provides the physician grounds for the inference that the death will take place. We can construct then the following syllogism of the first figure, *modus ponens*: Such-and-such a complexion is (always) symptomatic of a fatal disease; but the patient has such a complexion; therefore he has this fatal disease (and will die). The inherence of the complexion in the patient (minor premise) provides the syllogistic "sign."

The second passage puts forward a central tenet of Boethius' thought concerning future contingents and free choice of the will. If, Boethius argues, it is to be shown that there is compulsion driving things in the world, it must first be shown that this compulsion originates in an intrinsic or "simple" necessity in the natures of the things themselves, not in the external or "conditional" necessity that extends to the knowledge on the part of those who observe the things as they happen.³⁶ Arguing, as the Stoics do, that even deliberate choices are determined by the natural propensities of the soul at best allows the conclusion that divine foreknowledge is only a *signum* of what the soul will or will not have a proclivity for choosing. But the foreknowledge cannot be the cause of the choice, since signs have no causal efficacy.³⁷ In Boethius' mind, the major

³⁵ *CPh.* V.4,7.

³⁶ On the two necessities, *In Perih.* II.241; *CPh.* V.6,27–31; Ammonius, *In de Int.* 153,13ff.

³⁷ Knowing that something is or will come to be does not affect the outcome or nature of the thing itself. Cf. in general, Plotinus, III.1.5.33–37; 6.20–23; VI.1.22.24ff.; C.S. Lewis, *The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature*

premiss of the following syllogism requires qualification: What is known as future, must come to be; but this fact is known as future; therefore, it must come to be. *But*: it is not because it is known that the thing will come to be. It remains to be shown that the Stoics are in fact right. Boethius has already argued in his commentary that the sublunary world is ruled by a combination of causes, not the least of which is free, rational choice of the will.³⁸

Unlike St Augustine's, Boethius' semantics is not a theory of *signa*. It is, however, a theory of *significatio*. From Aristotle's σημαίνειν and σημαντικός Boethius takes *significare*, *significativus* and the other related verbals and substantives (*significans*, *significatio*, etc.) used throughout his commentaries. Also used are the verbs, *signare*,³⁹ *designare* and *monstrare*,⁴⁰ the precise meanings of which cannot be uniformly differentiated on the basis of what Boethius says in the commentaries. In the *Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos* and in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries, *significativa* replaces the *designativa* used for the parallel definitions of *nomen* and *oratio* in the *De Syllogismis Categoricis*. De Rijk refers to this information in dating the works.⁴¹ If the chronology is correct, then Boethius revised this

(Cambridge, 1964), p. 88: "For the question never was whether foreknowledge necessitates the act but whether it is not evidence that the act must have been necessary;" J. Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae* (Berlin-NY, 1978): Texte und Kommentare 9, p. 397: "Wenn das Vorauswissen nur ein Hinweis, ein Anzeichen dafür ist, daß etwas geschehen wird, wird das Geschehen auch ohne Anzeichen, also ohne Vorauswissen, eintreten, denn ein Anzeichen hat keine Wirkung." Augustine identifies "sign" with "cause" in connection with prophecy (*Conf.* XI.18.24): cum ergo videri dicuntur futura, non ipsa, quae nondum sunt, id est, quae futura sunt, sed eorum causae, vel signa forsitan videntur. Plato (*Tim.* 40c9) speaks of "signs" of future events, and Xenophon's Socrates (*Ap.* 13) of "symbols." Aristotle (*Div. per Somn.* 462b26) proposes three possible explanations for the prophecies that come in dreams: ἀνάγκη δ' οὐν τὰ ἐνύπνια ἢ αἰτία εἶναι ἢ σημεῖα τῶν γινομένων ἢ συμπτώματα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνια τούτων ἢ ἐν μόνον. Cf. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 186.

³⁸ On the Stoic position, see Boethius, *In Perih.* II.217,20ff.; for Boethius' refutation, *ibid.* II.231–32. Cf. Plotinus, IV.4.38.22: "Ὡστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνων, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ΦΥΣΙΝ εἰσφέρεισθαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν προστιθέναι."

³⁹ Professor De Rijk points out to me, however, that *signare* is probably an error, for *significare*. There is some attestation for the semantical sense of the verb ('signify') in ancient authors (e.g., *OLD*, s.v. *signo* 4), but De Rijk's observation may be correct. I find only five cases in which it is equivalent to *significare* or *designare* (*In Perih.* I.151,12; I.151,22; II.56,9; II.120,10; II.141,10; cf. I.33,21; *In Isag.* II.147,1, on *inscriptio*).

⁴⁰ See below, n. 43.

⁴¹ "Chronology," p. 7 (cf. pp. 10–11). The monographs may be twin translations of a Greek breviarium for the *Peri Hermeneias*, as promised by Boethius (*In Perih.* II.251,8–15, cf. II.501,11ff., and Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries," p. 238). The relevant passages are: *Syll. Cat.* 794d; 797a; *Intr. Syll. Cat.* 762d; 766c; *In Perih.* I.42,15–21; II.52,28; II.54,1; II.54,12, etc. More generally, see G. Righi, *A.M.S. Boezio: "De Syllogismo Cathgorico:" Studio sul I libro* (Milan, 1984), pp. 49–68. De Rijk says that Bidez "supposed the *De syll. categ.* to be a *prima recensio* of the *Introductio*. He refers to the remarkable use

terminology between ca. 506–13.⁴² In the second *Isagoge* and in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries he uses *monstrare* in connection with acts of reference (pointing the finger at a particular object, touching or naming that object, etc.);⁴³ *demonstratio* and *designatio* show similar force in the second *Peri Hermeneias* commentary.⁴⁴ Occasionally Boethius seems to use *significatio* (-are) for what we call “sense,” and *designatio* (-are) for “reference,” but in fact the two words are almost always interchangeable.⁴⁵ The terminology falls under what he rather indiscriminately refers to as *significatio*, and so particular terms connote only in context what we call “sense”⁴⁶ and “reference.”⁴⁷ At times, *significatio* connotes the coincidence of the two (sense and reference).⁴⁸ It also can mean the definition or formula of

of ‘*designativa*’ instead of ‘*significativa*’ in the definitions of noun and verb.” This observation is correct, but I have found it neither in Bidez (“Boèce et Porphyre,” *Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire* 2 [1923], 189–201; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, *Boethius*, pp. 133–45) nor in A. van de Vyver (“Les étapes du développement philosophique du haut moyen-âge,” *ibid.* 8 [1929], esp. 444ff.). Van de Vyver takes from Bidez the idea that the *Introductio* is a second redaction of the *Syll. Cat.*, but he seems to make no mention whatsoever of the change in terminology.

⁴² The first commentary is dated ca. 513 by De Rijk, and the *Introductio* ca. 523.

⁴³ E.g. *In Isag.* II.234,6: *individua enim maxime ostendi queunt, si vel tacito nomine, sensui ipsi oculorum digito tactuve monstrentur; In Perih.* II.64,22: *illa enim rectius dicuntur nomina quae prima posita sunt, id est quae aliquid monstrant* (the “first” imposition, see above, pp. 15, n. 20; 39, n. 105).

⁴⁴ *In Perih.* II.56,9: *quid enim attinet, si naturalia sunt vocabula, unius rei plures esse nominum voces, quae ad unam designationem demonstrationemque concurrerent? dicimus enim “gladius,” “ensis,” “mucro,” et haec tria ad unam subiectam substantiam currunt.*

⁴⁵ E.g. *In Cat.* 186d: *quocirca propinquior erit ad significationem designatio, cum individuo species redditur, quam si generis vocabulum praedicetur. rursus si quamlibet individuum arborem designare aliquis volens, arborem dicat, propinquius designabit quid sit id quod diffinivit, quam si plantam nominet: planta autem genus est arboris; In Perih.* I.68,15: *quare nomen hoc id est “homo” ut affirmatio non significat, sed designat aliquid simplex, significat igitur aliquid “ut dictio”; I.40,15: vox enim et intellectum rei significat et ipsam rem. ut cum dico “lapis” et intellectum lapidis et ipsum lapidem id est ipsam substantiam designat, sed prius intellectum, secundo vero loco significat rem; II.6,18: syllabae . . . nihil omnino significant, coniunctiones . . . per se vero nihil designant; II.21,22: vox in equi significatione . . . in equi designatione; I.101,11: “hominis” quidem nomen significat “animal,” significat “mortale, rationale” quoque designat. Cf. generally: *In Perih.* I.46,11–12 (significativa, monstrat); I.47,18–19 (significant, designat); II.54,14 (designantia); II.54,26 (designat); II.54,29 (significativam); II.56,11 (designationem demonstrationemque); *Div.* 887a–b.*

⁴⁶ E.g., *Eut.* I.80,53: *est etiam alia significatio “naturae” per quam dicimus diversam esse naturam auri atque argenti in hoc proprietatem rerum monstrare cupientes; In Cat.* 164d: *secundum hanc igitur ultimam “communis” significationem Aristoteles putat aequivocis rebus commune esse vocabulum; In Isag.* II.276,15: *id est “propria” quadrifarium dicunt. cuius quadrifariae appellationis significationes enumerat.*

⁴⁷ See above, nn. 43–45.

⁴⁸ E.g. *CPh.* V.1,8: *nihil omnino casum esse confirmo et praeter subiectae rei significationem inanem prorsus vocem esse decerno. Chance is, and therefore casus “means,” nothing. Of course, Boethius does not hold that a word must have reference in order to have sense. See, for instance, In Perih.* II.5,11: *sive autem aliquid quaecumque vox significet, ut est hic sermo “homo,” sive omnino nihil, sive positum alicui nomen significare*

a thing.⁴⁹ In this respect Boethius' terminology is flexible. Refinement comes with the ideas developed in response to specific passages of Aristotle's treatise.

A *signum* is not, for Boethius, precisely the same thing as a *nota*, and so *signum* is not used in the translation of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6. Only once do we find it used in such a way as to suggest a meaning in any way similar to that required for *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6 (*In Perih.* II.34,17): *velut non eodem modo cerae vel marmori vel chartis litterae id est vocum signa mandantur*. But the context indicates that the meaning is not precisely the same as that at 16a6. Boethius is pointing out that form is not impressed upon the soul, as the Stoics believe, in the same way as seal-impressions are made upon wax (or letters engraved in marble, etc.). For this *signum* is appropriate in that it is possible for Boethius to make use of the fact that 'seal-impression' is one of the most common connotations of the word. Here Boethius has in mind both "symbols" and "seal-impressions," and for that purpose *signum* happens to be well-suited. As to *Peri Hermeneias* 16b7/10, he does use *nota* as a translation of σημείον (*AL* II.1.7,3; 6 = *In Perih.* I.56,15; 57,1–2; II.66,2; 68,5; 28; 69,14), although at 16b22 he retains *signum* (*AL* II.1.7,17 = *In Perih.* I.64,14; 25; 65,5; 7; II.71,8; 76,10–31). Evidently he thinks that every *signum* can be called a *nota*, but not every *nota* a *signum*, for *signum* is not used in the context of 16a3–8 as *nota* is for 16b7/10; nor does the lexical change represent the Nature-Convention antithesis. For Boethius, then, *signum* has little specifically semantical force. *Nota*, on the other hand, not only has the authority of Cicero's translation to recommend it, but it conveys the idea of the communication of that which is in the mind, of something *known*—a *res nota*. Boethius' terminology, it is true, does not correspond precisely to the English terms, "sense" and "reference," but that some approximation of these notions is present in his understanding of this chapter of Aristotle's treatise would have been evident to us now, even had his commentaries perished and the translation alone survived. His use of *notae* pretty well makes clear that the things which we say are significant primarily of impressions in the soul and secondarily of the objects of which those impressions are likenesses. Only the genitive plural *primorum* could have cast the shadow of doubt. Medieval thinkers seem to have experienced no confusion concerning Boethius' meaning, but they of course had also his commentaries to consult. It is to these that we must turn next.

possit, ut est "blityri" (haec enim vox per se cum nihil significet, posita tamen ut alicui nomen sit significabit), sive per se quidem nihil significet, cum aliis vero iuncta designet; II.50,18: nec illud parvae curae fuit non ponere nomen [sc. *hircocervus*] quod omnino nihil significaret, sed quod cum significaret quiddam, tamen verum aut falsum esse non posset; *Eut.* I.78,15: idcirco vero adiunximus "quae cum sint," quoniam etiam ipsum "nihil" significat aliquid sed non naturam.

⁴⁹ E.g. above, n. 46.

CHAPTER THREE

ORANDI ORDO

Boethius' explication of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–9 is the subject of this, and of the following discussion. Most of the material to be considered is found in the second commentary on the treatise, which is the most broadly conceived and exhaustive of Boethius' Aristotelian commentaries. According to L.M. De Rijk, it was written ca. 515–16. The first edition is datable to 513 or not long thereafter.¹ The latter will provide some important points of comparison particularly for the study of Boethius' terminology, but it offers few or no philosophical insights which are not more fully discussed in the second. Boethius may have selected material from his source(s) for use in the first edition with the intention of later providing the supplementary information in the second.² His second commentary on the first chapter alone of the *Peri Hermeneias* occupies fifty-two pages in Meiser's critical edition, that is, well over one tenth of a commentary

¹ De Rijk, "Chronology," pp. 131–40; 145; H. Chadwick, *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1981), p. 154; L. Obertello, *Severino Boezio* 2 vols. (Genoa, 1974), I.311ff. On the question of chronology see also, S. Brandt, "Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von Boethius," *Philologus* 62 (1903), 141–54; A.P. McKinlay, "Stylistic Tests and the Chronology of the Work of Boethius," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 18 (1907), 123–56. That the two commentaries were not composed simultaneously is indicated at *In Perih.* I.32,2: quod vero altius acumen considerationis exposcit, secundae series editionis *expediat*. It should be noted, however, that in the lines immediately preceding, Boethius twice refers to his commentary in the past tense: nos libri huius enodationem duplici commentatione *supplevimus* et quantum simplices quidem intellectus sententiarum oratio brevis obscuraque complectitur, tantum hac huius operis tractatione *digessimus*. The references in the past tense may be Boethius' revisions after publication of the second edition. Alternatively, they may be corrections in the archetype. It is known that Martius Novatus Renatus collected the works, in Constantinople, and that in 527 they were copied by Theodorus, a pupil of Priscian. They were also corrected on the basis of the *codex Renati*. It may be added that I.32,3 (*expediat*) seems to address the question of the order in which the commentaries are to be read rather than the order in which they have been composed: *nunc a me tantum lector exspectet*, etc. Boethius twice refers (II.184,23; II.189,4) to conflict between the Franks and Ostrogoths. Usener (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1 [1880], 370) thought that this, combined with Boethius' claim to have spent two years on the second commentary (II.421,5–6), dates the work to 507–09. But the illustrations Boethius gives of the different kinds of propositions cannot be pressed for historical information. *Francorum Gothorumque pugna committitur* (*Gothos Franci superabunt*) is no more an historical observation than *a Persis ad Graecos missos legatos* (II.193,9) is (after all, Boethius is discussing future contingents, of which we can have no certain knowledge). Nor (as Shiel has pointed out) does *Apollinares ludi . . . quando eos esse dicimus* (*In Cat.* 263a) indicate the continuance of the July games in Boethius' day.

² Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries," pp. 232–33.

on a treatise in fourteen chapters. As with Aristotle's difficult discussion of future contingents in the ninth chapter (= *In Perih.* II.185–250), the opening lines of the *Peri Hermeneias* evidently presented problems of special concern to Boethius. Indeed, the commentary tends to verge on the diffuse, although there is no need, with Arens, to brand Boethius as “neither a great philosopher nor an eminent philologist,” whose “vanity triumphs over method and economy,” and who “anticipates things which he will have to explain shortly after, giving himself the air of one who knew everything himself before reading Aristotle's treatise.”³ It is no doubt true that Boethius was not a great or original philosopher, but if all of Arens' charges hold true of him, then they must hold also of Ammonius and of many other commentators who are sometimes equally diffuse, but without whose writings many difficult problems in Aristotle and in ancient philosophy generally would remain obscure to us today. It is for the translations and commentaries that subsequent generations owed their greatest debt to Boethius and for which Boethius himself (if we may judge on the basis of the special attention he devoted to Aristotle's logic) hoped to be remembered, and in these works there is pretense to nothing more than careful and systematic exposition of the ideas that seemed implicit in the texts with which Boethius worked. Arens' misjudgement is due to oversight of a consideration seemingly so plain as not to require any mention at all. The prolixity and periodic discursiveness of the commentaries are to be attributed in large part to the fact that Boethius, using the Latin tongue but a “starkly Greek idiom” (Shiel), transmitted ideas otherwise found almost exclusively in Greek sources. Albinus' treatise on dialectic was evidently not available to him;⁴ Vettius Agorius Praetextatus (d. 384) offered only a translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *Analytics*, of which Boethius had Aristotle's Greek in any case;⁵ book 4 of Martianus Capella's strange compendium undoubtedly was available to him, but can only have provided little consolation, not to say help, for the two years of sweat which Boethius poured over this difficult treatise of Aristotle;⁶ it is

³ Arens, *Theory of Language*, pp. 206; 213.

⁴ *In Perih.* II.4,3: Albinus quoque de isdem rebus scripsisse perhibetur, cuius ego geometricos quidem libros editos scio, de dialectica vero diu multumque quaesitos reperire non valui. Minio-Paluello suggested (*AL* I.1–5.lxxviii) that Albinus was the author of the Ps. Augustinian *Categoriae Decem (Paraphrasis Themistianae)*. This will not be the Platonist Albinus (2nd c. AD), for the author of the treatise refers (*AL* I.5.162,21) to Praetextatus. Cf. more generally, G. Pfligersdorffer, “Zu Boëthius, De Interpr. Ed. Sec. I, p. 4,4sqq. Meiser nebst Beobachtungen zur Geschichte der Dialektik bei den Römern,” *Wiener Studien*, 66 (1953), 131–54; Obertello, *Severino Boezio*, I.547ff.; Chadwick, *Boethius*, p. 114.

⁵ *In Perih.* II.3,7: Vetius Praetextatus priores postremosque analyticos non vertendo Aristotelem Latino sermoni tradidit, sed transferendo Themistium.

⁶ *In Perih.* II.421,3: nam et plurimorum sunt in unum coacervatae sententiae et

remotely possible that Apuleius' (2nd c. AD) *Peri Hermeneias* was of some help;⁷ Augustine's *De Dialectica*, on the other hand, appears to have been unknown to him.⁸ Whether, or to what extent, these Latin authors functioned as sources for Boethius' commentaries are questions still in need of detailed investigation, but it is difficult to put in doubt the conclusions that the tasks of translation and commentary were very much solitary ones and that Boethius was only too well aware of that fact.⁹ If Marius Victorinus' translation (cf. above, p. 54, n. 13) had been available, it would most probably have been the object of clearly voiced criticisms similar to those levelled against his translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge*,¹⁰ but Boethius makes no mention of such a translation. In the case of the *Peri Hermeneias* Boethius probably began by composing his own complete translation, which he appears later to have revised for the lemmata of the second commentary (see above, p. 50). This will have left him with the twofold task of first rendering the Greek of the treatise itself, and then sifting through the Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines passed down by the commentaries and (or) the scholia which were at his disposal. Here it is well to listen to James Shiel, who cannot be said ever to have overestimated

duorum ferme annorum spatium continuo commentandi sudore consumpsimus. Echoes in the *Consolatio* make Boethius' knowledge of the *De Nuptiis* readily apparent. See, e.g., Bieler, ed. *CPh.*, *Fontes et Similia*, p. 115.

⁷ Chadwick, *Boethius*, p. 113; but cf. Isaac, *Le Peri Hermeneias en occident*, pp. 27–29 (Isaac explains the similarities between Apuleius and Boethius by supposing the indirect influence of Theophrastus' treatise. Boethius, Isaac assumes, learned of Theophrastus' *De Adfirmatione et Negatione* from Porphyry.); M.W. Sullivan, *Apuleian Logic: The Nature, Sources, and Influence of Apuleius's Peri Hermeneias* (Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 209–28; cf. G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity* (Amsterdam-London, 1973), pp. 121–22, n. 12.

⁸ Chadwick, *Boethius*, p. 114.

⁹ His ambitious plan to translate and comment upon all of Plato and Aristotle was shaped by a gloomy assessment of the learning of the day, e.g. *In Cat.* 230c: multae quoque sunt artes, quas esse quidem in suae naturae ratione perspicimus, quarum neglectus scientiam sustulit. multumque ego ipse iam metuo ne hoc verissime de omnibus studiis liberalibus dicatur. On the plans for translation of and commentary upon all of the works of both Plato and Aristotle, *In Perih.* II.79,9: mihi autem si potentior divinitatis adnuerit favor, haec fixa sententia est, ut quamquam fuerint praeclara ingenia, quorum labor ac studium multa de his quae nunc quoque tractamus Latinae linguae contulerit, non tamen quendam quodammodo ordinem filumque et dispositione disciplinarum gradus ediderunt, ego omne Aristotelis opus, quodcumque in manus venerit, in Romanum stilum vertens eorum omnium commenta Latina oratione perscribam, ut si quid ex logicae artis subtilitate, ex moralis gravitate peritiae, ex naturalis acumine veritatis ab Aristotele conscriptum sit, id omne ordinatum transferam atque etiam quodam lumine commentationis inlustrem omnesque Platonis dialogos vertendo vel etiam commentando in Latinam redigam formam. his peractis non equidem contempserim Aristotelis Platonisque sententias in unam quodammodo revocare concordiam eosque non ut plerique dissentire in omnibus, sed in plerisque et his in philosophia maximis consentire demonstrem. haec, si vita otiumque suppetit, cum multa operis huius utilitate nec non etiam labore contenderim, qua in re faveant oportet, quos nulla coquit invidia.

¹⁰ See e.g., *In Isag.* I.23,17; I.33,2; I.34,12–37,1; I.64,8; I.94,12; I.95,14–96,2.

the originality of Boethius' thought: "To form the idea was a silent judgment on the learning of his day; to realize it was more than one man could accomplish; but Boethius accomplished much."¹¹ For in effect, it was necessary for him to develop anew a Latin philosophical terminology with which to express the Greek thought. That Boethius took painstaking care to revise his own translations and choices of philosophical terminology has been substantiated by the critical editions of his translations in *Aristoteles Latinus*. Arens underestimates not only the immense difficulty and historical importance of the undertaking, but the success with which Boethius completed what Fortune allowed him to complete. His fault in the commentaries was, if anything, a tendency to over-explain.

Boethius approaches the opening lines of the *Peri Hermeneias* with two central questions in mind and then organizes his commentary accordingly: (a) What are the order and relationship of the four semantical elements (actual things, mental impressions or "thoughts," spoken sounds, written marks) posited by Aristotle? (b) In what processes is the mind engaged when it proceeds either from some natural object to spoken enunciation of that object, or from a spoken sound to its corresponding object? It is the intention here to follow Boethius' program. We begin therefore with the first question, reserving the second for the following chapter.

The discussion with which Boethius opens his second commentary is devoted to some of the *didascalica* (κεφάλαια) which had traditionally been enumerated in the *prolegomena*¹² of the ancient commentaries (after Proclus, the headings included intention, utility, under which part of philosophy, title, authenticity, order, internal divisions, etc.), and with some prefatory clarification of the terms which pertain more generally to the subject matter of the treatise (*vox, oratio, enuntiatio, adfirmatio, negatio*, etc.). This stage of his commentary need not concern us. Boethius approaches the problem of signification itself by positing a general principle for the organization of three of the elements laid down by Aristotle, more particularly, by positing their order¹³ and their relative positions in that order (*orandi ordo*):

¹¹ "Boethius' Commentaries," p. 217.

¹² On which see in general, Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, pp. xxv–xxxii; Obertello, *Severino Boezio*, I.526, n. 15; Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries," p. 225f. It has been pointed out that Courcelle overlooked the differences between Ammonius' and Boethius' *prolegomena*: Tarán, *Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, p. viii, n. 10.

¹³ Cf. *In Perih.* II.7,9: erunt ergo interpretationis duae primae partes nomen et verbum. his enim quidquid est in animi intellectibus designatur; his namque totus *ordo orationis* efficitur. et in quantum vox ipsa quidem intellectus significat, in duas (ut dictum est) secatur partes, nomen et verbum, in quantum vero vox per intellectum medietatem subiectas intellectui res demonstrat, etc.

sive enim quaelibet interrogatio sit atque responsio, sive perpetua cuiuslibet orationis continuatio atque alterius auditus et intellegentia, sive hic quidem doceat ille vero discat, tribus his totus *orandi ordo* perficitur: rebus, intellectibus, vocibus.¹⁴

Similarly, in the first commentary:

tota autem ratio sensus huiusmodi est: tria sunt ex quibus omnis conlocutio disputatioque perficitur: res, intellectus, voces. res sunt quas animi ratione percipimus intellectuque discernimus, intellectus vero quibus res ipsas adiscimus, voces quibus id quod intellectu capimus significamus.¹⁵

We may first observe that in the passages cited above Boethius substitutes *intellectus* (νόημα) for *animae passionēs* (τὰ παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), and that he omits *litterae* (γράμματα, γραφόμενα) from his preliminary remarks altogether, thus leaving only two of the five (including ὁμοιώματα, *similitudines*) things mentioned by Aristotle in 16a3–9: πράγματα (*res*), and φωναί/τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ (*voces*). His reasons for this will become apparent presently. A parallel substitution of τὰ νοήματα for τὰ παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς is found in Ammonius, and will be discussed later as well. Ammonius' explanation of the omission of τὰ γράμματα is more immediately pertinent. He argues that Aristotle includes written marks in his opening comments because they in particular draw attention to the fact that languages have their basis in convention rather than in nature, and because of their preservative quality for spoken sounds. The “ancients” may have expressed doubt concerning the conventional basis of spoken languages, but they never expressed doubt concerning the conventional basis of written ones. Apart from this, however, written marks contribute nothing to the discussion proposed by Aristotle, since it is through (a) *thought* that knowledge is acquired of (b) *things*, and through (c) *spoken sounds* that teaching and learning take place,¹⁶ and these, according to

¹⁴ *In Perih.* II.20,12. Here *orare* perhaps does not conform to Boethius' normal linguistic usage: *enuntiare* or *dicere* might have been expected instead. I have retained *orandi ordo* only because it is the expression Boethius himself uses in this instance (cf. above, n. 13: totus ordo orationis).

¹⁵ *In Perih.* I.37,4.

¹⁶ *In de Int.* 19,18: καὶ δῆλον ὅτι μᾶλλον τῶν φωνῶν περὶ τὰ γράμματα τὸ θέσει θεωρηθῆσεται. διὸ καὶ ὅλως ἡξιώται μνήμης ὡς ἔχοντά τινα πρὸς τὰς φωνὰς οἰκειότητα, οὐ μόνον τῷ πρὸς τὴν μνήμην αὐτῶν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἐναργεῶς ἔχοντα τὸ θέσει καὶ δυνάμενα δι' ἑαυτῶν σαφέστερον ἡμᾶς ἐπιστῆσαι τῷ θέσει εἶναι τὰς φωνὰς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοίως γινώριμον τῷ θέσει τὰ γράμματα εἶναι (περὶ γοῦν τῶν φωνῶν ζητεῖν ἡξίωσαν οἱ παλαιότεροι, πότερον φύσει εἶναι αὐτὰς ἢ θέσει ρητέον, καὶ ἣν ἐν τούτοις προσῆκον διορισθῆναι, πότερος αὐταῖς τούτων τῶν τρόπων τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἀρμόσει, καὶ τούτῳ χρῆσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς τοῦ τε ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκειμένου λόγου· περὶ δὲ τῶν γραμμάτων οὐδεμία παρ' αὐτοῖς γέγονεν ἀμφισβήτησις), ἐπεὶ ὅτι ἄλλως οὐδεμίαν ἡμῖν χρεῖαν παρέξει πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν προκειμένων, αὐτὸς ἐφεξῆς δηλώσει, τὰ μὲν γράμματα παραλιπὼν μόνα δὲ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς θεωρῶν ὡς ποτὲ μὲν ἀπλᾶ

Ammonius, are the issues at which the introduction of the treatise is directed. Thus in Ammonius as well as in Boethius we can see a tendency to reduce the scope of the passage to the relationship of three things: actual things, thoughts and spoken sounds.

Second, it will be noted that in both of the quotations which are presented above Boethius constructs the triads in a fixed order:

res-intellectus-vox,

and that in the first he insinuates the positions of both *dicens* and *audiens* (*orationis continuatio atque alterius auditus*). This triad as a whole will be inverted, but the sequence of the three things it contains will not be altered:¹⁷ *intellectus* will retain middle position in the case of both speaker and listener. Boethius gives no immediate explanation for his use of the expression *intellectus* rather than *passiones animae*, but is intent instead upon discussing first the internal sequence of these three things. This, we may conjecture, is not peculiar to him, for the same concern is evident in both Ammonius and Stephanus. Ammonius, for example, uncovers a parallel tetrad and lays down its τάξις: (a) actual things (b) thoughts (c)¹⁸ spoken sounds (d) written marks:

τὰ πράγματα-τὰ νοήματα-αἱ φωναί-τὰ γράμματα.¹⁹

Actual things, he goes on to explain, constitute a kind of τέλος, since it is the purpose of thoughts to apprehend (κατάληψις) them—in this the “attention rests.” Spoken sounds are enunciative of thoughts and serve the communications on the basis of which social bonds are forged. The τέλος of written marks is the preservation of spoken sounds.²⁰ Ammonius

ποτέ δὲ σύνθετα; 20,26: τούτων δὴ τεττάρων, λέγω δὴ πραγμάτων νοημάτων φωνῶν γραμμάτων, χαίρειν ἔσας τὰ γράμματα ὡς οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχοντα πρὸς τὴν προσεχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ὑφήγησιν, ἃ προηγουμένως ὁ φιλόσοφος βούλεται θεωρεῖν, περὶ νοημάτων σκοπεῖ, δι’ ὧν ταῦτα γινώσκουμεν, καὶ περὶ φωνῶν διορίζεται, ὧν χωρὶς ἀδύνατον μάθησιν ἢ διδασκαλίαν γενέσθαι.

¹⁷ Cf. K. Berka, “Die Semantik des Boethius,” *Helikon* 8 (1968), 454: “Diese semiotischen Grundelemente bilden eine geordnete Reihe—die Sache, das Abbild, die Stimme, die Buchstaben—deren Glieder nicht umkehrbar sind.” On the triad, cf. above, p. 16.

¹⁸ Καὶ ἔτι (*In de Int.* 18,25–26)—and thus the tetrad can be divided in half, because (c) and (d) are conventional, whereas (a) and (b) are natural. Cf. below, p. 73.

¹⁹ See below, n. 20.

²⁰ *In de Int.* 18,23: Τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων διαρθροῦντες ἡμεῖς τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου παραδιδόμενα λέγομεν ὅτι τέτταρα ταῦτα παραλαμβάνει διὰ τούτων ὡς χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην θεωρίαν, πράγματά τε καὶ νοήματα καὶ ἔτι φωνὰς καὶ γράμματα. ἐν οἷς πρώτῃ μὲν ἔχει τὰξιν τὰ πράγματα δευτέρῃ δὲ τὰ νοήματα τρίτῃ αἱ φωναὶ καὶ τελευταίαν τὰ γράμματα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ νοήματα τέλος ἔχει τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων κατάληψιν, καὶ τότε ὄντως νοήματα ἔστιν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ὡς περ ἐφαρμοσθῇ τοῖς πράγμασιν· εἰκόνες γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων. αἱ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰσὶν ἐξαγγελτικαὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δέδονται ἡμῖν

sees the movement within this τάξις as progressing in one respect from right to left (from written marks to actual things, or from convention to nature), but of the *natural* order or movement as from left to right (from actual things to written marks, or from nature to convention). Stephanus' explanation²¹ differs only slightly: of the four elements, certain ones are only enunciative (written marks); others are only enunciated (actual things); others (thoughts, spoken sounds) participate in both. Each element enunciates that which is *prior* to itself, but is in turn enunciated by that which is *subsequent* to itself in the order. Thoughts are subsequent to actual things, but prior to spoken sounds and written marks. Nothing is prior to actual things, and nothing is subsequent to written marks. The same order as that in Ammonius is therefore discovered: (a) actual things (b) thoughts (c) spoken sounds (d) written marks. This represents the *natural* order, because actual things are understood to be φύσει prior to thoughts, thoughts prior to spoken sounds, and spoken sounds to written marks. There must first be an object, then a thought about that object, then a spoken sound for that thought, and finally a set of written marks for the spoken sound.²²

Boethius introduces his explication of the *ordo* by positing three subsidiary principles for this first triad (*res-intellectus-vox*):

res enim ab intellectu concipitur, vox vero conceptiones animi intellectusque significat, ipsi vero intellectus et concipiunt subiectas res et significantur a vocibus.²³

ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς τὰς ἐννοίας τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵνα καὶ δυνώμεθα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπολιτεύεσθαι· κοινωνικὸν γὰρ ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος· διόπερ οἱ μὴ κεχρημένοι ταῖς αὐταῖς φωναῖς οὐδὲ κοινωνοῦσι πολιτείας ἀλλήλοις ὥς μὴ γινώσκοντες τὰς ἀλλήλων ἐννοίας. τὰ δὲ γράμματα τέλος ἔχει τὸ διαφυλάττειν τὴν μνήμην τῶν φωνῶν.

²¹ Evidently Stephanus' source is followed also by Probus (trans. p. 95 Hoffmann): "Docet nos igitur de his quattuor, quae quidem ex eis significet, quid autem per eas significetur, et quae consignificet et [con]significetur. Actiones enim solum significantur non significantes. Cogitatio autem significat et significatur. Significat quidem actionem; significatur autem voce. Vox autem similiter significat et significatur. Significat quidem cogitationes, significatur autem per scripta. Scripta autem significant solum."

²² Stephanus, *In de Int.* 5,21: πρῶτως εἶπεν σημεία εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῶν νοημάτων, διότι δευτέρως καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σημεία ἐστίν. τῶν γὰρ δ' τούτων τὰ μὲν μόνως ἐξαγγέλλουσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ γραφόμενα, τὰ δὲ μόνως ἐξαγγέλλονται, ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξαγγέλλουσιν καὶ ἐξαγγέλλονται, ὥσπερ τὰ νοήματα καὶ αἱ φωναί. ἐξαγγέλλουσιν μὲν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν, ἐξαγγέλλονται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν μετ' αὐτά. οἷον τὰ νοήματα ἐπειδὴ δευτέρα μὲν εἰσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, πρῶτα δὲ τῶν φωνῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων, ἐξαγγέλλουσι μὲν τὰ πράγματα, ἐξαγγέλλονται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν (καὶ) τῶν γραφομένων. πάλιν αἱ φωναὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξαγγέλλουσι μὲν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, ἐξαγγέλλονται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν γραφομένων. τὰ μέντοι πράγματα οὔτε ἐξαγγέλλουσι ποτε, ἐπειδὴ οὐδέν ἐστιν πρὸ αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τὰ γραφόμενα ἐξαγγέλλονται ὑπὸ τίνος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔχουσι τι μετ' αὐτά. καὶ ἔστιν φύσει μὲν πρότερον τὸ πρᾶγμα τῶν ἄλλων· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον εἶναι φέρε εἰπεῖν τὸν ἴππον καὶ οὕτως τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν νόημα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ἴππου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα τὰ γράμματα, εἶπερ δλως εἰσιν γράμματα.

²³ *In Perih.* II,20,17.

The final phrase appears pleonastic, but its function evidently is to make explicit (through the double connectives) the Janus-like quality of an *intellectus*, which is in some sense “contiguous” with both *res* and *vox*. This double relation is given emphasis by the respective use of the verbs, *concupere* and *significare*: an *intellectus* “conceives” a *res* (it forms a concept or conception); a *vox*, however, “signifies” an *intellectus*. This then is how Boethius envisages his first triad:

res-CONCIPERE-intellectus-SIGNIFICARE-vox.

The use of the verb *concupere* finds a striking parallel in the Ps. Augustinian *Categoriae Decem* (= *Paraphrasis Themistianae*), 19.²⁴ Boethius’ triad would be asymmetrical, were it not for the fact that in some instances the verbs (or verbals) *significare* and *designare* replace *concupere*. For example:

In Perih. II.7,26: quantum eas [sc. *res*] medius animi *significet* intellectus,

II.24,14: intellectus vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum *significativi* sunt,

II.24,16: *significationes* intellectuum (*subjective genitive*),

II.24,25: haec intellectus oratio subiectas principaliter *res* sibi *concupiat* ac *designet*.²⁵

A *vox* signifies an *intellectus*; but an *intellectus* signifies a *res*; therefore, the *vox* also signifies, mediately, a *res*. The precise meaning of the verb *significare* in this context is not explained.

²⁴ *AL* I.5.137,16 (= *PL* 32.1422): Primo: sunt, *res* omnes quas natura peperit; secundo: percipiuntur, ea quorum imagines animo videndo formamus et condimus; tertio: dicuntur, illa quibus ea quae sunt impressa animis efferuntur (id namque quod quis *concupit* animo, lingua prosequente declarat).

²⁵ In saying that *intellectus* are significative of *res*, Boethius may have in mind the Hellenistic problem of the *iudicium*. On Epicurus, see in general G. Striker, “Epicurus on the Truth of Sense Impressions,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 59 (1977), 125–42. Boethius is probably not following an Epicurean idea; indeed, he quotes Lucretius only once (*Inst. Ar.* 77,13, but cf. Bieler’s *Fontes et Similia*, p. 114), while the echo of Vergil *Geor.* II.490 at *CPh.* III.m12,1–4 is of no doctrinal significance. Moreover, *Philosophia* (*CPh.* I.3,7) is made to speak disparagingly of both the Stoics and the Epicureans. Through Cicero and Augustine, however, the Stoic-Sceptic debates became common knowledge in the Latin West, and among Stoics sense-perceptions and presentations may have been referred to as “signs” of extramental realities. Cicero (*Acad.* II.11.35f.; 32.103; 34.111) uses *nota*, *argumentum* and *signum*, with *visum* (φαντασία), for the internal “mark” that distinguishes a true from a false presentation. Boethius evidently has the Stoic sense of *nota* in mind at *CPh.* V.m4,29. Sextus (*AM* VII.367), on the other hand, denies any firm σημειώσις in the πάθη: affections are not true “signs” of how external objects are. I have been unable to trace Boethius’ use to any specific source, but in this connection it may be recalled that in the *Consolatio* he speaks (above, p. 59f.) of divine foreknowledge as being a *sign* of things future. The present argument is not concerned with the problem of providence, of course, but there is a unitive thread to connect the two discussions: God sees all things in an eternal “now,” and that can be partially understood in light of the manner in which human beings perceive phenomenal occurrences, for in each case the knowledge is a *sign*, but not a *cause*, of its object.

Like Ammonius, and later Stephanus, Boethius constructs a corresponding tetradic order of the elements by adding *litterae* to the triad: quantum quoque quiddam est, quo voces ipsae valeant designari, id autem sunt litterae.²⁶ Their position in the *orandi ordo* is parallel to that assigned, as we have already seen, by Stephanus and Ammonius:

res-intellectus-vox-litterae,

but what Boethius immediately adds is the observation that the sequence of elements is not to be confused:

quae scilicet habent *quandam non confusam neque fortuitam consequentiam*, sed terminata naturae suae ordinatione constant. res enim semper comitantur eum qui ab ipsis concipitur intellectum, ipsum vero intellectum vox sequitur, sed voces elementa id est litterae.²⁷

Boethius interprets the sequence of elements in this first tetrad as reflecting the natural or absolute order of things. The order is not conceived as a temporal one (*res comitantur intellectum*), but as a logical one. We shall see later that Boethius may be thinking of the bond between an *intellectus* and a *res* as falling under the Aristotelian category of Relation; but for the moment the outlines of his thought are clear enough. Things exist in nature; people conceive thoughts from them; they speak the things they think; and then they write down what they speak. A *res*, he says, “accompanies” an *intellectus*;—but the nature of things is such that a *res* could subsist in the absence of any *intellectus*, since it need not be thought at all. This holds also for the other elements in the order: thoughts may exist in the absence of spoken sounds and spoken sounds in the absence of written

²⁶ *In Perih.* II.20,24.

²⁷ *In Perih.* II.20,29. On the distinction of written marks and alphabetic sounds, see *In Perih.* II.23,14: sed nos in supra dictis sentiis elemento atque littera promiscue usum, quae autem sit horum distantia paucis absolvam. littera est inscriptio atque figura partis minimae vocis articulatae, elementum vero sonus ipsius inscriptionis: ut cum scribo litteram quae est *a*, formula ipsa quae atramento vel graphio scribitur littera nominatur, ipse vero sonus quo ipsam litteram voce proferimus dicitur elementum. The distinction is found in Ammonius (*In de Int.* 23,10–29) as well, although the two explanations are quite different from one another: Ammonius in fact discusses γραφόμενα in the context of the Peripatetic theory of the three discourses (δνόματα and ῥήματα that are: νοούμενα, ἐκφωνούμενα and γραφόμενα), whereas Boethius does not. He makes a distinction between στοιχεῖα, γράμματα and γραφόμενα, whereas Boethius provides no corresponding discussion of the third level (he distinguishes only *elementa* and *litterae*). He also explains, as Boethius does not, that the στοιχεῖα (= *elementa*) cannot be symbols of spoken sounds, since they are *parts* of spoken sounds. (The στοιχεῖα are spoken alphabetic sounds.) The γράμμα (= *littera*) is the marking actually written on the tablet. The γραφόμενον (= *scriptum*, not present in Boethius’ account) is its “type:” it is the shape or form of the written alphabetic mark (cf. however the scholium to *Perih.* 16a4 in Waitz, *Organon*, I.39). It is possible to visualize the γραφόμενον without actually writing it on the page. Stephanus’ account (*In de Int.* 5,1–19) appears largely derivative.

marks, but not vice versa. That is why the tetrad is held to reflect priority κατὰ φύσιν (*naturae suae ordinatione*). Boethius' next step is to split the tetrad in half, in order to distinguish the elements that arise *naturaliter* from those that arise *positione*:²⁸

NATURALITER	POSITIONE
res – intellectus	vox – litterae.

In this first tetrad *vox* and *litterae* are secondary, as being the products of convention.

Later in the commentary a doxographical notice is introduced in connection with this idea. Boethius reports that Aspasius objected to the claim that *passiones animae* are *naturaliter*, that is, that they are “the same for all:”

in hoc vero Aspasius permolestus est. ait enim: qui fieri potest, ut eadem apud omnes passiones animae sint, cum tam diversa sententia de iusto ac bono sit? arbitratur Aristotelem passiones animae non de rebus incorporalibus, sed de his tantum quae sensibus capi possunt passiones animae dixisse. quod perfalsum est. neque enim umquam intellexisse dicitur, qui fallitur, et fortasse quidem passionem animi habuisse dicitur quicumque id quod est bonum non eodem modo quo est, sed aliter arbitratur, intellexisse vero non dicitur. Aristoteles autem cum de similitudine loquitur, de intellectu pronuntiat. neque enim fieri potest, ut qui quod bonum est malum esse arbitratur boni similitudinem mente conceperit. neque enim intellexit rem subiectam. sed quae sunt iusta ac bona ad positionem omnia naturamve referuntur. et si de iusto ac bono ita loquitur, ut de eo quod civile ius aut civilis iniuria dicitur, recte non eadem sunt passiones animae, quoniam civile ius et civile bonum positione est, non natura. naturale vero bonum atque iustum apud omnes gentes idem est. et de deo quoque idem: cuius quamvis diversa cultura sit, idem tamen cuiusdam eminentissimae naturae est intellectus.²⁹

Not all people have the same conception of the just and good. Boethius rejoins, however, that Aspasius was mistaken on two points: (a) in thinking that *passiones animae* apply only in the case of corporeal objects; (b) in not realizing that simply to have a *passio animae* is not yet to have an *intellectus*—whereas the focus of Aristotle's discussion obviously is the latter. Furthermore: it may be true that there are different conceptions of civil justice or of positive law (which are products of convention), but there can be no disagreement over the natural Good, nor in the conceptions that different people have of God.

Prima facie the notice appears flatly self-contradictory, for Boethius says

²⁸ In *Perih.* II.23,2–5; II.25,1–5; II.37,22–39,16; II.42,28–43,9. So also Ammonius, In *de Int.* 19,1–18 (and above, n. 18, καὶ ἔτι), and Stephanus, In *de Int.* 1,13–2,1.

²⁹ In *Perih.* II.41,13.

that Aspasius addressed the question of *animae passionēs* in terms of the just and the good, which are incorporeal, but then criticizes him for holding that they pertain only to *corporeal* objects. Some reconstruction of the disagreement is required. Aspasius' chief objection seems to have been that the differences of opinion over what is deemed just and good indicate that the *animae passionēs* are not in fact "the same for all," and that we must therefore restrict their compass to the cognition of sensibles. Boethius' reply to this is, then, as follows: when Aristotle speaks of *animae passionēs* as being "the same for all," he really intends *intellectus*; these *are* the same for all (a false notion of the Good may perhaps be called an *animae passio* but it is not properly speaking an *intellectus* or likeness), except in cases of conventional "goods," which change from one society to the next. By this reference to conventional "goods" Boethius can only mean that different legal systems may decree different rewards and retributions in respect of what is Just and Good, but that absolute or intuitive knowledge (*intellectus*) of the Good, the Just and the Divine is the same everywhere and always.³⁰ Once again we are able to detect the influence of Porphyry, for this report follows directly upon the heels of that concerning Herminius and Alexander, in which Boethius has introduced Porphyry as arbitrator,³¹ and to which the subject matter is closely related.

Boethius indicates that the sequence of elements in the first tetrad is capable of being inverted: *ad cognitionem vero conversim sese res habet*.³² The second tetrad is therefore the following:

litterae-vox-intellectus-res,³³

and its corresponding triad will be:

vox-intellectus-res.

This inverted disposition of things reflects the "order of learning" (*ad cognitionem*), in which the movement is from that which is "by convention" to that which is "by nature."

³⁰ Prof. Striker suggests to me that Aspasius' opinion may strengthen the case for an original reading of *πρώτων* at 16a6 (cf. above, pp. 23–24). Chadwick (*Boethius*, p. 156) misses the implication of Boethius' argument, for the question is not posed in terms simply of "identical rational considerations," but in terms of rational considerations and the institutions that result from them. There is one conception of God, but there are many religions; there is one conception of Justice, but there are many systems of positive law. If this is not Boethius' meaning, then the argument is self-contradictory: people have the same conceptions of the Just and the Good, but they have different conceptions of the just and the good.

³¹ See above, pp. 11, n. 12; 52.

³² *In Perih.* II.21,7.

³³ Cf. *In Perih.* II.42,27: et quoniam quattuor ista quaedam sunt: litterae, voces, intellectus, res, quorum litterae et voces positione sunt, natura vero res atque intellectus, etc.

Boethius' primary concern is to explicate the processes encompassed by the two triads, or, more precisely, to explicate the processes encompassed by the *same* triad as seen from two points of view:

DICENS AUDIENS
res – intellectus – vox.

Res and *vox* mark the stop-points of the two systems. The *dicens* (first triad) begins with the experience of some *res*, from which is conceived an *intellectus*. The *intellectus* is signified by a *vox* and the process stops, *significatio* takes place. Things are reversed, however, for the *audiens* (second triad), who begins by receiving the *vox* uttered by the *dicens*. This gives rise to an *intellectus* in the mind of the *audiens*, which in turn causes him to direct his attention to a *res*. At this point the attention rests and *significatio* takes place:

nam qui docet et qui dicit et qui interrogat a rebus ad intellectum profecti per nomina et verba vim propriae actionis exercent atque officium (rebus enim subiectis ab his capiunt intellectus et per nomina verbaque pronuntiat), qui vero discit vel qui audit vel etiam qui respondet a nominibus ad intellectus progressi ad res usque perveniunt. accipiens enim is qui discit vel qui audit vel qui respondet docentis vel dicentis vel interrogantis sermonem, quid unusquisque illorum dicat intellegit et intellegens rerum quoque scientiam capit et in ea consistit.³⁴

Thus far Boethius has proposed only a skeletal account of the two activities, along with some implicit justification for the mediating position of *intellectus*. For it is through the *intellectus* that the *vox*, whether given or received, must pass.

There is another fundamental principle which is laid down by Boethius, this time in reference to the *second* of these triads (*vox-intellectus-res*). This we may designate the principle of "sameness," or what Boethius uses as the criterion for distinguishing things *naturaliter* from things *positione* in the *orandi ordo*. Ammonius in his commentary speaks of a "canon" for distinguishing the two: things which are formally (κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος), not numerically, "the same for all" are "by nature;" things which are not "the same for all" are "by convention," for nature is one and produces the same effects everywhere.³⁵ It is therefore recognizable by

³⁴ *In Perih.* II.23,27.

³⁵ *In de Int.* 19,1–9; cf. Stephanus, *In de Int.* 1,13–24. We may detect here traces of the Stoic "common conceptions" (e.g. *SVF* II.104; 473; Cicero, *Acad.* I.11.42; II.10.30; 33; *Tusc.* I.24.57; 13.30; *ND* I.12.30; II.17.45; *Lgg.* I.8.24). Cf. Boethius, *CPh.* III.10,7 (deum . . . bonum esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum); V.6,2 (deum . . . aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est); *Hebd.* 40,18 (communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam); *Top. Diff.* 1176c ([*propositiones*] quarum nulla probatio est, maximae vel principales vocantur).

the uniformity, that is, by the “sameness,” of its effects. Boethius presses this notion into the service principally of the second tetrad (*litterae-vox-intellectus-res*), which reflects the “order of learning:”

namque apud quos eadem sunt litterae et qui eisdem elementis utuntur, eisdem quoque nominibus eos ac verbis id est vocibus uti necesse est et qui vocibus eisdem utuntur, idem quoque apud eos intellectus in animi conceptione versantur. sed apud quos idem intellectus sunt, easdem res eorum intellectibus subiectas esse manifestum est.³⁶

He envisions a logical necessity governing the movement across the members of the second tetrad, from *litterae* to *res*, and—what is symptomatic of this necessity—a “sameness-for-all” that obtains for each of the members of the sequence if for the first. This provides a scheme of inference: when people see or use a set of written marks which are formally “the same,”³⁷ it can be determined that the corresponding spoken sounds, thoughts and ultimately things will be “the same” as well. The results of an empirical test of this principle are, in other words, predictable. Two literate Romans of sound mind and faculties of perception, when given “the same” written marks, E-Q-U-U-S, and asked to read the marks, will pronounce “the same” word, *equus*; they will both, when asked to identify the object they have in mind while saying the word, point to “the same” horse (or horses, as opposed to, say, a cow or house). Of course, the word, *equus*, has to be univocal, and it is in that regard that Boethius (i.e., Porphyry) has corrected Herminus’ emendation (ταῦτα = *hae*) for *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6: it must be clear to both the *dicens* and the *audiens* that it is an actual horse, not representations of a horse in stone, paint, bronze, etc., that is at issue. This line of reasoning is amplified in the following passage. (Periods have been numbered for purposes of commentary.)

(1) praecedit autem res intellectum, intellectus vero vocem, vox litteras, sed hoc converti non potest. (2) neque enim si litterae sint, mox aliqua ex his significatio vocis existit. (3) hominibus namque qui litteras ignorant nullum nomen quaelibet elementa significant, quippe quae nesciunt. (4) nec si voces sint, mox intellectus esse necesse est. plures enim voces invenies quae nihil omnino significant. (5) nec intellectui quoque subiecta res semper est.

By *idem aptud omnes* Boethius will mean one of two things. He sometimes uses it in a restricted sense, for those instances in which a thing, e.g. an alphabet or a spoken language, is not absolutely “the same for all,” but the same for all members of a particular group. All people who read Greek, i.e. read “the same” written alphabet, have also “the same” spoken language, Greek. On the other hand, things which are produced by nature are absolutely *eadem aptud omnes*, since they do not change from one society to the next.

³⁶ *In Perih.* II.21,8.

³⁷ The written mark(s) can, of course, be numerically “the same” (i.e. numerically one, in which case there is no question of their not being formally the same), but that is not necessary for the point Boethius is making. Only formal sameness is required.

(6) sunt enim intellectus sine re ulla subiecta, ut quos centauros vel chi-maeras poetae finxerunt. (7) horum enim sunt intellectus quibus subiecta nulla substantia est. (8) sed si quis ad naturam redeat eamque consideret diligenter, agnoscat cum res est, eius quoque esse intellectum: quod si non apud homines, certe apud eum, qui propriae divinitate substantiae in propria natura ipsius rei nihil ignorat. (9) et si est intellectus, et vox est; quod si vox fuerit, eius quoque sunt litterae, quae si ignorantur, nihil ad ipsam vocis naturam. (10) neque enim, quasi causa quaedam vocum est intellectus aut vox causa litterarum, ut cum eadem sint apud aliquos litterae, necesse sit eadem quoque esse nomina, ita quoque cum eadem sint vel res vel intellectus apud aliquos, mox necesse est intellectum ipsorum vel rerum eadem esse vocabula.³⁸

The argument appears somewhat circular, but Boethius' thought is in fact carefully ordered. Detailed consideration is required, but first a remark concerning Meiser's punctuation of (10) is advisable. The force of *neque enim* (cf. above, n. 29) is obviously to assign a negative explanation for what has gone before, and it carries through both clauses (cf. οὐ γάρ).³⁹ Since it qualifies the whole sentence, it should be felt before the phrase which begins, *ut cum eadem*. It is necessary, therefore, to remove the colon that Meiser places after *nomina* (II.22,16), and thus to restore the balance of *ut* and *ita quoque*. We may translate: "For a thought is not, as it were, the cause of spoken sounds, nor a spoken sound of written marks; [for it is *not* the case that:] just as when people have 'the same' written marks (and) it is necessary that the (spoken) names also be 'the same,' so too when they have either 'the same' things or 'the same' thoughts, it is therefore (*mox*) necessary that the words for these thoughts or things be 'the same'."⁴⁰

Boethius begins this passage by reemphasizing the "natural order" that is implicit in the sequence of elements in the first tetrad (*res-intellectus-vox-litterae*), but he substitutes the verb *praecedo* for *comitor*.⁴¹ This introduces no special difficulty, for, as we have already seen, the order is conceived of as being a logical rather than a temporal one. In the phenomenal world, *res* can, although they need not, subsist in the absence of *intellectus*. The second point (*sed hoc converti non potest*) that is made in sentence (1) seems

³⁸ *In Perih.* II.21,28.

³⁹ E.g., Plato, *Phlb.* 16b2; 24d3; 27d8; e7; 28a6; 67b11; Aristotle, *Cat.* 4b36; *PeriH.* 19b2 (οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ . . . οὕτως); *De An.* 420b29; 428a29; *Meta.* 1032a1; Plotinus, I.4.7.45; 10.24; 6.7.34; III.8.2.25; V.9.7.12; 17. Cf. Boethius, *CPh.* II.1,15; II.6,13; *In Perih.* II.73,20ff.; II.40,22; II.193,8; Cicero, *Fat.* XIX.44; *In Catilinam* I.6.15; Augustine, *Conf.* II.3.8 (non enim . . . sicut . . . ita); *Civ. Dei.* XIII.3 (I.559,16: neque enim ita . . . sicut); XIV.26 (II.54,5: neque enim . . . ita . . . sicut).

⁴⁰ Cf. the syntax of *In Isag.* II.138,17: *neque enim sese ut in numeris, ita etiam in rationationibus habet* (quoted in full below, p. 122).

⁴¹ See above, p. 72, n. 27.

at first baffling, for Boethius himself reverses the sequence of the first tetrad (*ad cognitionem vero conversim sese res habet*, II.21,7) in order to account for the experience of the *audiens*, the “order of learning.” What, then, is the bearing of this remark?

Its meaning becomes clear only when seen in light of what is said concerning the principle of “sameness” that imposes the necessary concatenation upon the sequence of elements in the second tetrad (*litterae-vox-intellectus-res*). This is clarified in sentences (2) through (7). Boethius has already made the following point: *litterae* imply *voces*, *voces* imply *intellectus* and *intellectus* imply *res*—but *only* if it is known that the *litterae* are in any given instance formally “the same for all.” Yet even *litterae* which are “the same for all” do not require the actual existence of *voces*, but only that the *voces*, if at all existent, be likewise “the same for all.” In the present passage Boethius makes his meaning explicit: the existence of written marks does not guarantee the existence of (significant) spoken sounds (2), for there are people who can communicate verbally with one another but who are either illiterate and therefore have no knowledge whatsoever of written language, or to whom the written languages of other societies are simply unintelligible (3): the writing could exist without anyone either understanding it or reading it aloud. Similarly, it does not follow that if there is a *vox* there is also an *intellectus*, for articulated spoken sounds such as *blityri* and *scindapsus* have no significance (4): we understand nothing (have no *intellectus*) when we hear them.⁴² Finally, the existence of an *intellectus* does not guarantee that of a *res*, as is demonstrated by the poetical fictions, centaur and chimaera (5)–(7): we can think them, but they do not exist. Sentences (1) through (7), therefore, are given in support of the point that the only necessity inherent in the complete sequence of the second tetrad is that which is guaranteed by the canon or principle of “sameness.”

Sentence (8) brings the argument back around to the first tetrad (*res-intellectus-vox-litterae*), the “order of nature” (*sed si quis ad naturam redeat*). Following the pattern established in the first half of the passage, a point already made by Boethius is now to be reinforced. If there is a *res*, there is also an *intellectus* of that *res* (8). Here, however, Boethius adds the observation that if the *intellectus* cannot be found among men then it will certainly be in the mind of God, who has knowledge of the *res ipsa* or transcendent

⁴² Cf. *In Perih.* II.5,11: *sive autem aliquid quaecumque vox significet, ut est hic sermo “homo,” sive omnino nihil, sive positum alicui nomen significare possit, ut est “blityri” (haec enim vox per se cum nihil significet, posita tamen ut alicui nomen sit significabit), etc.; II.54,5: sunt quoque quaedam voces litteris syllabisque compositae, quae nullam habeant significationem, ut est “blityri.”* Cf. Ammonius, *In de Int.* 17,20–25; 30,17–19; 31,14. *Blityri*, like *scindapsus* (cf. Boethius, II.53,29), is used also by the Stoics (e.g. *SVF* II.149).

Idea. L.M. De Rijk correctly identifies this as the force of the expression, *res ipsa*.⁴³ Boethius himself, it may be noted, adds the demonstrative pronoun in connection with the Realist position on signification,⁴⁴ while Plato and Aristotle use the parallel Greek expression for precisely the same purpose.⁴⁵ It is understandable, therefore, that the MSS. that were the basis for Rota's (v. Meiser's critical apparatus, ad loc. II.22,9) and hence Migne's (col. 403b16) editions mistook *apud eum* for *apud Deum* (8).⁴⁶ Boethius then proceeds through the remaining sequence of elements in the first tetrad: if there is an *intellectus*, there is a *vox*, and if there is a *vox* there are *litterae* (9). That not all people are literate apparently does not damage the claims that are being made here. Boethius simply observes: quae [sc. *litterae*] si ignorantur, nihil ad ipsam vocis naturam. In this instance, he is probably taking into consideration the facts that communities can and in fact do survive without any *written* language, but that they cannot survive without spoken language. And since this first tetrad represents the natural order of priority, there is in its sequence of elements no reciprocity as to the implication of existence. *Vox* is naturally prior to *litterae*, and so its destruction brings also the destruction of *litterae*, but not the other way around. The inference on the basis of "sameness" does not hold in the case of the first tetrad, and that is why Boethius splits the tetrad into two (*naturaliter, positione*) portions:

sed hoc nulla ratione convertitur. namque apud quos eadem res sunt idemque intellectus, non statim eadem voces eademque sunt litterae. nam cum Romanus, Graecus ac barbarus simul videant equum, habent quoque de eo eundem intellectum quod equus sit et apud eos eadem res subiecta est, idem a re ipsa concipitur intellectus. sed Graecus aliter equum vocat, alia quoque vox in equi significatione Romana est et barbarus ab utroque in equi designatione dissentit. quocirca diversis quoque voces proprias elementis inscribunt.⁴⁷

Sentence (10) is the most difficult to understand. The force of *causa* is of particular importance to the present discussion. Boethius indicates that an *intellectus* is not *quasi causa quaedam vocum*. There is no reason to suppose

⁴³ "Boèce logicien et philosophe: ses positions sémantiques et sa métaphysique de l'être," in *Atti: Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre 1980*, ed. L. Ober-tello (Rome, 1981), pp. 144-45. (This has now been supplemented by De Rijk's discussion of Boethius' notion of Being.)

⁴⁴ *In Perih.* II.26,28 (below, p. 95, n. 8); cf. *CPh.* V.4,30: ipsam illam simplicem formam.

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Meta.* 1040b32-34; Plato, *Symp.* 211d3; *Phd.* 74a11-12; 75c11-d2; 78d2-4, etc.

⁴⁶ The text printed by Henricus Loritus Glareanus (Basel, 1546; 1570), who reproduced the edition of Julianus Martianus Rota (Venice, 1546), is the basis for Migne's text. Cf. Chadwick, *Boethius*, p. 258.

⁴⁷ *In Perih.* II.21,15.

that he means the efficient cause, for he states repeatedly that *intellectus* are, as Aristotle himself might have put it, the first beginnings of movement or change⁴⁸ where *voces* are concerned:

In Perih. I.223,6: ea quae sunt in anima principia quaedam sunt eorum quae significantur in voce,

II.26,9: quocirca quoniam significantium momentum ex his [sc. *intellectibus*, following Alexander] quae significantur oritur,

II.43,11: omnem vocem animalis aut ex passione animae aut propter passionem proferri,⁴⁹

II.43,20: quidquid est in voce significationis ab intellectibus venit,

II.44,9: quoniam nomen et verbum atque omnis oratio significativa sunt animae passionum, ex ipsis sine dubio quae designant in eisdem vocibus proprietates significationis innascitur.

Similarly, he cannot have in mind the final cause, since he identifies the signification of an *intellectus* as the end or the purpose for which a *vox* comes into being:

In Perih. II.4,28: vox namque cum emittitur, significationis alicuius causa [= οὐ ἔνεκα] profertur. tussis vero cum sonus sit, nullius significationis causa subrepat potius quam profertur,

II.41,9: tamen non idcirco utimur vocibus, ut res significemus, sed ut eas quae ex rebus nobis innatae sunt animae passionem. quocirca propter quorum [sc. *intellectuum*, = *animae passionum*, following Alexander] significantiam voces ipsae proferuntur . . .

One may compare Ammonius: τὰ νοήματα . . . ὡς αἴτια τῶν φωνῶν ὄντα.⁵⁰ *Intellectus*, therefore, are in some sense the causes of *voces*. It seems

⁴⁸ *Phys.* 194b29–32; *Meta.* 1013a29ff. (also on final cause).

⁴⁹ Efficient and final cause. In material entities these and the formal cause, despite being conceptually distinct, are sometimes found to coincide. The builder is the house in so far as he possesses the *form* of the house (*Meta.* 1032b9–14; 1044a32–b1; 1070b33–34), which obviously is irrelevant to the present discussion. It will perhaps be objected that the preposition *ex* can denote material cause (e.g. *Phys.* 194b24; Seneca, *Ep.* 65.2; Augustine, *Conf.* XII.17.25), but the context demands the efficient cause (cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 194b29, ὁθεν = *unde*), and in any case the *passiones animae* are not material. This interpretation of *ex* finds support in numerous authors (*OLD* s.v. *ex*, 18–19). The material cause is the air that is smitten by the tongue in the windpipe (cf. Aristotle, *De An.* 420b32–21a2; *GA* 786b21; Plato, *Phd.* 98d7; Plotinus, VI.1.5.4–8). Boethius discusses this in the opening of the commentary (*In Perih.* II.4,18–25).

⁵⁰ *In de Int.* 18,6. Cf. *ibid.* 18,35, on the τέλος (spoken sounds) of written marks, although Ammonius sees the end or goal of the respective elements in the order: things, thoughts, spoken sounds, written marks, as being that which is in each case *prior* (thoughts are for the apprehension of things; spoken sounds are for the signification of thoughts; written marks are for the signification and preservation of spoken sounds); *ibid.* 25,27 (the μερική ψυχή = the efficient cause of articulated spoken sounds).

a fair surmise that Boethius has in mind the Stoic conception of causation (*causa, necesse*, 10) in *denying* that they are *causae*, for it would be true to say that *intellectus* cannot logically necessitate (“cause”) *voces*, since many of them are never spoken (we do not say everything we think).⁵¹ So actual thoughts (i.e., thoughts when they are in the mind) may be both the efficient and the final⁵² causes of actual spoken sounds without there being any causality in the Stoic sense of the word: *intellectus* are causes (final and efficient), but only of spoken sounds that do in fact occur. But another possibility, one in which the Stoic notion of causality perhaps does come into play, is that Boethius means that thoughts are not “causes” of spoken sounds with respect to the inference that is drawn on the basis of “sameness-for-all,” as in the case of the second tetrad. This interpretation is in fact supported by the second half of the first phrase of sentence (10): neither is *vox* a “cause” in the sense that its presence requires the presence also of *litterae*—although it is indeed the case that “the same” *litterae* do require “the same” *voces* (*nomina*). The point is driven home in the final phrase of (10): “the same” *res* or *intellectus* do not require “the same” *vocabula*.

To these observations may be added a passing remark of *In Perih.* II.37,25:

nam si litterae voces, ipsae vero voces intellectus animi naturaliter designarent, omnes homines isdem litteris, isdem etiam vocibus uterentur. quod quoniam apud omnes neque eadem litterae neque eadem voces sunt, constat eas non esse naturales.

The *propositionum consequentia* is as follows:⁵³ If (a) written marks naturally signified (*naturaliter designarent*) spoken sounds and spoken sounds naturally signified thoughts, then (b) written marks and spoken sounds would be “the same” for all; but they are not (b) “the same” for all, and so they are not (a) natural (*non esse naturales*). But the inference has further implications, for the *order* of things in the protasis (*litterae-voces-intellectus*), coupled with the notion that some things are significative *naturaliter* (as opposed to being *naturales*, as *res* are) calls to mind what Boethius says concerning the order of things in the second tetrad (excluding *res*): “the same” written marks signify “the same” spoken sounds, which in turn signify “the same” thoughts. Now if written marks naturally signified spoken sounds

⁵¹ Cf. above, p. 58, n. 28.

⁵² By providing also the spontaneous impulse that triggers the signification. *In Perih.* II.34,6: hac [sc. *intellectus perceptione*] vero posita atque in mentis sedibus conlocata fit *indicandae* ad alterum *passionis voluntas*, cui actus quidam continuandae intellegentiae protinus ex intimae rationis potestate supervenit.

⁵³ Cf. *Hyp. Syll.* I.4.3–4 (222,21–38).

and spoken sounds naturally signified thoughts so that the significations were always “the same” (this must be Boethius’ meaning), then all people would necessarily be using “the same” written marks and spoken sounds, *and* it would be possible always to predict the spoken sounds signified by written marks and the thoughts signified by spoken sounds. In fact, however, it is observed that there are many different systems of writing and of spoken communication, and so the ability to predict must be limited only to those cases in which it is known that the *litterae* and the *vores* are in fact “the same for all” of the members of a given society (not for all societies). Thus, once again, the scheme of inference in the second tetrad depends upon the notion of sameness.

A scheme of inference is evidently implicit also in what is said about the order of elements in the first tetrad (*res-intellectus-vox-litterae*), although it is not an inference drawn according to the criterion of “sameness.” Boethius states in fairly clear terms that if there is a *res* then there is an *intellectus*, and if there is an *intellectus* then there is a *vox*, and if there is a *vox* then there are *litterae*. Is there, then, any indication that he makes the objective existence of a *res* the necessary condition for signification (and if so, what is the point behind the remark concerning the divine knowledge of the *res ipsa*, whereby the discussion is elevated beyond the range of the hylomorphic?)⁵⁴—Obviously not, for Boethius makes specific reference to the fantastic invention of chimaeras and centaurs in the minds of the poets and to the names for those conceptions. The words “chimaera” and “centaur” are not to be regarded as meaningless, for Boethius knows that it is at least true to state that the things they signify do not exist outside of the mind.⁵⁵ In this sense the objective existence of a *res* cannot be the necessary condition for signification. More to the point would have been the question whether *intellectus*, in the first tetrad, somehow brings the argument back to *res*: If people have “the same” *intellectus* for “the same” word “chimaera,” is there then a corresponding *res*?—Obviously not, since all would agree, and would understand one another, in stating that chimaeras do not exist, and so the criterion of “sameness” must be

⁵⁴ Cf. Berka, “Semantik,” p. 455: “. . . für die Bedeutung von Ausdrücken nur die reale Existenz von Objekten relevant ist; die fiktive Existenz ist für die Annahme der Bedeutung von Ausdrücken nicht hinreichend.” When Berka discusses (*ibid.*) words and expressions that lack meaning, he oversimplifies Boethius’ view of the matter. It is true that *blityri* has no meaning because it signifies neither a conception in the soul nor a real object, but it is not true that *chimaera*, because it signifies no real object, does not signify a conception in the soul. Moreover the text he cites in support of his argument (*ibid.*, n. 6, = PL 64.303b = I.49,17ff.) is irrelevant.

⁵⁵ Cf. L.M. De Rijk, “On Boethius’ Notion of Being: A Chapter of Boethian Semantics,” in, *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann (Norwell, 1988), p. 13.

restricted in the case of this particular *ordo*. This, however, is not an approach pursued by Boethius, and so must be put aside.

Some added light is shed on the sequence of elements in the first tetrad by Boethius' comments on the Aristotelian category of Relation. Aristotle posits knowledge and the knowable as correlatives, but places them under the rather exceptional class of correlatives, those that are not simultaneous by nature.⁵⁶ It is nearly always the case that the knowable is prior to knowledge and that the destruction of the knowable brings also the destruction of knowledge, but not vice versa. At *De Anima* 426a20–26 this problem is treated in light of the act-potency distinction: Democritus was wrong in holding that there is no color without seeing, for although his view is right in respect of actuality, it fails to take into account what is potentially color in the absence of seeing. The activity (*not* the essence) of both the sensible object and the sense is one; so that when that which can have color actually has color and that which can see actually sees, the two come into being, and will be destroyed, together (cf. Plato, *Thi.* 182b3ff.). In the *Categories* discussion there is no mention of act and potency. Rather, Aristotle instances the squaring of the circle as a knowable that is not yet known,⁵⁷ and, in passing, remarks that “in few cases, or in none, could one find knowledge coming into being simultaneously with the knowable.”⁵⁸ This observation proves the source of some rather interesting commentary. Simplicius gives the following interpretation. *In few cases.* By this Aristotle means (a) the immaterial intelligibles which are “simultaneous” with knowledge that is always actual: Plotinus and Iamblichus held that some part of us is always in such a state; but perhaps Aristotle means the intellect that is always in act (mind thinking itself), if in fact it is appropriate to call such *noesis* “knowledge;” or, (b) the presentations which are in imagination: the chimaera that is formed in the imagination is simultaneous with our “knowledge” of it. *Or in none.* These words are added because some thinkers admit neither the universal intelligibles nor the things which are contrived in the mind; but if such things were to exist in nature, they would in any case be prior to our knowledge of them.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ *Cat.* 7b22–33.

⁵⁷ Boethius (mistakenly) thinks that the method has since been discovered: *In Cat.* 231b. Ammonius (*In Cat.* 75, 14) thinks the method has not been discovered; Porphyry (*In Cat.* 120, 16) expresses doubt. Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 192, 15–30.

⁵⁸ *Cat.* 7b25–27.

⁵⁹ *In Cat.* 191, 7: τίνα δὲ τὰ ὀλίγα ἐστίν, ἐφ' ὧν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη; τὰ ἀνευ ὕλης τὰ νοητὰ ἅμα τῇ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰεὶ ἐστώσῃ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐστίν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν τις τοιαύτη αἰεὶ ἀνω μένουσα, ὡς Πλωτίνῳ καὶ Ἰαμβλίχῳ δοκεῖ, εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νῷ, εἴ τις καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἔλοιτο καλεῖν. δύναται δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ὑπόστασιν εἰρῆσθαι τὴν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τούτων καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπλασμάτων τῶν τε ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἅμα γὰρ

Boethius, probably following Porphyry, suggests that one of the “few cases” Aristotle has in mind is that which includes things such as chimaeras and centaurs, i.e., knowables that cannot be prior to knowledge, since they are non-existent:

quasdam namque res animus sibi ipse confingit, ut chimaeram, vel centaurum, vel alia huiusmodi, quae tunc sciuntur, cum ea sibi animus finxerit. tunc autem esse incipiunt, quando primum in opinione versantur. tunc igitur sciuntur, cum in opinione versata sint, et haec simul habent esse et sciri. nam quoniam in opinione nascuntur, mox esse incipiunt, sed cum in ratione sunt, tunc eorum scientia capitur.⁶⁰

But the chimaera, he explains, is a *scibile* in only the most limited sense:

sed quoniam nihil quod in substantia non permanet, neque in veritate consistit, sciri potest (scientia enim est rerum quae sunt comprehensio veritatis), et quidquid sibi animus fingit, vel imaginatione reperit, cum in substantia atque veritate constitutum non sit, illud posse sciri non dicitur, atque ideo non est eorum scientia ulla quae sola imaginatione subsistunt.⁶¹

Furthermore, the only true opinion about an *opinabile* that does not actually exist is that it does not exist.⁶² Considered in light of these observations, Boethius’ meaning as to the order of things in the first tetrad is not difficult to grasp: signification requires only some clearly formed conception or thought in the mind of the *dicens*. For Boethius explicates the movement within the first tetrad by stating that *if* or *when* there is a *res*, there is also in *intellectus*, a *vox*, and so on; but there need not be a *res* at all for signification to occur, and thus objective existence cannot be the necessary condition for signification.

Is, on the other hand, the objective existence of a *res* held by Boethius to be the sufficient condition for signification? This is a more difficult

χίμαιρα καὶ ἐπιστήμη τῆς χιμαίρας. διὰ τί οὖν προσέθηκεν τὸ ἢ ἐπ’ οὐδενός; ἢ ὅτι τινὲς ἀνῆρουν καὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ ὁπωσοῦν ἐπινοούμενα ἢ ὅτι κἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰς ἐπινοίας αὐτῶν ὕστερον ἐλάβομεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων προϋπάρχειν τῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἐπιστητόν.

⁶⁰ *In Cat.* 229b–c. Cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 121,8: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἀναπλάσαι χίμαιραν ὑπέστη ἅμα καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς χιμαίρας καὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτῆς, καὶ ὁ πρῶτος γράμματα διδάξας ἅμα τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τῶν γραμμάτων εἰσήγαγεν τὰ γράμματα, καὶ ὁ ζωγραφίαν εὐρὼν πρῶτος ἅμα τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ εἰσήγαγε τὰς εἰκόνας.

⁶¹ *In Cat.* 229c–d.

⁶² *In Perih.* I.166,6 (= *Perih.* 21a32; *Sph. El.* 167a1): quidam volentes id quod non est aliquo modo esse monstrare tali utebantur syllogismo: “quod opinabile est, est; quod autem non est, opinabile est;” concludebant “quod non est igitur est” docentes ea quae essent scibilia potius, non opinabilia esse, quod autem non est opinioni tantum subiacere, nulla etiam scientia claudi. quod Aristoteles hoc modo discutit: ait enim: non idcirco est opinabile, quoniam est, sed idcirco est opinabile, quoniam non est; sed hoc quod non est, est quidem quiddam, sed est non per se, sed opinabile; cf. *ibid.* II.375,23–76,23.

question. Boethius appears to claim that it is, but he promptly adds the remark that the absence of knowledge in human minds is met by the knowledge that is in the mind of God. This point is evidently intended to distinguish the human *intellectus* as being the abstraction of the forms (*forma, figura*) that are immanent in sensible objects, from the transcendent Ideas that are conceived in the mind of God. We have seen that in the *Categories* commentary Boethius speaks of the *esse* and *sciri* of chimaeras and centaurs as being simultaneous in the *imaginationes* of poets, and on that basis we have concluded that a subsistent *res* cannot be the necessary condition for signification. Now (8), however, Boethius seems to raise the question of the sufficient condition for signification, for which things such as chimaeras and centaurs are clearly irrelevant in so far as they do not exist outside of the mind. But the Ideas, as Boethius believes, do exist. Now, since Boethius makes specific reference (*In Perih.* II.22,4 = [6]) to the question of chimaeras and centaurs just before making the claim that is now under consideration, it ought to be possible to assume that some part of what has been said in the *Categories* commentary concerning chimaeras and the like will be regarded by him as valid also in the present context. What will that be, if not the point that has been made concerning the simultaneity of their *esse* and *sciri*? For this removes the impossibility—one which Boethius himself would certainly reject—that the knowable (*res ipsa*) is, even in the case of God, prior to knowledge.⁶³ It may be helpful to review the manner in which Boethius expresses the point:

In Perih. II.20,31: *res enim semper comitantur . . . intellectum,*

II.21,28: *praecedit autem res intellectum,*

II.22,8: *agnoscet cum res est, eius quoque esse intellectum.*

The *res*, he says, precedes the *intellectus* (II.21,28). We have seen, however, that the bearing of Boethius' remark is logical, not temporal, priority. Furthermore, there is no indication that Boethius intends anything other than the human *intellectus* when he makes this statement,⁶⁴ and so it need not be considered as applicable in the case of divine knowledge of the *res ipsa*. The other two quotations are somewhat ambiguous, but appear to indicate that *res* and *intellectus* are simultaneous. The most reasonable

⁶³ It is worth noting that both Porphyry (*In Cat.* 120,33–35) and Simplicius (*In Cat.* 194,21–22), in discussing the category of Relation, make reference to divine knowledge knowing all the “knowables” if there is no human knowledge. This is the bearing of Boethius' remark in (8). And when it is noted also that the commentators, Boethius included, instance the chimaera as an object of knowledge, it becomes quite clear that Boethius has the category of Relation in mind when he makes claims (6) and (8).

⁶⁴ Thus, II.21,31: *hominibus namque qui litteras ignorant, etc.*

conclusion to be drawn from the discussion appears to be that, in the mind of God, the *esse* and *sciri* of the Ideas are simultaneous, much as, in the imaginations of poets, the *esse* and *sciri* of chimaeras and centaurs can be said to be simultaneous. What is particularly attractive in the hypothesis is the parallel it finds in St Augustine's *De Trinitate*, to which Boethius claims to have given careful attention.⁶⁵ Augustine explicitly states that God does not come to know an already existing created order, but that the created order comes to exist because God knows it. Further, this knowledge or act of creation is held by Augustine to be an expression of the divine Word.⁶⁶ A similar idea occurs frequently in Proclus: for the

⁶⁵ *Trin.*, praef. 4,31: vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos venientia fructus extulerint.

⁶⁶ *Trin.* XV.13.22 (II.495): universas autem creaturas suas et spiritaes et corporales non quia sunt ideo novit, sed ideo sunt quia novit. non enim nescivit quae fuerat creaturus. quia ergo scivit creavit, non quia creavit scivit [cf. Proclus, *Elements*, prop. 174, with Dodds' commentary ad loc.]. nec aliter ea scivit creata quam creanda; non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, sed illis existentibus sicut oportebat et quando oportebat illa mansit ut erat. ita et scriptum est in libro ecclesiastico: "antequam crearentur omnia nota sunt illi, sic et postquam consummata sunt." "sic," inquit, non aliter; et "antequam crearentur et postquam consummata sunt sic ei nota sunt;" IX.11.16 (I.308): et cum habebat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam novit, hoc est cuius notitia est, haec habet perfectam et aequalem qua mens ipsa quae novit est nota. ideo et imago et verbum est quia de illa exprimitur cum cognoscendo eidem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est; *Conf.* XI.5.7: ergo dixisti "et facta sunt" atque in verbo tuo fecisti ea; *Civ. Dei* IX.22 (I.392): et ideo certius etiam temporalia et mutabilia ista noverunt, quia eorum principales causas in Verbo Dei conspiciunt, per quod factus est mundus. Cf. idem, "De Ideis," *Div. Quaest.* 46 (I.71): sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc alternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur; Boethius, *CPh.* III.m9,4: ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri / quem non externae pepulerunt fingere causae / materiae fluitantis opus verum insita summi / forma boni livore carens, tu cuncta superno / ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse / mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans; ibid. III.m11,4 (Reminiscence): suis retrusum possidere thesauris; IV.6,12: sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens movet operis effectum; *Inst. Ar.* 10,11: hanc ille huius mundanae molis conditor deus primam suae habuit ratiocinationis exemplar et ad hanc cuncta constituit, quaecunque fabricante ratione per numeros adsignati ordinis invenere concordiam; 12,14: omnia quaecunque a primaeva rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum videntur ratione formata. hoc enim fuit principale in animo conditoris exemplar (following the Neopythagorean equation of number with form); 122,21 (on Same/Other): qui autem de natura rerum propinquis investigantes rationibus, quique in matheseos disputatione versati, quid in quaque re esset proprium, subtilissime peritissime ediderunt, hi rerum omnium naturas in gemina dividentes hac speculatione distribuunt. dicunt enim omnes omnium rerum substantias constare ex ea, quae propriae suaeque semper habitudinis est nec ullo modo permutatur, et ea scilicet natura, quae variabilis motus sortita substantiam. et illam primam inmutabilem naturam unius eiusdemque substantiae vocant, hanc vero alterius, scilicet quod a prima illa inmutabili discedens prima sit altera, quod nimirum ad unitatem pertinet et ad dualitatem, qui numerus primus ab uno discedens alter factus est . . . quare notum nobis est, quod ex his ea, quae sunt in hoc mundo, coniuncta sunt. aut enim propriae inmutabilis eiusdemque substantiae est, quod est deus vel anima vel mens

gods, thinking is productive, and is expressed by a kind of naming. The divine names are thus coexistent with the created order.⁶⁷ Medieval writers would be influenced by this tradition of thought primarily through the Ps. Dionysius (e.g. *Div. Nom.* 816d; 869a; 872c). Two considerations recommend the Augustinian parallel as of only tentative significance here: (a) Boethius leaves undeveloped the comment concerning God's knowledge of the Ideas, while the other passages in his writings which can be adduced in support of the hypothesis are few;⁶⁸ (b) his point concerning

vel quodcunque propriae naturae incorporalitate beatur, aut mutabilis variabilisque naturae, quod corporibus indubitanter videmus accidere; 125,25: non ergo inutiliter neque inprovidē, qui de hoc mundo deque hac communi rerum natura ratiocinabantur, hanc primum totius mundi substantiae divisionem fecerunt. et Plato quidem in Timaeo eiusdem naturae et alterius nominat, quicquid in mundo est, atque aliud in sua natura permanere putat individuum inconiunctumque et rerum omnium primum, alterum divisibile et nunquam in proprii statu ordinis permanens; Plotinus V.9.7–8. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 29 (p. 79): ad cuius similitudinem formas mente conceptas ad corpora transferebat; Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I.6.20. The history of the doctrine of divine ideas is complex and lies outside of the scope of the present discussion. One may consult, among others: R.M. Jones, "The Ideas as the Thoughts of God," *Classical Philology* 21 (1926), 317–26; L.M. De Rijk, "Quaestio de Ideis. Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism," in, *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C.J. de Vogel*, edd. J. Mansfeld and L.M. De Rijk (Assen, 1975), 204–13; D.T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden, 1986), pp. 158–69; J.M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (London, 1977), pp. 95; 255; 410; on Proclus, cf. M. Hirschle, *Sprachphilosophie und Namenmagie im Neuplatonismus. Mit einem Exkurs zu 'Demokrit' B142* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1979): Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 96, p. 19. As to later adaptations of the Stoic *logoi spermatikoi*, see: Plotinus, III.2.2.19; V.9.6.11; Augustine, *Gen. ad Litt.* VI.5.8; 6.10–11; *Trin.* III.8.13–9.16; Calcidius, *In Tim.* 294. God does not bring each successive generation of things into being, for that would conflict with the Biblical account of creation, as well as impute mutability to the primordial plan of creation; nor does the divine mind exercise direct control over the processes of change that attend individual beings. The pattern behind the temporal changes will be explained by the *rationes seminales*.

⁶⁷ *In Rpb.* I.170,21: καὶ ὅπως τὰ μὲν πρόωιστα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ὅσα θεῖα συνυφέστηκεν τοῖς οὐσιν, τὰ δὲ δευτέρα ἀπεικασίαν τινὰ φέρεται τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ πολλοστὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμοιότητος ἀποπέπτωκεν; *In Tim.* II.255,20: μάλλον δὲ ἢ τε ποιήσεις αὐτοῦ τὴν κυριωτάτην ἔχει τοῦ ὀνόματος αἰτίαν καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις ποιήσις ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ νόσις ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἀποτέμνεται τῆς δημιουργίας, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν οἱ θεοὶ ποιοῦσιν' οὕτω γὰρ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ὀνοματίζειν ὑφιστάσι τὰ πράγματα. Cf. Hirschle, *Sprachphilosophie*, pp. 23–25.

⁶⁸ It is possible, however, that Boethius restricts the scope of his comments in consideration of his duty as an expositor of Aristotle's text, in which such a discussion is out of place. Cf. the problem of Universals, in which Boethius puts aside his own view in order to explicate the text on which he comments, *In Isag.* II.167,7: his igitur terminatis omnis, ut arbitror, quaestio dissoluta est. ipsa enim genera et species subsistunt quidem alio modo, intelleguntur vero alio, et sunt incorporalia, sed sensibilibus iuncta subsistunt in sensibilibus. intelleguntur vero ut per semet ipsa subsistentia ac non in aliis esse suum habentia. sed Plato genera et species ceteraque non modo intellegi universalia, verum etiam esse atque praeter corpora subsistere putat, Aristoteles vero intellegi quidem incorporalia atque universalia, sed subsistere in sensibilibus putat; quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi, altioris enim est philosophiae. idcirco vero studiosius Aristotelis

the sequence of elements in the first tetrad has not in any event been securely established, for he surely does not mean that God writes things down!

Another passage on the category of Relation must be noted before proceeding:

“quare prius quam sensus sensibile esse vide(bi)tur (*Cat.* 8a11).” sed quidam, quorum Porphyrius quoque unus est, astruunt in omnibus verum esse relativis, ut simul natura sint, veluti ipsum quoque sensum et scientiam non praecedere scibile atque sensibile, sed simul esse, quam, quoniam brevis est oratio, non gravabor opponere. ait enim: si cuiuslibet scientia non sit, ipsum quod per se poterit permanere scibile esse non poterit, ut si formarum scientia pereat, ipsae fortasse formae permaneant, atque in priore natura consistent, scibiles vero non sint. cum enim scientia, quae illud comprehendere possit, non sit, ipsa quoque sciri non potest res. namque omnis res scientia scitur, quae si non sit, sciri non possit. porro autem res quae sciri non potest scibilis non est. hoc idem de sensu gustantis: si gustus enim pereat, mel⁶⁹ forsitan permanebit, gustabile autem non erit. ita quoque omnino si sensus pereat, res quidem quae sentiri poterant sint, sensibiles vero non sint sensu pereunte. et fortasse neque scientia neque sensus secundum sentientes speculandus est, sed secundum ipsam naturam quae sensu valeat comprehendi. namque res quaecumque per naturam sensibilis est, eam quoque in natura sua proprium sensum, quo sentiri possit, habere necesse est. et quodcumque sciri potest per naturam, numquam possit addisci, nisi quaedam eius in natura scientia versaretur. haec Porphyrius.⁷⁰

If Boethius himself ever adhered to the position that is stated in the latter part of this passage, then he had changed his mind by the time of writing *Consolatio* V, in which he argued (following an idea which apparently originated with Iamblichus, but resurfaced in Proclus and Ammonius) that the level of cognition is determined not by the nature of its objects, but by the nature of the knowing subject.⁷¹ Whether the two passages can be reconciled is dubious, but it is remotely possible that the final remarks quoted above from the *Categories* commentary are in some rather obscure way dependent upon Aristotle's view of sense-perception, with emphasis placed upon the *natures* of objects as sensibles in the absence of faculties

sentientiam executi sumus, non quod eam maxime probaremus, sed quod hic liber ad Praedicamenta conscriptus est, quorum Aristoteles est auctor.

⁶⁹ Cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 121,17: “Ὅτι φέρε αἰσθήσεως μὴ οὐσης μέλι μὲν ἔστιν γευστόν, αἰσθητόν δὲ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ λευκὸν μὲν ἔσται, ὁρατὸν δὲ οὐκ ἔσται ὁράσεως μὴ οὐσης.

⁷⁰ *In Cat.* 233b–d.

⁷¹ Et fortasse neque scientia neque sensus secundum sentientes speculandus est, sed secundum ipsam naturam quae sensu valeat comprehendi; cf. *CPh.* V.4,24: cuius erroris causa est quod omnia quae quisque novit ex ipsorum tantum vi atque natura cognosci aestimat quae sciuntur. quod totum contra est; omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. As to sources, see Gruber, *Kommentar*, pp. 398–99.

of sense-perception. In fact, however, the sentence from *namque res quaecumque* to *habere necesse est* turns matters around, for Aristotle claims (*De An.* 418a10) that there is a proper *object* for each sense (not a proper sense for each object), which is consistent with his method (cf. 415a14–22) of investigating the objects before the activities, and then the faculties, of perception and thought. Also, what Boethius says is clearly too restricted, since there is nothing to prevent one and the same object, e.g. honey, from being perceived *per accidens* as being both sweet and amber. If, on the other hand, Boethius is not following Aristotle's view of perception, he may be thinking instead of a Neoplatonic idea which he perhaps found in Porphyry's comments. Simplicius speaks of the intelligibles as being always and actually what they are, but of intellect that proceeds as being only potentially intelligible. *Its* knowledge can be said to be measured according to its objects:

τελειότητες μὲν γὰρ οἱ ὄροι, καὶ ἡ νόησις αὐτῶν κατὰ τελειότητα ἴσταιται, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πᾶσα γνῶσις κατὰ τὸ γνωστόν.⁷²

Be that as it may, the Porphyrian borrowing above finds no precise parallel in the extant "Question and Answer" commentary⁷³ and may therefore provide fragmentary evidence for the more advanced *Pros Gedaleion*.⁷⁴ Perhaps Boethius intended to give his own view of the matter in his projected second commentary on the *Categories*.⁷⁵ In the "Question

⁷² *In de An.* 231,21; cf. 244,6ff.

⁷³ Cf. *In Cat.* 120,27–21,19. In the extant commentary Porphyry does not discuss the *formarum scientia*, nor does he make the rather difficult point (above, nn. 70–71) concerning the nature of knowledge in relation to its objects.

⁷⁴ Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries," p. 224. Simplicius quotes passages from Porphyry's lost commentary of which Boethius is ignorant. This indicates, as Shiel points out, that Boethius is probably not quoting at first-hand. It should be noted, however, that although the manner in which Boethius "ushers" in and out Porphyry's and Andronicus' opinions (*In Cat.* 233b–d; 263b) is indeed Greek in style, the parallels Shiel cites in Simplicius (*In Cat.* 364,5; 379,8) are not stringent proof that Boethius is quoting at second-hand. Otherwise Simplicius also will be quoting at second-hand, and that has not been proved. Transitional expressions such as *sed quidam quorum . . . unus est . . . astruunt*, and *sed haec . . . , . . . vero* would be as natural for a writer who knows a commentary first-hand as for one who quotes only from scholia. It seems to me that Shiel's argument is better supported on other grounds: (a) Boethius knows, as Shiel demonstrates, only a very small part of the *Pros Gedaleion*, and after he quotes the passages he does know, he immediately returns to the "Question and Answer" commentary; (b) his two paraphrases of the *Pros Gedaleion* suffer from a lack of clarity, so much so that *In Cat.* 263b–c is actually corrupt in Migne. This passage has been edited by Shiel. "Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes," *Vigiliae Christianae*, 11 (1957), 179–85.

⁷⁵ *In Cat.* 160a–b: *est vero in mente de intentione, utilitate et ordine, tribus [? olim, cf. Chadwick, Boethius, p. 141, with n. 51, and Shiel, Catholic Historical Review 70 (1984), 118] quaestionibus disputare, videlicet in alio commentario quem componere proposui de eisdem categoriis ad doctiores . . . illic ad scientiam Pythagoricam perfectamque doctrinam, hic ad simplices introducendorum motus expositionis sit accommodata sententia.*

and Answer'' commentary, many doctrines of which Boethius has adopted, Porphyry discusses the potential intelligibility of objects which are not actually known. Simplicius and Ammonius too raise the question of act and potency.⁷⁶ Without a pronouncement from Boethius himself, however, there can be no certainty concerning his meaning. Only the outlines of the thought are clear: should knowledge of the Ideas or Forms perish, but the Forms themselves remain, they would no longer exist *as knowables*. Or perhaps: objects cannot be known except by knowledge, and that which cannot be known is not a *scibile*; so without knowledge, there is nothing that exists *qua scibile* (cf. Plato, *Tht.* 160b2f.).

Yet to this line of argument Boethius himself might well object that the Forms are *by nature intellectibilia*⁷⁷ and must therefore be knowables (''intelligibles'') in something more than a relative sense. We can only conjecture that the unstated explanation he intends will somehow have been in

I have not studied the MSS. of the extant *Cat.* commentary, and so cannot give the correct reading. The reference to Pythagorean doctrine probably betrays the (indirect) influence of Iamblichus. On a possible fragment of Boethius' lost commentary, see P. Hadot, ''Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les Catégories d'Aristote dans le Codex Bernensis 363,'' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 26 (1959), 11–27; De Rijk, ''Chronology,'' pp. 140–41.

⁷⁶ Porphyry, *In Cat.* 120,27: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καθὼ αἰσθητὸν μένει ἢ ἔστιν μὴ οὐσης αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν καθὼ ἐπιστητὸν μένει ἢ ἔστιν μὴ οὐσης αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἐπιστητὸν, δυνάμει ἔσται μὴ οὐσης αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμης, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστητὸν, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἦ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' εἰ δυνάμει ἔστί ἐπιστητὸν, ὅτι δύναται αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη γενέσθαι, δυνάμει ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὅτι δύναται αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη (μὴ εἶναι). μήποτε δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μὴ εἴη ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστητοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει [cf. Boethius, *In Perih.* II.192,9: naturae vero notissimum; II.22,10] ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη πάντων τῶν ἐπιστητῶν νοῦ ἀιδίου καὶ πάντα ἐπισταμένου τὰ δντα, καὶ αἰεὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κάτεισιν ἢ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστήμη; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 194,20: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν ζῶου ἀναιρουμένου ἐπιστήμη ἀναιρεῖται οὐδὲ αἰσθησίς· κἂν γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινός, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἀκινήτῳ αἰτίῳ ἔστιν, κἂν ἐν μερικῷ ζῶῳ μὴ ἡ αἰσθησίς, ἀλλ' αἰσθητοῦ ὅλως δντος ἔστιν καὶ αἰσθησίς καθόλου ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντός ζωῇ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἀληθές, ὅτι μὴ οὐσης αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν τὸ αἰσθητὸν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν. μέλι γὰρ ἔστω καὶ χιών· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ μέλι γευστὸν οὐδὲ ἡ χιών ὁρατὴ, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι καθὼ αἰσθητὸν ἔσται χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως; 196,24: εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς τὸ ἔχον ἀφορμὴν ὥστε δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, τοῦτό ἐστι δυνατόν, ἀληθές μὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ῥηθέν, ὅτι μὴ οὐσης τῆς ἐπιστήμης κατ' ἐνεργείαν ἔστιν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δυνάμει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν τῶν πρὸς τι συνύπαρξιν· ἔδει γὰρ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει πρὸς τὸ δυνάμει παραβάλλειν, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ οὕτως ἅμα λέγειν τὰ πρὸς τι. ὑπάρχει δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, διότι σὺν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔστιν; cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 74,21: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὐσης τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δύναται εἶναι. ὡσαύτως αἰσθητοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ αἰσθησίς ἔστιν, αἰσθήσεως μέντοι μὴ οὐσης οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, οἷον πῦρ γῆν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια; 76,25: καὶ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι ὥς ἂν ἔχῃ το δέτερον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ἔξει. εἰ μὲν (γὰρ τὸ ἔτερον) ἐνεργείᾳ εἴη, ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἔτερον δυνάμει, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἔσται δυνάμει· οἷον ὅταν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐνεργείᾳ ᾗ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δυνάμει ᾗ, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δυνάμει ἔσται. ὅταν δὲ προεπινοῶμεν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, οὐκ ὥς ἐπιστητὸν ἢ ὥς αἰσθητὸν ἀλλ' ὥς πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ θεωροῦμεν.

⁷⁷ See below, p. 130f. Cf. Plotinus, V.9.8; Simplicius, *In de An.* 240,11; 244,6–25.

accordance with what we find now in Porphyry and Simplicius. That would seem to be that a thing in the absence of actual knowledge is actually what it is, but at the same time potentially knowable. This at least gives the otherwise rather abrupt claim that if there is a *res* then there is also an *intellectus*, if not among human beings then in the mind of God, a chance of making sense in the context of Boethius' discussion. It also places this restriction on the double-termination adjectives Boethius uses (*scibilis*, *sensibilis*, *gustabilis*): a *scibile* is a knowable, not a known. The conjecture is of help only if we understand, as Boethius certainly does, the *res ipsa* (*In Perih.* II.22, 10–11 = [8]) to refer to transcendent, intelligible Ideas; but due to its compression the force of Boethius' comment must remain uncertain, and the parenthetical remark concerning God's knowledge of the *res ipsa* doubly confusing. In the sublunary sphere, where knowledge (for the Neoplatonist) cannot always be actual, it may be the case that the logical priority of the *res* carries with it, as Porphyry evidently holds, knowability if not actual knowledge. And as all potentialities are forever tending towards actualization at least once,⁷⁸ there may be some basis for Boethius' maintaining that if there is a *res* then there is an *intellectus* and so on. Things exist in nature, if not as *scita*, then as *scibilia*; they are, or will be, known, spoken of, and written down—in just that order.

To conclude. The evidence in Simplicius, Ammonius and Porphyry indicates that Boethius brings traditional questions to his discussion of the problem of knowledge as being correlative to its objects (sc., the invention of chimaeras and centaurs *in imaginatione*; the potential intelligibility of things in the absence of knowledge); Augustine may well have provided a basis for Boethius' reference to God's knowledge of the Ideas; the act-potency distinction is probably at the back of Boethius' mind during this preliminary stage of commentary. The more obscure parts of the argument may be the result of the almost inevitable tension between Boethius' own Neoplatonism and the Aristotelian text upon which he comments, or perhaps the result of Boethius' limited access to sources which will have explored the issues in greater depth.

Boethius' preliminary account of signification is put forth primarily in the interest of establishing a fixed *orandi ordo*, the sequence of which, although capable of inversion, cannot be broken:

DICENS
res-intellectus-vox-(litterae)

⁷⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* 1047b3–6, on the Megarians, but with a reference to 1047a24–26, which give Aristotle's own (v. Zeller's emendation ap. Ross ad loc. 1047b3) conditions for the "possible" (viz., that there be nothing impossible in its consequences); more to the point is Plotinus, IV.7.8³.18–20 (= Eusebius, *PE* XV.22), with the interpretation of M. van Straaten, "On Plotinus IV, 7[2], 8³," in Mansfeld-De Rijk, *Kephalaion*, p. 167.

AUDIENS

(litterae)-vox-intellectus-res.

The two ternary formulations are of particular importance to the rest of his commentary on Aristotle's passage, but each of the four *ordines* holds special significance. Boethius studies their sequences and the conditions under which, for each, one thing can be said to follow from the other. In the second tetrad continuity is preserved by the precondition of "sameness;" in the first, if the present conjecture be correct, by the potential knowability of those things that are not actually known. In any case, it is as a process of movement through the different stages within the two triads (or tetrads) that Boethius conceives of signification, and it is in light of that movement that he will provide reasons for the mediating position of *intellectus* in the two triadic systems. Spoken sounds are given and received through the *intellectus*, and so it is through the *intellectus* that all meaningful exchanges occur. When given, the *vox* "interprets" the movements of the mind as its messenger (*interpres*).⁷⁹ The objective existence of a *res* is not the necessary condition for a *vox* and on that basis Boethius is able to regard words such as "chimaera" as being meaningful; on the other hand, the objective existence of a *res* appears to be, at least potentially, the sufficient condition for a *vox*, and it is on that basis that the respective priorities implicit in the order of the first tetrad are regarded as being naturally founded. Finally, it is noteworthy that Boethius isolates two important situations in which the notion of *significatio* may be called into question: (a) when a word (*blityri*) has neither a corresponding concept in the soul nor an extramental referent; (b) when a word (*chimaera*) has a corresponding concept in the soul but no extramental referent.

The status of the *res* has received clarification in connection with its role in Boethius' *orandi ordo*. It remains now to explicate the still rather empty and static conception of an *intellectus*. For this, being the nexus of the *orandi ordo*, is to be explicated in light of the movement across the two triads: How does an *intellectus* transfer the *res* to a *vox* and back again? Also, why does Aristotle speak of mental impressions, and not of thoughts, in lines 3–9 of the opening chapter of the *Peri Hermeneias*? The discussion of these questions will be found in the next chapter.

⁷⁹ In *Perih.* II.75,17: oratio vero opinionis atque intellectus passionumque animae interpres est. Cf. the connection between Hermes and language in Plato (*Critl.* 407e); compare also, Lucretius (VI.1149), Horace (*AP* 111) and Augustine (*Civ. Dei* VII.14); Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, I.235; Waitz, *Organon*, I.323.

CHAPTER FOUR

COGITABILIS ORATIO

According to Boethius, Aristotle sets out in the first two lines of the *Peri Hermeneias* the six terms that are to be defined, but then briefly interrupts his plan with the six lines which pose the question of what *oratio* signifies. In answer to this question Boethius supplies notices for the opinions of Herminius, Alexander and Porphyry, and places them in that order with respect to the *lack* of cogency in their respective expositions of Aristotle's doctrine:

cum igitur prius posuisset nomen et verbum et quaecumque secutus est postea se definire promisisset, haec interim praetermittens de passionibus animae deque earum notis, quae sunt scilicet voces, pauca praemittit. sed cur hoc ita interposuerit, plurimi commentatores causas reddere neglexerunt, sed a tribus quantum adhuc sciam ratio huius interpositionis explicata est.¹

His own judgement as to the relative merits of the views of the three commentators is precisely as it was in the case of the disputed readings at *Peri Hermeneias* 16a6–8 (ταῦτα/ταῦτά):² Herminius completely misunderstood the matter; Alexander struck closer to the mark; Porphyry had the fullest view of the problem. The source will again be Porphyry. For his explication of the *Peri Hermeneias* Boethius himself tells us that he is following Porphyry and some “other” commentators.³

Now, Herminius, we are told, held that Aristotle interposes the lines on signification because of the *utilitas* of knowing something about the relationship of spoken sounds to mental impressions:

quorum [sc. *trium commentatorum*] Hermini quidem a rerum veritate longe disiuncta [sc. *ratio*] est. ait enim idcirco Aristotelen de notis animae passionum interposuisse sermonem, ut utilitatem propositi operis inculcaret. disputaturus enim de vocibus, quae sunt notae animae passionum, recte de his quaedam ante praemisit. nam cum suae nullus animae passiones ignoret, notas quoque cum animae passionibus non nescire utilissimum est. neque enim illae cognosci possunt nisi per voces quae sunt earum scilicet notae.⁴

Boethius provides virtually no indication as to the shortcomings of

¹ In *Perih.* II.25,15.

² See above, pp. 9–14.

³ In *Perih.* II.7,4. See Shiel, “Boethius’ Commentaries,” pp. 230–31.

⁴ In *Perih.* II.25,22.

Herminus' argument, and in fact appears to have very little specific information upon which to base his own criticism of the same:

sed Herminus hoc loco repudiandus est. nihil enim tale quod ad causam propositae sententiae pertineret explicuit.⁵

If the report is correct, then we must conclude that Herminus added nothing of value for determining what is the purpose behind Aristotle's introductory remarks. Boethius' criticism, however, gives us no indication as to the error in what Herminus actually argued. In what respect is his explanation judged to be *a rerum veritate longe disiuncta*? No direct answer is forthcoming, but evidently Boethius or his source sees an implicit repudiation of Herminus in *Alexander's* view of the matter, for it is only after having introduced the latter that Boethius makes mention of the need to correct Herminus. Boethius supplies the following information as to how Alexander argued:

Alexander vero aliam huiusmodi interpositionis reddidit causam. quoniam, inquit, verba et nomina interpretatione simplici continentur, oratio vero ex verbis nominibusque coniuncta est et in ea iam veritas aut falsitas invenitur; sive autem quilibet sermo sit simplex, sive iam oratio coniuncta atque composita, ex his quae significant momentum sumunt (in illis enim prius est eorum ordo et continentia, post redundat in voces): quocirca quoniam significantium momentum ex his quae significantur oritur, idcirco prius nos de his quae voces ipsae significant docere proponit.⁶

How will Alexander's and Herminus' explanations have differed? The key to Herminus' view would appear to lie in the phrases *nullus . . . ignoret*, and *non nescire*. Herminus seems to have put the cart before the horse: since no one is entirely ignorant of the experiences that take place within his soul, and since those experiences are symbolized by spoken sounds, it is useful (*utilitas, utilissimum*) before investigating the *animae passiones* to know something also about the *voces* through which the *animae passiones* are made known to others. It is not difficult to guess the point behind Boethius' criticism: Aristotle does not introduce *voces* in order to clarify *animae passiones* (the *Peri Hermeneias* is not a treatise on the soul), but the other way around. Herminus apparently was aware of this fact (*disputaturus enim de vocibus*), but he nevertheless lost the thread of Aristotle's thought. Boethius' subsequent remarks concerning Alexander help to clarify this. The source of movement (the efficient cause) behind meaningful spoken sounds is what takes place in the soul. Aristotle intends to discuss spoken assertoric statements, but since spoken statements come from their *significata*, he has first

⁵ In *Perih.* II.26,12.

⁶ In *Perih.* II.26,1.

to enquire into the *significata* themselves, and those are the *passiones animae*. Even Alexander's explanation, however, falls short of Aristotle's intention:

Alexander vero strictim proxima intellegentia praetervectus tetigit quidem causam, non tamen principalem rationem Aristotelicae propositionis ex-solvit.⁷

As also in the case of Herminus above, Boethius here neglects to make explicit the reasons for his criticism of Alexander. We learn only that it is Porphyry who gave the most lucid explanation:

sed Porphyrius ipsam plenius causam originemque sermonis huius ante oculos conlocavit, qui omnem apud priscos philosophos de significationis vi contentionem litemque retexit. ait namque dubie apud antiquorum philosophorum sententias constitisse quid esset proprie quod vocibus significaretur. putabant namque alii res vocibus designari earumque vocabula esse ea quae sonarent in vocibus arbitrabantur. alii vero incorporeas quasdam naturas meditabantur, quarum essent significationes quaecumque vocibus designarentur: Platonis aliquo modo species incorporeas aemulati dicentis hoc ipsum homo et hoc ipsum equus non hanc cuiuslibet subiectam substantiam, sed illum ipsum hominem specialem et illum ipsum equum, universaliter et incorporaliter cogitantes incorporales quasdam naturas constituebant, quas ad significandum primas venire putabant et cum aliis item rebus in significationibus posse coniungi, ut ex his aliqua enuntiatio vel oratio conficeretur. alii vero sensus, alii imaginationes significari vocibus arbitrabantur.⁸

Porphyry began by identifying the possible *significata vocum*, of which Alexander had given only a limited account. The four possibilities mentioned here are: (a) that actual, subsistent *res* are the *significata* of spoken words; (b) that the Platonic Ideas are the *significata*⁹—here again, *ipsa* makes explicit the distinction between immanent form and transcendent Idea (the phrase, *cum aliis item rebus in significationibus posse coniungi*, may refer to Plato on the intermingling of kinds);¹⁰ (c) that sense-perceptions (*sensus*) and (d) that phantasms (*imaginationes*) are the *significata* of words.

⁷ *In Perih.* II.26,14.

⁸ *In Perih.* II.26,17.

⁹ As e.g. in Proclus: Hirschle, *Sprachphilosophie und Namenmagie*, p. 18.

¹⁰ *Sph.* 259e. From *Div.* 875d we learn that Porphyry wrote a commentary on the *Sophist*: quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia dividendi, quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici diligentissimi senis de divisione liber editus, et hic idem a Plotino gravissimo philosopho comprobatus, et in libri Platonis, qui Sophistes inscribitur, commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per haec [*Morax emend.* (1973), I.120, n. 1; hanc: *Migne, Pozzi*], introductionis laudata in Categorias utilitas. But from the *Liber divisionum* itself we get nothing very different from what is to be found in the *Isagoge*, in which the intermingling of kinds is not discussed. This passing reference is probably gleaned from a scholium or from a comment in Porphyry.

It is important to observe that (b), the Realist position, is no sooner mentioned than dropped altogether from the discussion. In these lines Boethius neither defends nor denies the Platonist view. De Rijk argues quite persuasively that there are grounds for suspecting that he in fact thinks that the Ideas ultimately are the *significata* of words.¹¹ Position (a), on the other hand, is refuted, but with virtually no supporting argument, only the αὐτὸς ἔφα: Aristoteles enim nominibus et verbis res subiectas significari non putat . . .¹² Boethius' reasons for this assertion, however, are to become clear during the course of his commentary, and, indeed, are supported already by what has been said (cf. above, p. 71ff.) concerning the *orandi ordo*. Actual things are signified only *indirectly*. The refutation of position (c) is taken from a fragment (87 [76] Rose = 5 Ross) of Aristotle's lost *De Iustitia* which, it may be noted, is not mentioned in Ammonius' commentary. The fragment was preserved by Porphyry, but there is no possibility now of reconstructing with certainty the context in which it must originally have occurred:¹³

sensuum quidem non esse significativas voces nomina et verba in opere "de iustitia" sic declarat dicens φύσει γὰρ εὐθὺς διήρηται τὰ τε νοήματα καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, quod interpretari Latine potes[t] hoc modo: "natura enim <statim> divisa sunt intellectus et sensus." differe igitur aliquid arbitratur sensum atque intellectum. sed qui passiones animae a vocibus significari dicit, is non de sensibus loquitur. sensus enim corporis passiones sunt. si igitur ita dixisset passiones corporis a vocibus significari, tunc merito sensus intellexeremus. sed quoniam passiones animae nomina et verba significare proposuit, non sensus sed intellectus eum dicere putandum est.¹⁴

Aristotle says in *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–9 that *animae passiones*, not *corporis passiones*, are the *significata* of words. Now, by arguing that *animae passiones* are the same thing as *intellectus*, and then by introducing the *De Iustitia* fragment, in which *intellectus* and *sensus* (= *corporis passiones*) are claimed by Aristotle to be different things, Boethius is able to dismiss sense-perceptions as the *significata* of words. Similarly, position (d), that phantasms are *significata*, is dismissed on the basis of what is said at *De Anima* 432a10–14:

sed quoniam imaginatio quoque res animae est, dubitaverit aliquis ne forte passiones animae imaginationes, quas Graeci φαντασίας nominant, dicat.

¹¹ "Boèce logicien." So also G. Ralfs, "Die Erkenntnislehre des Boethius," in, *Stufen des Bewußtseins: Vorlesungen zur Erkenntnislehre*, ed. H. Glöckner (Cologne, 1965), p. 225; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, *Boethius*, p. 367.

¹² *In Perih.* II.27,10.

¹³ Cf. P. Moraux, *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu: Le dialogue "Sur la justice"* (Louvain-Paris, 1957), p. 61f.

¹⁴ *In Perih.* II.27,12. Potes is Rose's emendation.

sed haec in libris “de anima” verissime diligentissimeque separavit dicens ἔστιν δὲ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως· συμπλοκή γὰρ νοημάτων ἔστιν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. quod sic interpretamur: “est autem imaginatio diversa adfirmatione et negatione; complexio namque intellectuum est veritas et falsitas. primi vero intellectus quid discrepabunt, ut non sint imaginationes? an certe neque haec sunt imaginationes, sed sine imaginationibus non sunt.” quae sententia demonstrat aliud quidem esse imaginationes, aliud intellectus . . .¹⁵

The logic implicit in Boethius’ quotation of this passage is very much like that found in connection with his use of the *De Iustitia* fragment. Aristotle says that *animae passionēs* are the *significata* of words; but the *animae passionēs* are the same as *intellectus*, which *De Anima* 432a10–14 separates from *imaginationes*; therefore, *imaginationes* are not the *significata* of words. Ammonius draws the same conclusion from the *De Anima* passage, but unlike Boethius (cf. II.11, 13ff.) he does so principally in connection with Andronicus’ *athetesis* of the treatise (i.e., not while commenting upon the text of 16a3–9), and then, a second time, only briefly in connection with the reference of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a9.¹⁶ The details of his argument are not precisely the same as those in Boethius, but he too equates τὰ νοήματα with τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Since Boethius quotes lines 10–14 of *De Anima* 432a and Ammonius quotes only lines 12–14, it is necessary for us to conclude that Boethius has taken the passage from a source other than Ammonius, if not from the *De Anima* itself.

The point gained by the citation of 432a10–14 is, as Boethius explains, the following:

ex intellectuum quidem complexione adfirmationes fieri [sc. *sententia demonstrat*] et negationes: quocirca illud quoque dubitavit, utrum primi intellectus imaginationes quaedam essent. primos autem intellectus dicimus, qui simplicem rem concipiunt, ut si qui dicat “Socrates” solum dubitatque utrum huiusmodi intellectus, qui in se nihil neque veri continet neque falsi, intellectus sit an ipsius Socratis imaginatio. sed de hoc quoque aperte quid videretur ostendit. ait enim “an certe neque haec sunt imaginationes, sed non sine imaginationibus sunt.” id est quod hic sermo significat qui est “Socrates” vel alius simplex non est quidem imaginatio, sed intellectus, qui intellectus praeter imaginationem fieri non potest. sensus enim atque imaginatio quaedam primae figurae sunt, supra quas velut fundamento quodam superveniens intellegentia nitatur. nam sicut pictores solent designare lineatim corpus atque substernere ubi coloribus cuiuslibet exprimant vultum, sic sensus atque imaginatio naturaliter in animae perceptione substernitur. nam cum res aliqua sub sensum vel sub cogitationem cadit, prius eius quaedam

¹⁵ In *Perih.* II.27,25 (Boethius reads ταῦτα).

¹⁶ In *de Int.* 6,19; 25,32. Discussed above, p. 32, n. 85; below, p. 109f.

necesse est imaginatio nascatur, post vero plenior superveniat intellectus cunctas eius explicans partes quae confuse fuerant imaginatione praesumptae. quocirca imperfectum quiddam est imaginatio, nomina vero et verba non curta quaedam, sed perfecta significant.¹⁷

Both individual words and complete statements signify things that are completely formed within the mind. Sense-perceptions and mental images (phantasms, *imaginationes*), however, are akin to the first sketches (*primae figurae*) that painters put down before adding color.¹⁸ They arise *naturaliter in animae perceptione*, and are “spread out” as background for the *plenior intellectus* which unravels or completes (*explicat*) the picture. They are closely connected with the *primus (simplex) intellectus*.¹⁹ It is therefore completeness that distinguishes *intellectus* from *imaginatio*. Signification must produce a state of rest, a “stop-point,” in the attention of both the listener and speaker,²⁰ and that state of rest is associated with the filling in of the confused and imprecise mental images. This is a cardinal tenet of Boethius’ theory of *significatio*.

It will be evident now that the element assigned middle position in the two triads, *intellectus*, includes a series of activities and (or) faculties that are not discussed in Boethius’ preliminary account of the *orandi ordo*. Before proceeding to further explication, it is necessary for us to identify the different stages of cognition with which Boethius is concerned, and to reconstruct the two triadic *ordines* in light of them. Since Boethius never wrote a commentary on the *De Anima*, best progress will be made by gaining as precise an understanding as possible of his terminology through isolation and comparison of the terms and of their contexts, both here, and in his other writings. Five stages are proposed for consideration. The lack of a definite article in Latin makes Boethius’ use of terms confusing at times. It is not always clear whether a word such as *sensus* or *imaginatio* denotes a faculty of the soul as opposed to a mental content. In most cases the context provides an answer, but for the present discussion it has seemed best to use the Latin words as often as possible, in order not to prejudge the issue. Quotations of the appropriate Boethian passages will help to clarify.

SENSUS. These are either the acts, the contents, or the faculties, of sense-perception.²¹ Sight and seeing are of primary concern to Boethius. That

¹⁷ *In Perih.* II.28,15.

¹⁸ Cf. Plato, *Phlb.* 39b–c, in which the metaphor is reversed: the picture is portrayed in the soul *after* something has been “written” or asserted within.

¹⁹ *In Perih.* II.45,6: *simplices intellectus*; cf. *In Cat.* 180d: *singulari intellectu*.

²⁰ Cf. *Perih.* 16b20–21; *De An.* 407a32.

²¹ Cf. Cicero, *Acad.* I.11.41: *Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum id ipsum sensum appellabat.*

sensus are (a) the contents and activities of perception, is clear from Boethius' use of *sensus* to render Aristotle's αἴσθημα and αἴσθησις.²² Sense-perceptions are, as Aristotle says in the *De Iustitia*, in some sense distinct from *intellectus* (νοήματα); and they are, according to Boethius' "general doxographical report"²³ concerning Speusippus and Xenocrates, activities (*in sensibilibus rebus*) that mediate *res* and *intellectus*:

antiquiores vero quorum est Plato, Aristoteles, Speusippus, Xenocrates hi inter res et significationes intellectuum medios sensus ponunt in sensibilibus rebus vel imaginationes quasdam, in quibus intellectus ipsius origo constat. et nunc quidem quid de hac re Stoici dicant praetermittendum est.²⁴

Although Boethius rather studiously avoids detailed discussion of Stoic theories, the bearing of his final remark may well be the λεκτόν, which (according to Ammonius, at any rate) the Stoics locate midway between thoughts and actual things.²⁵ Boethius thinks of *sensus* as distinct from, but closely related to, both *imaginatio* and *intellectus*.²⁶ *Sensus* is, he explains, the *origo intellectus*. That *sensus* also means (b) the faculties of perception is clear from statements scattered throughout the commentaries and the *Consolatio*.²⁷ The faculties of perception somehow disengage the forms and attributes that are actually immanent in matter. There is no explanation as to how this occurs, nor is there any discussion of the *sensus communis*, or of the need for a diaphanous medium before seeing can take place. Already Alexander and the Stoics²⁸ had drawn attention to the element

²² *In Perih.* II.27,17 (*De Iustitia*); *AL* I.1.18,10 (= *Cat.* 6b3); 19,8 (6b35), etc.

²³ L. Tarán, *Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary*, fr. 76 (Leiden, 1981): *Philosophia Antiqua* 39, p. 435.

²⁴ *In Perih.* II.24,15.

²⁵ *In de Int.* 17,26–28 (= *SVF* II.168). Cf. B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1953), pp. 12–18; Wm. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 140–58; Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, pp. 86; 135. Ammonius is perhaps Probus' source (pp. 94–95 Hoffmann): "Cogitationes enim primo per voces significantur et deinde, per medietatem harum, actiones; neque opus esse, aliquid nos intermedium harum ponere."

²⁶ *In Perih.* II.8,5: per sensuum atque intellectuum medietatem res subiectas intellectibus voces ipsae valeant designare; II.28,28: sensus enim atque imaginatio quaedam primae figurae sunt; II.29,5: sic sensus atque imaginatio naturaliter in animae perceptione substernitur; *CPh.* V.m4,3: sensus et imagines / e corporibus extimis; *In Isag.* II.137,9: sensus imaginationesque.

²⁷ E.g., *In Perih.* II.55,17: quaequae alia sensibus quinque sentimus; II.29,6: nam cum res aliqua sub sensum . . . cadit; *In Isag.* I.84,7: nos non corporis sensibus a belvis, sed mentis divinitate distare; I.24,14: per sensuum qualitatem res sensibus subiectas intellegit; II.136,7: nullum vero rationis praestet sensusve iudicium; *CPh.* V.4,28: sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam [*perpendit*]. Cf. *AL* I.1.21,19–20 (= *Cat.* 7b38–39).

²⁸ Alexander, *De An.* 84,3–9; A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1986), p. 126. An antecedent of this idea is found in Plato, *Th.* 184b–85e. Cf. also below, pp. 103; 127, with n. 139; 133.

of judgement in the otherwise passive processes of sense-perception, but there is no allusion to this in Boethius' commentary. Only at *Consolatio* V.4,39–5,1 is *sensus* accounted for as a lower form of *actus iudicantis*.²⁹ Nor do the Augustinian notions of *intentio* and *contemperatio animi* appear to find any place in this discussion. Finally, although in the *Consolatio* Boethius will appeal to the inner presence of the Ideas as the basis for true judgements about the sensible world, in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentary he gives little or no attention to perceptions that are illusory, nor to the notorious problem of the κριτήριον, which was so often debated in the Hellenistic schools of philosophy.

IMAGINATIO. As with *sensus*, *imaginatio* designates a faculty as well as an activity or content of the soul.³⁰ Thus the Greek equivalents are both φαντασία³¹ and φάντασμα.³² *Imaginatio* shares with *sensus* the facts (a) that it is not what is signified by spoken sounds, and (b) that it is somehow distinct even from *primi intellectus*.³³ *Imaginatio(nes)* is (are) the precondition for *intellectus*.³⁴ Also like *sensus*, *imaginatio* is likened to the *primae figurae* laid down by painters;³⁵ it is associated with the images or forms which come into the soul³⁶ and is characterized as a visual rather than a linguistic medium. Aristotle had already explained the derivation of φαντασία in connection with φῶς, as would the Stoics.³⁷ For Boethius, the images in the soul additionally involve impressions or *passiones*:

fit vero haec passio velut figurae alicuius inpressio, sed ita ut in animo fieri consuevit. aliter namque naturaliter inest in re qualibet propria figura, aliter vero eius ad animum forma transfertur, velut non eodem modo cerae vel

²⁹ *Iudicare* and *iudicium* (*CPh.* V.4,39) are perhaps suggestive of Cicero's *iudicium* (= κριτήριον, *Acad.* I.8.30 with Reid, ad loc. 11; II.9.29), although Boethius makes no mention of Antiochus. In fact, he attacks the Stoic theory of impressions at V.m4.

³⁰ On the distinction in Aristotle, cf. *De An.* 428a1–2, and Hicks, *De Anima*, pp. 460–61 (ad loc. 428a2).

³¹ *In Perih.* II.27,26: imaginationes, quas Graeci φαντασίας nominant; cf. *In Isag.* I.25,8: mentis considerationes . . . φαντασίας Graeci dicunt, a nobis visa poterunt nominari; *In Perih.* II.24,18; II.27,5; II.28,8. Boethius' Latin translation (*visum*) recalls Cicero (*Acad.* I.11.40–41; II.6.17–18) on the Stoic καταληπτική φαντασία. Cf. Macrobius, *In Somn. Sc.* I.3.2.

³² *In Perih.* II.28,6–7; 11–13.

³³ *In Perih.* II.29,13: quaecumque in verbis nominibusque versantur, ea neque sensus neque imaginationes, sed solam significare intellectum qualitatem.

³⁴ *In Perih.* II.28,27: qui intellectus praeter imaginationem fieri non potest; cf. II.24,18: in quibus [sc. *sensibus vel imaginationibus*] intellectus ipsius origo consistat.

³⁵ *In Perih.* II.28,28: sensus enim atque imaginatio quaedam primae figurae sunt.

³⁶ *In Perih.* II.34,2: cum enim quis aliquam rem intellegit, prius imaginatione formam necesse est intellectae rei proprietatemque suscipiat et fiat vel passio vel cum passione quadam intellectus perceptio; II.44,17: hominis proprietas tacita imaginatione.

³⁷ Aristotle, *De An.* 429a4; cf. Simplicius, *In de An.* 216,35–38; *SVF* II.54 (φῶς).

marmori vel chartis litterae id est vocum signa mandantur. et imaginationem Stoici a rebus in animam translata loquuntur, sed cum adiectione semper dicentes "ut in anima."³⁸

The phrase *ut in anima* (*animo*) is probably a reference to the Stoic comparison of phantasms with seal-impressions in wax,³⁹ a comparison probably inspired by Plato and Aristotle.⁴⁰ Sextus Empiricus (*AM* VII.233) tells us that the words ὥς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ were used to defend against attacks upon Chrysippus' modification of Zeno's definition of "presentation." The charge had been levelled that while every presentation is an impression in the soul, not every impression in the soul is a presentation, for things such as cuts or bruises to the flesh may cause impressions upon the soul but they are not presentations. These few words provided the necessary rider: a presentation is an impression in the soul *qua* in soul; or: in so far as it is the regent part of soul, there is an impression within.⁴¹ How Boethius has come upon this rather recondite piece of doctrine is difficult to say, for he does not seem to have read Sextus. Moreover, his manner of citing Stoic opinions is usually quite dismissive, and indicates a general lack of ease concerning the more specific details of their doctrines.⁴² At *CPh.* V.m4,2, he refers to the Στοά as having produced *obscurus nimium senes*: to the Neoplatonist, the Stoics seemed unintelligible (cf. Gruber, ad loc.). Cicero and Seneca will probably have been his most abundant sources of information concerning Stoic thought; many of the references in the commentaries are borrowed from Porphyry, but their compression tends to argue against the possibility of Boethius having independent, first-hand knowledge of Stoic psychology. It is possible that a case could be made here for Boethius' use of the scholia supposed by Shiel (the phrase, *cum*

³⁸ *In Perih.* II.34,13.

³⁹ Cf. above, n. 29. Refuted by Plotinus, IV.6.

⁴⁰ Plato, *Tht.* 191c–d; Aristotle, *De An.* 424a19 (cf. 430a1).

⁴¹ The parallel in Sextus was drawn to my attention by Prof. Striker.

⁴² *In Perih.* II.24,19: et nunc quidem quid de hac re Stoici dicant praetermittendum est; II.71,13: hoc loco Porphyrius de Stoicorum dialectica aliarumque scholarum multa permiscet et in aliis quoque huius libri partibus idem in expositionibus fecit, quod interdum nobis est neglegendum; II.201,2: Porphyrius tamen quaedam de Stoica dialectica permiscet: quae cum Latinis auribus nota non sit, nec hoc ipsum quod in quaestione venit agnoscitur atque ideo illa studio praetermittemus; *In Isag.* I.31,10: nam Stoici, qui de his quoque rebus tractare voluerunt, non omnino a Porphyrio suscipiuntur, atque ideo ait se a Peripateticis rationem disputationis accipere; *In Cat.* 264c: Stoicorum quoniam longa sententia est, praetermittatur. The brief reference (*In Perih.* II.9,27) to the Stoic treatise on *axiomata* is not particularly significant, while another to the Stoic method of negating propositions (*ibid.* II.261,27) is raised only to be refuted. The *via inveniendi/iudicandi* distinction (*In Top. Cic.* 1047c) was also commonplace (Cicero, *Top.* I.6). J. Barnes gives a more positive assessment of Boethius' knowledge of Stoic logic: "Boethius and the Study of Logic," in Gibson, *Boethius*, p. 83.

adiectio . . . *in anima*, is very compact, and unexplained), although *Consolatio* V.m4, on the seal-impression theory, suggests that his knowledge of the Stoics may not be as limited as that. In any event, it is not insignificant that the immediately surrounding pages of the commentary (II.33 – 41) show constant reliance upon Porphyry, who is named five times, twice to settle difficulties (II.33,20; 40,9). His commentary is probably the source for what Boethius says about the *ut in anima* doctrine.

Boethius maintains that form inheres in actual things, but is received in the soul of the percipient as an impression.⁴³ In a phrase that is reminiscent of *De Anima* 420b31 – 32, he makes *imaginatio* the precondition for what is verbal, which, as we have seen, is *intellectus*.⁴⁴ *Imaginatio* is visual (irrational),⁴⁵ while *intellectus* is in some sense linguistic (rational). *Imaginatio* is “true” in so far as it provides accurate representations in the soul of extramental objects, but “false” in so far as it is capable also of *misrepresenting* the objects.⁴⁶ It is what survives when the sense-impressions vanish, and so is to be associated with the confused images which are retained in memory. Here we may refer to related passages of the second *Isagoge* commentary and *Consolatio* for further information concerning this faculty:

quibus vero sensus adest, non tantum eas rerum capiunt formas quibus sensibili corpore feriuntur praesente, sed abscedente quoque sensu sensibilibusque sepositis cognitarum sensu formarum imagines tenent memoriamque conficiunt, et prout quodque animal valet, longius breviusque custodit. sed eas imaginationes confusas atque inevidentes sumunt, ut nihil ex earum

⁴³ Cf. *Trin.* II.12,51, on the difference between transcendent and immanent form: ex his enim formis quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae venerunt quae sunt in materia et corpus efficiunt. nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas vocantes, dum imagines sint. Cf. Plotinus, I.8.8.13 – 16; II.4.5.18 – 20.

⁴⁴ *In Perih.* II.5,29: quod si vis quoque quaedam imaginationis addatur, illa significativa vox redditur; cf. II.43,11: omnem vocem animalis aut ex passione animae aut propter passionem proferri. The *passio* is more closely linked to *intellectus* than is the *imaginatio*. Cf. the phrases (in an altogether different context) in which *imaginatio* is used to explicate *vox* (articulated spoken sound), *In Perih.* I.49,18: imaginationem aliquam significationis; I.50,6: significationis imaginationem; II.4,27: cum quadam imaginatione significandi; II.5.24: significandi imaginatio; II.6,2: linguae percussione, articulo vocis sonitu, imaginatione aliqua proferendi fit interpretatio; cf. II.32,31: quae non solum vox sit, sed quae cum vox sit habeat tamen aliquam proprietatem et aliquam quodammodo figuram positae significationis *inpressam*.

⁴⁵ Cf. Plotinus, I.8.15.18: φαντασία δὲ πλεονή αλόγου ἐξωθεν δέχεται δὲ τὴν πλεονήν διὰ τοῦ οὐκ ἀμερούς.

⁴⁶ *In Perih.* II.45,32: in opinionibus namque veritas est, quotiens ex subiecta re capitur imaginatio vel etiam quotiens ita, ut sese res habet, imaginationem accipit intellectus; falsitas vero est quotiens aut non ex subiecto aut non ut sese habet res imaginatio subicitur intellectui. sed adhuc in veritate atque falsitate nihil equidem aliud reperitur nisi quaedam opinionis habitudo ad subiectam rem. qua enim habitudine et quomodo sese habeat imaginatio ad rem subiectam, hoc solum in hac veritate vel falsitate perspicitur. quam quidem habitudinem nullus dixerit compositionem. Discussed below, p. 111ff.

coniunctione ac compositione efficere possint. atque idcirco meminisse quidem possunt, nec aequae omnia, admissa vero oblivione memoriam recolligere ac revocare non possunt.

imaginatio quoque, tametsi ex sensibus visendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente sensibilia quaeque collustrat non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iudicandi.⁴⁷

Generally Boethius differentiates between *imaginatio* and *intellectus* on the basis of the observation that *imaginatio* is unable to combine or to separate things. Sometimes, however, he speaks of *imaginatio* as a faculty in which some such operation is in fact performed (*imaginaria . . . iudicandi*). For example, it is *imaginatio*, he tells us, which “puts together” chimaeras and the like.⁴⁸ Chimaeras are asserted *in opinione*, but they are pictured *in imaginatione*.⁴⁹ (One is reminded of Augustine’s discussion [*Trin.* XI.10.17] of inner images of black swans, four-footed birds, and the like.) When Boethius speaks of such combinations and separations of pictures as occurring in the imagination, and of memory as being a related function of imagination (as already in Aristotle), he may have in mind some more specific notion of the faculty than is indicated in the commentary itself, one that would include an active (“perception”) as well as the passive dimension (“sensation”). Ordinarily he assigns the tasks of combination and separation to *intellectus* alone. Finally, it should be pointed out that the deliberative (βουλευτική) imagination is little more than hinted at, in *Consolatio* V, and only in connection with the instinctive appetites and fears that are witnessed in *beasts* (but cf. below, n. 50). It may play some role in the theory of *significatio*, but whether it is the faculty that either initiates or moves us to speech is unclear.⁵⁰ To this question we shall return.

⁴⁷ Respectively, *In Isag.* II.136,17; *CPh.* V,4,37.

⁴⁸ *In Cat.* 229c: namque antequam chimaera fingeretur, sicut ipsa in nulla opinione fuerat, ita quoque eius scientia non erat. postquam vero ipsa animarum imaginatione constituta est, eius quoque cum ipsa imaginatione scientia consecuta est; *In Isag.* I.25,4: hinc ergo animus non solum per sensibilia res incorporeales intellegendi est artifex, sed etiam fingendi sibi atque etiam mentiendi. inde enim ex forma equi vel hominis falsam Centaurorum speciem sibi ipsa intellegentia comparavit. has igitur mentis considerationes . . . φαντασίας Graeci dicunt; II.164,7: in his enim solis falsa opinio ac non potius intellegentia est quae per compositionem fiunt. si enim quis componat atque coniungat intellectui id quod natura iungi non patitur, illud falsum esse nullus ignorat, ut si quis equum atque hominem iungat imaginatione atque effigiet Centaurum; II.282,19: si ab eo colorem nigrum imaginatione separemus; II.283,1: quam licet actu separare non possumus, tamen animi imaginatione disiungimus.

⁴⁹ According to Simplicius, imagination is midway between δόξα and αἴσθησις, *In de An.* 290,32 (cf. below, n. 87): ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον δόξης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως, καθ’ ὃ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν συμπλοκῇ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τὴν φαντασίαν ἐτίθετο ὡς διὰ τὴν μεσότητα πρὸς ἐκατέραν κοινωνοῦσαν.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *De An.* 434a5–7. Cf. Boethius, *In Perih.* II.34,7: indicandae . . . passionis voluntas; II.196,15: quotienscumque enim imaginationes quaedam concurrunt animo et

SIMILITUDO. This is Boethius' translation of Aristotle's *ὁμοίωμα*.⁵¹ The same Latin word is used in a different context to render Porphyry's *ὁμοιότης*.⁵² Like *imaginatio*, *similitudo* is closely associated with the preservation of *imagines* in *memoria*. Unlike *imaginatio*, however, it is explicitly identified with *intellectus* and *animae passio*. It evidently forms the bridge between *imaginatio* and *intellectus*:

nam qui sphaeram viderit, eius *similitudinem in animo perpendit et cogitat atque eius in animo quandam passus imaginem* id cuius imaginem patitur agnoscit. omnis vero imago rei cuius imago est similitudinem tenet: mens igitur cum intellegit, rerum similitudinem comprehendit. unde fit ut, cum duorum corporum maius unum, minus alterum contuemur, a sensu postea remotis corporibus illa ipsa corpora cogitantes illud quoque *memoria servante* noverimus sciamusque quod minus, quod vero maius corpus fuisse conspeximus, quod nullatenus eveniret, nisi quas semel mens passa est rerum similitudines optineret. quare quoniam *passiones animae quas intellectus vocavit rerum quaedam similitudines sunt*, idcirco Aristoteles, cum paulo post de passionibus animae loqueretur, continenti ordine ad similitudines transitum fecit, quoniam nihil differt utrum passiones diceret an similitudines. eadem namque res in anima quidem passio est, rei vero similitudo.⁵³

The similarities between *similitudo*, *animae passio* and *intellectus* are emphasized in other passages as well.⁵⁴ Already the pattern behind Boethius' use of these terms indicates that the theory of cognition is conceived in relation to the movement within the *orandi ordo*. *Sensus* and *imaginatio* are regarded as being closely connected levels of cognition in the *ordo* that are distinct from *intellectus*. *Sensus* is activated by the presence of a *res*; because *imaginatio* is a "secondary movement"⁵⁵ of *sensus*, Boethius frequently discusses the two faculties (contents) together. In numerous passages, however, he substitutes *intellectus* for both *sensus* and *imaginatio*. The latter he regards as being the lowest stages of cognition, those that are most strictly tied to *res*. They are only incomplete and confused forms of *intellectus*. *Similitudo*, on the other hand, is most frequently mentioned in connection with *animae passio* and *intellectus*. Now, every *sensus* is a form of *intellectus*, but not every *intellectus* entails a *sensus*, for there can be thoughts about chimaeras and goatstags, or about what happened yesterday. Only an

voluntatem irritant, eas ratio perpendit et de his iudicat, et quod ei melius videtur, cum arbitrio perpenderit et iudicatione collegerit, facit; *CPh.* V.2,4–7; V.5,3.

⁵¹ Above, p. 49; *AL* II.1.5,9 (*In Perih.* I.36,28; II.25,12 = *PeriH.* 16a7).

⁵² *AL* I.6.6,22 (*In Isag.* I.37,22; II.178,15 = *Isag.* 2,12).

⁵³ *In Perih.* II.35,3.

⁵⁴ E.g., *In Perih.* I.40,7: "et quorum hae similitudines" scilicet animae passiones, quae sunt similitudines rerum, "res etiam eadem," ac si diceret: quorum intellectus sunt similitudines, qui intellectus animae passiones sunt.

⁵⁵ Hicks, *De Anima*, p. 467, following Aristotle, *De An.* 428b10–29a9 (cf. *De Mem.* 451a14–17, on memory). Cf. Boethius, *CPh.* V.4,37 (above, n. 47).

imaginatio, as Aristotle says, is required for thinking. But neither a *sensus* nor an *imaginatio* is sufficient for signification by a *vox*, as Boethius has argued. In this sense the “natural” order of the first triad (*res-intellectus-vox*) is implicitly preserved by the very choice of terminology (i.e., by the use of *intellectus* alone). For there is an ascending order in the scale of cognition, the lowest level of which (*sensus*) is in immediate proximity to *res*, the highest of which (*intellectus*) is in immediate proximity to *vox*. A *vox* signifies an *intellectus*, beneath which is an *imaginatio*, and perhaps (although not necessarily) a *sensus* and a *res* as well. The *vox* cannot signify an *imaginatio* or *sensus*; if it signifies a *res* at all, it does so only indirectly through the *intellectus*. The *similitudo* falls on the side of *intellectus* rather than that of *sensus*, but it is difficult to say whether Boethius thinks of it as being signified by *vox*. That mental pictures should be *natural* likenesses of extramental things seems to indicate not. Added difficulty in ascertaining the status of *similitudo* is introduced by the fact that in the *De Anima* Aristotle does not posit a distinct faculty or activity called ὁμοίωμα.⁵⁶ Ammonius, as we have already observed, uses the word in order to draw the distinction between the natural foundation of likenesses and the artificial foundation of spoken symbols of signs. Simplicius (*In de An.* 225,13–31; cf. in general, Philoponus, *In de An.* 298,6–23) interprets *De Anima* 429a15–18⁵⁷ in light of the idea that the passive intellect becomes *like* its objects.

ANIMAE PASSIO. This phrase is the Latin equivalent of Aristotle’s τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ and τὰ παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς.⁵⁸ The *animae passionēs* are cognitive contents or activities (but *not* faculties) which are in many respects difficult to distinguish from *intellectus*. That there is a difference between the two is suggested, however, by the following comments:

Aristoteles autem idcirco passionēs animae intellectus vocabat, quod intellectus, quos sermone dicere et oratione proferre consuevimus, ex aliqua causa atque utilitate profecti sunt: ut enim dispersi homines colligerentur et legibus vellent esse subiecti civitatesque condere, utilitas quaedam fuit et causa. quocirca quae ex aliqua utilitate veniunt, ex passione quoque provenire necesse est. nam ut *divina sine ulla sunt passione*, ita nulla illis extrinsecus utilitas valet adiungi: *quae vero sunt passibilia* semper aliquam causam atque utilitatem quibus sustententur inveniunt.⁵⁹

The actual thoughts that human beings have are caused (final cause,

⁵⁶ Cf. *GC* 324a10–13; *De An.* 418a5–6; 429a16 (with Hicks, p. 477; Trendelenburg, pp. 383–84); cf. Alexander, *De An.* 82,19–83,13; Pépin, “ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ,” p. 29; Conybeare, *Aristotle’s Categories*, p. xviii.

⁵⁷ ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.

⁵⁸ *AL* II.1.5,5–9 (= *PeriH.* 16a3–7), above, p. 49.

⁵⁹ *In Perih.* II.12,28.

utilitas) by the exigencies of social existence. We use our thoughts to establish laws and institutions, and for that some means of verbal communication is necessary. Divine beings are not subject to these necessities; nor do they use any form of spoken communication. In the supralunary world there is neither *extrinsecus utilitas* nor *passio*. Boethius is using *passio* in one sense to differentiate between what is human and what is divine; a related sense of the word concerns the role of the *body* in human cognition. Human beings think, but they think in connection with what is received from sense-perception, which is principally *passive*. We may compare *Contra Eutychem et Nestorium* I.78,26: “pati” quidem ac “facere,” ut omnia corporea atque corporeorum anima; haec enim in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur.⁶⁰ Corporeal objects affect the soul by means of the organs of sensation. Or, seen from another point of view, sensation excites the powers of the mind (*CPh.* V.m4,30): praecedit tamen excitans / ac vires animi movens / vivo in corpore passio / cum vel lux oculos ferit / vel vox auribus instrepat. The close connections between *pati* (hence *passio*), *similitudo* and *imago* have already been observed:

nam qui sphaeram viderit, eius *similitudinem* in animo perpendit et cogitat atque eius in animo *quandam passus imaginem* id cuius *imaginem patitur* agnoscit.⁶¹

Parallel statements in the first *Peri Hermeneias* commentary underscore the unity also of *similitudo*, *pati* and *intellectus*:

intellectus vero animae quaedam passio est. nisi enim *quandam similitudinem* rei quam quis intellegit in animae ratione *patiatur*, nullus est intellectus. cum enim video orbem vel quadratum, figuram eius mente concipio et eius mihi *similitudo* in animae ratione formatur *patiturque* anima rei intellectae *similitudinem*, unde fit ut *intellectus* et *similitudo* sit rei et *animae passio*.⁶²

It is difficult indeed to make strict distinctions between *imaginatio*,

⁶⁰ Cf. *Eut.* II.82,24: rationabilium vero alia est inmutabilis atque impassibilis per naturam ut deus, alia per creationem mutabilis atque passibilis, nisi impassibilis gratia substantiae ad impassibilitatis firmitudinem permutetur ut angelorum atque animae; VI.112,66: non igitur fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur, nec vero fieri potest, ut incorporalia in sese commixtione aliqua permutentur. quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nec in se verti ac permutari queunt. nulla autem est incorporalibus materia rebus; non poterunt igitur in se invicem permutari. sed anima et deus incorporeae substantiae recte creduntur; non est igitur humana anima in divinitatem a qua adsumpta est permutata. quod si neque corpus neque anima in divinitatem potuit verti, nullo modo fieri potuit, ut humanitas converteretur in deum. multo minus vero credi potest, ut utraque in sese confunderentur, quoniam neque incorporalitas transire ad corpus potest neque rursus e converso corpus ad incorporalitem, quando quidem nulla his materia subiecta communis est quae alterutris substantiarum qualitatibus permutetur. Cf. below, n. 150.

⁶¹ *In Perih.* II.35,3.

⁶² *In Perih.* I.37,15.

similitudo, animae passio and *intellectus*. Although the *animae passionēs* are not the same as *sensus*,⁶³ it is clear that, in using the expression here, Boethius means *passiones animae* which are derivative from *sensus*. Cognition begins with the seeing of the sphere or cube. Because we are encumbered by the “passions” and the necessities of physical subsistence, we are compelled to gain knowledge of the world first through sensation, and to communicate by bodily means the movements that take place within the soul. That, as Boethius indicates, is the primary sense conveyed by *passio* in the context of the theory of signification:

passiones autem animae dixit, quoniam alias diligenter ostensum est omnem vocem animalis aut ex passione animae aut propter passionem proferri. similitudinem vero passionem animae vocavit, quod secundum Aristotelem nihil aliud intellegere nisi cuiuslibet subiectae rei proprietatem atque imaginationem in animae ipsius reputatione suscipere, de quibus animae passionibus in libris se “de anima” commemorat diligentius disputasse.⁶⁴

The *animae passionēs* entail the forms that are immanent in extramental objects, but in so far as the forms are present also in the soul.⁶⁵ They are in some sense prior to *intellectus*.⁶⁶ The *passio animae-intellectus* distinction has been met already in the context of Boethius’ assessment of Aspasius’ interpretation of Aristotle’s text (cf. above, p. 73f.). The five stages of cognition with which we are now concerned appear therefore to fall into two separate yet related groups within the first triad: RES-sensus-imaginatio | similitudo-animae passio-INTELLECTUS-VOX. As we have seen, the intermediate stages are unified under the single title, *intellectus*, the middle member of the triadic *orandi ordo*. To this we turn next.

INTELLECTUS. Thus Boethius translates νόημα.⁶⁷ It is the most compre-

⁶³ In *Perih.* II.27,17: differre igitur aliquid arbitratur sensum atque intellectum. sed qui passionēs animae a vocibus significari dicit, is non de sensibus loquitur. sensus enim corporis passionēs sunt.

⁶⁴ In *Perih.* II.43,9. Cf. above, pp. 80; 106.

⁶⁵ In *Perih.* II.34,13: fit vero haec passio velut figurae alicuius inpressio, sed ita ut in animo fieri consuevit; II.34,26: sed hae passionēs animarum ex rerum similitudine procreantur; II.33,33: passus enim quilibet eius rei proprietatem, etc. For Aristotle this means that the soul is potentially all such forms, but that it begins to perceive when actualized by one of them as by an agent already in act. An efficient cause which can make the *potential* objects of thought (forms) actual is therefore required, and it is in this respect that so many disputes over Aristotle’s doctrine have arisen. Cf. H. Cherniss, *Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy I* (Baltimore, 1944), pp. 468–69. Boethius does not discuss these issues.

⁶⁶ In *Perih.* II.33,31: intellectus ipsi non sine quibusdam passionibus sunt, quae in animam ex subiectis veniunt rebus.

⁶⁷ *AL* II.1.5,12 (= *Perih.* 16a10); II.1.5,16; In *Perih.* I.41,17; I.43,16; II.27,17; II.28,9; II.43,27. It also translates διάνοια: *AL* I.6.5,12 (= *Isag.* 1,11); V.1.22,6ff. (= *Sph. El.* 170b14ff.).

hensive, the most frequently employed, and therefore the most difficult to clarify of the terms pertaining to these sections of Boethius' commentary. We may begin with the *πρῶτα νοήματα*.⁶⁸ Boethius uses three Latin translations of the Greek expression:

sine complexione vero dicuntur . . . quaecumque *singulari intellectu* et voce proferuntur: secundum complexionem vero quaecumque aliqua coniunctione vel accidentis copulatione miscentur. . . . horum [sc. *sermonum*] autem ad se invicem complexione affirmatio fit,⁶⁹

ea enim . . . quae simpliciter dicuntur, similia sunt *simplicibus intellectibus*, qui sine ulla compositione vel divisione animi puro capiuntur intuitu,⁷⁰

primi vero *intellectus* quid discrepabunt, ut non sint imaginationes?⁷¹

The background against which these three passages must be discussed is *De Anima* 432a12–14 (of which, indeed, the third is Boethius' translation), in which Aristotle poses the question of whether or not there is any difference between "first" thoughts and phantasms. The text of 432a13 is divided:

τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τᾶλλα [ταῦτα] φαντάσματα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων.

The codices, Ammonius, Simplicius and Stephanus [Philoponus] have *τᾶλλα*, but Themistius, Boethius (*haec*, II.28,12), Torstrik and Ross (1961 ed. only) read *ταῦτα*. Hicks draws attention to the fact that *τᾶλλα* suggests an inference: if the *other* thoughts are not phantasms but cannot occur without phantasms, then the same will necessarily be true of the *first* thoughts.⁷² *Ταῦτα* abolishes the inference, but not the conclusion. On the assumptions that *τᾶλλα* is most probably what Aristotle wrote, and that "first" approximates "simple" or "non-composite," it is possible to

⁶⁸ Aristotle, *De An.* 432a12, the single thought "answering to a single image" (Ross, *De Anima*, ad loc. 432a12).

⁶⁹ *In Cat.* 180c. Shiel ("Boethius' Commentaries," p. 222) has shown that the source of the expression may be non-Porphyrion. It is found in Simplicius and, as seen above (p. 33), in Ammonius.

⁷⁰ *In Perih.* I.43,20. Cf. I.42,5: simplex enim intellectus, ut verbi gratia hominis vel equi, neque falsitatem ullam retinet neque veritatem. cum enim intellego simpliciter hominem, substantiam ipsam, nihil veri vel falsi in cogitatione retineo; I.42,20; II.15,32: haec enim per se ipsa intellectum simplicem servant, quae eadem dictiones vocantur, sed non sola dicuntur; II.44,21: ut cum ad quamlibet simplicem perceptionem mentis adiungitur aliud quod esse aliquid vel non esse constituat; II.45,3: quemadmodum aliquoties quidam simplices intellectus sunt, qui vero falsoque careant; II.45,13; II.49,23: quoniam si simplex in animae passionibus intellectus fuerit, cum ipse intellectus nullam adhuc veri falsique retineat naturam.

⁷¹ *In Perih.* II.28,10 (= *De An.* 432a12).

⁷² Hicks, *De Anima*, pp. 547–48. Soo too Trendelenburg, *De Anima*, p. 439. Torstrik (below, n. 74) and Ross (1961) follow Themistius.

conclude that the “other” thoughts must be complex or composite thoughts, i.e., categorical judgements in the mind that can be analyzed into subjects and predicates. Further, if the composite judgements include as distinct things both thoughts and phantasms, and if composite judgements are combinations of “first” or “simple” thoughts, then the latter must be somehow distinct from the phantasms; otherwise all thinking will be reduced to phantasms, which is impossible. Ross queries: What point can there be in the comparison with phantasms, if by “first” Aristotle means the highest, most abstract thoughts?⁷³ Torstrik, it seems, was right to identify the “first” thoughts with the forms abstracted from the objects of sense-perception, for to liken them thus to the lower universals at least gives some meaning to their comparison here with phantasms.⁷⁴

Be that as it may, both Ammonius and Boethius find in this passage a differentiation between uncombined and combined thoughts, and therein find elucidation also for *Peri Hermeneias* 16a9–11: “But just as in the soul there is sometimes a thought which is neither true nor false and sometimes one in which one or the other is necessary, so too in spoken sound.” Their arguments, as we have noted, are devoted more or less (Ammonius is answering Andronicus’ *athetesis*) to the question of why Aristotle speaks of mental impressions in 16a3–7 but changes at 16a10 to thoughts. Ammonius explains matters in the following way. Aristotle thinks of imagination, which is akin to sense-perception in having its essence and its activity inseparable from the body, as being equivalent to the passive intellect.⁷⁵ Imagination can act in the absence of physical objects (as e.g. in dreaming and in remembering), but without the passive intellect the soul cannot think any of the objects in the sensible world.⁷⁶ Ammonius brings in three passages of the *De Anima* for support: (430a23–25) “we do not remember, because intellect in this sense is impassive, while the passive intellect is perishable, and without this, (soul) thinks nothing;”⁷⁷ (431b2) “The thinking faculty, then, thinks the forms in phantasms;” (432a12–14) “In what, then, will the first thoughts differ from phan-

⁷³ Cf. Simplicius, *In de An.*, 286,1–6. See Trendelenburg, *De Anima*, p. 439; Rodier, *Traité de l’âme*, II.526–27. Cf. on Boethius, p. 112, below.

⁷⁴ A. Torstrik, *Aristotelis De Anima Libri III* (Berlin, 1862; rpt. Hildesheim-NY, 1970), pp. 213–14.

⁷⁵ *In de Int.* 6,5–14; cf. Simplicius, *In de An.* 17,2–5; 248,2–11; Stephanus [Philoponus], *In de An.* 490,22–23.

⁷⁶ *In de Int.* 6,14–16.

⁷⁷ Whether οὐθὲν (430a25) is nominative or accusative is difficult to say (cf. Hicks, *De Anima*, pp. 507–10; Ross, *De Anima*, p. 48; *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, I.cxlvi). I have given Ammonius’ interpretation. Like Ammonius, Simplicius (*In de An.* 248,3–8) takes οὐθὲν as accusative: without the passive intellect the impassive intellect thinks none of the things which pertain to memory or imagination.

tasms? The other thoughts are not phantasms, but they are not without phantasms.” Ammonius concludes that at *Peri Hermeneias* 16a3–7 Aristotle speaks of “impressions of (in) the soul,” but that he means “thoughts.”⁷⁸ The unitive thread lines in the notion of πάθος: τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ refers to what the *passive* intellect thinks. Two more passages of the *De Anima* are cited for further elucidation:⁷⁹ (403a5–10) “Generally it appears that (the soul) is neither acted upon nor acts without the body, as e.g. (in) being angry, brave, feeling desire, and (in) sensation generally. Thought in particular seems to belong to it; but if this is a kind of imagination, or not without imagination, it would follow that even thought is not independent of body;” (402a7–10) “We are seeking to investigate and discover the nature and essence of soul, and then its accidental attributes; of the latter, some are thought to be attributes (πάθη) peculiar to the soul, while others, it is believed, are common also to living things by virtue of soul.” Ammonius explains: Although it is different from φαντασία, νόησις is nevertheless a kind of πάθος—not πάθος in the sense of an affection in the body, but in the sense of the δύναμις that underlies every ἐνέργεια. That is, Aristotle differentiates between the ἐνέργεια of the intellect whose activity and essence are “identical” (σύνδρομον,⁸⁰ the intellect which is impassive, unmixed and separable from body), and the δύναμις of the passive intellect or φαντασία. Now since in these passages Ammonius has undertaken to demonstrate that Andronicus incorrectly athetized the *Peri Hermeneias*, it is necessary for him to point out that the use of παθήματα is both appropriate in the context of the *Peri Hermeneias*, and that it is in fact consistent with what Aristotle says in the *De Anima* about intellect, once it has been understood that πάθημα refers to the νοῦς παθητικός.⁸¹ *De Anima* 432a12–14 is quoted a second time, in connection with the reference of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a9, in order to show once again that Aristotle has in mind the imagination or passive intellect.⁸² Ammonius makes no explicit connection between the “first” thoughts of *De Anima* 432a12 and the “simple,”⁸³ uncombined thoughts of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a10, but here can be no doubt but that the connection is implicit throughout his argument.

⁷⁸ *In de Int.* 6,21–22.

⁷⁹ *In de Int.* 6,26–33.

⁸⁰ Cf. Simplicius: when intellect actually thinks itself, it is intelligible, since that is its essence (*In de An.* 243,27–32; 244,18–25; 247,5–6); when it proceeds, the activity and essence are separated (for we think intermittently); when it returns, the activity and essence are made one again (240,7–41,19).

⁸¹ On Andronicus, see above, p. 31, n. 84; Philoponus, *In de An.* 27,21–27.

⁸² *In de Int.* 25,32.

⁸³ *In de Int.* 26,15.

Boethius uses *primus* in the translation of *De Anima* 432a12,⁸⁴ but in his exposition of *Peri Hermeneias* 16a10 he uses *simplex*. *Singularis* apparently occurs only in the *Categories* commentary. We may be certain, however, that for him the three expressions have identical force. The *singularis* and *simplex* thoughts, at any rate, are equivalent in that they are said to entail no composition or division of notions, and are therefore neither true nor false. A *simplex intellectus* comes into being in *animae passionibus*. Its object is *substantia ipsa simpliciter*,⁸⁵ substance as stripped of all accidental attributes. Yet even the mental images or phantasms, as Boethius himself recognizes, must represent not only the nature of an object, but also the different attributes that inhere in it, for if it is true to say that there is no attribute apart from a substrate, it is equally true to say that no substrate is devoid of attributes. What do we perceive in a person who is running, and what is the content in our conception of God? Boethius considers these questions in the following passages:

cum enim intellego simpliciter hominem, substantiam ipsam, nihil veri vel falsi in cogitatione retineo. quod si cursum rursus animi cogitatione prospexero, cogitatio ipsa, quoniam simplicis rei tenet intuitum, a veritate et falsitate seclusa est. sed quando cursum et hominem iunxero et ex his aliquid intellegentia mea fecero (idque si voce proferam, huiusmodi erit "homo currit"), tunc ex hac substantiae et accidentis compositione et coniunctione huiusmodi intellectus fit, in quo vel falsitas possit esse vel veritas.⁸⁶

in opinionibus namque veritas est, quotiens ex subiecta re capitur imaginatio vel etiam quotiens ita, ut sese res habet imaginationem accipit intellectus; falsitas vero est quotiens aut non ex subiecto aut non ut sese habet res imaginatio subicitur intellectui. sed adhuc in veritate atque falsitate nihil eundem aliud reperitur nisi quaedam opinionis habitudo ad subiectam rem.

... nam in ipsa quidem habitudine imaginationis et rei nulla compositio est, in coniunctione vero intellectuum compositio fit. nam cum dico "Socrates ambulat," hoc ipsum quidem, quod eum ambulare concepi, nulla compositio est; quod vero in intellectus progressionem ambulationem cum Socrate coniungo, quaedam iam facta est compositio.⁸⁷

etiam illud quoque respiciendum est, quod in omnium maximo deo quidquid intellegitur non in eo accideret, sed substantialiter intellegitur. etenim

⁸⁴ Cf. *In Perih.* II.28,18–19 (primos autem intellectus dicimus, qui simplicem rem concipiunt).

⁸⁵ Below, n. 86. Cf. *In Perih.* I.42,16: ergo quemadmodum in intellectu sunt quaedam aliquotiens simplicia vero falsoque carentia.

⁸⁶ *In Perih.* I.42,7.

⁸⁷ *In Perih.* II.45,32, and II.46,27. Cf. Aristotle, *De An.* 428b1ff. (imagination cannot be a combination of belief and perception). What is the meaning of *habitudo*? Boethius uses the word as a translation of *ἕξις* (*AL* I.1.24,13 = *Cat.* 9a3), i.e., in the category of Quality. What he says *here* seems closer to *ad aliquid*. Aristotle uses *ἕξις* at *De An.* 428a3 and 430a15.

quae bona sunt substantialiter de eo non accideret credimus. quod si substantialiter credimus deum, deum vero nullus dixerit falsum nihilque in eo accideret poterit evenire, ipsa veritas deus dicendus est. ubi igitur compositio vel divisio in his quae simplicia naturaliter sunt nec ulla cuiuslibet rei conlatione iunguntur? quare non omnis veritas neque falsitas circa compositionem divisionemque constat, sed sola tantum quae in multitudine intellectuum fit et in prolatione dicendi.⁸⁸

The first of these three passages states that to think the *per se* nature of a sensible object, and to think an accident inherent in that object, are discrete acts. Only when the two things have been combined or separated by the operations of the mind can there be truth or falsity, an *intellectus*.⁸⁹ Boethius' meaning is clear: a *simplex intellectus* (= *intuitus*) is one that apprehends either a substance or an accident (*simplex res*), but which only incidentally grasps the two together. It is possible to think *only* of Socrates (even if he walks at the time), or to think *only* of walking (even if it happens to be Socrates who walks). Such thoughts are neither true nor false. When they are combined or separated, a true or false judgement results. We must join the thought of Socrates with that of walking ("Socrates walks"): if Socrates walks at the time, then the composite thought is true. If, however, we separate them ("Socrates does not walk"), the composite thought, in this instance, will be false.

The second passage allows for a kind of truth value *in opinionibus*, that is, in the simple correspondence (or lack thereof) between an *imaginatio* and its object (i.e., the nature of the object taken together with its inherent attributes: we have a mental picture of Socrates *walking*). A complication arises. *Imaginatio* grasps *per accidens* both substance and accident, and so if it corresponds with fact (that is, if the percipient is not deranged, dreaming, incorrectly remembering, ill, or deceived in some other way), it must be true in at least a limited sense. At the same time, it is simple, for there has been no analysis of notions, that is, no resolution into the different things which the image comprises. But that which is simple is, strictly speaking, neither true nor false. Thus if the mental image differs from a *simplex intellectus*, it must be for one reason alone: that, in *imaginatio*, the substance and the accident remain indistinct. It is therefore characteristic of the first thoughts to isolate a category of being, a substance or an accident. Truth or falsity comes into being after analysis of the image into substance and accident (in logic, subject and predicate) has taken place in the

⁸⁸ In *Perih.* II.46,15; cf. II.51,7: cum enim dicimus "deus est," non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed tantum in substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiae quam ad tempus aliquod referatur; *Trin.* IV.16–24; *Pat.* 34,24–40.

⁸⁹ In *Perih.* I.42,14 (cf. above, n. 86): tunc ex hac substantiae et accidentis compositione et coniunctione huiusmodi intellectus fit, in quo vel falsitas possit esse vel veritas.

form of simple or first thoughts, and the two have been recombined or separated in *intellectus progressionē*. An *intellectus* does not occur without an *imaginatio*, but it supersedes the *imaginatio*, since all mental images are confused and incomplete. *Intellectus* therefore establishes connections in the mind, while *imaginatio* apprehends connections in reality.

Finally, (third passage), truth obtains when we think of the divine natures which are incapable of analysis either in concept, or in reality (*quae simplicia naturaliter sunt*). Here also Boethius describes truth in terms of the *simplex intellectus*,⁹⁰ although the *simplex intellectus* is in this instance to be understood in a different sense from that above. Boethius means metaphysical truth (cf. Plotinus, III.7.4.11–12), not the truth of adaequation, and behind his comments one senses something like what Aristotle thinks of as simple contact.⁹¹

De Rijk argues that Boethius' *primi (simplices) intellectus* are the *passiones animae* (closely tied to *imaginationes*) which grasp in a phenomenal (spatio-temporal) entity the form or the "quiddity" that corresponds to the Idea or exemplar in the mind of God.⁹² This is not very far from Simplicius' view of the "first" thoughts.⁹³ Stephanus understands Aristotle's reference (432a13) to "other" thoughts to mean simple, uncombined thoughts, and thus takes the things to which they are implicitly compared to be composite judgements.⁹⁴ But he adds that thoughts differ from phantasms in being *αὔλα* (phantasms are *ἐνυλά πῶς*). In his commentaries Boethius treats the *simplices* or *primi intellectus* as uncombined notions, and that is consistent with his concern for the problems which fall under logic rather than psychology or metaphysics. De Rijk's conclusion is, however, correct. The *simplex intellectus* is closely bound to the form of a material object, but the form itself is immaterial. That is why in the *De Trinitate* (below, n. 90) Boethius can also use the phrase *simplex intellectus* when he discusses the apprehension of transcendent reality. It may be that he regards *simplex* as being particularly appropriate to logical enquiry, that is, to the study of propositions, which are composed of subjects and predicates, and to the study of what is true or false in propositions. *Primus* is used almost exclusively in the translation of the *De Anima* passage (above, nn. 71; 84). The Greek commentators, we have seen, speak of thoughts which are ἀπλᾶ καὶ πρῶτα.

⁹⁰ Cf. *Trin.* VI.30,24: nos vero nulla imaginatione diduci sed *simplici intellectu* erigi et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.

⁹¹ *Meta.* 1051b23ff.; 1072b21.

⁹² "Boèce logicien," p. 145.

⁹³ *In de An.* 286,2: πρῶτα καλῶν τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτῶν γνωστικά καὶ μάλιστα τὰ τῶν αὐλῶν εἰδῶν. Cf. De Rijk, "Boèce logicien," pp. 154–55, on intelligible Ideas.

⁹⁴ [Philoponus] *In de An.* 569,29–70,1.

To reiterate: Boethius regards *intellectus* as interchangeable with any, or indeed, with all, of the other terms used in his explication of the *orandi ordo* because *intellectus* includes all of the lower stages of cognition. A *vox* that signifies an *intellectus* thereby “signifies” all of the things under *intellectus*. *Sensus*, *imaginatio*, *passio animae* and *similitudo* are all forms of *intellectus*, but it is *intellectus* alone that pertains specifically to the theory of signification. The substitution of terms is not reciprocal: Boethius never speaks of *vox* signifying *sensus* or *imaginatio*. *Intellectus* is what conceives a *res*;⁹⁵ it is also what is signified by *vox*.⁹⁶ An *intellectus* is either a thought, or the faculty of thought (mind, intellect). In its plural forms the word denotes the former.⁹⁷ In the singular, either is possible.⁹⁸ There is also close affinity

⁹⁵ *In Perih.* I.37,13: *rem concipit intellectus*; I.37,19: *figuram eius mente concipio*; II.7,32: *conceptiones animi intellectusque*; II.20,17: *res enim ab intellectu concipitur, vox vero conceptiones animi intellectusque significat*; II.24,25: *intellectus oratio subiectas principaliter res sibi concipiat*; II.24,28: *animi conceptiones, id est eam quae fit in intellectibus orationem*; II.30,24: *conceptiones animi intellectusque*; II.32,21: *animi aliquam conceptionem*; cf. *In Isag.* II.160,3: *id quod est in rerum natura constitutum, intellectu concipit et sibimet ratione describit*.

⁹⁶ *In Perih.* I.37,9: *voces quibus id quod intellectu capimus significamus*; I.39,22: *significant autem voces illa quae sunt in intellectibus*; II.7,13: *vox ipsa quidem intellectus significat*; II.24,23: *vocis oratio . . . animi atque intellectus orationem designet*; II.29,21: *id quod significaretur a vocibus intellectus esse Aristoteles putabat*; II.35,27: *ea quae sunt in voce intellectus animi designare*; II.37,10: *voces . . . intellectus animi . . . designant*; II.37,25: *voces intellectus animi . . . designarent*.

⁹⁷ *In Perih.* I.37,8: *intellectus vero quibus res ipsas addiscimus*; I.39,17: *intellectus passionis quidem animae sunt*; I.39,22: *illa quae sunt in intellectibus*; I.41,12–15: *principaliter de intellectibus animae disputare . . . principaliter de animae passionibus disputare*; I.41,26: *ex animi intellectibus quidquid evenit vocibus indicatur [codd.; iudicatur: Meiser emend.]*; I.43,21: *simplicibus intellectibus*; II.7,10: *his enim quidquid est in animi intellectibus designatur*; II.7,15: *per intellectuum medietatem*; II.11,22: *quod intellectus animae passionis vocavit*; II.28,15: *ex intellectu quidem complexione*; II.33,31: *intellectus ipsi non sine quibusdam passionibus sunt*; II.35,28: *intellectus animi designare*; II.37,10: *voces . . . intellectus animi . . . designant*; II.39,1: *qui sunt scilicet intellectus rerum*; II.39,13: *intellectus quos animae passionis vocat*; II.49,29: *ex intellectibus voces capiunt significationem*; II.52,18: *intellectuum quaedam compositio*.

⁹⁸ FACULTY: *In Perih.* I.42,17: *in intellectu sunt quaedam . . . simplicia*; I.42,19: *veritatem inesse intellectui aut falsitatem*; II.24,24–26: *animi atque intellectus orationem . . . intellectus oratio*; II.34,1: [*proprietaem*] *quam intellectu complectitur*; *In Isag.* I.8,16: *mente intellectuque capitur*; *Eut.* I.78,8–12: *intellectu capi possunt*; *Trin.* VI.30,26: *aggredi etiam intellectu oportet*. MENTAL CONTENT-ACTIVITY: *In Isag.* I.24,5: *intellectu solo et mente [Victorinus’ translation of ἐνίνοια, Isag. 1,11, cf. Boethius, ibid. II.159,4: in solis nudisque intellectibus = AL I.6.5,12; 63,11]*; *In Perih.* I.37,15: *intellectus vero animae quaedam passio est*; I.39,23: *intellectus igitur animi passio est*; I.40,15: *vox enim et intellectum rei significat et ipsam rem*; I.42,14: *compositione et coniunctione huiusmodi intellectus fit*; I.43,1: *intellectum intellectui copulamur*; II.7,26: *medius animi . . . intellectus*; II.21,19: *habent quoque de eo eundem intellectum quod equus sit*; II.40,19: *ad unum intellectum utrique conveniunt*; II.44,31: *ad hominis intellectum adiciam quiddam*.

between *intellectus*, *ratio* and *intellegentia*.⁹⁹ Here, then, is the first triad fully analyzed:

RES – SENSUS – SIMILITUDO – VOX,
IMAGINATIO ANIMAE PASSIO
(PRIMUS) INTELLECTUS

* * * * *

ΤΟ ΠΡΑΓΜΑ	–	ΤΟ ΑΙΣΘΗΜΑ	–	ΤΟ ΎΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ	–	Ή ΦΩΝΗ.
		(Ή ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ)		ΤΟ ΠΑΘΗΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ		
		ΤΟ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ		ΤΟ (ΠΡΩΤΟΝ) ΝΟΗΜΑ		
		(Ή ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ)				

This schematization provides at best a very elemental view of the relationships between the different stages of cognition Boethius discusses, but it has been considered worthy of attention because of the continuum it describes. Boethius conceives of these mental contents and faculties in *linear* fashion, i.e., as the intermediate stages in the *ordines*. In outline, the central segments of the order reflect fairly well Aristotle's view, for in the *De Anima* sense-perception and imagination are described as being closely linked, yet separate, levels of cognition.¹⁰⁰ Imagination is a secondary movement of sensation which does not require the presence of physical objects, and so pertains also to memory and to dreaming.¹⁰¹ It forms the link between perception and thinking.¹⁰² Moreover, that sense-perception and imagination differ in so far as imagination can represent things that are not actually present, is evident from how we act. For without perceiving Rome, we do not try to walk to the Forum, but we imagine doing so.¹⁰³ A further difference is evident from the fact that imagination is often "false" even in what it portrays as present. This also separates imagination from thinking. For it is possible to have a mental image of the sun as being a foot in diameter without believing or thinking that it is so. Imagination is irrational, and hence it makes no affirmations

⁹⁹ Cf. *In Perih.* I.42,1: quaedam simplicia quae ratione animi concipiuntur constituunturque intelligentia mentis; I.38,23: omnis significatur intelligentia mentisque conceptio; I.44,1: [*simplices intellectus quos*] . . . simplex intelligentia concipit; II.35,2: rerum figuram eam in animi intelligentia quadam vi ac similitudine capit; I.42,11: sed quando cursum et hominem iunxero et ex his aliquid intelligentia mea fecero; I.63,16: intelligentia conquiescit; I.63,21: intellectus quiescit; I.63,28: nondum tota intelligentia constituitur audientis.

100 *De An.* 427b28ff.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *De Somn.* 458b15; 462a27–31.

102 *De An.* 427b14–16.

¹⁰³ Cf. *Meta.* 1010b10ff.

or denials: it cannot assert that the sun either is or is not a foot across.

To return now to the problem of signification. Boethius describes the activity as follows:

passus enim quilibet eius rei proprietatem, quam intellectu conplectitur, ad eius enuntiationem designationemque contendit. cum enim quis aliquam rem intellegit, prius imaginatione formam necesse est intellectae rei proprietatemque suscipiat et fiat vel passio vel cum passione quadam intellectus perceptio. hac vero posita atque in mentis sedibus conlocata fit indicandae ad alterum passionis voluntas, cui actus quidam continuandae intellegentiae protinus ex intimae rationis potestate supervenit, quem scilicet explicat et effundit oratio nitens ea quae primitus in mente fundata est passione, sive, quod est verius, significatione progressa oratio⟨ne⟩ progrediente simul et significantis se orationis motibus adaequante.¹⁰⁴

Imagination receives the form of an object by translating the sense-perception into a confused picture or likeness¹⁰⁵ that is completed by thought.¹⁰⁶ This completion of the confused image is somehow to be understood in relation to a pronouncement that occurs within the soul. Such, at any rate, is the case when the image, which is non-verbal, is analyzed and then put back together to produce an assertoric judgement.¹⁰⁷ The result of this process is what Boethius refers to as *cogitabilis oratio*, an inner speech which “participates” in truth or falsity.¹⁰⁸ *Cogitabilis* incidentally produces (for Boethius evinces no awareness of the fact) a striking contrast with St Augustine’s *dicibile*, behind which lies the Stoic *lekton*.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ *In Perih.* II.33,33. The text is troubled (below, p. 120), but Meiser seems to have adopted the best possible reading. The difficult phrase gains some clarity in light of *ibid.* II.47,1: quod vero in intellectus progressionem ambulationem cum Socrate coniungo, quaedam iam facta est compositio. quod si hoc oratione protulero, rursus eadem compositio est et circa eam vis veritatis et falsitatis adparet. By *progressio* Boethius appears to mean the inner articulation of words and statements that also can be spoken aloud, going over the same words silently within the mind.

¹⁰⁵ *In Perih.* II.35,6: omnis vero imago rei cuius imago est similitudinem tenet: mens igitur cum intellegit, rerum similitudinem comprehendit.

¹⁰⁶ *In Perih.* II.29,9: plenior superveniat intellectus cunctas eius explicans partes quae confuse fuerant imaginatione praesumptae.

¹⁰⁷ *In Perih.* II.44,16: ut cum nobis hominis proprietates tacita imaginatione suggeritur (nulla namque ex hac intellegentiae simplicitate vel veritatis nascitur vel falsitatis agnitio), sunt vero intellectus quidam compositi atque coniuncti in quibus inest iam quaedam veritatis vel falsitatis inspectio.

¹⁰⁸ *In Perih.* II.44,25: fient enim cogitabiles orationes veritatis vel falsitatis participes hoc modo: “homo est, homo non est, homo albus est, homo albus non est,” quarum quidem “homo est” vel “homo albus est” compositione dicitur: nam prior esse atque hominem, posterior hominem albo composita intellectus praedicatione conectit. Cf. *ibid.* II.31,1: addendum eorum nominum atque verborum quae profert atque explicat vocalis oratio.

¹⁰⁹ See in general, Jackson, *Augustine: De Dialectica*, p. 126, n. 7; *idem*, “The Theory of Signs in St Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana*,” *Revue des études augustiniennes* 15 (1969),

And although on this rather unusual occasion Latin offers greater flexibility than the Greek tongue does, Boethius does not put it to use: he uses *oratio* (λόγος), but in the sense of *ratio* (λόγος) or *cogitatio*, et *intra se ratiocinatio*.¹¹⁰ Two considerations follow.

First, Boethius' analysis of the middle segment of the first triad accounts for the changes involved in the movement from a *res*, to a *sensus* and *imaginatio*, then to an *intellectus* or pronouncement within the mind. The close proximity of the inner and outer pronouncements helps to clarify the mediating position of *intellectus* in the *ordo*: the final act before speaking something out loud is the "utterance" of something *in intellectu*. Thus it is because of their immediate proximity within the *ordo* that a *vox* can be said directly to signify an *intellectus*. *Vox* and *intellectus* are both linguistic events. Mediatly a *vox* signifies the *res* at the other side of the *intellectus*, which the *audiens* discovers by proceeding through the different stages of the triad in reverse order:

nam cum ea quae sunt in voce res intellectusque significant, principaliter quidem intellectus, res vero quas ipsa intellegentia comprehendit secundaria significatione per intellectuum medietatem . . .¹¹¹

Aristotle's *primorum* (16a6) has for Boethius the adverbial force of *principaliter*, since it denotes the strict proximity of *intellectus* in relation to *vox*, as compared with that of *res* in relation to *vox*. It means in effect, 'primarily' or 'in the first place,' since Boethius thinks of spoken sounds only as *notae*, and does not make any distinction between σύμβολα and σημεία. Thus signification proceeds in two stages: first sense, then reference. All of this is implicit in his Latin translation of the Aristotelian passage. The commentary puts the flesh on the skeleton.

9–49, rpt. in *Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. R.A. Markus (Garden City, 1972), pp. 92–147; A. Graeser, "The Stoic Theory of Meaning," in, *The Stoics*, ed. J.M. Rist (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1978), pp. 77–100; R.A. Markus, "St Augustine on Signs," *Phronesis* 2 (1957), 60–83, rpt. in Markus, *Augustine*, pp. 61–91; Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, I.286–99.

¹¹⁰ *In Cat.* 204a: quoniam vero Graeca oratione λόγος dicitur etiam animi cogitatio, et intra se ratiocinatio, λόγος quoque et oratio dicitur, ne quis Aristotelem cum diceret λόγον, id est orationem, quantitatem esse discretam, de eo putaret dicere quem quisque λόγον, id est rationem, in propria cogitatione diserneret, hoc addidi. dico autem illam quae fit cum voce orationem. apud R(ο)manam namque linguam discreta sunt vocabula orationis atque rationis. Graeca vero oratio utriusque vocabulum et rationis et orationis λόγον appellat; cf. *In Perih.* I.72,27: sed cum supra de oratione tractasset, quae apud illos eodem modo λόγος vocatur, dum de hominis ratione id est definitione vellet dicere, quoniam non significat verum vel falsum, nisi ei aut est aut fuit addatur, communione vocabuli usus ad λόγον de quo superius tractabat rettulit, ut non orationem intellegeremus, sed potius rationem. The observation occurs also in Isadore, *Etym.* II.24.7: Logi-cam, quae rationalis vocatur, Plato subiunxit . . . dividens eam in Dialecticam et Rhetoricam. . . . Λόγος enim apud Graecos et sermonem significat et rationem.

¹¹¹ *In Perih.* II.33,27.

Second, Boethius is preparing the way for his discussion of the “Peripatetic” theory of the three discourses: discourse which is written, discourse which is spoken, and discourse which is in thought.¹¹² His ultimate source for this is probably Porphyry, but the idea can be traced back through the Stoics to Aristotle and Plato.¹¹³ Boethius maintains that Aristotle intends, in the opening pages of his treatise, to provide definitions for the primary parts of speech, the *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα*. He further holds that the reason for using the expression *ea quae sunt in voce* (τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ) instead of simply *voces* (16a3) is that Aristotle is not discussing all spoken sounds, nor even meaningful syncategorematic expressions, but spoken *names* and *verbs*. Thus in his commentary Boethius expands the wording of Aristotle’s text:

sunt ergo ea *verba et nomina* quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae et ea *verba et nomina* quae scribuntur eorum *verborum et nominum* quae sunt in voce.¹¹⁴

Next he has only to substitute the idea of names and verbs *quae tacita mente tractentur*¹¹⁵ for Aristotle’s *in anima passiones* (τὰ παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), in order for the point he is making to become clear: there are three discourses, each of which is made up of *ὀνόματα* and *ῥήματα*.

Kretzmann has drawn attention to an apparent inconsistency in Boethius’ explanation of the doctrine of the inner discourse:

... is this mental discourse nothing more than silently running over a sentence in Latin or English, or is it a nonverbal operation, reminiscent of Augustine’s “inward locution?” The fact that mental discourse is said to have nouns and verbs of its own suggests the former view, if either; but since Aristotle had maintained that the mental modifications were the same for all ... and since Boethius offers this doctrine of the three discourses in explanation of Aristotle’s account, there is some basis for the second view as well.¹¹⁶

Boethius shows no awareness of the possibility that his exposition may be

¹¹² *In Perih.* II.24,22: *ea quae sunt in litteris eam significant orationem quae in voce consistit et ea quae est vocis oratio quod animi atque intellectus orationem designet, quae tacita cogitatione conficitur*; II.29,17: *Peripatetici rectissime posuerunt tres esse orationes, unam quae scribi possit elementis, alteram quae voce proferri, tertiam quae cogitatione conecit*; II.36,10: *Porphyrius vero quoniam tres proposuit orationes, unam quae litteris contineretur, secundam quae verbis ac nominibus personaret, tertiam quam mentis evolveret intellectus*; II.42,15: *triplex est oratio, quae in litteris, quae in voce, quae in intellectu est.*

¹¹³ Porphyry, *In Cat.* 64,28–30; 101,26–28; Ammonius, *In de Int.* 22,13–21; 23,12–15; *SVF* II.135; 223; Aristotle, *PAn.* 76b24f.; Plato, *Phlb.* 38c–e; *Thl.* 189e–90a; *Sph.* 263e–64b; *Tim.* 37b.

¹¹⁴ *In Perih.* II.31,4; cf. II.30,20; II.36,17.

¹¹⁵ *In Perih.* II.30,10.

¹¹⁶ “Semantics, History of,” p. 367b.

open to both of these interpretations, which ought to be disjunctive. That the inner pronouncements are said to be silent (*tacita mente*)¹¹⁷ serves only to distinguish them from audible sounds; it does not indicate whether they come into being in Latin or in any other conventionally spoken language. Two approaches to the problem are possible, one for each triad. We shall take each in turn.

Consider first what Boethius says concerning the second triad (*vox-intellectus-res*), in which he analyzes the activity in the mind of the *audiens*:

omni nomine audito quoniam per syllabas progrediens vox aliquantulum temporis spatium decerpit, in ipsa progressionem temporis qua dicitur nomen audientis quoque animus progreditur: ut cum dico “inperterritus,” sicut per syllabas “in” et “per” et “ter” et ceteras progreditur nomen, ita quoque animus audientis per easdem syllabas vadit. sed ubi quis expleverit nomen et dixerit “inperterritus,” sicut nomen finitum a syllabarum progressionem consistit, ita quoque audientis animus conquiescit, nam cum totum nomen audit, totam significationem capit et animus audientis, qui dicentis syllabas sequebatur volens quid ille diceret intellegere, cum significationem ceperit, consistit et eius animus perfecto demum nomine constituitur.¹¹⁸

To have grasped the “signification” is for the *intellectus* to have come to a state of rest and to have completed the process of receiving the spoken sound. The mind progresses (*progressione*, *progreditur*) through the series of syllables as it is spoken, and since words are quantities¹¹⁹ it requires time for them not only to be spoken by the *dicens*, but to come into the mind of the *audiens*. The received word(s) must be “explicated.”¹²⁰ If a Greek word is spoken aloud, then it is a *Greek* word as well that is articulated within the mind of the listener. How the listener identifies the referent of a word or words is, unfortunately, a question which is not specifically addressed by Boethius, but some help is afforded by what he says concerning the first triad (*dicens = res-intellectus-vox*), to which we must turn next.

First let us restate the problem. Sense-perceptions and mental images

¹¹⁷ *In Perih.* II.30,10; cf. II.24,25 (*tacita cogitatione*); II.44,17 (*tacita imaginatione*).

¹¹⁸ *In Perih.* II.72,14; cf. I.63,8ff.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *In Cat.* 208b–c, with the parallel in Simplicius (Iamblichus) as observed by Shiel, “Boethius’ Commentaries,” p. 223. Also, *In Cat.* 203c–04a. Syllables are discrete quantities (Aristotle, *Cat.* 4b22–5a15) which are not made continuous by the signification of the words they comprise. Cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 101,24–02,9; Ammonius *In Cat.* 57,11–24; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 131,27–33,5; Plotinus, VI.1.5.2–14, with the *apparatus fontium* of H.-S., ad loc. (= Dexippus, *In Cat.* 70,1–7).

¹²⁰ *In Perih.* II.73,1: non est enim quo progrediatur intellegentia ipsoque nomine terminato animus auditoris qui progrediebatur explicatione nominis constituitur et quiescit et ultra ad intellegentiam, quippe expedita significatione nominis, non procedit. Cf. Ammonius, *In de Int.* 54,27–55,10. The *dicens* is productive of the state of rest; the *audiens* is receptive of it. Also, for Ammonius, the *ἐννοια* is ἐν μήκει προφερομένη μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν παραστάσεως.

of *res* that are formally “the same” (they need not be numerically “the same”) are by nature themselves “the same,” as also are the *intellectus*. The *voces* (and *litterae*), however, are not “the same.” How then do “the same” things produce “the same” sense-perceptions, images and thoughts, but not “the same” spoken sounds? Or, in the first triad, how do the non-verbal sense-perceptions and mental images result in something verbal, either within or outside of the mind? The passage in which Boethius describes the process is the following:

hac [sc. *passione vel intellectus perceptione*] vero posita atque in mentis sedibus conlocata fit indicandae ad alterum passionis voluntas, cui actus quidam continuandae intellegentiae protinus ex intimae rationis potestate supervenit, quem scilicet explicat et effundit oratio nitens ea quae primitus in mente fundata est passione, sive, quod est verius, significatione progressa oratio (ne) progrediente simul et significantis se orationis motibus adaequante [cod. E in marg.: aliter sive quod est verius significatione progrediente oratio progressa simul et se signif<icantis> or<ationis> mo<tibus> adae<quans>].¹²¹

The progression of events seems to be as follows (II.33,33 – 34,5, cf. above, p. 116). The percipient “suffers” the *proprietas* of an object *in intellectu*, and then indirects his attention to, or has an impulse (*contendit*, II.34,2; *fit voluntas*, II.34,5 – 6) to signify, the thing in question. Boethius describes it another way: when we think (*intellegit*) some thing, we must first have the *forma* or *proprietas* in *imaginatio*; with this there comes either a *passio* or with the *passio* an *intellectus perceptio* (*vel . . . vel*, II.34,4 – 5, it is difficult to say whether the two are really disjunctive, or whether Boethius is simply rephrasing the same point). Now appear the lines quoted immediately above. When the *passio* or *perceptio intellectus* is *in mentis sedibus* there arises the *voluntas* to signify the mental content. Immediately (*protinus*) there comes an *actus intellegentiae* out of *potestas rationis*, which *actus* is “explicitated” by *oratio*. The *oratio* is in turn based upon (*nitens*) the *primitus in mente passio*. The final lines are particularly difficult, but not impossible,¹²² to construe. We may translate (with some help from the gloss in MS. E): “as the (inner) signification has progressed the speech progresses simultaneously, and adaequates itself to the movements of the signifying (inner) speech.” The use of the verbs *explicare* and *progredi* is indicative of the fact that the process described here is complementary to that introduced above in connection with the second triad. The outer speech runs “alongside” of the inner. *Supervenire* has already been met in obviously analogous contexts.¹²³ Thus far Boethius uses the terminology consistently. The

¹²¹ In *Perih.* II.34,6.

¹²² As Arens maintains, *Theory of Language*, p. 217.

¹²³ In *Perih.* II.28,28: *sensus enim atque imaginatio quaedam primae figurae sunt*,

concept that has not yet been encountered is that embodied in the expressions, *actus intellegentiae* and *potestas rationis*. What is Boethius' meaning?

One very remote possibility proves generally illuminating *positionis gratia*. A passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* puts forth the claim, apparently against what is stated in the logical works, that actual knowledge is of the individual and potential knowledge of the universal.¹²⁴ A commonly accepted interpretation of this states that to know a *this* is to have actual knowledge of the form as inherent *in* an individual substance. Since matter is the principle of individuation and thus makes possible the infinite multiplication of this form, the knowledge, like the form itself, is potentially universal. The grammarian who actually knows this *A* according to its form potentially recognizes all written marks possessing the same form. The *per accidens* presence of the universal is the presence, in the soul, of the form of the individual,¹²⁵ while the number of things in which the form of that individual is able to inhere is indefinite. The notion of actual and potential knowledge is introduced for the "loosing" of an aporia in *Metaphysics* B, but it seems to be a genuine part of Aristotle's teaching.¹²⁶ This interpretation has been put forward here not *propter se*, but for discussion of the possibility that Boethius has it in mind when he introduces the *actus-potestas* distinction. The correct interpretation of the passage is Cherniss', viz., that by *this A* Aristotle means not the composite particular, but an intelligible object as actualized in thought and therefore distinct from all other intelligibles, which are now only potential objects of thought (cf. *De An.* 417a24–29). For the object of actual knowledge is not the form particularized in matter, but the form *apart from* matter. Aristotle is indeed discussing objects of which universality is not a primary characteristic, but the incidental knowledge of a *this* is "potential" knowledge of it as the *form* of all other such things, since matter always imparts an element of potentiality. The concrete individual *qua* individual is inaccessible to knowledge; only its form is intelligible.

Now Boethius does not discuss this passage of the *Metaphysics*, but what he holds concerning knowledge that is either universal or particular may be approached by way of his theory of signification. Aristotle observes in the *Sophistici Elenchi* (165a6–13) that due to the impossibility of arguing

supra quas velut fundamento quodam superveniens intellegentia nitatur. II.29,9: plenior superveniat intellectus cunctas eius [sc. *imaginationis*] explicans partes.

¹²⁴ *Meta.* 1087a15–21.

¹²⁵ *PAn.* 100a6–b4.

¹²⁶ Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, II.466; cf. Owens, *Doctrine of Being*, pp. 427–30. Cherniss (*Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I*, pp. 340–55) and Tarán (*Speusippus of Athens*, p. 27, n. 136) discuss the difficulties of this doctrine.

by the introduction of the actual things under discussion,¹²⁷ and to the consequent necessity of using names in their place, it is sometimes assumed that the relation between names and things is the same as that between counters and objects counted. But the two instances are very different, for a finite number of names is used to signify things which are indefinite in number. A brief refutation of "Epicurus" in Boethius' second *Isagoge* commentary makes the same point:

hic vero magnus est error; neque enim sese ut in numeris, ita etiam in ratiocinationibus habet. in numeris enim quicquid in digitis recte computantis evenierit, id sine dubio in res quoque ipsas necesse est evenire, ut si ex calculo centum esse contigerit, centum quoque res illi numero subiectas esse necesse est. hoc vero non aequae in disputatione servatur; neque enim quicquid sermonum decursus invenerit, id natura quoque fixum tenetur.¹²⁸

What Boethius is defending is in fact part of Porphyry's theory of the predicables: a genus is what gathers together many things which differ according to species, while a species is what gathers things which differ in number. Only individual significations ("Socrates," "this white," "this approaching son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates be his only son") are of individual things.¹²⁹ The "individual" name encompasses a set of characteristics or attributes which is never reproduced in another individual object, and thus individual objects *qua* individuals do not share common names. In certain cases the precise signification of an individual cannot be made even by a name:

individua autem de singulis praedicantur, ut Socrates et Plato, eaque maxime sunt individua quae sub ostensionem indicationemque digiti cadunt, ut hoc scamnum, hic veniens atque quae ex aliqua proprie accidentium designantur nota, ut si quis Socratem significatione velit ostendere, non dicat "Socrates," ne sit alius qui forte hoc nomine nuncupetur, sed dicat "Sophronisci filius," si unicus Sophronisco fuit. individua enim maxime ostendi queunt, si vel tacito nomine sensui ipsi oculorum digito tactuve monstrentur, vel ex aliquo accidenti significantur vel nomine proprio, si solus illud adeptus est nomen¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Cf. Boethius, *In Cat.* 162b: namque . . . non de rerum generibus, neque de rebus, sed de sermonibus rerum genera significantibus in hoc opere tractatus habetur, hoc vero Aristoteles ipse declarat cum dicit: "eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat, aut quantitatem." quod si de rebus divisionem faceret, non dixisset "significat;" res enim significatur, non ipsa significat res enim si iungantur, affirmationem nullo modo perficiunt, affirmatio namque in oratione est. Also, Porphyry, *In Cat.* 57,35ff. Boethius is explaining that the *inscriptio* of the *Categories* is based upon the fact that at 2a4–6 (cf. 1b25f.) Aristotle refers to συμπλοκαὶ εἰρημένων as producing affirmations and denials. The treatise is therefore about the classes of *spoken sounds* which signify the classes of being.

¹²⁸ *In Isag.* II.138,17.

¹²⁹ Porphyry, *Isag.* 7,19–27.

¹³⁰ *In Isag.* II.233,20.

The most exact method of signifying an individual such as Socrates is to point it out, since there may be another individual of the same name. Ordinarily, however, the proper name will suffice. But what does the proper name signify in the soul? Socrates *qua* man is known in light of the universal, "man," and in light of the corresponding definition, "rational, mortal, animal." "Man" and its definition signify the forms which inhere in individual men, but in so far as they are reproduced in the soul. That is, when we say "man" or "rational, mortal animal," we signify a specific nature (*humanitas*), but we also signify a universal conception that is in our mind (*In Perih.* II.74,20):

quoniam quilibet audiens cum significativam vocem ceperit animo, eius intelligentia nitetur: et cum quis audit "homo," *quid sit* hoc ipsum quod accipit mente comprehendit constituitque animo audisse se *animal rationale mortale*.

(Boethius here discusses the *audiens*, but what the *audiens* comprehends the *dicens* signifies, for the same *intellectus* is common to both.) "Socrates," however, has no corresponding definition and is not a universal. Now, things are signified either by names or by definitions; the definition signifies the essence (*quid sit, esse, natura, substantia*), and that is the basis of a word's sense, which is universal ("man").¹³¹ As to reference, it is individuals ("Socrates," "Plato") which present special difficulty, since they admit of no definition. Boethius therefore proposes quasi-appellatives such as *Platonitas* which will signify an individual being as it is conceived together with the peculiar combination of attributes that makes it to be what it is and nothing else. This collection of attributes he calls the *qualitas incommunicabilis*.¹³² Since a *ratio substantiae* is either

¹³¹ *In Cat.* 163c: omnis res aut nomine aut diffinitione monstratur; namque subiectam rem aut proprio nomine vocamus, aut diffinitione quid sit ostendimus. ut, verbi gratia, quandam substantiam vocamus hominis nomine, et eiusdem definitionem damus dicentes esse hominem animal rationale mortale; *Top. Diff.* 1196c: diffinitio vero est oratio quae uniuscuiusque rei quidem esse designat. Boethius uses *quid sit, esse, natura* and *substantia* almost as synonyms: *In Perih.* II.17,31: secundum esse suum atque substantiam; II.18,11: ad esse atque ad naturam propriam; II.18,24: ad esse proprium atque substantiam. *Causa* and *ratio* are very close to one another in meaning (*In Perih.* II.12,16), and are sometimes close to *natura* as well (cf. above, p. 58, n. 28).

¹³² *In Perih.* II.139,18–19. Cf. *ibid.* II.136,23–37,26, with De Rijk's emendation ("Boèce logicien," p. 143, n. 8). Is Boethius influenced by a Stoic doctrine (cf. DL VII.58)? He is probably not thinking of Plotinian Ideas of particulars (*Enn.* V.7). Boethius contributes to Gilbert of Poitiers' formulation of these issues (the *forma nativa*, see N.M. Häring, ed., *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* [Toronto, 1966]: Studies and Texts 13, pp. 83–84; 286), but he does not pursue, as Duns Scotus will, the question of whether there is a *distinctio formalis* between the *Platonitas* and the *Humanitas* in Plato.

universal or particular, it is a definition or a description respectively. Each case, however, entails a name and a corresponding formula. The definition encompasses the species by means of the genus and differentiae; the description collects the qualities peculiar to an individual being.¹³³

In light of the fact that Boethius has a clear understanding of the difference between the universal and the particular signification, it would be reasonable to expect that, if universal significations were of knowledge that is potential and particular significations of knowledge that is actual (or, indeed, even the other way around), he would then use the words *potestas* and *actus* with special reference to *intellectus*, since that is the significate of a *vox*. We should also expect a corresponding differentiation between the natures of objects as intelligibles. But that is not how Boethius uses the words. Rather, *potestas* and *actus* appear in conjunction with *ratio* and *intellegentia* respectively, and the latter are evidently different faculties of the soul. We have seen already the flexibility allowed by the term *significatio* (sense, reference, meaning, definition, etc.); we have also seen that the psychological speculations are made only in clarification of the processes of signification. Boethius is not concerned with what or how the soul knows, except in so far as the enquiry advances what he has to say about signification. The theory of signification itself addresses first the relationship of *vox* to *intellectus*, and does not restrict the *intellectus-res* relationship to objects that are either universal or particular. The *intellectus* signified, e.g., by the word "man" may be either particular (this man, Socrates) or universal (rational, mortal, animal) without there being any change in what Boethius says about the activities of the mind when it either "speaks" or understands the word.¹³⁴ Another explanation must therefore be sought.

¹³³ *In Cat.* 166a: subalternorum vero generum, quoniam et differentias habent et genera, diffinitiones esse possunt. at vero quorum diffinitiones reddi nequeunt, illa tantum descriptionibus terminantur. descriptio autem est quae quamlibet rem propria quadam proprietate designat. Cf. *In Isag.* II.153,10–54,2.

¹³⁴ Cf. *In Perih.* II.41,3: rei enim ponitur nomen, ut cum dicimus "homo" significamus quidem intellectum, rei tamen nomen est id est animalis rationalis mortalis. This is from an objection (cf. above, p. 52f.) lodged against what had been purported to be an error in Aristotle's doctrine. Alexander refutes the objection, but the statement above is given as one to which, it is assumed, both parties will agree. The example involves an interesting ambiguity. For *homo* is indeed the name of a thing, i.e., it signifies particular rational, mortal animals, but there is here the possibility of confusing the sense and reference. *Homo* also signifies a content in the mind which is subject to a definition that is universal (cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* 1035b34–36a12), and that is the basis of its sense. Do we mean *this* rational, mortal animal Plato, or the common nature? After all, in either case the *vox* signifies an *intellectus*, although it need not signify the same extramental *res* (we mean Socrates when we say *homo*, but the *audiens* looks at Plato instead). Why doesn't Alexander instance a name such as "Plato?" Because it has no definiton and is therefore not as well suited to the point he is making. Even if there is no particular man around

A somewhat less remote possibility is that the act-potency distinction is based upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the *mens in habitu* (*De Anima* III.4–5). Since the time of Alexander there has been so much said concerning the “agent” intellect, and with so little agreement, that to attempt a new explanation here could only further confuse matters. A summary of the ancient debates is found in Stephanus’ doxography,¹³⁵ in which four schools of thought are identified and refuted on the basis of lines gleaned from the *De Anima*. Some of the salient points may be summarized as follows. (a) Alexander (cf. below) is reported to have held that the agent intellect is the Prime Mover. Stephanus finds this interpretation unacceptable: If this were correct, then the Prime Mover, pure act, would be preceded by something that is potential (429b31; 430a21), but from *Metaphysics* Λ we know that this cannot be; furthermore, Aristotle says that the agent intellect *alone* is immortal and unending (430a23), but there are beings besides the Prime Mover which are immortal and unending; finally, the Prime Mover is more like the sun than like the positive disposition of light to which Aristotle compares the agent intellect (430a15; cf. Themistius, *In de An.* 103,32–04,3; Simplicius, *In de An.* 223,9–12; 242,31ff.). (b) Plotinus held a very different view from that of Alexander, but he too is refuted by Stephanus: If the agent intellect is a part of the human intellect that is always active, as Plotinus maintains, then it cannot be “prior in potency” (429b31; 430a21); also, even the intellect which is intermittently active is immortal and unending, but Aristotle ascribes this characteristic to the active intellect alone (430a23). (c) Marinus (cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* III.165,7–25; *Elements* props. 175; 183) took the middle path, that of demonic intellects, but is refuted by Stephanus on the following grounds: A demonic intellect cannot be “prior in potency” (430a21); nor can daemonic beings alone be immortal and unending (430a23), given that the Prime Mover must be this as well; and what need would they have of the soul or of phantasms (432a1–14)? Alexander and Marinus have failed to see that the Prime Mover and demonic intellects are separate (κεχωρισμένοι) rather than separable (χωριστοί, 430a17 [*but*

when we say *homo*, we will not be in the dark as to what the word *means*. Alexander must have in mind also cases such as “chimaera,” which would provide even better examples of how, as he is arguing, sense comes before reference. An actual substance is the same as its essence and definition (*Meta.* 1031b32–32a1), of course, but there are no definitions of individuals as such.

¹³⁵ [Philoponus] *In de An.* 535,2–39,12. On Stephanus and Plotinus, see H.J. Blumenthal, “Neoplatonic Elements in the *De Anima* Commentaries,” *Phronesis* 21 (1976), 75; and in general, O. Hamelin, *La théorie de l’intellect d’après Aristote et ses commentateurs* (Paris, 1953); H. Kurfess, *Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der aristotelischen Lehre vom sogenannten ΝΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ und ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ* (Diss. Tübingen, 1911).

cf. 430a22]). It is (d) Plutarch's¹³⁶ view to which Stephanus assents: There is one human intellect which operates in two ways, by making, or by becoming, all things; the active intellect is that which "is in essence an activity" (430a18); by this we are to understand an activity according to knowledge, and knowledge is to soul as form is to matter; thus when Aristotle says that intellect always thinks (430a22), he does *not* mean that there is an intellect which is numerically one and always active, but that there is always in the world a human intellect that either is or can become active.

In Simplicius we find Aristotle's doctrine Platonized: There is (a) unproceeding (active) intellect which is actually both intellect and the intelligible; (b) intellect which is neither unproceeding nor proceeding actually, but both potentially; (c) intellect which proceeds, but when it reverts to itself *in habitu*.¹³⁷

Stephanus' account is of significance in so far as it indicates the web in which commentators had become enmeshed due to the puzzling obscurity of Aristotle's doctrine. By playing lines of the text off against the opinions of Alexander, Marinus and Plotinus, Stephanus produces a rather curious exercise, but not a sustained exposition of Aristotle himself. Simplicius, on the other hand, shows how Aristotle was being made into a Neoplatonist. During the Middle Ages debates over the unicity of intellect and the fate of the soul after death developed and intensified until, and indeed beyond, the Paris condemnations of the 1270's. Aristotle had proposed a difficult and lasting problem. Now since Boethius left no commentary on the *De Anima*, it is impossible for us to know precisely where he falls in the labyrinth of ancient opinions. If he regards some section of *De Anima* III.4–5 as relevant in any way to the "other business" mentioned at *Peri Hermeneias* 16a8–9, then the question of how *words* are called forth and articulated within the mind becomes especially obscure, since he will also regard the subjects treated by the two texts as requiring separate discussions. We have seen that Boethius (II.28) interprets *Peri Hermeneias* 16a8–9 as pointing to what is said at *De Anima* III.8 concerning the difference between thoughts and phantasms. There is in his writings, however, some evidence with which to reconstruct his view of the active mind. Despite the difficulties which the doctrine will raise for the theory of signification, it is necessary momentarily to pursue the *actus-potestas*

¹³⁶ See above, p. 6, n. 6. I agree with Blumenthal (cf. "Neoplatonic Elements in the *De Anima* Commentaries," p. 77, n. 53) that this must be Plutarch of Athens, Syrianus' and Proclus' teacher.

¹³⁷ *In de An.* 219,39–20,12; 244,5–48,17; cf. Hicks, *De Anima*, p. lxxv, and Hamelin, *La théorie de l'intellect*, p. 45ff.

distinction from this point of view, thereby bringing the problem of cognition into sharper focus.

As for the passive intellect which “becomes all things,” we may safely assume that Boethius sees a connection between it and the *animae passio*, which he holds to be closely connected with both *similitudo* and *intellectus*, but in some measure distinct from the latter. At the same time, *similitudo* and *animae passio* are regarded by him as being different from, but dependent upon, *imaginatio*, and ultimately upon *sensus* as well. If these claims be an accurate reflection of Boethius’ view, then the passive intellect is the *animae passio* or *similitudo*. It is primarily the intellect which thinks the forms of sensible individuals as they are received first in *sensus* and *imaginatio*. Therefore the passive intellect does not think universally, but it “suffers” the likeness or form of actual entities. Whether Boethius means passivity or *passio* on the analogy only with perception (*De An.* 429a13), or on the analogy also with matter (cf. Alexander’s “material” intellect)¹³⁸ is uncertain. The Neoplatonic view of sensation is generally regarded as including an activity initiated from within (“perception”) to meet the impressions that are received by the body (“sensation”),¹³⁹ and this in fact is the view which we find defended in the *Consolatio*. The phrase of his commentary in which Boethius couches the words *potestas* and *actus* suggests that the *actus continuandae intellegentiae* that is associated with an inner articulation of words comes directly (*protinus*) from what is evidently to be understood as the passive (? potential: νοῦς παθητικός/δυνάμει) intellect (*ex intimae rationis potestate*). The relationship of *ratio* to the passive intellect is puzzling, but Boethius does seem to equate the two things:

In Perih. I.37,16: *similitudinem rei . . . in animae ratione patiatur,*

¹³⁸ *Mant.* 106,19–07,20; *De An.* 81,24; Simplicius, *In de An.* 247,31–35. The “material” intellect (cf. above, n. 65) is so called because of its lack of identification with any of the νοητά before actually thinking them. In so far as intellect *becomes* the forms it thinks, it is comparable to matter. Perception differs from intellect in being bound to body and to the things in body; it is in some sense body already, and that is why it cannot grasp all things. The line and the circle are accessible to it only *per accidens*. Intellect is said to be “material” not as a substrate (although Alexander does sometimes refer to it as such, e.g., *De An.* 84,17), but rather as being δυνάμει πάντα. That is, intellect is not the slate (cf. *De An.* 430a1), but the capacity for being “inscribed” (ἐπιτηδεύειν πρὸς ἐγγραφήναι, 84,24), and the ἐπιτηδεύειν does not “suffer” when it is brought into act, since it is not a substrate. It is *soul* that is comparable to substrate.

¹³⁹ Simplicius, *In de An.* 119,3: ἐσχάτη γὰρ οὐσα γνωστικὴ ζωὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ καὶ ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑαυτῆς προηγουμένως γνωστικὴ, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξω κινεῖται οὐχ ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐνδοθεν μὲν ἐγειρομένη, ἵνα καὶ ζωτικὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια, προηγησαμένη δὲ τῷ περὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐγγινόμενῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς πάθει ἐπακολουθοῦσα καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐγειρομένη ἐνδοθεν, καὶ τελειομένη μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐνδοθεν τῶν λόγων προβολήν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τελειοῦσθαι, ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ γινόμενον πάθος τελειῶς οἰκοθεν ἐγειρομένη. This is discussed by Blumenthal, “The Psychology of (?) Simplicius’ Commentary on the *De Anima*,” pp. 84–85.

I.37,19: eius . . . similitudo in animae ratione formatur patiturque anima rei intellectae similitudinem.

Ratio may signify a faculty or power of the soul which is to be understood in light of the passive intellect.¹⁴⁰ Of this, more will be said presently.

Next arises the problematical part of the hypothesis, namely, that the agent intellect is in fact what is meant by the phrase, *actus quidam continuandae intelligentiae*.¹⁴¹ What basis is there for this suggestion? Aristotle does indeed make use of the act-potency difference in *De Anima* III.5, but does that alone support the view that the “agent” intellect is the bearing of Boethius’ use of *potestas* and *actus*? The strongest case to be made in favor of the hypothesis must take as its starting point *Consolatio* V.m4, in which Boethius attacks the Stoic seal-impression theory of cognition:

sed mens si propriis vicens / nihil motibus explicat, / sed tantum patiens iacet / notis subdita corporum / cassasque in speculi vicem / rerum reddit imagines, / unde haec sic animis viget / cernens omnia notio? / quae vis singula perspicit / aut quae cognita dividit? / quae divisa recolligit / alternumque legens iter / nunc summis caput inserit, / nunc decedit in infima, / tum sese referens sibi / veris falsa redarguit? / haec est efficiens magis / longe causa potentior / quam quae materiae modo / impressas patitur notas.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ On the use of *ratio* and *potestas*, cf. *In Perih.* II.94,11: significandi enim *ratio* atque *potestas* naturaliter est. Also, II.35,2: rerum figuram eam in animi intelligentia quadam vi ac similitudine capit. The words *vis*, *potentia* and *potestas* are closely related (= δύναμις), as is evident from Boethius’ translations: *AL* I.1,24,27 (*Cat.* 9a16: potentiam naturalem); I.1.27,27 (*Cat.* 10b1: illis potestatibus); I.6.17,21 (*Isag.* 11,4: potestate); II.1.32,14 (*Perih.* 22b39: vim inrationabilem); III.1.59,2 (*PrAn.* 43a23: potentiam); III.1.72,12 (*PrAn.* 47a3: potestatem). Cf. *Syll. Cat.* 803b: unde hinc quoque colligere licet omnes indefinitas potestate et vi aequales esse particularibus; 803a: aequali esse potentia: *In Perih.* II.133,22: amplius quoque si diverso modo quis dicat in negatione quod aliter in adfirmatione proposuit, vim contradictionis intercipit. siquis enim dicat adfirmationem potestate, negationem vero actu, possunt et adfirmatio et negatio uno tempore congruente veritate constitui. In Aristotle, δύναμις can mean a faculty of the soul (*De An.* 414a31; cf. Plato, *Tht.* 185c4), and since in Boethius *vis* sometimes has this meaning (*In Isag.* II.136,16: animae vis; II.137,4: vis animae tertia; II.137,20: triplicis animae vim; II.137,21: animae vis [from context, cf. *De An.* 432a28, *pars* might have been anticipated]; *In Perih.* II.5,29: vis . . . imaginationis; II.23,29: vim propriae actionis exercent), it is possible also that *potestas rationis* means the faculty of reason, which seems to agree with *CPh.* V.4,26–30, where *ratio* and *intelligentia* distinguish faculties of the soul. However, this view creates problems for the present passage, since in *CPh.* V *intelligentia* and *ratio* are intuition and discursive reasoning respectively (IV.6,17: igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus), not the active and passive intellects. These two uses of *ratio* are perplexing, but in the present instance *potestas* apparently requires the passive or potential intellect. Also, II.34,6ff. (above, n. 121) may indicate the passive intellect: the *passio* is located in *mentis sedibus*; to it the *actus intelligentiae* accedes ex intimae rationis potestate; oratio, following the *primitus in mente fundata passio*, “explicates” or unfolds the *actus intelligentiae*. So, *passio in mentis sedibus* (*primitus in mente fundata*) would seem to be the same as the *potestas intimae rationis* or passive mind. Cf. below, nn. 158–60.

¹⁴¹ Cf. *In Cat.* 173d: scientia actus est animae.

¹⁴² V.m4,10.

Aristotle speaks of the παθητικὸς νοῦς at 430a24f., but, notoriously, he does not mention a νοῦς ποιητικός. The commentators, however, regularly understood it from the αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν of 430a12, of which Boethius' *efficiens causa* above is undoubtedly an echo. What is confusing in V.m4 is that there is little indication as to precisely *what* this *causa* acts upon: does it make the objects of thought intelligible, or does it somehow illuminate the passive mind? The latter seems more likely, given what Boethius says elsewhere (cf. below, p. 133, n. 157). In this metrum he is arguing in support of the view stated in the preceeding prosa:¹⁴³ cognition is measured according to the powers of its subjects, not according to the natures of its objects. The antithesis which Boethius poses is that between the part of the mind which reflects the "empty images of things as in a mirror" and the *cernens omnia notio* (14–17) which actively separates and combines notions.¹⁴⁴ In common with the *In Peri Hermeneian* passage is only the use of the verb *explicare*, but in the prosa immediately following we find a clear reference to the agent intellect as *actus*:

quodsi in corporibus sentiendis, quamvis afficiant instrumenta sensuum forinsecus obiectae qualitates *animique agentis* vigorem passio corporis antecedit, quae in se *actum* mentis [*? = actus continuandae intelligentiae*] provocet excitetque interim quiescentes intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non passione insignitur, sed *ex sua vi* [*? = ex intimae rationis potestate*] subiectam corpori iudicat passionem, quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt in discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus sequuntur, sed *actem* suae mentis expediunt!¹⁴⁵

This is the linguistic evidence for the connection which the present hypothesis has first to establish. We must now ascertain what else Boethius holds concerning the agent intellect. From the solution, if that is the word, to the problem of Universals which he propounds *Alexandro consentiens*, we surmise that it is the active intellect which thinks universally:

itaque haec sunt quidem in singularibus, cogitantur vero universalialia nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus vero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine. sed haec similitudo cum in singularibus est, fit sensibilis, cum in universalibus, fit intellegibilis, eodemque modo cum sensibilis est, in singularibus permanet, cum intellegitur, fit universalis.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ V.4,39: nam cum omne iudicium iudicantis *actus* exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non ex aliena sed *ex propria potestate* perficiat.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 68d4–6; Plotinus, IV.6.2; III.6.3.27–35; H. Scheible, *Die Gedichte in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius* (Heidelberg, 1972): Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften, n.s. 46, pp. 166–69. On efficient cause, cf. Simplicius, *In de An.* 247,3–5; Alexander, *De An.* 88,24ff.

¹⁴⁵ *CPh.* V.5,1.

¹⁴⁶ *In Isag.* II.166,14, with Brandt, p. 164, app. font. ad loc. 4. Cf. *ibid.* I.24,13:

Intellect discovers the universal by abstracting the matter from the individual substance upon which it thinks. Line subsists in body and can be grasped only confusedly through sense-perception. The mind must separate the matter, in order to discover the universal, incorporeal nature.¹⁴⁷ When it reintegrates the things it has separated there is truth or falsity in what it thinks. As for the vexed question of the origin of the active intellect, Boethius gives clear preference to the Neoplatonists rather than to Alexander,¹⁴⁸ as is evident from his view of the descent of soul into body:

est enim intellectibile quod unum atque idem per se in propria semper divinitate consistens nullis umquam sensibus, sed sola tantum mente intellectuque capitur. quae res ad speculationem dei atque ad animi incorporalitatem considerationemque verae philosophiae indagatione componitur: quam partem Graeci θεωρίαν nominant. secunda vero est pars intellegibilis, quae primam intellectibilem cogitatione atque intelligentia comprehendit. quae est omnium caelestium supernae divinitatis operum et quicquid sub lunari globo beatiore animo atque puriore substantia valet et postremo humanarum animarum. quae omnia cum prioris illius intellectibilis substantiae fuissent, corporum tactu ab intellectibilibus ad intellegibilia degenerarunt, ut non magis ipsa intellegantur quam intellegant et intellegentiae

quoniam hominum multiformis est animus, per sensuum qualitatem res sensibus subiectas intellegit et ex his quadam speculatione concepta viam sibi ad incorporalia intellegenda praemunit, ut cum singulos homines videam, eos quoque me vidisse cognoscam et quia homines sint, me intellexisse profitear. hinc igitur ducta intellegentia velut iam sensibilibus cognitione roborata sublimiori sese intellectu considerationis extollit et iam speciem ipsam hominis, quae sub animali est posita, et singulos homines continere suspicatur et illud incorporeum intellegit cuius ante particulas corporales in singulis hominibus sentiendis et intellegendis assumpserat. nam hominem quidem illum specialem, qui nos omnes intra sui nominis ambitum coerchet, non est dicere corporalem, quippe quem sola mente intellegentiaque concipimus. sic igitur mens rerum nixa primordiis altiori atque incomparabili intellegentia sublimatur.

¹⁴⁷ In *Isag.* II.165,1: omnes enim huiusmodi res incorporeas in corporibus esse suum habentes sensus cum ipsis nobis corporibus tradit, at vero animus, cui potestas est et diiuncta componere et composita resolvere, quae a sensibus confusa et corporibus coniuncta tranduntur, ita distinguit, ut incorpoream naturam per se ac sine corporibus in quibus est concreta, speculetur et videat. On what is incorporeal, cf. I.29,22: talis autem est quaestio, ut quoniam quaedam incorporeales sunt res, quae omnino corpora non patiuntur, ut animus vel deus, quaedam vero quae sine corporibus esse non possunt, ut prima post terminos incorporalitas, quaedam autem quae in corporibus sunt et praeter corpora sese esse patiuntur, ut anima; II.160,23: duae quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua incorporeitate perdurent, ut deus, mens, anima, alia vero cum sint incorporea, tamen praeter corpora esse non possint, ut linea vel superficies vel numerus vel singulae qualitates, quas tametsi incorporeas esse pronuntiamus, quod tribus spatiis minime distendantur, tamen ita in corporibus sunt, ut ab his divelli nequeant aut separari aut, si a corporibus separata sint, nullo modo permaneant.

¹⁴⁸ Who interprets the doctrine in the light of *Meta.* 1072b13ff., and thus sees the active intellect as entering the human soul from without: *De An.* 89,9–11; 90,16–20; *Mant.* 108,22; 109,7ff.

puritate tunc beatiora sint, quotiens sese intellectibilibus applicarint. tertia theoretices species est quae circa corpora atque eorum scientiam cognitionemque versatur: quae est physiologia, quae naturas corporum passionemque declarat. secunda vero, intellegibilium substantia, merito medio collocata est, quod habeat et corporum animationem et quodammodo vivificationem et intellectibilium considerationem cognitionemque.¹⁴⁹

The soul's contact with matter has rendered the exercise of intellect intermittent and incomplete; therefore, so long as it is in the body, the soul "is what it thinks" (*non magis ipsa intellegantur quam intellegant*).¹⁵⁰ Compare Plotinus, IV.3.8.13:

¹⁴⁹ *In Isag.* I.8,13. Cf. *Inst. Ar.* 9,28: hoc igitur illud quadrivium est, quo his viandum sit, quibus excellentior animus a nobiscum procreatis sensibus ad intellegentiae certiora perducitur; cf. *CPh.* V.2,8: humanas vero animas liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis divinae speculatione conservant, minus vero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam cum terrenis artibus colligantur; extrema vero est servitus cum vitiis deditae rationis propriae possessione ceciderunt. nam ubi oculos a summae luce veritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiecerint, mox inscitiae nube caligant, perniciosius turbantur affectibus, quibus accedendo consentiendoque quam invexere sibi adjuvant servitutem et sunt quodam modo propria libertate captivae.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. below, n. 151. Like is known by like (cf. Empedocles, DK 31 A 86; B 109) and intellect knows its objects without the mediation of phantasms (a Neoplatonic adaptation of Parmenides, DK 28 B 3; e.g. Plotinus, III.8.8.8; Proclus, *Elements*, prop. 167). At *CPh.* III.10,24–25 (cf. I.4,39; II.5,25; IV.3,10) Boethius argues for divinization: sed uti iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita divinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. omnis igitur beatus deus. But at *Hebd.* 44,75–80 he claims that to hold that the created order is inherently good is to make all things God, *quod dictu nefas est*. Opposite to divinization is to degenerate into a beast (*CPh.* II.5,29; IV.3,21). The theory of deification does not betray a pagan point of view (Chadwick, *Boethius*, p. 211). Gruber (*Kommentar*, pp. 295–96) points to Patristic, and Fortescue (ed. and comm., *De consolatione philosophiae libri quinque* [London, 1925; rpt. Hildesheim-NY, 1976], p. 88, ad loc. 19) to Biblical, parallels. Nor does degeneration into a beast mean a theory of reincarnation (cf. Augustine, *Gen. ad Litt.* VII.10.15 = *PL* 34.361). Cf. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 219 (p. 232): deus a se hominibus factis inspiraverit divinum spiritum, quo ratiocinamur quoque intellegimus et quo veneramur pie deum estque nobis cum divinitate cognatio "dii" que esse dicimur et "filii summi dei;" Macrobius, *In Somn. Sc.* II.12.5: apertius admonetur ut esse se deum noverit . . . ut animam non solum immortalem, sed deum esse clarescat. Plotinus (IV.8.5.25) speaks of the soul as divine, but Proclus (*Elements*, props. 153; 183–85; 202) is careful to distinguish between gods and that which is divine by participation in them. When Philosophia questions "Boethius" as to his own nature, he replies (I.6,15) with the logical definition, "rational, mortal, animal." By this she concludes that he suffers from loss of self-knowledge (cf. I.2,6), i.e., knowledge of himself as being of divine origin (v. Gruber, *Kommentar*, pp. 155–57; V. Schmidt-Kohl, *Die Neuplatonische Seelenlehre in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius* [Meisenheim am Glan, 1965]: Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 16, pp. 41–52, esp. 47–48). For at V.4,35 a similar definition is used to illustrate the difference between *ratio* and the divine *intellegentia* which knows the Forms (cf. below, p. 143). At *In Perih.* II.459,2 Boethius equates divine existence with incorporeality (*si secundum nullam motus speciem moveri divina atque incorporalia ratio declaraverit, ordine convincitur non moveri divina*), but at *In Isag.* II.208,22–09,3, he guardedly explains that Plato and the other ancients thought the cosmos to be a god. Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 34a–b; Aristotle, *Meta.* 1074b1ff.; Macrobius, *In Somn. Sc.* I.14.2; I.17.12–14; Proclus, *In Tim.* I.4,2–5.

τοῦτο δὲ τῷ τὴν μὲν ἐνοῦσθαι ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν γνώσει, τὴν δὲ ἐν ὁρέξει, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῃν ἄλλα βλέπειν καὶ ἅπερ βλέπει εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι.

The soul is fully descended, but it can reascend (*quotiens sese intellectibilibus applicarint*).¹⁵¹ Whether or not Boethius adheres to a doctrine of a double fall (ontological, moral; cf. Plotinus, IV.8.5.16) is unclear in the present evidence, but the fact that the soul¹⁵² can, while still in the body, regain contact with the *intellectibilia* or νοητά perhaps implies such a doctrine (one that does appear in the *Consolatio*, cf. below, p. 142ff.; above, nn. 149–50). *Intellectibilia*, Boethius evidently claims,¹⁵³ is a term newly coined. The graduated tripartition of *sensibilis*, *intelligibilis* and *intellectibilis* is reminiscent of a similar division in Proclus (αἰσθητός, νοερός, νοητός),¹⁵⁴ while the νοερός-νοητός differentiation appears to have its origin in Plutarch. In Victorinus we find *intelligibilis* (= νοητός) and *intellectualis* (= νοερός). However, Victorinus also uses *intellectibilis* (*in supernis aeternisque, id est in intellectibilibus atque intellectualibus nihil accidens, nihil qualitas*), but Boethius is either ignorant of the fact, or declines to acknowledge it.¹⁵⁵ Ammonius'

¹⁵¹ Quae omnia cum prioris illius intellectibilis substantiae fuissent [sc. *si non cecidissent*]. *Fuissent* suggests an unfulfilled apodosis, and the *cum* has concessive force: "Although all of these would have been substances of that prior *intellectibile* (or: would have been of that prior intellectible substance), because of contact with bodies they degenerated from *intellectibilia* to *intelligibilia*, so that they themselves are the objects of thought (*intellegantur*) to the extent that they exercise thought (*intellegant*), and they are in the more blessed state of the purity of *intellegentia* when they apply themselves to the *intellectibilia*." That is, they *become* what they think, in self-contemplation. On the ascent of the soul, see Magee, "The Boethian Wheels of Fortune and Fate," *Mediaeval Studies* 49 (1987), 524–33; Schmidt-Kohl, *Neuplatonische Seelenlehre*, pp. 9–10; 18–19; 33–36.

¹⁵² There seems to be no trace of Plotinus' ἡμεῖς, *Enn.* I.1.9.7; 13.1; IV.3.27.2; V.3.3.36; VI.4.14.16. But cf. Boethius, *CPh.* V.3,35; V.5,12. Also, III.m9,19 and IV.1,9 on the *vehiculum* (ὄχημα).

¹⁵³ *In Isag.* I.8,11: Νοητά . . . quoniam Latino sermone numquam dictum repperi, intellectibilia egomet mea verbi compositione vocavi. See below, n. 155.

¹⁵⁴ *In Tim.* II.298,5: ἔστι γὰρ τῶν μὲν εἰκόν, τῶν δὲ παράδειγμα. καθάπερ οὖν ὁ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς φησι τό' γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δὲ ὕδωρ καὶ στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δὲ γε νεῖκεῖ λυγρῶ, τὸν αὐτὸν δῆπου τρόπον καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι τῇ ἑαυτῆς οὐσίᾳ πάσας γινώσκει τὰς οὐσίας, ἅφ' ὧν τέ ἐστι καὶ ὧν κατ' αἰτίαν προηγείται, τῇ δὲ ταυτότητι τὴν ἐν ὅλοις τοῖς οὐσίαι ταυτότητα, νοητοῖς, νοεροῖς, αἰσθητοῖς, τῇ δὲ ἐτερότητι τὴν διήκουσαν ἐτερότητα διὰ πάντων. On Porphyry and Plotinus, see A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism* (The Hague, 1974), p. 61. On Proclus' disagreement with Plotinus (I.1.13.7–8; IV.8.8.1–3) as to whether part of soul is always with the intelligible, v. *In Tim.* III.333,25: ἡ δὲ [sc. *περίοδος*] θατέρου διασέσειςται ψευδῶν ἀναπλησθεῖσα δογμάτων' ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἀλογίαν γειννῆσις ποιεῖ καὶ αὐτὴν εἰσδέχεσθαι τι πάθος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτός. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων ὁρμώμενοι παρρησιασόμεθα πρὸς Πλωτῖνον καὶ τὸν μέγαν Θεόδωρον ἀπαθές τι φυλάττοντας ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ αἰεὶ νοοῦν, etc. See also, Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima Commentaries," esp. pp. 68–81; "The Psychology of (?) Simplicius' Commentary on the *De Anima*," pp. 89–90.

¹⁵⁵ See P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1968), II.40 (62,17 = *Adv. Ar.* IV.2.1); I.99–102. If Boethius knows of Victorinus' use of *intellectibilis* (νοερός) but disagrees with it, his silence is uncharacteristic. Has he not read the *Adversus Arium*? The

proemium (10,13–13,7) to the *Isagoge* divides theoretical philosophy into theology, mathematics and physiology, but does not trace the descent of the soul.

The final lines of *Consolatio* V.m4 indicate that the Forms (*intus species, reconditis formis*) are brought forth from within to meet the mental images that are acquired from sensation, which breathes Plotinian.¹⁵⁶ When in act, the soul is “called back” to itself by an *inluminatio*; the activity is not θύραθεν (ἐξώθεν, cf. Alexander, *Mant.* 108,19ff.; Aristotle, *GA* 736b27f.), but arises from within.¹⁵⁷ The indwelling Ideas (*semen introrsum veri / quod excitatur ventilante doctrina*) are the basis also for what Boethius says concerning the doctrine of Reminiscence in *Consolatio* III.m11 (15f.):

quodsi Platonis Musa personat verum, / quod quisque discit immemor recordatur.—

Where *Consolatio* V disagrees with the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries is over the nature of *ratio*, for in the *Consolatio* *ratio* signifies discursive reasoning (vs. *intellegentia*), not a faculty of the soul specifically related to the passive

problem lies in the phrase, *egomet mea verbi compositione vocavi*. Is Boethius *inventing* a new Latin word, or giving an old one a new usage? Cf. S. Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, 1986), II.659, n. 50; II.677, n. 129.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. above, n. 145; Plotinus, V.3,2–3; Simplicius, *In de An.* 236,18: καὶ οὗτος ὁ τῷ ἀγράφῳ ἀπεικαζόμενος γραμματεῖω· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐπιτήδειον ὄν πρὸς τὸ ἐγγράφεισθαι, οὕτω ἐγγέγραπται. τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας εἰς τὸ ἐξω ρέουσα ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ὥς εἰς ἀμαθίαν καὶ ἀγνοίαν ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ πάσης εἰδητικῆς οὐσίας ὑποφέρεσθαι, τῆς ὡς ὑφ’ ἑτέρου δεῖται τελειώσεως ὑφ’ ἑαυτῆς μὲν γάρ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὑφ’ ἑτέρας, διότι ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἐξέστη οὐσίας. τελειοῦται γοῦν ἐπιστραφεῖσα πρὸς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ οὐσιώδεις λόγους, κατ’ αὐτοὺς ζητοῦσά τε καὶ εὐρίσκουσα τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν, ἐγειρομένης εἰς θεωρίαν καὶ τελειοῦντας τὸ ἐξω προῖδν ἑαυτῆς. διὸ καὶ τελειωθείς ὁ προελθὼν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ ἐγγεγράφθαι καὶ οἶον ἐκικτῆτως καὶ ἐτέρωθεν; Augustine, *De Mus.* VI.5.9 (= *PL* 32.1168). According to Aristotle, *De An.* 429a27–29 (Alexander, *De An.* 84,14–85,10), the soul is the place of the forms only potentially. For Boethius, the Forms are actually present in the soul (cf. *CPh.* III.m11, on Recollection).

¹⁵⁷ *In Isag.* I.7,16: est autem hic amor sapientiae intellegentis animi ab illa pura sapientia inluminatio et quodammodo ad se ipsam retractio atque advocatio, ut videatur studium sapientiae studium divinitatis et purae mentis illius amicitia. haec igitur sapientia cuncto equidem animarum generi meritum suae divinitatis inponit et ad propriam naturae vim puritatemque reducit; *Eut.* I.78,27: haec [sc. anima] enim in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur. *Inluminatio* has Neoplatonic associations. Cf. Plotinus, I.2.4.22–23; Augustine, *Lib. Arb.* III.24.72 (318,48): sic et sapientia non est ab illo qui inluminatur sed ab illo qui inluminat; Stephanus [Philoponus], *In de An.* 539,3; Macrobius, *Sat.* I.18.17: mundi autem mentem solem esse opinantur auctores, a quo in homines manat intellegendi principium. Similarly, *redux* (*CPh.* III.m9,21) and *procedere* (III.2,2; III.10,5). See Gruber, *Kommentar*, p. 285; Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, II.713; Schmidt-Kohl, *Neuplatonische Seelenlehre*, p. 37. On illumination, cf. I. Hadot, “La doctrine de Simplicius sur l’âme raisonnable humaine dans le commentaire sur le manuel d’Épic-tète,” in Blumenthal-Lloyd, *Soul and the Structure of Being*, p. 60, with n. 27. The light metaphor appears in both Plato and Aristotle (*De An.* 430a16; Ross, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, I.cxlv). Boethius speaks of God bringing wisdom into the minds of men (*CPh.* I.4,8): tu mihi et qui te sapientium mentibus inseruit deus. Cf. Gruber, *Kommentar*, pp. 117–18.

intellect. Merlan has argued that in Plotinus νοῦς and διάνοια are related to the active and passive intellects respectively.¹⁵⁸ Simplicius describes the διανοητικὴ ψυχὴ (= imagination, passive intellect) as that which gathers information for the minor premises.¹⁵⁹ Further, Sophonias (late 13th-early 14th c.) uses the expression δυνάμει νοῦς in two ways: (a) = διάνοια, the part of the soul which reasons syllogistically, gathering premises from both sense-perceptions and intellect, and which combines and separates notions, thinking the *noeta* successively (whereas *nous* grasps simple, “hypostatic” truths); (b) = τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι (*De An.* 430a14f.), the intellect that is not *in habitu*, but which, even when it is, cannot think all things together.¹⁶⁰ These considerations shed only the dimmest light; the even more exiguous evidence in Boethius’ writings, however, precludes any certainty as to his view of the relationship between the passive intellect, discursive reasoning, and what is called *ratio*. *Sensus*, *imaginatio* and *intellegentia*, however, appear very much as presented in the commentaries (see below, pp. 142–44).

Returning now to the subject of the speech that is articulated within the mind, we may note that the expressions *actus intellegentiae* and *explicare* are found also in the second of Boethius’ *Isagoge* commentaries:

sed vis animae tertia, quae secum priores alendi ac sentiendi trahit hisque velut famulis atque oboedientibus utitur, eadem tota in ratione constituta est eaque vel in rerum praesentium firmissima conceptione vel in absentium intellegentia vel in ignotarum inquisitione versatur. haec tantum humano generi praesto est, quae non solum sensus imaginationesque perfectas et non inconditas capit, sed etiam *pleno actu intellegentiae* quod imaginatio suggerit, *explicat* atque confirmat.¹⁶¹

However, the apparent similarities between this and the *In Peri Hermeneian*

¹⁵⁸ P. Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 10; 79; cf. H.J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus’ Psychology* (The Hague, 1971), p. 104, n. 10. In V.3.3, διάνοια appears not only to be generated from νοῦς, but to operate in conjunction with perception and imagination. It is intermediate in two senses, by “unfolding” (ἐξελίττου) (a) the shapes that come through imagination, and (b) the Forms descending from Intellect. In relation to Intellect, it is what reasons discursively; in relation to imagination, it is what analyzes the images. On διάνοια and *ratio(cinatio)*, cf. Merlan, *ibid.* pp. 44; 61; Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, II.708–09. Sophonias (*In de An.* 121,38) speaks of διάνοια as an ἀνέλιξις.

¹⁵⁹ *In de An.* 273,5–10. Ross (*De Anima*, p. 47) speaks of it as thinking inductively and as drawing conclusions that are based upon one particular premise. A similar differentiation of νοῦς and διάνοια is made in Plato’s *Line* (*Rpb.* 511d), where each represents a method or approach to the *noeta*. Διάνοια in Aristotle “implies . . . multiplicity in its object,” Owens, *Doctrine of Being*, p. 215, n. 15.

¹⁶⁰ Sophonias, *In de An.* 117,19–21; 121,37–24,12; 125,15–26,15.

¹⁶¹ *In Isag.* II.137,4.

passage under consideration are misleading, as the immediately subsequent comments indicate:

itaque, ut dictum est, huic divinae naturae non ea tantum cognitione sufficiunt quae subiecta sensibus comprehendit, verum etiam et insensibilibus imaginatione concepta et absentibus rebus nomina indere potest et quod intellegentiae ratione comprehendit, vocabulorum quoque positionibus aperit.¹⁶²

The concern here is for how words are *invented* (*positio*, = θέσις); in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentary, on the other hand, the concern is for how the words of a language which is already known to the *dicens* are coupled with concepts as they come into the mind. There seems to be some inconsistency in Boethius' use of *actus intellegentiae*. Also, it is unclear what is meant by *intellegentiae ratione* (above), for these are the two words which Boethius uses in the *In Perihermeneian* and in *Consolatio* V for things that are apparently different from one another. Still more damaging to the *De Anima* hypothesis, however, are the following considerations. (a) It would be perverse for Boethius to ascribe the invention of words (supposing for the moment that this is one of his concerns, as above) to the agent intellect, or *actus intellegentiae*, for words are *positione*, not *naturaliter*; would not the agent intellect invent words which are universally "the same for all?" (b) If the concern is not for the invention of words, there is still no explanation as to why an event as momentous as the intervention of the agent intellect, which for Boethius seems to mean a renewed contact with the realm of *intellec-tibilia*, is required for the transition from a concept (one which can derive from *sense-perception*) in the mind of the person who already knows a language to the vocal expression of that concept. Boethius' silence leaves these issues very cloudy indeed, but we shall be giving him the benefit of the doubt by suggesting that the *actus-potestas* difference bears no special reference to the doctrine of the agent intellect.

A third avenue of enquiry concerns Boethius' use of the verb *explicare*. The most basic meanings of this verb are, 'to unfold' and 'to disentangle,' but both during and after the classical period it was frequently used to connote the giving of a verbal account, or breaking into speech.¹⁶³ We have seen it in several Boethian passages, for two of which the import remains uncertain. An occurrence at *Consolatio* IV.6,10 gives a sense that is more or less representative of Boethius' usage:

providentia namque cuncta pariter quamvis diversa quamvis infinita

¹⁶² II.137,12.

¹⁶³ E.g. Cicero, *Att.* X.6.1: meas cogitationes omnis explicavi tibi superioribus litteris (cf. Merguet's lexicon, and *OLD*, s.v. *explicare*, 8).

complectitur, fatum vero singula digerit in motum locis, formis ac temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in divinae mentis adunata prospectum providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio digesta atque explicata temporibus fatum vocetur.¹⁶⁴

The verb is used in this instance to illustrate the movements of fate, which distributes, unfolds, spins out or makes discursive what is unifiedly present to the eternal knowledge of divine providence. If this passage sheds any light upon the use of the same verb in the context of the theory of signification, then it should be possible to conclude that *oratio* spins out, or makes discursive the concepts which are unifiedly present in the *primitus in mente fundata passio*. Passages in Cicero suggest that there may be some Stoic influence. They concern the “unfolding” of *notiones*:

Off. III.19.76: si qui voluerit animi sui *complicatam* notionem *evolvere*,

Tusc. IV.24.53: notionem nostram, quam habemus omnes . . . tectam atque involutam,

Acad. I.8.32: scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus; qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam ἐτυμολογίαν appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari volebant; denique tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est orationis ratione conclusae; huic quasi ex altera parte *oratio vis dicendi* adhibebatur, *explicatrix orationis perpetuae* ad persuadendum accommodatae.

The third text above is of interest because of the association of *oratio*, *vis* (= *potestas*) and *explicatrix* (note also the use of *nota* = σύμβολον). Cicero is paraphrasing the Logic of Antiochus, the Stoicizing dogmatist of the “Old” Academy,¹⁶⁵ but unfortunately what he says about him here does not throw special light on the Boethian passage. It is tempting to speculate that *explicare* is a translation of διαρθροῦν, or perhaps of ἀναπτύσσειν or ἐξελίσσειν.¹⁶⁶ Chrysippus is said to have spoken of the ἐννοιαὶ as ἐνέργειαί, which may indicate a Stoic provenance for Boethius’ use of *actus*, if *intellectus* and *passio* are somehow akin to Cicero’s *notio*.¹⁶⁷ In a Senecan epistle is found a rather interesting use of the verb *explicare*:

omnium honestarum rerum semina animi gerunt, quae admonitione

¹⁶⁴ For further comparison: II.m7,10; II.8,2; III.7,4; III.12,7; IV.2,5; IV.6,1 (= *evolvere*); IV.6.15.

¹⁶⁵ In general, J. Gucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen, 1978): Hypomnemata 56, pp. 81–83. Cf. also Cicero, *ND* III.24.62; *Div.* II.63.130.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Plato, *Prt.* 322a6; Aristotle, *HA* 535a31; *PA* 660a22.

¹⁶⁷ *SVF* II.841. Cf. Cicero, *Acad.* II.10.30; *Tusc.* I.24.57.

excitantur non aliter quam scintilla flatu levi adiuta ignem suum *explicat*; erigitur virtus cum tacta est et impulsā. praeterea quaedam sunt quidem in animo, sed parum prompta, quae incipiunt in expedito esse cum dicta sunt¹⁶⁸

This similarity in diction, however, proves of little help, for Seneca's concern is the clarity that comes when the voice expresses what is in the mind, whereas Boethius' is the clarity achieved within the mind *before* speaking aloud. In fact *Consolatio* III.m11,11–12 seems consciously to borrow the Senecan formulation of words:

haeret profecto *semen* introrsum veri / quod *excitatur* ventilante doctrina,

but, as the context indicates, the bearing of Boethius' lines is Platonic rather than Stoic.¹⁶⁹ We must conclude, as it appears, that Boethius' diction comprises an amalgam of ideas and terminology which depends upon no specifically identifiable source. If *explicare* betrays any Stoic influence at all, then the possibility lies open that by *actus* Boethius means an automatic production¹⁷⁰ of words as learned in accordance with the dictates of convention;¹⁷¹ that is, a translation into a linguistic medium of those things which are contained in the *passio-intellectus* (? = ἐννοια), either as from perception or from memory. This interpretation is of course based upon speculation, but it may be that Boethius has adopted the Ciceronian terminology with some dim awareness of its Stoic antecedents. Before continuing we should note some of the other terms in Boethius' exposition which may be of Stoic origins: *comprehendit* (*In Perih.* II.35,8) and *perceptio* (II.34,5) may derive from the Stoic κατάληψις (cf. Cicero, *Acad.* II.6.17; 10.31); *agnoscit* (II.35,6) is perhaps related to συγκατάθεσις (= *adsensio*, *Acad.* II.12.37), as *contendit* (II.34,2) to ὁρμή (= *adpetitio*, *Acad.* II.8.24); *passio* and *inpressio* (II.34,13f.) will have come from πάθος and τύπωσις;¹⁷² finally, when Boethius translates φαντασία as *visum* (*In Isag.* I.25,10f.), he is probably following Cicero (*Acad.* I.11.40f.; above, n. 31).

¹⁶⁸ *Ep.* 94.29.

¹⁶⁹ On the theory of Recollection, cf. above, p. 133. One may compare Plato, *Mn.* 85c9 (stirring up or "winnowing" truths from the slave-boy = *ventilante doctrina*). Note also the use of *scintilla* at *CPh.* III.12,25 (cf. Plato, *Rpb.* 435a1–2): sed visne rationes ipsas invicem collidamus? forsitan ex huius modi conflictatione pulchra quaedam veritatis scintilla dissiliat. *Conflictatio* apparently refers to elenchus or dialectic, the means of "winnowing" doctrines from the soul that has forgotten.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. DL VII.49: προηγείται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἴθ' ἡ διάνοια ἐκλαλητικὴ ὑπάρχουσα, δὲ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ; Sextus Empiricus, *AM* VIII.70: λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον. Cf. "Longinus," *De Subl.* XV.1.

¹⁷¹ Sextus, *AM* VIII.275–76; *SVF* II.83.

¹⁷² Cf. Sextus, *PH* II.70; *AM* VII.162; 228–31; 293; 372–77; VIII.400; DL VII.45–46; 50.

A final possibility is that Boethius has in mind Augustine's theory of *intima verba*. Compare, for example, *De Trinitate* XV.15.25 (II.499,54):

sed quomodo est verbum quod nondum in cogitationis visione formatum est? quomodo erit simile scientiae de qua nascitur si eius non habet formam et ideo iam vocatur verbum quia potest habere? tale est enim ac si dicatur ideo iam vocandum esse verbum quia potest esse verbum.

sed quid est quod potest esse verbum et ideo iam dignum est verbi nomine? quid est, inquam, hoc formabile nondumque formatum nisi quiddam mentis nostrae quod hac atque hac volubili quadam motione iactamus cum a nobis nunc hoc, nunc illud sicut inventum fuerit vel occurrerit cogitatur? et tunc fit verum verbum quando illud quod nos dixi volubili motione iactare ad id quod scimus pervenit atque inde formatur eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens ut quomodo res quaeque scitur sic etiam cogitur, id est sine voce, sine cogitatione vocis quae profecto alicuius linguae est sic in corde dicatur.

Augustine has just pointed out the difference between *scientia* and *cogitatio*: *scientia* is always present to the mind, but *cogitatio* is present only when *scientia* is expressed in a *verbum*. The human *verbum* differs from the divine in not being *sempiternum* and coequal to *scientia* (in God, thinking and knowing are identical). But Augustine has also explained that the *possibilitas* (*scientia*) from which *cogitatio* comes into being gives to the human *verbum* a certain "perpetuity." That is, it is always *possible* for us to think what we know, even if we are not actually thinking it at the time. Thus *scientia* is a *verbum formabile, nondumque formatum* until it is elicited from within in the form of a (non-linguistic) *verbum formatum* or *cogitatio*. Two considerations set this view apart from that of Boethius: (a) Augustine visualizes the *verbum* as generated solely from within and describes the inner "search" that brings *scientia* into *cogitatio*, whereas Boethius seems to describe a more complex process in which external stimulation of the faculties of sensation can prompt a concept which in turn triggers the inner word(s);¹⁷³ (b) Augustine speaks of *scientia* that is a *verbum formabile* (cf. *dicibile*), whereas Boethius speaks of *oratio* that is *cogitabilis*. The adjectives reveal the different orientations of the two views.

What may we conclude concerning Boethius' *cogitabilis oratio*? How do "the same" *intellectus* produce different *voces*? In his commentary, Boethius is bound to defend Aristotle's assertion that the *animae passiones* (*intellectus*) are universally "the same for all." His first tetrad, however, is divided between that which is *naturaliter* (*res, intellectus*) and that which

¹⁷³ Of course, not all concepts derive from sense-perception, but Boethius does not explain what happens in the mind when we articulate a word for the mental image of a chimaera, as opposed to that of a horse which is actually perceived. The theory is vitiated by a lack of clarity here.

is *positione* (*vox, litterae*). *Sensus* and *imaginatio* he associates with the former.¹⁷⁴ How is the transition made from one side of the first tetrad to the other? The direction of his thinking seems to be as follows. The inner pronouncements of *intellectus* are to be associated with the addition of clarity or precision to the confused *imaginationes*. These mental images, which are formed in the passive intellect, are indeed “the same for all,” and in that sense Boethius is true to Aristotle’s doctrine: cognition ascends from a common sensible world, to the lower faculties of the soul (*sensus, imaginatio*), and beyond (*similitudo, animae passio, intellectus*). In the *orandi ordo*, *intellectus* is the element most closely situated to *vox*—for it alone is verbal rather than visual—, and so it is *intellectus*, not *sensus* or *imaginatio*, that is signified by *vox*. From this we may infer that Boethius thinks of the movement across the first *ordo* as including the change from what is irrational and potential to what is rational and actual, or, that he thinks of the passive intellect as having a latent (*primitus in mente*) capacity to “speak” conventional languages such as Greek and Latin, and of there being some process of activation that immediately (*protinus*) translates the mental picture into “words”. So when actualization occurs, the mind articulates a word, or words, of the sort that can then be pronounced out loud. Many words are possible for “the same” *res* or *imaginatio* (*equus, ἵππος*, etc.), but for each society the possibilities are limited to the *verba posita*. The inner locution is evidently not translinguistic, and the passive mind is not linguistic at all.

This interpretation complements what Boethius says concerning the reception of words in the mind of the *audiens* (second triad), for whom the order of events is the reverse of that for the *dicens*, but not altogether different from it. The *audiens* speaks or articulates in his mind the same words as those uttered by the *dicens*, which are, of course, the words of conventional languages such as Latin and Greek. Herein lies the strongest indication that the inner speech is not to be compared to Augustine’s theory. Furthermore, Boethius holds that the *intellectus* is part of a *cogitabilis oratio*, not of a *dicibilis cogitatio*, i.e., that it is the inner articulation of a word or words already in a known linguistic medium. For Boethius, *sensus, imaginatio, similitudo* and *animae passio* are indeed, as Aristotle says, “the same for all,” and therefore so too are *intellectus* “the same for all.” An *intellectus* considered *per se*, however, is the completion of the preliminary apprehensions of *sensus* and *imaginatio*, not unlike the color added to a painter’s sketches, and in this respect it stands apart from the lower stages of cognition. The preliminary sketch (perception, imagination) that was able to

¹⁷⁴ *In Perih.* II.29,5: sic sensus atque imaginatio naturaliter in animae perceptione substernitur; cf. II.55,9: ut sensus, quoniam naturaliter sunt, idem apud omnes sunt.

be completed in different “colors” (words), is now fixed *in intellectu*. To speak of the “sameness” of *intellectus* is to speak with specific reference to the underlying *potestas* of the lower cognitive levels, not with reference to the words by means of which *intellectus* are either signified or understood. This view is also consistent with the process of actualization running across the different levels of the first triad. For Boethius, a *res* can, and will, be known; an *imaginatio* can, and will, be articulated in the form of some *intellectus*; an *intellectus* can, and will, be spoken aloud.¹⁷⁵ The successive actualizations of the first tetrad bring us farther from nature, into the realm of convention: *res*-(*sensus*-*imaginatio*)-*intellectus*-*vox*-*litterae*.

That many pieces of the puzzle are missing is to be attributed to the facts that Boethius never translated and commented upon works such as the *Cratylus*, *Timaeus* and *De Anima*, and that what we have as a result are only his preliminary comments on a treatise about propositions, not the mind.¹⁷⁶ Had he accomplished the tasks he intended, many issues would not remain so obscure. The *Peri Hermeneias* commentary allows only limited speculation, but three points are now certain: (a) the Latin translation suppresses the potential ambiguities in Aristotle’s Greek (with the possible exception of *primorum*, 16a6) in accordance with the theory Boethius already intends to expound; (b) Boethius conceives of the theory of signification in terms of the movement across the (triadic) *orandi ordo*, in which *intellectus*, and all of the activities and faculties of cognition implicit therein, hold middle position for both *dicens* and *audiens*: a *vox* immediately signifies an *intellectus*, and mediately signifies a *res*; (c) in the

¹⁷⁵ In explicating the doctrine of the discourse of the World Soul (*Tim.* 37), Proclus introduces an extraordinary image, comparing soul to the Hydra uttering at once and in all tongues the causes of things (*In Tim.* II.305,14): τοιοῦτον δεῖ νοεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς, ὅτι δὴ πᾶσαν ὑποστήσασα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ζωὴν μίαν οὖσαν καὶ ποικίλην, ὅσον ζῶον πολυκέφαλον κατὰ πάσας φθεγγόμενον τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ πῇ μὲν Ἑλληνικὴν, πῇ δὲ βάρβαρον φωνὴν ἀφιέν, πάντων περιέχει τῶν γιγνομένων τὰς αἰτίας, τὰ μὲν καθ’ ἑκάστα τοῖς καθόλου, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ταῖς οὐσίαις, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις γινώσκουσα, πάντα δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ θεῖον ἀπλῶς; cf. generally II.308,18: ὁ γὰρ ἐνδον λόγος τούτων οὐδὲν δεῖται παντελῶς, ἀλλ’ ὁ προφορικὸς ὥσει ἔλεγεν, ὅτι πάσης τῆς εἰς τὸ ἔξω φερομένης ἐνεργείας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἔχει κίνησιν τελειοτέραν· ὁ γὰρ φθόγγος καὶ ὁ ἦχος τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινήσεων εἰληπταὶ σύμβολα. φερόμενος δ’ οὖν ὁ ἐνδον λόγος, ἅτε ἡνίοχος ὢν καὶ κινῶν τῶν κύκλων ἐκάτερον, διττὰς ἀποτελεῖ γνώσεις ἐν ἡμῖν, ἃς ἐφεξῆς ὁ Πλάτων παραδίδωσιν. Plotinus speaks of Intellect “saying many things in one word” (V.3.13.28): εἶρηκε μὴ ῥήσει πολλά. As to whether Boethius knew Proclus’ commentary, see F. Klingner, *De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae* (Berlin, 1921; rpt. Zürich-Dublin, 1966): *Philologische Untersuchungen* 27, p. 38ff.; but cf. Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, II.701–05; Obertello, *Severino Boezio*, I.507ff.

¹⁷⁶ Boethius promises to fill the gap (*In Perih.* II.501,11): nam sicut in voce adfirmatio et negatio est, ita quoque etiam in opinione, cum ipse animus in cogitatione sua aliquid adfirmat aut quid negat, quod nos alio loco diligentius expediemus. As at II.251,8–15 (cf. above, p. 61, n. 41), Boethius may here be referring to the *Introductio*. If so, the promise remains unfulfilled, for the *Introductio* does not add anything of importance concerning the affirmations and denials that are in the mind.

actus-potestas distinction, the background to which is difficult to recover, lies the key to the question of how mental pictures which are “the same for all” are translated into words which, both within and outside of the mind, are not “the same for all.” The act-potency distinction evidently requires some explanation in light of what Boethius says concerning the concatenation of elements in the first triad.

AFTERWORD

Boethius' view of the soul and of its descent into this world is, as we have seen, clearly that of a Neoplatonist. The soul exercises its greatest freedom when it contemplates the divine *intellectibilia*, but suffers the restraints of necessity when it falls into the sublunary world of matter, and then into a body. In so doing, the soul turns its gaze from the light of the highest truth to lower things,¹ and thus it remains in this life for it to reascend. Now while for centuries the final book of the *Consolatio* has been discussed in light of its defense of free choice of the will in a providentially ordered cosmos, an important perplexity it poses in the course of that defense seems generally to have been ignored. The first question suggested by the foregoing discussions is: Can the gulf between *ratio* and *intellegentia* be bridged from the side only of human beings, or is an intervention from above, what Boethius refers to as *divina gratia*, necessary? The second question we must ask is, whether *intellegentia* in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries is to be understood as precisely the same thing as *intellegentia* in the *Consolatio*.

To begin with the first question. The "consolation" of the fifth book is at moments disturbingly ambiguous. At V.4,2, for example, Philosophia cites as the cause (*cuius caliginis causa*) of human ignorance concerning providence the inability of *ratiocinatio* (= *ratio*, cf. V.5,5; 8; IV.6,17) to approach the simplicity of the divine *intellegentia*. Shortly thereafter, her point is clarified. A common error arises, as she explains, in thinking (*cuius erroris causa*, V.4,24) that knowledge is to be measured according to the natures of objects known instead of according to the powers of the beings that exercise knowledge. The lower powers, she will argue, cannot attain to the higher, but the higher subsume the lower. Then comes her fourfold division of cognitive faculties, the *scala cognitionis*: (a) *sensus* knows the *figura in subiecta materia* and cannot attain to the level of (b) *imaginatio*; *imaginatio* perceives the shape of an object as apart from matter, but cannot attain to the level of (c) *ratio*; *ratio* grasps form (*speciem-que ipsam*, V.4,29) that is both immanent in individuals and universal, but not the Form (*ipsam illam simplicem formam*, V.4,30) which is accessible to no other faculty (*quae nulli alii nota esse poterat*, V.4,32) except (d) *intellegentia*. *Ratio*, according to her explanation, is capable of formulating universal definitions such as, "man is a rational, mortal, animal;" but it is clear from what she has already said in earlier sections of the dialogue

¹ *CPh.* V.2,8–10.

that this level of thought is characteristic of an intellect that is somehow fettered.² That in book 1 Boethius (the Boethius of the *mise en scène*) relied upon definitions of this sort was, Philosophia observed, the mark of his lingering weakness and oblivion of his true origin. When questioned as to his knowledge of his own nature, “Boethius” could do no more than to offer the *logical* definition, “rational, mortal, animal.” This response served as the beginning of Philosophia’s diagnosis of his illness: he had for the moment ceased to “know himself.”

When she presents the four faculties in ascending order for a second time, however, a certain ambiguity results in her mode of exposition. Only *sensus* (*sensus enim solus*), she says, is accessible to vegetative, stationary life; (? only) *imaginatio* pertains (? only) to appetitive existence (but it subsumes at the same time the powers of *sensus*); *ratio*, she continues, belongs only to human beings (*humani tantum generis*, i.e., to nothing lower), and only *intellegentia* belongs to the divine (*sicut intellegentia sola divini*).³ A subtle change in expression has taken place: reason belongs *only* to mortal beings—but *only* intelligence belongs to the divine, just as *only* sense-perception (and imagination; i.e., nothing higher) belongs to the lower levels of life. The transference of *sola* in the case of *intellegentia* is clear,⁴ for the argument requires, and subsequently states, that each level in the hierarchy encompasses the powers of those below it.⁵ For it is not that intelligence is incapable of grasping things sensibly, imaginatively and rationally or that it is limited in its powers, but that it transcends these levels by “seeing” intuitively. So Philosophia means that the lowest beings exercise sense-perception but nothing higher, and that those at the second level exercise both imagination and sense-perception but nothing higher, while *only* God exercises intelligence and everything below it. *Intellegentia sola divini* must therefore mean, *intellegentia solius divini*. The expression as it appears in Bieler’s text takes on rather greater significance when viewed

² I.6,15–17; V.4,35.

³ V.5,3–4.

⁴ Cf. Bieler’s app. cr., p. 100, ad loc. 17; Vergil, *Aen.* VI.268: *ibant obscuri sola sub nocte*.

⁵ V.4,32: *sed intellegentia quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat, sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat, comprehendit. nam et rationis universum et imaginationis figuram et materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens.* Fortescue (*De cons. ph.*, p. 150, ad loc. 19) comments upon an apparent discrepancy between V.4,2 and V.4,32–33. He thinks that at V.4,29 Boethius concedes *intellegentia* to man, only to deny it later (v. V.4,32; V.5,4). However, he evidently misinterprets V.4,27, by construing *ipsum quoque hominem* as an internal accusative (“and in the case of man,” etc.). *Homo*, however, is introduced by Philosophia as an *object* of cognition (cf. V.4,35: *haec [sc. ratio] est enim quae conceptionis suae universale ita definit: homo est animal bipes rationale*).

in light of the ambiguity in what is said about *ratio*: *only* human beings (comparing the levels below) have *ratio*. Is that to say that mortals have *only ratio*?—Certainly not, for it has been argued that the possession of *ratio* brings *imaginatio* and *sensus* as well (cf. V.5,7). Then do they have or partake of *intellegentia*? Had Philosophia said, as in the case of *sensus* (and even in the case of *intellegentia*, should we ignore for the moment the transference of *sola*), that *only ratio* (i.e., not *intellegentia*) belongs to the level of life specifically associated with it, we might have concluded that our question had already been answered—and then been left to ponder the rather gloomy implications of that answer. However, she does not say so, and therein lies “Boethius’” hope and Philosophia’s consolation.

V.5,5–12 is again suggestive of the problem now under consideration, but in a slightly different manner. Should *sensus*, Philosophia says, attempt to assume for itself the power of *imaginatio*, it must inevitably fail, just as *imaginatio* would fail with respect to the power of *ratio*. And should *ratio* essay the divine *intellegentia*, it must inevitably fall into the error of thinking (e.g.) that all things foreseen by providence are therefore compelled to come into existence. She then continues:

si igitur uti rationis participes sumus ita divinae iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem sensumque rationi cedere oportere iudicavimus sic divinae sese menti humanam summittere rationem iustissimum censeremus. quare in illius summae intellegentiae cacumen si possumus erigamur; illic enim ratio videbit quod in se non potest intueri . . .⁶

We do, as she says, have *ratio*; but now her use of the unfulfilled protasis (*si . . . possemus*) suggests that we are deprived of the divine *mens* (= *divina intellegentia*). Why then the subsequent exhortation (*si possumus erigamur*) to both herself and her interlocutor? Is not even Philosophia participant in the divine intelligence?⁷

⁶ V.5,11–12.

⁷ Klingner (*De Boeth. Cons. Ph.*, pp.113–16) thought that Philosophia “*eas partes gerit quas in sacris illis dialogis angelus dei sive deus*,” finding similarities in the Hermetic Poimandres, but denying any resemblance to Plato’s Diotima. Courcelle (*La consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire: antécédents et postérité de Boèce* [Paris, 1967], pp. 21–23), however, was correct in pointing out that she is not a symbol of pure Nous. Compare, for example, the implicit distinctions made at I.4,8 (*tu mihi et qui te sapientium mentibus inseruit deus*) and IV.1,2 (*cum sui speculatione divina tum tuis rationibus invicta*). Philosophia may very well be a daemonic figure such as those that were believed to appear in dreams and to convey wisdom from the gods to mortals. Calcidius’ Latin (*In Tim.* 254) coincidentally draws attention to an especially significant parallel in the dream Socrates has in prison (Plato, *Crito* 44a10–b2). *Consolatio* V.m3 (25: *igitur quisquis vera requirit / neutro est habitu; nam neque novit / nec penitus tamen omnia nescit, / sed quam retinens meminit summam / consulit alle visa retractans, / ut servatis queat oblitus / addere partes*) portrays the philosophical endeavor as midway between knowledge and ignorance, which is consonant with Plato’s account of Eros (*Symp.* 201e–04c), both daemon and philosopher, who conveys human prayers upward and divine commands downward.

Her status, as “Boethius” observed upon her arrival (I.1,1–2), is indeed difficult to ascertain, for although she appears more than human, she is not infinitely so: one moment she is of human height, while the next she penetrates the very heavens. “Boethius” is made to refer to her as *praeuia luminis* (IV.1,2) rather than *lumen*, and she herself investigates the divine only *quantum fas est* (V.6,1), leaving the deepest questions to the *divini speculator* (V.6,25) who evidently will pass beyond the limits of the deductive arguments (many of which are hypothetical in nature, being based upon untested axioms and *porismata*, cf. III.10,22) that are utilized throughout the course of the dialogue. She too prays for ascent (III.m9,22) and will only conjecture (*puto*, IV.4,23) about the punishments after death. Furthermore, she declines to speak “as though a god” (IV.6,53–54). Nevertheless, her exhortation (V.m5,14) to raise the intellect *in sublime* leaves little doubt but that she has some direct knowledge of that of which she sings, and that the ascent she proposes lies open to humans as well. It also suggests that the *πέλασις* may not be a rational or *philosophical* experience as such. Is there any indication as to how the ascent is to be initiated?

An answer to this question must be sought in book 5 itself. The horns of the dilemma disturbing “Boethius” are the two sides on one of which necessity must fall: on that of human actions, or on that of providence.⁸ The time-worn (at least after Carneades) dilemmas concerning providence, free will and the practical consequences of determinism are raised by “Boethius” and later answered by Philosophia in a carefully ordered sequence. If divine providence thinks that that will inevitably occur which could equally well not occur, then it will be deceived. If, on the other hand, like Horace’s mocking Teiresias (V.3,25) it sees only that something may or may not occur, it has no knowledge at all, but only a kind of opinion. But if (as must be the case) divine providence is *not* deceived about things future, then those same things must necessarily occur just as foreseen. “Boethius” lodges three complaints (V.3,28–34): (a) thus (*quare*) there will be no freedom of choice; (b) and so (*quo semel recepto*) there will be a complete collapse of human institutions, of systems that reward virtue and punish vice, and God himself will prove the sole cause of evil; and (c) therefore (*igitur*) hope and prayer will be rendered empty, for what could we hope for, or pray either to occur or to be averted otherwise than as

⁸ V.3,8. In fact, these are not Philosophia’s alternatives, but those which “Boethius” will have received from the traditional formulation of the problem. As we have seen, Philosophia is made to propose two questions: (a) Is divine foreknowledge a *sign* of that which is to come? (b) Does such a sign enjoin any necessity upon the things which it signifies as yet to be? And “Boethius” himself rejects the argument from *ordo causarum*.

foreordained? There will be no intercourse (*commercium, colloqui*) between divine and human, and we shall waste away, cut off from the *inaccessa lux*. When, at the end of the colloquy, all problems have been solved according to the doctrine of the “two necessities,” Philosophia responds to these same complaints, preserving now the precise order in which they were originally stated. Divine foreknowledge sees things future, she says, but without thereby enjoining any necessity upon them; thus it sees our future actions as freely chosen ones. She continues (V.6,44–47): (a) therefore (*quae cum ita sint*) there is free choice of the will, and (b) the laws, rewards and punishments established by mortals are not only meaningful, but are presided over by the Judge who sees all things; (c) and so (*igitur*) we must cultivate virtue, shun vice, and place our prayers and hopes in God, for they are not in vain.

Already Boethius had worked out many of the details of this argument, in the third book of his second *Peri Hermeneias* commentary.⁹ In both discussions there is, however, the suggestion that some aspect of the problem either is being, or has so far been, passed over. The context of the observation in the commentary provides no hint as to the *lacuna*:

cuncti autem divinae providentiae subiecti ex illa quoque divinorum voluntate pendemus. itaque nec caelestium necessitas tota subruitur nec casum disputatio haec de rebus eliminat et liberum firmat arbitrium. sed haec maiora sunt quam ut nunc digne pertractari queant.¹⁰

In the *Consolatio* Philosophia is apparently given a backward reference to the omissions left by her interlocutor’s earlier disquisition:

vetus . . . haec est de providentia querela M.que Tullio cum divinationem †distribuit† vehementer agitata tibi que ipsi res diu prorsus multumque quaesita, sed haudquaquam ab ullo vestrum hactenus satis diligenter ac firmiter expedita.¹¹

A comparison of the two treatments reveals that “Boethius” and Philosophia’s brief references to prayer are the point hitherto neglected, but now to be attended to. Moreover, the very placement of these two references in the order of “Boethius” complaints, and then of Philosophia’s replies, indicates the importance of the subject of prayer to the whole discussion. “Boethius” seems to be saying: “Not only might one be led to conclude, on the assumption that divine providence cannot be deceived,

⁹ Cf., for example, the following correspondences between the two treatments: *In Perih.* II.194,8–15; II.220,10–21,10; II.222,27–23,9; II.224,23–26; II.225,9–21; II.230,10–15; II.241,1–42,9; *CPh.* V.1,13–17; V.2,3–4; V.3,4–6; V.3,22–32; V.6,27–31.

¹⁰ *In Perih.* II.232,6.

¹¹ *CPh.* V.4,1.

that freedom of choice and human institutions are thereby destroyed, but also—what is far more important—that belief in this absolute, divine providence threatens to remove the one means by which humans communicate with *intellegentia* or God, that is, prayer.” Philosophia will reply: “There is divine foreknowledge, but it does not remove freedom of choice. And if there is freedom of choice, then institutions that reward and punish are not rendered vain. *However*, we must still know how to exercise the freedom, and for that, it is necessary to cultivate virtue and direct our prayers upward.”

What is the substance of this concern? The Neoplatonist knows that control over or true satisfaction with one’s material existence is highly illusory. And although there may be comfort in knowing that tyranny will not go unpunished (nor virtue unrewarded) in the life hereafter, that does not prevent there being tyranny in the first place. The only part of our condition which is not subject to the will of others more powerful than ourselves is that which pertains to the activities of the soul and intellect (cf. Plotinus, VI.8.6), and it is in this connection that Philosophia’s consolation is made to depend upon the issue of prayer. So long as access to the divine intelligence is preserved for mortals there is cause for hope, and the rest of her argument will stand, for it is ultimately in accordance with the activities of the mind that we must measure our freedom and hence our salvation. Prayer will be the key.

It would be going too far afield to investigate the sources of these references, especially since they provide no very sure direction for the enquiry. *Commercium* may be an allusion to a fifth-century antiphon, while *iusta humilitas* and *divina gratia* (V.3,34) are suggestive of a Christian provenance.¹²

¹² R.-J. Hesbert, ed. *Corpus Antiphonalium Officii* III (Rome, 1968), p. 362, no. 3985: O admirabile commercium! Creator generis humani, animatum corpus sumens, de virgine nasci dignatus est; et procedens homo sine semine, largitus est nobis suam deitatem. This antiphon was originally drawn to my attention by the late Rev. Osmund Lewry, but I have since learned that Christine Mohrmann has noticed the same similarity: “Some Remarks of the Language of Boethius’ *Consolatio Philosophiae*,” in, *Latin Script and Letters, AD 400–900: Festschrift Presented to Ludwig Bieler on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday*, edd. J.J. O’Meara and B. Naumann (Leiden, 1976), p. 57, rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, *Boethius*, pp. 305–06. Chadwick (*Boethius*, p. 251) remains dubious. If in fact the antiphon was in Boethius’ mind when he composed the phrases, then *et procedens homo sine semine, largitus est nobis suam deitatem* will allay suspicions that *CPh.* III.10,24–25 (*omnis igitur beatus deus*) is a sign of apostasy. On grace, v. Klingner, *De Boeth. Cons. Ph.*, p. 101; Gruber, *Kommentar*, p. 392 (ad loc. V.3,34). Among Christian Neoplatonists, prayer was a matter of great concern. One thinks not only of Origen’s treatise on the subject, but of Clement (e.g. *Str.* VII.7 = *PG* 9.453a–69a), and of Augustine (*Mag.* I.2; *Sol.* I.1.2–6; *Trin.* XV.28.51), to cite only a few examples. It is also possible, however, that *iusta* (*humilitas*) and *gratia* echo pagan Neoplatonic sources, in which similar expressions can be found: Porphyry, *Phil. ex Or.* (= Augustine, *Civ. Dei.* XIX.23 [II.397,16]): nam Deus quidem, utpote omnium Pater, nullius indiget; sed nobis est bene, cum eum per iustitiam et

But pagan Neoplatonists too stress the role of prayer in the initiation of the soul's ascent back up to the divine.¹³ Proclus speaks of imitating the theoretical energy of the gods through hymns,¹⁴ and of prayer as a form of converse with, and as a means of joining the words of the supplicant

castitatem aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. inquisitio enim purgat, inquit; imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando; Plotinus, VI.7.22.6: ἐφετὸν δὲ γίνεται ἐπιχρῶσαντος αὐτὸ τοῦ αγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ χάριτας δόντος αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐφιέμενα ἔρωτας. The notion of grace is not unknown to pagan Neoplatonists; but it is perhaps significant that there is no trace of the influence of theurgy upon what Boethius says in the passages under consideration. Since the Neoplatonic interpretations of prayer is a topic of deep complexity, and since these are only concluding reflections on how Boethius may have conceived of prayer in connection with intelligence, I have endeavored to provide only the most general observations, rather than to enter into a subject which lies outside the scope of this study.

¹³ E.g. Plotinus, V.1.6.10; V.8.9.11–14. Porphyry, ap. Proclus, *In Tim.* I.207,21: Δεῖ δὴ οὖν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἡμᾶς περὶ εὐχῆς τι γινῶναι σαφές, τίς τε ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς καὶ τίς ἡ τελειότης, καὶ πόθεν ἐνδίδοται ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος δι-
 ορισόμενος, τίνες μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν προσήκαντο τὴν εὐχὴν, τίνες δὲ οὐ, περὶ ἡγαγεν ἡμᾶς ἐπ' ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας δόξας λέγων, ὡς συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὔτε οἱ τὴν πρώτην ἀθεότητα νοσήσαντες προσποιοῦνται τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς εὐχῆς ὠφέλειαν, οἱ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι λέγοντες θεοὺς, οὔτε οἱ τὴν δευτέραν, ὅσοι τὴν πρόνοιαν ἄρδην ἀνατρέπουσι θεοὺς εἶναι διδόντες, οὐθ' οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς συγχωροῦντες, ἅπαντα δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι· τῶν γὰρ ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως γίνεσθαι μὴ ὄντων ἀναιρεῖται τὸ τῆς εὐχῆς ὄφελος· ὅσοι δὲ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν φασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ πολλὰ τῶν γιγνομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὗτοι καὶ τὰς εὐχὰς εἰκότως παραδέχονται καὶ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀνορθοῦν ὁμολογοῦσι. καὶ δὴ καὶ προστίθουσιν, ὅτι τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ εὐχὴ μάλιστα προσήκει, διότι συναφὴ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἐστὶ, τῷ δὲ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὁμοιον συνάπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος ὁμοιότατος, καὶ διότι ἐν φρουρᾷ ὄντες οἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντεχόμενοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὡς δεσμοκτῆρην συνειλημμένοι δεῖσθαι τῶν θεῶν ὀφείλουσι περὶ τῆς ἐντεῦθεν μεταστάσεως, καὶ ὅτι ὡς παῖδας πατέρων ἀποσπασθέντας εὐχεσθαι προσήκει περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινούς ἡμῶν πατέρας, τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐπ' ἀνόδου, καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτορές τινες ἄρα καὶ ἀμήτορες ἔοικασιν εἶναι οἱ μὴ ἀξιοῦντες εὐχεσθαι μὴδὲ ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς τοὺς κρείττους, καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔξθεσιν οἱ σοφῶς διενεγκόντες περὶ εὐχὰς ἐσπούδασαν, Ἰνδῶν μὲν Βραχμᾶνες, Μάγοι δὲ Περσῶν, Ἑλλήνων δὲ οἱ θεολογικώτατοι, οἱ καὶ τελετὰς κατεστήσαντο καὶ μυστήρια· Χαλδαῖοι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο θεῖον ἐθεράπευσαν καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν θεῶν θεὸν εἰπόντες ἐσέφθησαν, πολλοὺ δέοντες διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπερφρονεῖν τῆς ἱερᾶς θρησκείας, etc. The latter is interesting, since Porphyry evidently holds that belief in the efficacy of prayer is not inconsistent with belief in a divine providence which presides over a world in which contingent and freely chosen events do occur. Proclus presents Porphyry's *historia* in terms not unlike those of Boethius' discussion: there are those who deny not only prayer but the gods themselves; there are those who believe in the gods but deny divine providence; there are those who accept both the gods and divine providence, but argue that all things happen of divinely ordained necessity. If, Porphyry argues, there are no contingent occurrences, then the benefit of prayer is obviously destroyed; but those who allow for both providence and contingent occurrences in generated things rightly allow also for the corrective power of prayer, which is a form of contact with the divine. J. Dillon has attempted to reconstruct Iamblichus' discussion (*In Tim.*) of prayer as interpreted by Proclus: ed., trans. and comm., *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973): *Philosophia Antiqua* 23, pp. 296; 407–11.

¹⁴ *In Tim.* I.197,6: εἰ γὰρ τι φωνῆς ὄφελος ἀνθρώποις, εἰς ὕμνους αὐτῇ χρηστέον. καὶ ἄλλως ἐπειδὴ θεωρίας καὶ πράξεως ἡ θεὸς αἰτία, διὰ μὲν τῆς θυσίας μιμούμεθα τὴν πρακτικὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ὕμνου τὴν θεωρητικὴν.

to, the divine.¹⁵ He also makes reference to the Porphyrian triad of faith, truth and love, to which both he and Porphyry add hope. *Philosophia*, on the other hand, mentions only *spes precesque* (V.3,33–34; V.6,46–48).¹⁶ Whether or not in *Consolatio* V Boethius writes specifically as a Christian is for the moment unimportant, for in itself the belief in the efficacy of prayer is not sufficient to separate him from pagan Neoplatonists. What must be noted is that the references to prayer implicitly secure once and for all the possibility of some form of contact between human *ratio* and divine *intellegentia*, even if they leave it unexplained. The profoundly Neoplatonic orientation of the *Consolatio*, however, suggests that *actus intellegentiae* there means something quite different from what is intended in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentaries, where the concern is of decidedly narrower compass. In the case of the *Consolatio*, as also in the case of the first *Isagoge* commentary, we think in terms of the soul's ascent to the world of the *intellecabilia*, in terms even of the inherent (or so Boethius believes) shortcomings in the Stoic theories of psychology (*CPh.* V.m4), but not in terms of *intellegentia* as one of the mechanisms involved in the soul's production of meaningful, articulated spoken sounds in accordance with the inner mental images and the dictates of convention. The *intellegentia* which for Boethius the Peripatetic commentator plays so significant a role in the communications of daily life, is for Boethius the Neoplatonist something augustly remote, but nevertheless attainable by means of petition in prayer, and by the intervention of grace. *Hactenus haec.*

¹⁵ In *Tim.* I.209,3: οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀθέων ἀνθρώπων ὁ λόγος τῷ Πλάτῳ νῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ σωφρονούντων καὶ θεοῖς προσομιλεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδὲ περὶ ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ ἔργα τῆς οἰότητος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σῶζεσθαι δυναμένων ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ ὅλα σφζόντων παραδίδωσι δὲ τὴν τε δύναμιν τῆς εὐχῆς καὶ τὴν τελειότητα θαυμαστὴν τινα καὶ ὑπερφυῆ καὶ πᾶσαν ὑπεραίρουσαν ἐλπίδα; I.211,2: τῶν θεῶν τὴν εὐποιαν ἔλκουσα εἰς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἐνοῦσα μὲν τοὺς εὐχομένους ἐκείνοις, πρὸς οὓς εὐχονται, συνάπτουσα δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν θεῶν νοῦν πρὸς τοὺς τῶν εὐχομένων λόγους, κινουσα δὲ τὴν βούλησιν τῶν τελείως τὰ ἀγαθὰ περιεχόντων ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφθονον αὐτῶν μετάδοσιν, πειθοῦς τε οὕσα τῆς θείας δημιουργοῦ καὶ ὅλα τὰ ἡμέτερα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐνιδρύουσα.

¹⁶ (Proclus) In *Tim.* I.212,19 (n.b. the echo of Plotinus, V.1.6.11): καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῶν θεῶν ἔργων ἀσάλευτον φυλάττειν ἀρετὰς τε ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως καθαρτικὰς καὶ ἀναγωγοὺς προβεβλήσθαι καὶ πίστιν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἔρωτα, ταύτην ἐκείνην τὴν τριάδα, καὶ ἐλπίδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀτρεπτόν τε ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θείου φωτὸς καὶ ἔκστασιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἵνα μόνος τις τῷ θεῷ μόνῳ συνῇ καὶ μὴ μετὰ πλήθους τῷ ἐνὶ συνάπτειν ἑαυτὸν ἔγχειρῃ; Porphyry, *Ad Marc.* 23–24 (289,12–18).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ackrill, J.L., trans. and comm., *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*. Oxford, 1963.
- Alston, Wm. P., "Meaning." *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. V, pp. 233–41. Ed. P. Edwards. NY-London, 1967.
- Apostle, H.G., trans. and comm., *Aristotle's Categories and On Propositions (De Interpretatione)*. Grinnell, 1980.
- Arens, H., *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition: Texts from 500 to 1750*. Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1984. *ASTH* 29.
- Barnes, J., "Boethius and the Study of Logic," in Gibson, ed., *Boethius*, pp. 73–89.
- Belardi, W., *Il Linguaggio nella Filosofia di Aristotele*. Rome, 1975.
- Bellemare, P., "Symbole: fondements anthropobiologiques de la doctrine aristotélicienne du langage." *Philosophiques* 9, 1982, 265–79.
- Berka, K., "Die Semantik des Boethius." *Helikon* 8, 1968, 454–59.
- Bidez, J., "Boèce et Porphyre." *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 2, 1923, 189–201; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, *Boethius*, pp. 133–45.
- Blumenthal, H.J., "Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima Commentaries." *Phronesis* 21, 1976, 64–87.
- *Plotinus' Psychology*. The Hague, 1971.
- "The Psychology of (?) Simplicius' Commentary on the De Anima," in Blumenthal-Lloyd, ed., *Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism*, pp. 73–93.
- Blumenthal, H.J. and Lloyd, A.C., ed., *Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius*. Liverpool, 1982.
- Bonitz, H., *Index Aristotelicus*. Berlin, 1870.
- Brandt, R., *Die aristotelische Urteilslehre; Untersuchungen zur "Hermeneutik."* Diss. Marburg, 1965.
- Brandt, S., "Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von Boethius." *Philologus* 62, 1903, 141–54.
- Chadwick, H., *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy*. Oxford, 1981.
- Cherniss, H., *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I*. Baltimore, 1944.
- Colli, G., trans. and comm., *Aristotele: Organon*. Turin, 1955.
- Conybeare, F.C., ed., *A Collation with the Ancient Armenian Versions of the Greek Text of Aristotle's Categories, De Interpretatione, De Mundo, De Virtutibus et Vitiis and of Porphyry's Introduction*. Oxford, 1892. *Anecdota Oxoniensia* 6.
- Cooke, H.P., and Tredennick, H., trans., *Aristotle: The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*. Cambridge, Mass., 1938.
- Corcoran, J., ed., *Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972*. Dordrecht-Boston, 1974. *Synthese Historical Library* 9.
- Courcelle, P., *La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire: antécédents et postérité de Boèce*. Paris, 1967.
- *Les lettres grecques en occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore*. 2nd ed. Paris, 1948. Trans. H.E. Wedeck, *Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources*. Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
- De Lacy, P.H. and E.A., ed., trans. and comm., *Philodemus: On Methods of Inference: A Study in Ancient Empiricism*. 2nd ed. Naples, 1978.
- Denniston, J.D., *The Greek Particles*. 2nd ed. Oxford, 1954.
- Denniston, J.D., and Page, D., ed. and comm., *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. Oxford, 1957.
- De Rijk, L.M., "Boèce logicien et philosophe: ses positions sémantiques et sa métaphysique de l'être," in Obertello, ed., *Atti: Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani*, pp. 141–56.
- "On Boethius' Notion of Being: A Chapter of Boethian Semantics," in Kretzmann, ed., *Meaning and Inference*, pp. 1–29.

- "On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic." *Vivarium* 2, 1964, 1–49; 125–62.
- "Quaestio de Ideis. Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism," in Mansfeld-De Rijk, ed., *Kephalaion*, pp. 204–13.
- Di Cesare, D., *La Semantica nella Filosofia Greca*. Rome, 1980. Biblioteca di Cultura 186.
- Dillon, J.M., ed., trans. and comm., *Iamblichus Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentarium Fragmenta*. Leiden, 1973. *Philosophia Antiqua* 23.
- *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220*. London, 1977.
- Edghill, E.M., trans., *Categoriae and De Interpretatione*. Oxford, 1926.
- Fortescue, A., ed. and comm., *Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae libri quinque*. London, 1925; rpt. Hildesheim-NY, 1976.
- Fraenkel, E., ed., trans. and comm., *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. 3 vols. Oxford, 1950.
- Furlani, G., "Aristoteles, de interpretatione, 16a, 6–7, nach einem syrisch erhaltenen Kommentar." *Zeitschrift für Semiotik und verwandte Gebiete* 1, 1922, 34–37.
- Fuhrmann, M., and Gruber, J., ed., *Boethius*. Darmstadt, 1984. Wege der Forschung 483.
- Gersh, S., *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*. 2 vols. Notre Dame, 1986.
- Gibson, M., ed., *Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence*. Oxford, 1981.
- Glöckner, H., ed., *Stufen des Bewußtseins: Vorlesungen zur Erkenntnislehre*. Cologne, 1965.
- Glucker, J., *Antiochus and the Late Academy*. Göttingen, 1978. *Hypomnemata* 56.
- Gohlke, P., trans. and comm., *Aristoteles: Kategorien und Hermeneutik*. Paderborn, 1951.
- Graeser, A., "The Stoic Theory of Meaning," in Rist, ed., *The Stoics*, pp. 77–100.
- Gruber, J., *Kommentar zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae*. Berlin-NY, 1978. Texte und Kommentare 9.
- Gyekye, K., "Aristotle on Language and Meaning." *International Philosophical Quarterly* 14, 1974, 71–77.
- Hadot, I., "La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le commentaire sur le manuel d'Epictète," in Blumenthal-Lloyd, ed., *Soul and the Structure of Being*, pp. 46–70.
- Hadot, P., *Porphyre et Victorinus*. 2 vols. Paris, 1968.
- "Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les Catégories d'Aristote dans le Codex Bernensis 363." *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 26, 1959, 11–27.
- Hamelin, O., *La théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs*. Paris, 1953.
- Häring, N.M., ed., *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*. Toronto, 1966. *Studies and Texts* 13.
- Hesbert, R.-J., ed., *Corpus Antiphonarium Officii*. Vol. 3. Rome, 1968.
- Hicks, R.D., ed., trans. and comm., *Aristotle: De Anima*. Cambridge, 1907; rpt. Salem, 1988.
- Hirschle, M., *Sprachphilosophie und Namenmagie im Neuplatonismus. Mit einem Exkurs zu "Demokrit" B 142*. Meisenheim am Glan, 1979. Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 96.
- Hoffmann, J.G.E., *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristoteleis*. Leipzig, 1873.
- Hunt, R.W., "Studies on Priscian II," in idem, *Collected Papers on the History of Grammar in the Middle Ages*. Ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall. Amsterdam, 1980. *ASTH* 5.
- Irwin, T.H., "Aristotle's Concept of Signification," in Schofield-Nussbaum, ed., *Language and Logos*, pp. 241–66.
- Isaac, J., *Le Peri Hermeneias en occident de Boèce à St. Thomas: Histoire littéraire d'un traité d'Aristote*. Paris, 1953.
- Jackson, B.D., trans. and comm., *Augustine: De Dialectica*. Dordrecht-Boston, 1975. Synthese Historical Library 16.
- "The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*." *Revue des études augustiniennes* 15, 1969, 9–49; rpt. in Markus, ed. *Augustine*, pp. 92–147.
- Joachim, H.H., ed. and comm., *Aristotle: On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away (De Generatione et Corruptione)*. Oxford, 1922.
- Jones, R.M., "The Ideas as the Thoughts of God." *Classical Philology* 21, 1926, 317–26; rpt. in idem, *The Platonism of Plutarch*.

- *The Platonism of Plutarch*. Menasha, 1916; rpt. with selected papers, ed. L. Tarán, NY-London, 1980.
- Kelly, J.N.D., *Early Christian Creeds*. 3rd ed. NY-London, 1972.
- Kirkby, H., "The Scholar and His Public," in Gibson, ed., *Boethius*, pp. 44–72.
- Klingner, F., *De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae*. Berlin, 1921; rpt. Zürich-Dublin, 1966. *Philologische Untersuchungen* 27.
- Kneale, Wm. and M., *The Development of Logic*. Oxford, 1962.
- Kretzmann, N., "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention," in Corcoran, ed., *Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations*, pp. 3–21.
- Ed., *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*. Norwell, 1988.
- "Semantics, History of." *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. VII, pp. 359–406. Ed. P. Edwards. NY-London, 1967.
- Kurfess, H., *Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der aristotelischen Lehre vom sogenannten NOYΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ und ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ*. Diss. Tübingen, 1911.
- Larkin, M.T., *Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle*. The Hague-Paris, 1971. *Janua Linguarum* 87.
- Lee, T.-S., *Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike*. Göttingen, 1984. *Hypomnemata* 79.
- Lewis, C.S., *The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature*. Cambridge, 1964.
- Long, A.A., *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*. 2nd ed. Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1986.
- Lucio, M.L., *Aristotelis Organum, Graece et Latine, Commentario Analytico et Paraphrastico*. Basel, 1619.
- Magee, J., "The Boethian Wheels of Fortune and Fate." *Mediaeval Studies* 49, 1987, 524–33.
- Mansfeld, J. and De Rijk, L.M., edd., *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C.J. De Vogel*. Assen, 1975.
- Markus, R.A., ed., *Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Garden City, 1972.
- "St. Augustine on Signs." *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 60–83; rpt. in idem, ed., *Augustine*, pp. 61–91.
- Martin, J., ed., *Scholia in Aratum Vetera*. Stuttgart, 1974.
- Mates, B., *Stoic Logic*. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1953.
- McKeon, R., "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of Language." *Classical Philology* 41, 1946, 193–206.
- McKinlay, A.P., "Stylistic Tests and the Chronology of the Work of Boethius." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 18, 1907, 123–56.
- Meiser, C., "Des Boetius Übersetzung der aristotelischen Schrift ΠΕΡΙ 'ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ." *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, 117, 1878, 247–53.
- Merguet, H., *Lexikon zu den philosophischen Schriften Cicero's mit Angabe sämtlicher Stellen*. 3 vols. Jena, 1887; rpt. Hildesheim, 1961.
- Merlan, P., *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness*. The Hague, 1963.
- Mohrmann, C., "Some Remarks on the Language of Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*," in O'Meara-Naumann, edd., *Latin Script and Letters, AD 400–900*, pp. 54–61; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, edd., *Boethius*, pp. 302–10.
- Montanari, E., *La Sezione Linguistica del Peri Hermeneias di Aristotele*. 2 vols. Florence, 1984/88. *Studi e Testi* 5/8.
- Morau, P., *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu: Le dialogue "Sur la justice"*. Louvain-Paris, 1957.
- *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*. Paris-Liege, 1942.
- *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*. 2 vols. Vol. 1: *Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh. v. Chr.* Berlin-NY, 1973. Vol. 2: *Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr.* Berlin-NY, 1984. *Peripatoi* 5/6.
- Müri, W., "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ. Wort- und Sachgeschichtliche Studie." *Beilage zum Jahresbericht über das Städtische Gymnasium in Bern* 1–3, 1931, p. 1ff.; rpt. in idem, *Griechische Studien: Ausgewählte Wort- und Sachgeschichtliche Forschungen zur Antike*. Ed. E. Vischer. Basel, 1976, pp. 1–44. *Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft* 15.

- Niphus, A., ed. and comm., *Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ, Hoc Est, de Interpretatione Liber*. Venice, 1555.
- Nuchelmans, G., *Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity*. Amsterdam-London, 1973.
- Obertello, L., *Severino Boezio*. 2 vols. Genoa, 1974.
- Ed., *Atti: Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani Pavia, 5–8 Ottobre 1980*. Rome, 1981.
- Oesterle, J.T., trans., *Aristotle: On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Peri Hermeneias)*. Milwaukee, 1962.
- O'Meara, J.J. and Naumann, B., ed., *Latin Script and Letters, AD 400–900: Festschrift Presented to Ludwig Bieler on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday*. Leiden, 1976.
- Owen, O.F., trans. and comm., *The Organon or Logical Treatises of Aristotle, with the Introduction of Porphyry*. 2 vols. London, 1908/10.
- Owens, J., *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics": A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*. 3rd ed. Toronto, 1978.
- Pacius, J., ed., *Aristotelis Peripateticorum Principis Organum*. Basel, 1566; rpt. Hildesheim, 1967.
- Pépin, J., "ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ, ΣΗΜΕΙΑ, ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑΤΑ. A propos de De interpretatione I, 16a3–8 et Politique VIII 5, 1340a6–39," in Wiesner, ed., *Aristoteles und seine Schule*, pp. 22–44.
- Pfeiffer, R., *History of Classical Scholarship I: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age*. Oxford, 1968.
- Pfligersdorffer, G., "Zu Boëthius, De Interpr. Ed. Sec. I, p. 4, 4sq. Meiser nebst Beobachtungen zur Geschichte der Dialektik bei den Römern." *Wiener Studien* 66, 1953, 131–54.
- Pozzi, L., ed., trans. and comm., *Boezio: Trattato sulla Divisione*. Padua, 1969.
- Ralfs, G., "Die Erkenntnislehre des Boethius," in Glöckner, ed., *Stufen des Bewusstseins*, pp. 211–31; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, ed., *Boethius*, pp. 350–74.
- Reid, J.S., ed. and comm., *M. Tulli Ciceronis Academica*. London, 1885; rpt. Hildesheim, 1966.
- Righi, G., *A.M.S. Boezio: "De Syllogismo Cathgorico:" Studio sul I Libro*. Milan, 1984.
- Riondato, E., *La Teoria Aristotelica dell' Enunciazione*. Padua, 1957.
- Rist, J.M., ed., *The Stoics*. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1978.
- Rodier, G., ed., trans. and comm., *Aristote: Traité de l'âme*. 2 vols. Paris, 1900.
- Ross, W.D., ed. and comm., *Aristotle: De Anima*. Oxford, 1961.
- Ed. and comm., *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. 2 vols. Oxford, 1924.
- Ed. and comm., *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*. Oxford, 1949.
- Runia, D.T., *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*. Leiden, 1986. *Philosophia Antiqua* 44.
- Saint-Hilaire, J.B., trans. and comm., *Logique d'Aristote*. 4 vols. Paris, 1839–44.
- Scheible, H., *Die Gedichte in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*. Heidelberg, 1972. *Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften n.s.* 46.
- Schmidt-Kohl, V., *Die Neuplatonische Seelenlehre in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*. Meisenheim am Glan, 1965. *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 16.
- Schofield, M. and Nussbaum, M.C., ed., *Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L. Owen*. Cambridge, 1982.
- Shiel, J., "A Recent Discovery: Boethius' Notes on the *Prior Analytics*." *Vivarium* 20, 1982, 128–39.
- "Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes." *Vigiliae Christianae* 11, 1957, 179–85.
- "Boethius and Eudemos." *Vivarium* 12, 1974, 14–17.
- "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle." *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4, 1958, 217–44; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, ed., *Boethius*, pp. 155–83.
- Review of Chadwick. *Catholic Historical Review* 70, 1984, 117–18.
- "The Greek Copy of Porphyrios' Isagoge Used by Boethius," in Wiesner, ed., *Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben*, pp. 312–40.
- Shipp, G.P., *NΟΜΟΣ "Law"*. Sydney, 1978. *The Australian Academy of the Humanities* 4.

- Smith, A., *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism*. The Hague, 1974.
- Solmsen, F., "Boethius and the History of the 'Organon'." *American Journal of Philology* 65, 1944, 69–74; rpt. in Fuhrmann-Gruber, ed., *Boethius*, pp. 127–33.
- Steinthal, H., *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik*. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1890/91; rpt. Hildesheim, 1961.
- Striker, G., "Epicurus on the Truth of Sense Impressions." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 59, 1977, 125–42.
- Sullivan, M. W., *Apuleian Logic: The Nature, Sources and Influence of Apuleius's Peri Hermeneias*. Amsterdam, 1967.
- Tarân, L., ed., *Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Codex Parisinus Graecus 2064)*. Meisenheim am Glan, 1978. Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 95.
- Review of Mignucci. *Gnomon* 45, 1973, 749–56.
- Review of Moraux. *Gnomon* 53, 1981, 721–50.
- *Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary*. Leiden, 1981. *Philosophia Antiqua* 39.
- Torstrik, A., ed. and comm., *Aristotelis De Anima Libri III*. Berlin, 1862; rpt. Hildesheim-NY, 1970.
- Trendelenburg, F. A., ed. and comm., *Aristotelis de Anima Libri Tres*. 2nd ed. Berlin, 1877.
- Tricot, J., trans. and comm., *Aristote: Organon*. 6 vols. Paris, 1936–39; 2nd ed. vol. 1, Paris, 1959.
- Usener, H., review of Meiser. *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1, 1880, 370.
- Vancourt, R., *Les derniers commentateurs alexandrins d'Aristote: L'école d'Olympiodore, Étienne d'Alexandrie*. Lille, 1941.
- Van de Vyver, A., "Les étapes du développement philosophique du haut moyen-âge." *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 8, 1929, 425–52.
- Van Straaten, M., "On Plotinus IV, 7 [2], 8³," in Mansfeld-De Rijk, ed., *Kephalaion*, pp. 164–70.
- Waitz, T., ed. and comm., *Aristotelis Organon Graece*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1844/46.
- West, M. L., ed., *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati*. 2 vols. Oxford, 1971.
- Westerink, L. G., ed. and trans., *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*. Amsterdam, 1962.
- Wiesner, J., ed., *Aristoteles und seine Schule*. Berlin-NY, 1985. Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung 1.
- Ed., *Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben*. Berlin-NY, 1987. Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung 2.
- Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. NY, 1968.
- Wright, M. R., ed., trans. and comm., *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments*. New Haven, 1981.

INDEX LOCORUM

(No mention is made in this index of Aristotle, *Peri Hermeneias* I, 16a3–9, because the first two chapters deal specifically with that text, while the third and fourth chapters presuppose the discussions of chapters one and two.)

AESCHYLUS

Ag. 8, 144, 315: 40n.

ALBINUS

Ep. III: 15n.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

De An. 31,10ff.: 22n.; 81,17ff.: 127n.;
82,19ff.: 105n.; 84,3ff.: 99n.; 84,14ff.:
133n.; 84,17: 127n.; 88,24ff.: 129n.;
89,9ff.: 130n.

Mant. 102,29ff.: 22n., 27n.; 106,19ff.:
127n.; 108,19ff.: 133; 108,22: 130n.;
109,7: 130n.

(?) AMBROSE

Expl. Symb. 1155c: 56n.

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

XVIII.3.2: 56n.

AMMONIUS

In Cat. 9,17ff.: 16n.; 11,7ff.: 39n.; 12,1:
33n.; 57,11ff.: 119n.; 74,21ff.: 90n.;
75,14: 83n.; 76,25ff.: 90n.

In An. Pr. 10,36ff.: 16n.

In de Int. 1,6ff.: 54n.; 1,21ff.: 14n.; 4,5ff.:
14n.; 5,24ff.: 31n.; 6,5ff.: 109nn.; 6,19:
97n.; 6,21ff.: 110nn.; 8,24ff.: 26n.;
16,15ff.: 42n.; 17,17: 25, 28; 17,20ff.:
78n.; 17,20ff.: 14n., 16n.; 17,25: 23n.;
17,26ff.: 99n.; 18,6: 80n.; 18,23ff.: 69–
70nn.; 18,35: 80n.; 19,1ff.: 73n., 75n.;
19,18ff.: 68–69n.; 19,32ff.: 54; 22,11ff.:
42n.; 22,13ff.: 118n.; 22,27ff.: 38n.;
23,10ff.: 72n.; 24,5ff.: 25, 28&n., 44n.;
24,6ff.: 25, 27; 24,8f.: 23n., 27; 24,12ff.:
11n.; 24,18: 11n.; 25,27: 80n.; 25,31ff.:
32n.; 25,32: 97n., 110n.; 26,15: 110n.;
30,17ff.: 78n.; 31,14: 78n.; 54,27ff.:
119n.; 56,14ff.: 59n.; 153,13ff.: 60n.

In Isag. 10,13ff.: 133

ANAXAGORAS

fr. 19: 39n.

ARATUS

832 (scholium on): 39n.

ARISTOTLE

Cat. 1b25f.: 122n.; 2a4ff.: 122n.; 4b22ff.:
119n.; 4b36: 77n.; 6b3: 99n.; 6b35:
99n.; 7b22ff.: 83n.; 7b25ff.: 83n.; 8a11:
88; 9a3: 111n.; 9a16: 128n.; 10b1:
128n.; 14a26ff.: 21n.

De An. III.3–8: 31n.; III.4–5: 125–26;
III.5: 30, 128; III.8: 33, 47, 126;
402a7ff.: 110; 403a5ff.: 110; 403a8f.:
32n.; 405a7: 22; 407a32: 98n.; 413b2:
22; 414a13: 22; 414a31: 128n.;
415a14ff.: 89; 417a24ff.: 121; 418a5f.:
105n.; 418a10: 89; 420b29: 77n.;
420b31f.: 102; 420b32ff.: 80n.; 421b31:
23n.; 422b34: 23n.; 423b30: 27n.;
424a19: 101n.; 426a20ff.: 83; 427b14ff.:
115n.; 427b28ff.: 115n.; 428a1f.: 100n.;
428a3: 111n.; 428a29: 77n.; 428b1ff.:
111n.; 428b10ff.: 104n.; 429a4: 100n.;
429a13ff.: 32n., 127; 429a15ff.: 36n.,
105n.; 429a27ff.: 20n., 133n.; 429b24f.:
32n.; 429b31: 125; 430a1: 101n., 127n.;
430a12: 129; 430a15ff.: 111n., 125–26,
133n.; 430a23ff.: 109, 129; 430b4ff.:
36n.; 431b2: 109; 432a1ff.: 125;
432a9ff.: 30–34&nn., 96–97, 108–11;
432a13: 33, 108–09, 113; 432a28:
128n.; 433a10: 32n.; 434a5ff.: 103n.

De Mem. 451a14ff.: 104n.

De Somn. 458b15: 115n.; 462a27ff.:
115n.

Div. per Somn. 462b26f.: 61n.

EE 1239b31: 40n.

fr. 87[76] (= *De Iustitia*): 96

- GA* 722b11: 39n.; 736b27f.: 133; 764b17: 39n.; 786b21: 80n. [ARISTOTLE]
Physiog. 805a5ff.: 57n.
- GC* 324a10ff.: 105n.; 331a24: 40n.; 332a32: 40n. AUGUSTINE, ST
Civ. Dei VII.14: 92n.; IX.22: 86n.; XIII.3, XIV.26: 77n.; XIX.23: 147–48n.
- HA* 535a31: 136n.
- Meta.* 1010b10ff.: 115n.; 1013a29ff.: 80n.; 1018b9ff.: 21n.; 1026a13ff.: 15n.; 1028a30f.: 23n.; 1029a15: 27n.; 1031b32ff.: 125n.; 1032a1: 77n.; 1032b9ff.: 80n.; 1035b25: 27n.; 1035b43ff.: 124n.; 1040b32ff.: 79n.; 1044a32ff.: 80n.; 1047a24ff.: 91n.; 1051b23ff.: 113n.; 1070b33f.: 80n.; 1072b13ff.: 130n.; 1072b21: 113n.; 1074b1ff.: 131n.; 1087a15ff.: 121n. *Conf.* II.3.8: 77n.; XI.5.7: 86n.; XI.18.24: 61n.; XII.17.25: 80n.
- Meteor.* 360a26: 40n. *De Mus.* VI.5.9: 133n.
- NE* 1133a30f.: 38n. *De Dialectica* V: 48n.
- PA* 660a22: 136n. *Div. Quaest.* q. 46: 86n.
- PAn.* 71b16ff.: 57n.; 76b24ff.: 45, 118n.; 100a6ff.: 121n. *Doct. Xr.* II.3.4: 39n.; II.25.39: 39n.
- PeriH.* ch. XIV: 5; 16a9ff.: 109; 16a10: 107n.; 16a11: 30n.; 16a13ff.: 7, 32–33, 47; 16a19: 42n.–43; 16a26ff.: 38n.; 16a27ff.: 28n.; 16a28: 43n.; 16b7: 59n., 63; 16b10: 59n., 63; 16b20f.: 98n.; 16b22: 59n., 63; 16b33ff.: 43&n.; 19b2: 77n.; 21a32: 84n.; 22b39: 128n.; 23a32ff.: 45&n.; 24b1f.: 45&n. *Gen. ad Litt.* VI.5.8ff.: 87n.; VII.10.15: 131n.
- Phys.* 194b24ff.: 80n.; 194b29: 80nn.; 195a16ff.: 58n.; 260b16ff.: 21n. *Lib. Arb.* III.24.72: 133n.
- Poet.* 1454b19ff.: 40n.; 1462a6: 40n., 46n. *Mag.* I.2: 147n.
- Pol.* 1253a9ff.: 46n. *Serm. de Symb.*: 56n.
- PrAn.* 43a23: 128n.; 47a3: 128n.; 70a6ff.: 57–58nn.; 70b9ff.: 58n. *Serm.* 212: 57n.
- Rht.* 1357a24ff.: 57n.; 1383b30ff.: 40n.; 1386b2: 40n.; 1417b2f.: 40n., 46n. *Sol.* I.1.2ff.: 147n.
- Sens. et Sensib.* 437a13ff.: 38n. *Trin.* III.8.13ff.: 87n.; VII.4ff.: 52n.; IX.11.16: 86n.; XI.10.17: 103; XV.13.22: 86n.; XV.15.25: 138; XV.28.51: 147n.
- Sph. El.* 165a6ff.: 38n., 121; 167a1: 84n.; 170b14ff.: 107n. [AUGUSTINE]
Categoriae Decem 19: 71&n.
- Biblia Vulgata*
Prov. 23.21: 57n.
- BOETHIUS
CPh. I.1,1f.: 145; I.2,6: 131n.; I.4,3: 4; I.4,8: 133n., 144n.; I.4,17: 56n.; I.4,39: 131n.; I.6,15ff.: 131n., 143n.; II.1,15: 77n.; II.5,25/29: 131n.; II.6,13: 77n.; II.m7,10: 136n.; II.8,2: 136n.; III.2,2: 133n.; III.7,4: 136n.; III.m9,4ff.: 86n.; III.m9,19: 132n.; III.m9,21f.: 133n., 145; III.10,5: 133n.; III.10,7: 75n.; III.10,22ff.: 131n., 145, 147n.; III.11,40: 56n.; III.m11,4: 86n.; III.m11,11ff.: 137; III.m11,15ff.: 133; III.12,7: 136n.; III.12,25: 137n.; III.m12,1ff.:

- 71n.; IV.1,2: 144n.-45; IV.1,9: 132n.; IV.2,5: 136n.; IV.3,10: 131n.; IV.3,21: 131n.; IV.4,23: 145; IV.4,26, IV.4,37, IV.6,1: 58n., 136n.; IV.6,10ff.: 135-36; IV.6,12: 86n.; IV.6,17: 142; IV.6,53f.: 145; V.1,8: 62n.; V.1,13ff.: 146n.; V.2,3f.: 146n.; V.2,4ff.: 104n.; V.2,8ff.: 131n.; V.3,4ff.: 146n.; V.3,8: 145n.; V.3,22ff.: 146n.; V.3,25: 145; V.3,28ff.: 145; V.3,33ff.: 132n., 147, 149; V.m3, 12: 56n.; V.m3,25ff.: 144n.; V.4,1f.: 142-43n., 146n.; V.4,7ff.: 60; V.4,24ff.: 88n., 142; V.4,27: 143n.; V.4,28: 99n.; V.4,29: 143n.; V.4,30: 79n., 142; V.4,32f.: 142-43nn.; V.4,35: 131n., 143n.; V.4,37: 103-04n.; V.4,39ff.: 100&n., 129n.; V.m4,2: 101; V.m4,3f.: 99n.; V.m4,8: 56n.; V.m4,10ff.: 128; V.m4,14ff.: 129; V.m4,29: 56n., 71n.; V.m4,30ff.: 106; V.m4,36ff.: 133; V.5, 1ff.: 129; V.5,3f.: 104n., 143n.; V.5, 5ff.: 142, 144; V.5,8: 142; V.5,12: 132n.; V.m5,14: 145; V.6,1: 145; V.6,2: 75n.; V.6,25: 145; V.6,27ff.: 60n.; V.6, 27ff.: 146n.; V.6,44ff.: 146; V.6,46ff.: 149
- Div.* 875d: 95n.; 887a-b: 62n.
- Eut.* I.78,8ff.: 114n.; I.78,15f.: 63n.; I.78,26ff.: 106, 133n.; I.80,53ff.: 62n.; II.82,24ff.: 106n.; III.86ff.: 52n.; V.104,62: 56n.; VI.112,66ff.: 106n.
- Hebd.* 40,18: 75n.; 44,75ff.: 131n.
- Hyp. Syll.* I.4.3f.: 81n.
- In Cat.* 159c: 17n.; 160a-b: 89n.; 161b-c: 16-17n., 58n.; 162a-b: 4n., 122n.; 163c: 123n.; 164d: 62n.; 166a: 124n.; 173d: 128n.; 180c-d: 98n.; 108; 186d: 62n.; 203c-04a: 119n.; 204a: 117n.; 208b-c: 119n.; 229b-d: 84, 103n.; 230c: 66n.; 231b: 83n.; 233b-d: 88-89nn.; 252b: 17n.; 263a-c: 64n., 89n.; 264c: 101n.
- In Isag.* I.7,16ff.: 133n.; I.8,11f.: 132n.; I.8,13ff.: 15n., 130-31; I.8,16: 114n.; I.12,19ff.: 14n.; I.23,17: 66n.; I.24,5: 114n.; I.24,14: 99n.; I.25,4ff.: 103n.; I.25,8: 100n.; I.29,22ff.: 130n.; I.31, 10ff.: 101n.; I.33,2, I.34,12ff.: 66n.; I.37,22: 104n.; I.64,8: 66n.; I.84,7: 99n.; I.94,12, I.95,14ff.: 66n.; II.135, 8ff.: 51; II.136,7: 99n.; II.136,16ff.: 102-03, 128n.; II.137,4ff.: 134; II.137, 9: 99n.; II.137,12ff.: 135; II.138,17ff.: 77n., 122; II.142,6ff.: 15-16n.; II.147, 1: 61n.; II.159,4: 114n.; II.160,3f.: 114n.; II.164,7ff.: 103n.; II.165,1ff.: 130n.; II.166,14ff.: 129; II.167,7ff.: 87n.; II.178,15: 104n.; II.208,22ff.: 131n.; II.233,20ff.: 122; II.234,6f., II.276,15f.: 62nn.; II.282,19, II.283,1f.: 103n.
- In Perih.* I.3,9: 51n.; I.24,13ff.: 129-30n.; I.32,2f.: 64n.; I.32,14ff.: 15n.; I.33,21: 61n.; I.36,26: 51n.; I.36,28: 12n., 104n.; I.37,4ff.: 48n., 68; I.37, 8ff., I.37,13: 114n.; I.37,15ff.: 106, 114n., 127; I.37,19f.: 128; I.38,23f.: 115n.; I.39,12f.: 51n.; I.39,14: 12n.; I.39,17: 114n.; I.39,18: 51n.; I.37,19: 114n.; I.39,22ff.: 114nn.; I.40,7ff.: 12n., 104n.; I.40,13: 51n.; I.40,15ff.: 62n., 114n.; I.40,18ff.: 52n.; I.40,25ff.: 9n.; I.40,26ff.: 10n.-11, 50, 51n.; I.41,11ff.: 32n.; I.41,12ff.: 114n.; I.41, 17: 107n.; I.41,26: 114n.; I.42,1f.: 115n.; I.42,5ff.: 108n.; I.42,7ff.: 111; I.42,11f.: 115n.; I.42,14f.: 112n., 114n.; I.42,15ff.: 61n.; I.42,16f.: 111n.; I.42,17ff.: 114n.; I.42,20: 108n.; I.43,1: 114n.; I.43,16: 107n.; I.43,21: 114n.; I.44,1f.: 115n.; I.46,11f., I.47,18f.: 62n.; I.49,18: 102n.; I.43,20ff.: 108; I.49,17ff.: 82n.; I.50,6: 102n.; I.56, 15: 63; I.57,1f.: 63; I.63,8ff.: 119n.; I.63,16ff.: 115n.; I.64,14: 63; I.64, 22ff.: 59n.; I.64,25, I.65,5, I.65,7: 63; I.68,15ff.: 62n.; I.72,27ff.: 117n.; I.101, 11f.: 62n.; I.151,12: 61n.; I.151, 22: 61n.; I.166,6ff.: 84n.; I.223,6: 80; II.3,7f.: 65n.; II.4,3ff.: 65n.; II.4,5ff.: 54n.; II.4,18ff.: 80n.; II.4,27: 102n.; II.4,28ff.: 80; II.5,11ff.: 62n., 78n.; II.5,24: 102n.; II.5,29f.: 102n., 128n.; II.6,2: 102n.; II.6,7ff.: 15n.; II.6,18ff.: 62n.; II.7,4: 93n.; II.7,9ff.: 67n., 114n.; II.7,13f.: 114n.; II.7,18: 14n.; II.7,26f.: 71, 114n.; II.7,32: 114n.; II.8,5f.: 99n.; II.8,20ff.: 17n.; II.9,27: 101n.; II.11-13: 31n.; II.11,22f.: 114n.; II.12,19ff.: 17n.; II.12,28ff.: 105; II.14,30ff.: 15n.; II.15,32f.: 108n.; II.17,31ff.: 123n.; II.18,11ff.: 123n.; II.18,26: 4n.; II.20, 12ff.: 68; II.20,16ff.: 48n.; II.20,17ff.: 70, 114n.; II.20,24f.: 72; II.20,29ff.: 72; II.20,31: 85; II.21,7: 74; II.21,8ff.: 76;

II.21,15ff.: 79; II.21,19f.: 114n.; II.21,22ff.: 62n.; II.21,28ff.: 76–77, 85; II.21,31, II.22,4, II.22,8: 85&n.; II.22,9: 79; II.22,10f.: 90n.–91; II.22,16: 77; II.23,2ff.: 73n.; II.23,14ff.: 72n.; II.23,27ff.: 75; II.23,29: 128n.; II.24,11f.: 52n.; II.24,14ff.: 71; II.24,15ff.: 99; II.24,18: 100n.; II.24,19f.: 101n.; II.24,22ff.: 118n.; II.24,23ff.: 114n.; II.24,25f.: 114n., 119n.; II.25,1ff.: 73n.; II.25,10: 51n.; II.25,12: 12&n., 50, 104n.; II.25,15ff.: 14n., 93; II.25,22ff.: 93; II.26,1ff.: 94; II.26,9f.: 80; II.26,12f.: 94; II.26,14ff.: 95; II.26,16f.: 58n.; II.26,17ff.: 95; II.26,28: 79n.; II.27,5: 100n.; II.27,10f.: 96; II.27,12ff.: 96; II.27,17ff.: 99n., 107nn.; II.27,25ff.: 96–97; II.27,26: 100n.; II.28,1ff.: 32n., 126; II.28,6ff.: 100n.; II.28,9: 107n.; II.28,10: 108; II.28,11ff.: 100n.; II.28,12: 108; II.28,15ff.: 97–98, 114n.; II.28,18f.: 111n.; II.28,27: 100n.; II.28,28ff.: 99–100nn., 120n.; II.29,5ff.: 99n., 139n.; II.29,9f.: 116n., 121n.; II.29,13f.: 100n.; II.29,17ff.: 118n.; II.29,21f.: 114n.; II.30,10: 118–19nn.; II.30,20: 118n.; II.30,24: 114n.; II.30,30: 41n.; II.31,1ff.: 116n.; II.31,4ff.: 118; II.31,27ff.: 42n.; II.32,13ff.: 39n.; II.32,17ff.: 15n.; II.32,21: 114n.; II.32,31ff.: 102n.; II.33–41: 102; II.33,20: 102; II.33,27ff.: 16, 117; II.33,28: 52n.; II.33,31f.: 107n.; 114n.; II.33,33ff.: 107n., 116, 120; II.34,1: 114n.; II.34,2ff.: 100n., 120, 137; II.34,4ff.: 120, 137; II.34,6ff.: 81n.; 103n., 120, 128n.; II.34,13ff.: 100–01, 107n., 137; II.34,17f.: 63; II.34,23: 52n.; II.34,26f.: 107n.; II.35,2ff.: 104, 106, 115n., 128n.; II.35,6f.: 116n., 137; II.35,8: 137; II.35,19f.: 13; II.35,27f.: 114n.; II.35,28: 114n.; II.36,7f.: 59n.; II.36,10ff., II.36,17: 118nn.; II.37,10f.: 114nn.; II.37,22ff.: 73n.; II.37,25ff.: 81, 114n.; II.37,30f.: 9n., 13, 51–52nn.; II.38,2f.: 9n., 12&n.–13, 50; II.38,18: 51n.; II.39,1ff.: 114n.; II.39,3ff.: 51n.; II.39,9ff.: 10n.; II.39,16f.: 12n.–13; II.39,21ff.: 13; II.39,25f.: 9n., 13; II.39,31ff.: 11–12&nn., 50, 51n.; II.40,9ff.: 11n., 102; II.40,19: 114n.; II.40,22: 77n.; II.40,25: 12; II.40,28ff.: 51n.–52; II.41,3ff.: 124n.; II.41,7ff.: 52n.; II.41,9ff.: 80; II.41,13ff.: 73; II.42,15f.: 118n.; II.42,27f.: 74n.; II.42,28ff.: 73n.; II.43,6: 51n.; II.43,9ff.: 107;

II.43,11f.: 80, 102n.; II.43,19f.: 52n., 80; II.43,27: 107n.; II.44,9ff.: 80; II.44,14: 52n.; II.44,16ff.: 100n., 116n., 119n.; II.44,21f.: 108n.; II.44,25ff.: 116n.; II.44,31: 114n.; II.45,3f.: 108n.; II.45,6: 98n.; II.45,13: 108n.; II.45,32ff.: 102n.; 111; II.46,15ff.: 111–12; II.46,27ff.: 111; II.47,1ff.: 116n.; II.49,23ff.: 108n.; II.49,29f.: 114n.; II.50,18ff.: 63n.; II.51,7ff.: 112n.; II.52,18: 114n.; II.52,28: 61n.; II.53,29: 78n.; II.54,1: 61n.; II.54,5ff.: 78n.; II.54,12: 61n.; II.54,14: 62n.; II.54,26: 62n.; II.54,29: 62n.; II.55,9f.: 139n.; II.55,17: 99n.; II.56,9ff.: 61–62nn.; II.56,11: 62n.; II.64,22f.: 62n.; II.66,2, II.68,5, II.68,28, II.69,14, II.71,8: 63; II.71,13ff.: 101n.; II.72,14ff.: 119; II.73,1ff.: 119n.; II.73,20ff.: 77n.; II.74,20ff.: 123; II.75,17f.: 92n.; II.76,10ff.: 59n., 63; II.79,9ff.: 66n.; II.87,30: 4n.; II.94,11f.: 128n.; II.120,10: 61n.; II.136,23ff., II.139,18f.: 123n.; II.141,10: 61n.; II.153,10ff.: 124n.; II.160,23ff.: 130n.; II.172,13: 4n.; II.184,23: 64n.; II.185–250: 65; II.189,4: 64n.; II.192,9: 90n.; II.193,6ff.: 59; II.193,8f.: 64n., 77n.; II.194,8ff.: 146n.; II.196,15ff.: 103–04n.; II.201,2ff.: 101n.; II.217,20ff.: 61n.; II.220,10ff., II.222,27ff., II.224,23ff., II.225,9ff., II.230,10ff.: 146n.; II.231–32: 61n.; II.232,6ff.: 146; II.241: 60n.; II.241,1ff.: 146n.; II.251,8ff.: 61n., 140n.; II.261,27: 101n.; II.321,21: 4n.; II.324,15: 4n.; II.361,9: 54n.; II.375,23ff.: 84n.; II.421,3ff.: 65–66n.; II.421,5f.: 64n.; II.459,2f.: 131n.; II.501,11ff.: 61n., 140n.

Inst. Ar. (Friedlein) 9,28ff.: 131n.; 10,1ff., 12,14ff.: 86n.; 77,13: 71n.; 122,21ff.: 86n.; 125,25ff.: 87n.

In Top. Cic. 1047c: 101n.; 1085a: 56n.; 1111b: 56

Intr. Syll. Cat. 762c–d: 15n., 17n., 39n., 61n.; 766a–c: 15n., 61n.

Pat. 32,24ff.: 112n.

Syll. Cat. 794d: 17n.; 61n.; 796d–97a: 15n., 61n.; 803a–b: 128n.

Top. Diff. 1176c: 75n.; 1196c: 123n.

- Trin.* praef. 4,31f.: 86n.; II.8,5ff.: 15n.; II.12,51ff.: 102n.; IV.16–24: 112n.; VI.30,24ff.: 113n.; VI.30,26: 114n.
- CALCIDIUS
In Tim. 29: 87n.; 186: 61n.; 219: 131n.; 254: 144n.; 264: 15n.; 294: 87n.
- CASSIODORUS
Inst. II.3.18: 54n.
- Var.* I.45.3: 2n.
- CICERO
Acad. I.8.30: 100n.; I.8.32: 55n., 136; I.11.40ff.: 75n., 98n., 100n.; II.6.17f.: 100n.; 137; II.8.24: 137; II.9.29: 100n.; II.10.30ff.: 75n., 136n.–37; II.11,35f.: 55–56n., 71n.; II.12.37: 137; II.18.58, II.26.84: 56n.; II.32.103: 71n.; II.34, 111: 71n.
- Div.* I.56.127, II.21.47: 55n.
- Fat.* XI.23ff.: 58n.; XIX.44: 77n.
- Fin.* V.25.74: 55n.
- In Cat.* I.6.15: 77n.
- Inv.* I.30.48: 58n.
- Lgg.* I.8.24: 75n.
- ND* I.12.30, II.17.45: 75n.
- Off.* III.19.76: 136
- Rpb.* III.2.3: 55n.
- Top.* I.6: 101n.; VIII.35: 55
- Tusc.* I.13.30: 75n.; I.24.57: 75n., 136n.; II.15.35: 52n.; IV.24.53: 136
- CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
Str. VII.7: 147n.
- DEXIPPUS
In Cat. 6,13ff.: 55n.; 9,24ff.: 23n.; 11,4ff.: 39n.; 70,1ff.: 119n.
- DIOGENES LAERTIUS
VII.45ff.: 137n.; VII.49: 137n.; VII.58: 123n.
- DIONYSIUS THRAX
AG 25,3ff.: 39n.
- EMPEDOCLES
fr. 63: 39n.; fr. 109: 131n.
- ENNODIUS
V.Ep. 208c: 56n.
- EUSEBIUS
PE XV.22: 91n.
- FESTUS
Sign. Verb. 177: 39n.; 182f.: 56n.
- FERMICUS MATERNUS
Err. Prof. Relig. XVIII.1: 57n.
- GALEN
De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. III.8: 39n.
- HERODOTUS
7.128, 8.92: 40n.
- HOMER
Od. XXI.231, XXIII.73, 110, 206, 225, 273, XXIV.346: 40n.
- HORACE
AP 58f.: 39n.; 111: 92n.
- Epd.* II.37f.: 29n.
- ISADORE
Etym. II.24.7: 117n.
- JOHN OF SALISBURY
Metal. III.5: 48n.
- LUCRETIUS
I.136ff.: 52n.; VI.1149: 92n.
- (?) LONGINUS
De Subl. XV.1: 137n.
- Macrobius
In Somn. Sc. I.3.2: 100n.; I.6.20: 87n.; I.14.2: 131n.; I.17.12ff.: 131n.; II.12.5: 131n.
- MARCUS AURELIUS
VII.9, IX.9: 58n.
- Sat. I.18.17: 133n.

MARIUS VICTORINUS

Adv. Ar. IV.2.1: 132n.

Def. (PL 64) 901b-c: 56n.

OLYMPIODORUS

Proleg. et in Cat. 18,29ff.: 16n.

PARMENIDES

fr. 3: 131n.

PHILOPONUS (see also under Stephanus)

In de An. 27,21ff.: 110n.; 83,13ff.: 22n.;
235,27ff., 245,28f.: 22nn.; 298,6ff.: 105

PINDAR

Ol. 12.10: 40n.

PLATO

Crito 44a10ff.: 144n.

Crtl. 387aff.: 43n.; 407e: 92n.

Mn. 85c9: 137n.

Phd. 74a11f., 75c11ff., 78d2ff.: 79n.;
98d7: 80n.

Phlb. 16b2, 24d3, 27d8, 27e7, 28a6:
77n.; 38c-e: 118n.; 39b-c: 98n.;
67b11: 77n.

Prt. 322a6: 136n.

Sph. 259e: 95n.; 263eff.: 118n.

Symp. 191d4: 39-40nn.; 201eff.: 144n.;
211d3: 79n.

Rpb. 371b8: 38n.; 435a1f.: 137n.; 511d:
134n.

Thl. 182b3ff.: 83; 184bff.: 99n., 185c4:
128n.; 189ef.: 118n.; 191cf.: 101n.;
191d7: 40n.

Tim. 34af.: 131n.; 37: 140n.; 37b: 118n.;
40c9: 61n.; 68d4ff.: 129n.

PLAUTUS

Bacc. 263ff.: 57n.

Pseud. 55ff.: 57n.

PLINY THE ELDER

NH 33.4.10: 57n.

PLOTINUS

Enn. I.1.9.7, I.1.13.1, I.1.13.7f.: 132n.;
I.2.4.22ff.: 133n.; I.3.6: 16n.; I.4.7.45,
I.4.10.24, I.6.7.34: 77n.; I.8.8.13ff.,
I.8.15.18: 102n.; II.3.7.12: 59n.; II.4.5.
18ff.: 102n.; III.1.5.33ff., III.1.6.20ff.:
60n.; III.2.2.19: 87n.; III.6.3.27ff.:
129n.; III.7.4.11f.: 113; III.8.2.25:
77n.; III.8.8.8: 131n.; IV.3.8.13f.,
IV.3.27.2: 132n.; IV.4.38.22f.: 61n.;
IV.4.39.17ff.: 59n.; IV.6: 101n.;
IV.6.2: 129n.; IV.7.8³.18ff.: 91n.;
IV.8.5.16: 132; IV.8.5.25: 131n.; IV.8.
8.1ff.: 132n.; V.1.6.10f.: 148-49nn.;
V.3.2f.: 133-34nn.; V.3.3.36: 132n.;
V.3.13.28: 140n.; V.7: 123n.; V.8.9.
11ff.: 148n.; V.9.6.11: 87n.; V.9.7f.:
87n.; V.9.7.12ff.: 77n.; V.9.8: 90n.;
VI.1.5.2ff.: 119n.; VI.1.5.4ff.: 80n.;
VI.1.22.24ff.: 60n.; VI.4.14.16: 132n.;
VI.7.22.6f.: 148n.; VI.8.6: 147

PORPHYRY

Ad Marc. 23f.: 149n.

In Cat. 6,5f., 7,11ff.: 53n.; 56,2: 40n.;
57,2ff.: 39n.; 57,35ff.: 122n.; 64,28ff.:
118n.; 101,24ff.: 119n.; 101,26ff.:
118n.; 120,16: 83n.; 120,27ff.: 89-
90nn.; 120,33ff.: 85n.; 121,8ff.: 84n.;
121,17ff.: 88n.

Isag. 1,11: 107n., 114n.; 2,12: 104n.;
7,19ff.: 122n.; 11,4: 128n.

VPl. 20.80: 27n.

PROCLUS

Elements (props.) 153, 167: 131n.; 174:
86n.; 175, 183: 125, 183ff.: 131n.; 202:
131n.

In Rpb. I.170,21ff.: 87n.

In Tim. I.4,2ff.: 131n.; I.8,13ff.: 15n.;
I.197,6ff., I.207,21f.: 148nn.; I.209,
3ff.: 149n.; I.211,2ff., I.212,19ff.:
149n.; II.298,5ff.: 132n.; II.305,14ff.,
II.308, 18ff.: 140n.; III.165,7ff.: 125;
III.333, 25ff.: 132n.

PRUDENTIUS

PSt. IX.23: 56n.

PS. DIONYSIUS

Div. Nom. 816d, 869a, 872c: 87

QUINTILIAN

Inst. I.6.28: 56

RUFINUS OF AQUILEIA

Comm. in Symb. 337a: 56n.

SENECA

Ep. 65.2: 80n.; 65.12: 58n.; 94.29: 136–37

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

AM VII.162, VII.228ff.: 137n.; VII.233: 101; VII.293: 137n.; VII.367: 71n.; VII.372ff., VIII.70, VIII.275f., VIII.400: 137nn.

PH II.70: 137n.

SIMPLICIUS

In Cat. 13,11ff.: 16n.; 13,20f.: 33n.; 15,2ff.: 39n.; 131,27ff.: 119n.; 191,7ff., 192,15ff.: 83nn.; 194,20ff.: 90n.; 194,21f.: 85n.; 364,5: 89n.; 379,8: 89n.

In de An. 17,2ff.: 109n.; 104,32f.: 22n.; 119,3ff.: 127n.; 216,35ff.: 100n.; 219,39ff.: 126n.; 225,13ff.: 105; 231,21f.: 89; 236,18ff.: 133n.; 240,7ff.: 110n.; 240,11: 90n.; 243,27ff.: 110n.; 244,5ff.: 89–90nn., 126n.; 244,18ff.: 110n.; 247,3ff.: 129n.; 247,5f.: 110n.; 247,31ff.: 127n.; 248,2ff.: 109nn.; 273,5ff.: 134n.; 286,1ff.: 109n.; 286,2f.: 113n.; 290,32ff.: 103n.

SOPHOCLES

OT 221, 710, 1059: 40n.

SOPHONIAS

In de An. 117,19ff., 121,37ff., 125,15ff.: 134nn.

SPEUSIPPUS

fr. 76: 99

STEPHANUS

In de Int. 1,13ff.: 73n., 75n.; 1,23: 12n.; 5,1ff.: 72n.; 5,20ff.: 23n., 25, 70n.; 5,26: 28; 6,6ff.: 55n.

In de An. [Philoponus] 490,22f.: 109n.; 535,2ff.: 125n.; 539,3: 133n.; 569,29ff.: 113n.

SUETONIUS

Aug. 75, 94: 39n.

TERTULLIAN

Adv. M. V.1: 57n.

Adv. Prx. II.4: 52n.

Adv. V. (562a): 57n.

THEMISTIUS

In de An. 116,17: 33n.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST

In Peri H. Lects. II.13.3, II.15.5: 20; II.15.15: 29n.

VERGIL

Aen. VI.268: 143n.

Geor. II.490: 71n.

XENOCRATES

fr. 8: 99

XENOPHON

Ap. 13: 61n.

Cyr. 8.5.13: 40n.

INDEX NOMINUM ET RERUM (SELECTIVE)

Ancient and medieval authors are mentioned here only in those instances in which they are *not* mentioned in the Index Locorum, which the reader is therefore advised to consult for further information.

- Ackrill 19; 31n.; 36&n.
 Albinus 65&n.
 Alexander of Aphrodisias 1; 4; 7; 8n.; 9-14&nn.; 16; 21n.; 31n.; 49-50; 52-54; 74; 80; 93-95; 99; 124n.; 125n.-26; 129-30
 Alphabetic sounds and written marks, difference between 72n.
 Alston 19n.
 Ammonius 2-3; 5-6&n.; 8&n.; 10-11&n.; 14-17&nn.; 18n.; 28-29; 31&n.; 33; 38&n.; 48; 54&n.-55; 65; 88; 91. 96; 108&n.
 Andronicus of Rhodes 3-4; 31n.; 89n.; 97; 109-10&n.
 Antiochus of Ascalon 136
 Apostle 29n.; 34-35&n.
 Apuleius 66&n.
 Archilochus 40n.
 Arens 31&n.; 41; 43n.; 65; 67; 120n.
 Aretaeus 39n.
 Aristophanes of Byzantium 9
 Aristophanes Comicus 38; 40n.
 Armenian translation, of Aristotle, *PeriH.* 27&n.-28
 Aspasius 4; 54; 73-74&n.; 107
 Augustine, St 66; 91; 100
 Ps. Augustine 65n.
 Axiomata, Stoic 101n.
- Barnes 101n.
 Bekker 21
 Belardi 27n.; 31n.; 45
 Bellemare 41
 Berka 1n.; 69n.; 82n.
 Bieler 66n.; 71n.; 143&n.
 Bidez 61-62n.
 Blumenthal 22n.; 125-27nn.; 132n.; 134n.
 Boethus 16
 Bonitz 23; 38; 40nn.
 Brandt, R. 30-31nn.; 38n.; 44-45nn.
 Brandt, S. 64n.
 Busse 8n.; 25-28&nn.; 42n.
- Causation 53; 80-81
 Chadwick 64-66nn.; 74n.; 89n.; 131n.; 147n.
 Cherniss 107n.; 121&n.
 Chrysippus 101; 136
 Cicero 5; 56; 57n.; 63; 101
 Coinage 38-39n.
 Colli 21; 44-45
 Common conceptions, Stoic 75n.
 Condemnations, of Aristotle 126
 Conybeare 8n.; 26; 27n.; 105n.
 Cooke 21; 34
 Courcelle 2; 5; 31n.; 54&n.; 67n.; 144n.
 Creeds, Apostles' and "Old Roman" 56-57&n.
 Crossett 29; 38n.
- David, commentator 6n.
 Definition 19; 123
 Deification 131n.
 De Lacy 58n.
 Denniston 11n.; 40n.
 De Rijk 1n.; 48n.; 61&n.; 64; 79&n.; 82n.; 87n.; 90n.; 96; 113; 123n.
 Dexippus 53
 Di Cesare 30&n.
 Dillon 87n.; 148n.
 Diotima 144n.
 Distinctio formalis 123n.
 Duns Scotus 123n.
- Edghill 18-19&n.
 Elias 6n.
 Empedocles 39; 131n.
 Epicurus 71n.; 122
 Equivocity 10-11
 Eros 144n.
 Essence 20; 123
- Forma nativa 123n.
 Fortescue 131n.; 143n.
 Fraenkel 40n.
 Free choice of the will 60-61; 145-47
 Furlani 8n.; 28; 32n.
 Future contingents 59-61; 65; 145-47
- Catullus 57n.

- Galen 5
 Georgius 7; 25n.; 27-28
 Gersh 5; 133-34nn.; 140n.
 Gilbert of Poitiers 123n.
 Glareanus 52n.; 79n.
 Glucker 136n.
 Gohlke 31n.; 35n.
 Graeser 117n.
 Gruber 61n.; 88n.; 101; 131n.; 133n.; 147n.
 Gyekye 41n.

 Hadot, I. 133n.
 Hadot, P. 90n.; 132n.
 Hamelin 125-26nn.
 Hayduck 25; 28
 Herminus 4; 7; 9-14&nn.; 16; 49-50; 54; 74; 76; 93-95
 Hesbert 147n.
 Hicks 22&nn.; 32n.; 100n.; 104-05nn.; 108&n.; 126n.
 Hirschle 87nn.; 95n.
 Hoffmann 7; 8n.; 14n.; 25n.
 Horace 57n.; 145
 Hunt 48n.

 Iamblichus 4n.; 16; 54; 83; 88; 119n.
 Ideas 19; 79; 85-90; 95-96; 100; 113n.; 123n.; 133
 Illumination 129; 133&n.
 Imagination (phantasms) 33; 95-98; 100-03; 112-13; 115; 142-43
 Impositions, "first and second" 15n.; 39n.
 Intellect 109-10; 125-35; 142-49
 Intentio (σκόπος) 14n.
 Irwin 41n.
 Isaac 54n.; 66n.

 Jackson 116n.
 Joachim 40n.
 Jones 59n.; 87n.

 καταληπτική φαντασία, Stoic 100n.
 κατάληψις, Stoic 137
 Kelly 57n.
 κεφάλαια (didascalica) 67
 Kirkby 54n.
 Klingner 5; 140n.; 144n.; 147n.
 Kneale 99n.
 Knowledge, actual and potential 121-24
 Kretzmann 18nn.; 23; 26; 31n.; 32; 35n.; 36-48 pass; 118
 κριτήριο 100
 Kurfess 125n.

 Larkin 19-21; 29; 35; 46
 Lee 16n.
 λεκτόν, Stoic 99; 116
 Lewis 60-61n.
 Littig 31n.
 Livy 57n.
 Logic, tool or part of philosophy 15-16
 λόγος 117&n.
 Long 99n.
 Lucan 57n.
 Lucio 21&n.; 30&n.
 Lucretius 57n.; 71n.

 Magee 132n.
 Maier 7; 31n.
 Marinus 125
 Marius Victorinus 53-54; 66; 114n.; 132&n.
 Markus 117n.
 Martianus Capella 65
 Martius Novatus Renatus 64n.
 Mates 99n.
 McKeon 30&n.
 McKinlay 64n.
 Meiser 26&n.; 27n.; 50; 51n.; 53n.; 64; 77; 79; 116n.
 Mental impressions 10-11; 13; 21; 29; 31&nn.; 36-37; 42; 73-74; 105-107; 118
 Merguet 56n.
 Merlan 134&n.
 Migne 10n.; 79&n.; 95n.
 Minio-Paluello 8n.; 9n.; 11-12; 14; 23-26; 49-50; 51nn.; 65n.
 Modistae 48
 Mohrmann 147n.
 Montanari 8-9nn.; 11n.; 12; 16n.; 18; 24&n.; 27-28nn.; 31n.; 33n.; 34-35nn.; 41n.; 44-45nn.
 Moraux 16n.; 22n.; 31n.; 95-96nn.
 Muri 40-41&n.; 56n.

 Necessity, two kinds 60; 146
 Neoplatonic (-ism, -ists) 5; 89; 126-27; 130; 133n.; 142; 147-49&nn.
 Niphus 21&n.
 Nota 39n.; 56-57; 63; 71n.; 136
 Nuchelmans 66n.; 99n.

 Obbarius 2
 Obertello 64-65nn.; 67n.; 140n.
 Oesterle 18n.
 Olympiodorus 6n.-7; 28
 Ordo, and works of the Organon 14n.-15
 Origen 147n.

- ὁρμή, Stoic 137
 Ovid 57n.
 Owen 30–31&n.; 34n.
 Owens 15n.; 19; 29; 46; 121n.; 134n.

 Pacius 21; 29–30; 31n.
 Page 40n.
 πέλασις 145
 Pépin 32&n.; 44n.–46; 57n.; 105n.
 Pfeiffer 9
 Pfligersdorffer 65n.
 Philoponus 5–6n.; 108
 Philosophia 142–49
 Plotinus 83; 125–26
 Plutarch of Athens 6n.; 126&n.
 Plutarch of Chaeroneia 6n.; 59n.
 Poimandres 144n.
 Porismata 145
 Porphyry 3–5; 11–12; 14; 16; 54–55;
 66; 74; 76; 88–91; 93; 95–96; 101–02;
 147n.; 149
 Pozzi 95n.
 Prayer 145–49
 Predicables 122
 Prime Mover 125
 Priscian, grammarian 64n.
 Priscianus Lydus 22n.
 Probus 8; 14n.; 16n.; 26n.; 70n.; 99n.
 Proclus 4–5; 54; 67; 86; 88; 95n.
 Procopius of Gaza 3
 πρόθεσις 14
 πρώτων, πρώτον, πρώτως 14–34
 Providence 145–47
 (Neo-) Pythagorean 38n.; 86n.

 Ralfs 96n.
 Ratio 127–28; 133–34; 142–44
 Rationes seminales 87n.
 Reference 19; 62; 117 & pass.
 Reid 100n.
 Relation, category of 35; 40n.; 83–91
 pass.
 Reminiscence 133
 Righi 61n.
 Rodier 22; 109n.
 Rose 96&n.
 Ross 15n.; 96; 108–09&n.; 121n.; 133–
 34nn.
 Rota 52n.; 79&n.
 Runia 87n.

 Saint-Hilaire 30; 35n.
 Sceptics 71n.
 Scheible 129n.
 Schmidt-Kohl 131–33nn.
 Scholia 3&n.; 42n.; 66; 101

 Seneca 5; 101
 Sense 19; 62; 117 & pass.
 Sense-perception 95; 98–100; 142–43
 Sextus Empiricus 58n.; 101
 Shakespeare 39n.
 Shiel 3&n.–4; 54n.; 58n.; 61n.; 64nn.;
 65–66; 89nn.; 101; 119n.
 Shipp 39n.
 Sign 19–63 pass. (esp. 38–41; 52; 54–
 56); 117
 Signum 71n.
 Similitude (likeness) 9–10; 12–14; 21;
 104–05
 Simplicius 1; 5; 108
 Smith 132n.
 Solmsen 14n.
 Spiazzi 18n.
 Steinthal 21; 38n.; 45n.; 92n.; 117n.
 Stephanus 5–6n.; 8&n.; 27; 51n.; 69;
 108; 125n.–26
 Stoic(s) 5; 15; 58; 61; 63; 66; 71n.; 75n.;
 78n.; 81; 87n.; 99–102&nn.; 116; 118;
 123n.; 128; 137; 149
 Striker 71n.; 74n.
 συγκατάθεσις, Stoic 137
 Syllogism 57–61
 Symbol 19–63 pass. (esp. 38–41; 54–
 56); 117; 136
 Syriac translation, of Aristotle,
 PeriH. 25&n.
 Syrianus 4–5; 16; 54

 τάξις 14; 69–70
 Tarán 5n.; 16n.; 54n.; 58n.; 67n.; 99n.;
 121n.
 Themistius 4n.; 22; 65; 108
 Theodoric 2
 Theodorus 64n.
 Theology 15&n.
 Theophrastus 66n.
 Thomas Aquinas, St 18&n.; 46
 Thought(s) 31n.; 32–34; 36n.; 69;
 73–74; 96; 98; 100; 107–15 & pass.
 Torstrik 108–09&nn.
 Trendelenburg 22n.; 105n.; 108–09nn.
 Tricot 23; 35; 38n.
 Truth 112–13
 τύπωσις, Stoic 137

 Universals 87n.; 129
 Univocity 76
 Usener 64n.
 Vancourt 6n.
 Van de Vyver 62n.
 Van Straaten 91n.
 Vehiculum (ὄχημα) 132n.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Verbeke 6n. | West 40n. |
| Vergil 57n. | Westerink 6n.; 67n. |
| Vettius Agorius Praetextatus 65 | Wittgenstein 39n. |
| Via inveniendi/iudicandi 101n. | Wm. of Moerbeke 8; 18&n.; 28; 51n. |
| Waitz 10&n. – 11; 20–21&n.; 23&n.; | Zeno, Stoic 101 |
| 25–26; 31n.; 38n.; 45n.; 72n.; 92n. | |